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Introduction
This book examines various questions concerning the forced labor of Jews in the General Government. Since labor in general provides means 
of subsistence, it is important to the economy and existence of any society. 
However, in this case we are dealing not only with labor but “forced labor” in 
the times of war and the Holocaust. This was one of the greatest catastrophes 
of the Jewish people and with no doubt one of the blackest times of the his-
tory of the humanity. Therefore, the concepts of subsistence and labor in this 
period take new and important meaning, especially if terms like “labor,” “pro-
ductivity,” and “utility” are the ones which could have played a role in saving 
the lives of able-bodied Jews from imminent destruction. The key term here 
is “forced labor” (Zwangsarbeit) because, apart from some variants, it was the 
word employed for the labor of Jews during most of the period of the General 
Government’s existence and, in general, this term was one of the most widely 
used during World War II. But the question is not only semantics; rather, our 
goal is to examine the the real meaning hidden behind this term. This idea was 
first conceived in the official documents of the General Government in the 
autumn of 1939 but, quite quickly, other words were adopted to supplement 
or clarify the meaning. Perhaps, a term that better reflects the meaning of such 
labor is the word “slave labor” (Sklavenarbeit), although the Nazi official estab-
lishment tried to avoid its use. 
The period of utilization of forced labor in the General Government can 
be divided into two key phases that will be examined:
-  a period when Jews worked as a means to obtain a bare subsistence
-  a period when Jews worked as a means to save themselves from imme-
diate destruction
The first period begins with the outbreak of the war and ends with the 
beginning of the Aktion Reinhardt. It important to stress that during this 
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period most of the Jews in occupied Poland and, in particular, in the terri-
tory of the General Government were still alive. Moreover, during that period 
more and more Jews were deported from the territory of Warthegau and other 
formerly Polish territories annexed to the Reich as well as from the Reich itself 
(from Vienna, Stettin, and other places). Therefore, the problem of finding 
work that could provide means of subsistence concerned millions of Jews. 
Contemporary research still does not dedicate enough space and attention to 
this question.
Additionally, our research aims to understand the role that forced labor 
played in the economic policies of the German authorities in the General 
Government. War economy has its rules, its limitations, and its regulations, 
making it different from a free market capitalist economy. To complicate 
matters, in the ghettos of the General Government there existed a particular 
economic system, which could be described as “forced economy.” It was very 
different from the general economic system outside the ghettos, which also had 
its limitations and regulations. However, this “forced” economic system was 
also limited by general legal restrictions, such as rationing of means of energy, 
restrictions concerning the functioning of the market, and so on. The people 
inside the ghettos were struggling with additional legal restrictions, which lim-
ited their movement, transfer of money, and so forth. This system forced the 
Jews to work under the conditions of hunger and lack of raw materials. In some 
cases, the workers were not able even to feed themselves and their families. 
They were underpaid and exploited. This economic system requires further 
research, however.1
The second period, starting with the Aktion Reinardt, begins a com-
pletely new phase in the life of the Jews in the General Government as well 
in other areas of Nazi-occupied Central and Eastern Europe. This period 
is marked by the partial liquidation of the ghettos, acompanied by brutal 
Aktionen, and by the beginning of mass deportation to the death camps, so 
that most of the Jews at this time faced danger of imminent annihilation. 
The only ones who could hope for a prolongation of their existence were 
able-bodied men and women who could work for the Germans. The Jews 
faced a choice: to work or to perish. Not all Jews were able to work; thus, this 
question was irrelevant to most of them. However, in many cases, even those 
 1 Witold Mędykowski, “Der jüdische Kampf um Lebensunterhalt in den Ghettos des 
Generalgouvernements,” in Lebenswelt Ghetto: Alltag und Soziales Umfeld während der nazion-
alsozialistischen Verfolgung, ed. Imke Hanse Katrin Steffen, and Joachim Tauber (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz Vlg., 2013), 230.
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not particularly abled, old, or underaged made all the possible effort in order 
to work. We will, however, examine closely whether the work really meant 
survival or not. This question is quite important, since not all working Jews 
survived. Was the Nazi policy in this regard consistent during the examined 
period, and who were the people or organizations making those decisions? 
The aim of this research is also to identify these actors, the conflicting objec-
tives of their activities, the competition among them, and even their oppos-
ing interests. The use of a monolithic understanding of the SS turns out to 
be incorrect in the case of the General Government. Moreover, even from a 
broader perspective, the SS, as well as its different agencies, seems to be less 
monolithic. 
Forced labor in general and forced labor of Jews in particular were also 
important in the context of migrations inside the Third Reich as well as in 
 territories occupied by Nazi Germany in Europe. Frequently mentioned are 
foreign laborers, including concentration camp prisoners and forced laborers, 
among them the Jews. For example, in 1944, 7.1 million foreign workers were 
employed in Nazi Germany.2 According to Wolfgang Benz, “A total of about 
15 million Soviet citizens had been recruited into the one or other forms to 
perform work for the German side.”3 We do not have the exact numbers for 
all the occupied territories but, surely, we may speak about tens of millions 
of forced laborers performing daily work for the Nazi regime. In this case, the 
General Government may serve as a case study. It is a very complex case, but 
especially important because the General Government suffered Nazi occu-
pation during an especially long period, which allowed the Nazis to develop 
special policies concerning the territory’s multiethnic population, which 
included ethnic Germans. The Nazi authorities introduced new migration 
policies, settlement of ethnic Germans, a Jewish policy that involved con-
struction of more death camps than anywhere in Europe and annihilation 
measures such as Aktion Reinhardt. Their legislation also aimed at devel-
oping the region’s armament industry. Close examination of the develop-
ments in the General Government may answer many questions concerning 
the Nazi policy in general and SS policy in particular. Although the General 
Government was conceived as an independent administrative unit, it was, 
however, a playground of multiple actors within the German administration 
 2 Wolfgang Benz, “Zwangsarbeit im nationalsozialistischen Staat: Dimensionen—
Strukturen—Perspektiven,” in Dachauer Hefte 16 (2000): 4.
3 Ibid., 6.
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on different levels, in the Reich proper, the SS, the Wehrmacht, among the 
German entrepreneurs, as well as, to lesser extent, the Polish entrepreneurs 
and the Jewish institutions and individuals. 
From autumn 1942 forward, forced labor was increasingly used in the 
German armament industry. Because of the importance of this industry for 
the Third Reich’s war effort, working there took on a new meaning. These 
protected workplaces could save lives. However, the controversy between 
the Wehrmacht and the SS in this matter was not a new problem. It existed 
in the Reich since the beginning of the war and reemerged periodically. 
It seems that this controversy remained unsolved until the very end of the 
Third Reich. 
During the last twenty-five years, the question of forced labor during 
the Nazi period has become a subject not only of intensive research but also 
a battlefield of various theories and theses. Many researchers have advanced 
arguments for this or that position, trying to explain the meaning of forced 
labor policies that led to the annihilation of millions of people, among them 
most of the European Jewish population. Thus, labor, forced labor, and the war 
economy are directly linked to the key questions surrounding the very nature 
of the Nazi State. We hope that this research may contribute to this larger 
 historical debate.
BEGINNING OF THE WAR
The use of forced labor in the 1930s serves as a basis for the analysis of the devel-
opment of forced labor in Polish territory during the period of hostilities and 
military administration. The creation of the General Government in October 
1939 initiated a period of exploitation of forced labor of the Jews. Hans Frank,4 
and subsequently the higher SS and police leader in the General Government, 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger,5 created a legal basis for exploitation of the Jews. 
 4 Hans Frank (1900–1946), founder of the Academy of German Law, Member of the 
Reichstag and Minister without portfolio. In September 1939 he was nominated by General 
Gerd von Runstedt as the chief of the civil administration (Chef der Zivilverwaltung) by the 
Army Group South. Since October 26, 1939, Frank served as the general governor for the 
occupied Polish territories (Generalgouverneur für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete). Arrested 
by American troops on May 3, 1945, he was tried before the International Military Tribunal 
in Nuremberg. He was sentenced to death on October 1, 1946, and executed on October 16, 
1946.
 5 Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger (1894–1945) became on October 4, 1939 HSSPF “Ost,” 
then HSSPF in the General Government. Since May 1942 he was also Secretary of State 
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During that period, the civil administration started working together with 
the SS, the organization formally responsible for Jewish affairs. This was the 
period of relative stability, when the Jewish population ruled by the General 
Government was untouched, apart from the victims of the war who fell in 1939. 
For this population, the main problem was the need to adapt to the new reality 
and reorganize its economic activity. 
The beginning of the war against the Soviet Union was an important 
and decisive event during the period of German occupation. Previously, 
the Nazis had held military control during a relatively stable period when, 
despite economic difficulties, the majority of the Jewish community was 
preserved. Operation Barbarossa marked the launch of the massacres of 
Jews on an immense scale, with the first mass executions of Jews by the 
Einsatzgruppen.6 Later, the onset of Aktion Reinhardt started mass extermi-
nation in the death camps.
Although the mass murder by the Einsatzgruppen took place within 
other eastern territories, only in the newly created Galicia District—the fifth 
district of the General Government—did they precede the beginning of Aktion 
Reinhardt by several months. In the course of Aktion Reinhardt, mass deporta-
tions to death camps followed. These deportations were often accompanied by 
violent actions; mass executions were also undertaken in many small towns.
for Security Affairs in the General Government (Staatssekretär für das Sicherheitswesen 
im Generalgouvernement). From November 1943 to April 1944, he headed the 7th 
SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division “Prinz Eugen” in occupied Jugoslavia, then the 6th Gebirgs-
Division “Nord” and the 5th SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgskorps. Since February, he was Himmler’s 
Plenipotentiary of Southeastern Front, then in April and May, he became the commander 
of police unit Kampfgruppe der Ordnungspolizei bei der Heeresgruppe Süd, and since May 1—
the commander of Heeresgruppe Ostmark. He committed suicide in an American prison in 
Gundertshausen on May 10, 1945.
 6 Helmut Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskriege 1938–
1942 (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1985); Dieter Pohl and Andrej 
Angrick, Einsatzgruppen C and D in the Invasion of the Soviet Union (London: Holocaust 
Educational Trust, 2000); Patrick Dempsey, Einsatzgruppen and the Destruction of European 
Jewry (Eastbourne: P.A. Draigh Publishing, 2003); Yitzhak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and 
Shmuel Spector, eds., The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selections from the Dispatches of the Nazi 
Death Squads’ Campaign against the Jews, July 1941–January 1943 (New York: Holocaust 
Library, 1989); P. Klein, ed., Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/1942: 
Die Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Berlin: Edition 
Hentrich, 1997); Richard Rhodes, Extermination: La machine nazie: Einsatzgruppen, a l’Est, 
1941–1943 (Paris: Autrement, 2004); French L. MacLean, The Field Men: The Officers Who 
Led the Einsatzkommandos—the Nazi Mobile Kiling Units (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military 
History, 1999).
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The transition from a period of relative stability to a period of mass 
destruction put into question the meaning of work in general, including 
labor and forced labor. During this period, labor had received an additional 
dimension. It ceased to be merely a means to acquire the basic means for 
 subsistence. Now it became a way to survive. Those who worked had their exis-
tence justified; those did not work became useless and, as such, were led to 
their deaths.
After the first period of deportation to extermination camps, smaller 
ghettos (Restghetto) were created in many places. These were forced labor 
camps of sorts. In addition, new labor camps were established. In the second 
period of deportation, from the spring of 1943 onward, it was not the 
ability to work that determined survival. In addition, it was necessary to 
actively convince the Germans that work done by the Jews was necessary 
in order to increase manufacturing production and to release Germans 
capable of fighting from production plants. This convincing took place in 
various ways: through personal initiative of establishment and efforts of pro-
duction, working in order to fulfill German needs, offering bribes to author-
ities, and so forth.
Other groups besides the Jews were interested in prolonging the busi-
ness activity of Jewish enterprises, labor camps, and small ghettos. German 
actors also had a keen interest in maintaining the existence of Jewish firms 
and Jewish labor. This research also aims to identify these actors, as well as 
conflicting objectives of their activities, competition, and opposing inter-
ests. I argue that only one organization, the SS, was interested in the total 
destruction of the Jews. All other German organizations were opposed to 
this decision or were neutral. However, there remains an important question 
to ask: how did it happen that the organization carrying out such an absurd 
program—not only from a moral and human point of view, but also from an 
economic, strategic, and logistic viewpoint—almost fully realize that annihi-
lation plan? 
Those who were saved from the destruction were forced to work in the 
framework of labor camps and concentration camps in appalling living and 
work conditions, which ultimately caused their death. The prisoners in the 
camps were also worked to death. Such conditions created by the adminis-
tration of labor and concentration camps were intentional, part of the policy 
called “extermination through labor” (Vernichtung durch Arbeit).
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DEFINITIONS
The starting point of a discussion on forced labor is to give a definition. One 
of the basic definitions describing forced labor is given in Article 2 of the 
Convention of the 16 International Labor Organization, signed in Geneva in 
1930, and reads as follows:
1.  For the purposes of this Convention the term forced or compulsory labor shall
mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of 
any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.7
The English term “forced labor” has its equivalent in German—Zwangsarbeit. 
However, in terms of Nazi legislation, Arbeitspflicht were also used. The last 
term may be translated into English as “duty of labor” or “obligation of labor.” In 
the correspondence of German offices in the General Government, we find yet 
another term: Judenarbeitspflicht, synonymous to Zwangsarbeit.8 A rarer term 
in the context of forced labor for Jews is Pflichtarbeit, translated as “labor under 
obligation.”9 There is yet another term, which was seldom used in the Nazi 
time: Sklavenarbeit, translated to English as “slave labor.”10
In order to discuss the question of slave labor, we should provide a definition 
of slavery. According to the Slavery Convention in 1926, slavery is the following: 
“The status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership are exercised.”11 It is important to mention that Germany 
was one of signatories of this convention. The definition of a slave according to the 
New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language is as follows: “a person 
who is the property of, and completely subject to another person, a person victim-
ized by another. . . .”12 This definition will also be useful as we examine the questions 
of forced labor, duty of labor, and slave labor of Jews during the Holocaust. 
 7 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor signed in Geneva during the 
Fourteenth Session of the General Conference of the International Labor Organisation on 
June 10, 1930.
8 Documents of Governor of Lublin District (GDL). YVA-JM.12307, 59.
 9 YVA-JM.12331, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Jasło, Jasło, den 2 Juni 1940, Lagebericht 
über die Zeit von Mitte Mai 1940 bis Ende Mai 1940, scan 75.
10 Albert Speer, Der Sklavenstaat: Meine Auseinandersetzungen mit der SS (Stuttgart: 
DVA, 1981).
11 Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Lts, 1953), vol. 20, 786.
12 The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Lexicon 
Publications Inc., 1989), 933.
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The use of prisoners of war was in flagrant disregard of the rules of inter-
national law, particularly Article 6 of the Regulations annexed to The Hague 
Convention Number 4 of 1907, which states that the tasks of prisoners of war 
shall have no connection with the operations of war.13
The Geneva Convention of 1929 was adopted in times of peace, and while 
it provides for situations of war, this document does not discuss forced labor of 
ethnic groups at risk of total extermination. Hence, further discussion will be 
needed to define more clearly what forced labor was understood to be during 
the Holocaust. Can paid work be considered forced labor? Or working in ghet-
tos in exchange for food? According to Jens-Christian Wagner, “the undiffer-
entiated use of the term ‘forced labor’ leads to an equation of the living and 
working conditions of such widely differing groups as, for example, Dutch civil-
ian workers, Soviet prisoners of war and Jewish concentration camps inmates. 
What is more, the definition of ‘force’ is also subjective and, finally the degree 
of force used in any given case could also vary. For example, many prisoners of 
war were assigned the status of civilian worker at some point during the war, 
but were still forced to work in Germany.”14 Wagner tries to draw a general 
definition of forced labor: “. . .the term ‘forced labor’ will be used to denote all 
cases in which the laborer was forced to work against his/her will with coercive 
measures of non-material nature.”15 Other researchers confirm the use of the 
term “forced labor” in differing contexts and different meanings, which requires 
further research.16
However, the above definition does not, and cannot, exhaustively explain 
the issue of forced labor, as it does not take into account other factors beyond the 
physical compelling to perform work and the lack of payment. Consideration 
should also be given to the matter of terminology as well as the issue of the 
circumstances in which the work was done. With the onset of Aktion Reinhardt, 
when most Jews were deported to death camps, new types of forced labor 
camps came into being. They were more similar to concentration camps and 
appeared where forced labor turned into slave labor.
13 International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and Judgment 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), vol. 1, 911. Hereafter as IMT, 
Red Series.
14 Jens-Christian Wagner, “Forced Labor in the National Sozialist Era—an Overview,” in Forced 
Labor: The Germans, the Forced Laborers and the War, ed. Volkhard Knigge et al. (Weimar: 
Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora, 2010), 180.
15 Ibid.
16 Stephan Lehenstaedt, “Die deutsche Arbeitsverwaltung im Generalgouvernement und die 
Juden,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3 (2012): 416.
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In the discussion of forced labor, many terms are used that require clarifi-
cation and verification. Such terms as described above are “forced labor,” “slave 
labor,” “labor camp,” “economics of the ghetto,” and others. Such terminology 
will appear throughout this work, but the meaning of certain terms changes in 
practice, which can lead to confusion or misunderstanding of the contents of 
the documents. It is necessary to check the significance of individual terms and 
determine whether it remains the same or changes over time.
The following analysis of the idea of “forced labor” is based on tracing its 
development. We have to check whether it underwent evolution and, if yes, 
then in which direction: whether this evolution was due to the development 
of this concept or to practical considerations that affected this idea. We do not 
approach the forced labor of Jews as a subset of forced labor in general, meaning 
that Jews should work just as other population groups should work. The very 
fact that the one regulation was established for Jews and another for the Poles 
testifies that there was no equality and that for the Jews there was a different 
kind of work and a different ideological basis for its establishment. However, 
legislation gives only a partial answer to the question of why there were differ-
ences in the types of forced labor. It is also about the fact that besides coercion 
to work, the implementation of this notion was changing. The very idea of what 
“forced labor” should be was also evolving. According to Wagner: 
… in the twelve years of Nazi rule, the economic, political and social 
framework conditions of forced labor gradually changed: it was constantly 
adapted to the changing requirements of the Nazi power machinery, and 
took on increasing economic importance over the course of the war.17
The framework of forced labor of Jews in October 1939 in the General 
Government was very different from the scheme of forced labor in October 1943. 
This also concerned the forced labor of Poles and other nationalities. It is there-
fore important to examine the mutual correlation of ideas and praxis. Reference 
groups that can be used are concentration camp prisoners, POWs (including 
Soviet POWs), Polish workers and Polish forced laborers, Ostarbeiter, youth 
brigade of Baudienst, workers of the Organisation Todt (OT), and DAF workers.
For analytic purposes, we may make a comparison with other areas of 
Central and Eastern Europe under German occupation: part of Warthegau, 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine, and Reichskommisariat Ostland. A partial anal-
ogy can be made between the working conditions of forced laborers and the 
17 Wagner, “Forced Labor,” 181.
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 working conditions in the camps in the Reich. Assessment of other areas, which 
spent less time under the German occupation or where the branches of the 
Nazi state apparatus were not so well developed, does not seem appropriate.
In the discussion of forced labor, it is also important to raise issues of 
economic models applied in occupied territories. In these areas, a war economy 
was introduced, which was an extension of the model that prevailed in Germany 
before the war. It was a planned economy where, despite the existence of private 
property, the state regulated the production profile, allotted raw materials, and 
often was the recipient of the finished products. The state also controlled the level 
of profit. In order to function well in such a system, companies struggled for large 
military orders, receiving allocations of raw materials and forced laborers. Forced 
labor meant cheap labor, which was important for the computation of profits. If all 
other factors were regulated by the state, reducing labor costs could significantly 
affect the amount of profit, and a sudden increase in labor cost could incur great 
losses. Additionally, in large ghettos, a certain isolated economic system existed. 
It had its circumstances and its characteristics, even though it was associated with 
the external environment. It was a forced system created by existing legislation 
that isolated and persecuted the Jews. The ghetto was not based on an autarchic 
system, because there was no sufficient economic basis and no natural resources; 
therefore, it was dependent on an exchange with the external environment.
This research demonstrates the modus operandi of the Nazi system of 
power, which suffered from massive bureaucracy, conflicts of interest between 
different institutions, and a total destruction of human and moral values—all 
of which led to extensive degeneration.
This research intends to show the fate of Jews in the Nazi system as com-
pared to other population groups, especially the Poles. The Jews showed great 
activity and initiative, at least during the first stretch of the war. Later on, the 
Jews became more passive because they had no possibility of influencing deci-
sive factors. Their actions lacked any characteristic of collective activity, but 
rather presented individual or small group initiatives. Uprisings and revolts of 
the Jews in the General Government did not contribute to the improvement of 
their situation; on the contrary, they accelerated the extermination. However, 
the Jews saw undisputed successes in their struggles and, despite their final 
 subjugation, achieved a great moral victory.
Adopting a macro perspective on the problems of forced labor and eco-
nomic policy in the General Government, this research gives few examples of 
individual actions and approaches. Yet, despite this limitation, the human ele-
ment is revealed. The victims of the forced labor system had to function under 
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great pressure; in many cases they depended only on luck. Nonetheless, they 
also had some possibilities to manipulate their situation, despite the apparently 
restricted possibility of any action or initiative.
Although it is not a treatise on morality, undoubtedly this work will illus-
trate an inhumane and cruel battle against a people who, due to their origin, 
religion, or ethnicity, had been deprived of the right to live. Even so, they tried 
to survive and believed it was possible. Their struggle against evil and a belief in 
human values helped some of the persecuted to survive. This work can serve as 
a case study of the exploitation of social, ethnic, and religious groups defense-
less against modern state mechanisms. Our research shows to what extent such 
exploitation can, in the absence of a democratic apparatus, affect a balance of 
power in a country.
THE TYPES OF FORCED LABOR: CATEGORIZATION
Our in-depth discussion is accompanied by an appendix that contains statis-
tical tables supplying quantitative backup data for our assertions. Two maps 
are also provided to help the reader visualize the scope and boundaries of the 
General Government. We can define different forms of forced labor by classify-
ing cases by the place of execution, ethnic composition of forced laborers, type 
of work, organizing agent, economic sector, the form of the regime, the form of 
coercion and so forth. Later in the discussion, many of these terms and forms 
will be used on a regular basis.
Forced labor, in terms of organizational forms, can be divided into the 
following types: work in places of residence, ghettos, labor camps and other 
types of camps, outposts or labor detachments (in German, Dienststellen, or, in 
Polish, placówki).
Evolution of forced labor due to the progressive restrictions of freedom 
can be divided into the following categories: obligation to work (Arbeitspflicht), 
forced labor (Zwangsarbeit), and slave labor (Sklavenarbeit).
 Categorization of the camps can be made according to the following 
criteria:
-  Period of their existence: temporary (provisory), permanent, working 
commandos.
-  Ethnic composition: Jewish (Julag or Judenlager), non-Jewish, mixed.
-  Parent/organizing agent: SS, Army (Wehrmacht, Heeres, Luftwaffe),
civil administration, private firms.
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-  Typical names, which include: Arbeitslager (labor camp),
Zwangsarbeitslager (ZAL, forced labor camp), Julag ( Jewish camp),
Straflager (penal camps), and Kriegsgefangenenlager (POW camp).
-  Forms of work, depending on the industry: infrastructure (roads, railways, 
bridges, water management), industry (military, civil, heavy industry, light 
industry), mining, agriculture (field work, support for existing property).
In classifying by paid wages, cases of forced labor can be divided into work 
for no compensation, work in exchange for full pay, and work in exchange for 
accommodations.
Another ground for division is the nature of employment: hired workers 
(pracownicy wolnonajemni), workers performing forced labor (substitutions for 
those originally called up to perform forced labor), penal workers (prisoners, 
convicts, prisoners of concentration camps), and prisoners of war (POWs).
FORCED LABOR IN OCCUPIED POLAND
Jews were first forced to work at the beginning of the occupation, so that a con-
cept of forced labor was required early in the course of war. When during war 
it is necessary to perform some urgent work, civilians are often conscripted for 
this purpose. We have to mention the German anti-Semitic propaganda cam-
paigns in September 1939, and the direct contact between German soldiers 
with Orthodox and traditional Jews, with whom they were not intimate in 
Germany. This contact plus the propaganda made possible the German sol-
diers’ practical application of the German experience directly on the object of 
the propaganda. In wartime, there were additional elements in play as well—
force and vulnerability. 
When the creation of the General Government was proclaimed on 
October 26, 1939, two important pieces of legislation were published that 
announced the introduction of forced labor for Jews (Zwangsarbeit) and the 
obligation to work for the Poles (Arbeitspflicht). This last term poses some 
difficulties, because in Germany there was also an obligation to work for the 
Germans. Nevertheless, it is difficult to compare the situation of Germans in 
Germany and that of people in annexed or occupied territories, such as the 
 situation of Poles in the General Government. Particularly difficult was the sit-
uation of Poles in the areas annexed to the Reich, where they were deported 
en masse and persecuted. In the General Government, in the initial period of 
occupation, the Poles were the majority population; therefore, their persecution 
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was more political than economic. However, after a while, when there was an 
increased demand for labor in Germany, the initial obligation to work often 
evolved into forced labor. Polish workers, especially in Germany, were subject 
to many restrictions. In particular, this concerned the rural population which, 
in the early years of the occupation, was not obliged to work (although later 
the situation was exacerbated). A special form of forced labor was labor bat-
talions, bearing the name of the Polish Service of Construction in the General 
Government (Polnischer Baudienst im Generalgouvernement), which mobi-
lized young men of military age.18 Similar organizations were created for the 
Mountaineers (Goralische Heimatsdienst), whom the German authorities 
wanted to isolate from the rest of the Poles; furthermore, they were considered 
a separate ethnic group. The Ukrainians in the General Government worked 
in the Ukrainian Homeland Service (Ukrainischer Heimatdienst or Ukrains’ka 
Sluzhba Bat’kivschyni). These organizations were modeled after the German 
labor battalions of the Reich Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst, RAD).
A separate form of forced labor was the work of prisoners of concen-
tration camps (KZ Häftlinge) and detainees in prisons, who during the war 
were also transferred to concentration camps or penal labor camps adminis-
tered by the SS and police leaders in the districts. Throughout the war, con-
victs were sent to concentration camps for the time required to serve their 
sentence. These prisoners could be released after completing their 
 punishments. Later, releases from the concentration camps were annulled and 
prisoners’ sentences were not limited in time, becoming life imprisonment. 
Penal labor camps organized by the SS commanders and police leaders in the 
districts of the General Government were intended for both Poles and Jews.
REVIEW OF RESEARCH LITERATURE
The first post-war text concerning forced labor during World War II and the 
Holocaust appeared by 1946.19 The author of this text not only gave a general 
description of different of Nazi camps, but also attempted to make a classifica-
tion of labor camps. The article also contains one of the first lists of labor camps 
in post-war Poland. It is quite characteristic that most post-war publications in 
Poland did not use wartime administrative division, but rather the new regional 
18 Mścisław Wróblewski, Służba Budowlana (Baudienst) w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie 
1940–1945 (Warsaw: PWN, 1984).
19 Zofia Czyńska and Bogumił Kupść, “Obozy zagłady, obozy koncentracyjne i obozy pracy na 
ziemiech polskich w latach 1939–1945,” BGKBZNwP I (1946): 11–62.
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division in districts (województwa). It was without doubt influenced by a 
regional network of the branches of the main Commission for Investigation 
of Nazi Crimes in Poland (Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w 
Polsce, GKBZHP). The bulletin of the Main Commission (Biuletyn GKBZHP) 
published some other articles concerning forced labor and labor camps.20 
In the post-war period, there were books published concerning economic 
aspects of the German occupation in Poland. Among the researchers writ-
ing on those subjects were authors linked to the Western Institute in Poznań 
and Main Commission: Wacław Jastrzębowski,21 Tadeusz Kłosiński,22 and 
Czesław Łuczak.23 During the following years more books appeared about the 
Holocaust period, but already written in the spirit of Stalinism.24 Their authors 
emphasized the importance of the communist organizations and interpreted 
history according to Marxist ideology. In the beginning of the 1950s, Tatiana 
Berenstein begun to publish numerous articles, many of which explored 
economic exploitation of Jews and forced labor.25 At the end of the 1950s, 
she began to write about labor camps for Jews in the district of Lublin26 
and continued during the 1960s with an article about Jewish forced labor in 
Warsaw,27 followed by work on extermination and forced labor of Jews in the 
district of Galicia.28 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Jewish Institute in Warsaw 
(ŻIH), which continued the work of the Central Jewish Historical Commission 
from 1944–1947, became practically the only institution researching the 
20 Zdzisław Łukaszewicz, “Obóz pracy w Treblince,” BGKBZNwP III (1947): 107–22.
21 Wacław Jastrzębowski, Gospodarka niemiecka w Polsce 1939–1944 (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1946).
22 Tadeusz Kłosinski, Polityka przemyslowa okupanta w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie (Poznań: 
Instytut Zachodni, 1947).
23 Czesław Łuczak, Przyczynki do gospodarki niemieckiej w latach 1939–1945 (Poznań: Instytut 
Zachodni, 1949). 
24 Artur Eisenbach, Hitlerowska polityka eksterminacji Żydów jako jeden z przejawów imperial-
izmu niemieckiego (Warsaw: ŻIH, 1953).
25 Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein, “Hitlerowskie dyskryminacje gospodarcze wobec Żydów 
w Warszawie przed utworzeniem getta,” BŻIH 2/4 (1952): 156–90; Tatiana Brustin-
Berenstein, “O hitlerowskich metodach eksploatacji gospodarczej getta warszawskiego,” 
BŻIH 4/8 (1953): 3–52; Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein, “O niektórych zagadnieniach gos-
podarczych w tzw. Generalnej Guberni w świetle ‘Dziennika Franka,”’ BŻIH 9–10 (1954): 
236–87. 
26 Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein, “Obozy pracy przymusowej dla Żydów w dystrykcie lubelskim,” 
BŻIH 24 (1957): 3–20. 
27 Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa Żydów w Warszawie w czasie okupacji 
hitlerowskiej,” BŻIH 45–46 (1963): 42–93.
28 Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein, “Eksterminacja ludności żydowskiej w dystrykcie Galicja 
(1941–1943),” BŻIH 61 (1967): 3–58; Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa 
ludności żydowskiej w tzw. Dystrykcie Galicja (1941–1944),” BŻIH 69 (1969): 3–45.
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Holocaust and Judaism in Poland. Apart from the books published by the 
Institute, the Biuletyn ŻIH (BŻIH) became the main scientific journal where 
this research was published. Besides Berenstein, BŻIH published articles writ-
ten by Brenner,29 Datner,30 and Rutkowski.31 In mid-1965, the journal Zeszyty 
Majdanka was launched by the State Museum in Majdanek, which quickly 
became one of the most important scientific journals concerning the period 
of World War II and the Holocaust. This journal featured articles about eco-
nomic exploitation,32 forced labor,33 POWs,34 and the German administration 
in occupied Poland.35 In the 1960s and beyond, BGKBZHP (Biuletyn Głównej 
Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, or, in English, Bulletin of the 
Main Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland) continued to 
publish articles on economic aspects of the German occupation and forced 
labor, but mainly  concerning Poles or the general population.36
In the 1960s and 1970s, important books were published about economic 
aspects of the German occupation. One of the leading scholars of that period 
was Czesław Madajczyk, who published, among others, monumental works 
such as Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce37 and Faszyzm i okupacje.38 
29 L. Brener, “O pracy przymusowej ludności żydowskiej w Częstochowie w okresie okupacji 
hitlerowskiej,” BŻIH 22 (1952): 45–60.
30 Szymon Datner, “Sonderkommando 1005 i jego działalność ze szczególnym uwzględnie-
niem okręgu białostockiego,” BŻIH 100 (1976): 63–78.
31 A. Rutkowski, “Hitlerowskie obozy pracy dla Żydów w dystrykcie radomskim,” BŻIH 17–18 
(1956): 106–26. 
32 Bronisław Wróblewski, “Obóz w Budzyniu,” Zeszyty Majdanka 5 (1971): 179–189.
33 Czesław Madajczyk, “Lubelszczyzna w polityce okupanta,” Zeszyty Majdanka 2 (1967): 
5–18; Czesław Rajca, “Lubelska filia Niemieckich Zakładów Zbrojeniowych,” Zeszyty 
Majdanka 4 (1969): 237–300; Józef Kasperek, “Początki organizacji i działalności urzędów 
pracy na Lubelszczyźnie (październik 1939—styczeń 1940),” Zeszyty Majdanka 6 (1972): 
130–150; Józef Kasperek, “Zarys organizacyjny Arbeitsamtów w dystrykcie lubelskim w 
latach 1939–1944,” Zeszyty Majdanka 7 (1973): 94–117; Józef Kasperek, “Metody wer-
bunku do przymusowych robót w III Rzeszy na terenie dystryktu lubelskiego w latach 
1939–1944,” Zeszyty Majdanka 8 (1975): 52–99; Mścisław Wróblewski, Służba Budowlana. 
34 Szymon Datner, “Obozy jenieckie na Lubelszczyźnie w latach okupacji niemieckiej,” Zeszyty 
Majdanka 3 (1969): 235–37.
35 Czesław Szczepańczyk, “Centralny Urząd Rolniczy—Landwirtschaftliche Zentralstelle,” 
Zeszyty Majdanka 7 (1973): 121–58.
36 Szymon Datner, “Wywóz ludności polskiej na roboty niewolnicze do Niemiec,” BGKBZHP 
XVI (1967): 17–64; Szymon Datner, “Zbrodnie Wehrmachtu na jeńcach wojennych w 
zakresie pracy,” BGKBZHP XVII (1967): 7–100.
37 Czesław Madajczyk, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce (Warsaw: PWN, 1970).
38 Czesław Madajczyk, Faszyzm i okupacje 1938–1945: Wykonywanie okupacji przez państwa Osi w 
Europie, vol. 1, Ukształtowanie się zarządów okupacyjnych (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 
1983), and vol. 2, Mechanizmy realizowania okupacji (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1984).
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Madajczyk also wrote some important studies about Generalplan Ost39 and the 
General Government.40 Czesław Łuczak also researched economic aspects of the 
occupation.41 During the 1970s, more books were published about the monetary 
and fiscal policy of the German authorities in Poland by Franciszek Skalniak42 and 
Karol Ostrowski.43 In 1976, Alfred Konieczny published an important collection 
of documents on forced labor of Poles.44 It is important to stress that during the 
communist period in Poland, there was a tendency to speak about Poles or Polish 
citizens (including Polish Jews) and not Jews. Toward the end of 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s, important books were published about forced labor and 
the German arms industry in the district of Kielce by Kaczanowski,45 Meducki,46 
and Pietrzykowski47. Herbert Szurgacz published in 1979 his study about forced 
labor of Poles under the Nazi occupants in 1941.48 One of the most important 
publications of this period in Poland was an encyclopedia or lexicon of Nazi 
camps in the Polish territories from 1939 to 1945, published in 1979.49 This book 
gave very short descriptions of many camps, including labor camps for Poles and 
for Jews, which until then were literally unknown. During the 1980s, relatively 
few publications appeared concerning the question of forced labor and various 
39 Czesław Madajczyk, Generalplan Ost (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1962).
40 Czesław Madajczyk, Generalna Gubernia w planach hitlerowskich: Studia (Warsaw: 
Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1961).
41 Czesław Łuczak, Polityka ludnościowa i ekonomiczna hitlerowskich Niemiec w okupowanej 
Polsce (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1979).
42 Franciszek Skalniak, Polityka pieniężna i budżetowa tzw. Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 
narzedziem finansowania potrzeb III Rzeszy (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości. 
Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, 1976); Franciszek Skalniak, 
Stopa życiowa społeczeństwa polskiego w okresie okupacji na terenie Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 
(Warsaw: Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości. Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich 
w Polsce, 1979).
43 Karol Ostrowski, Hitlerowska polityka podatkowa w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie (Krakow: 
PWN, 1977). 
44 Alfred Konieczny, ed., Praca przymusowa Polakow pod panowaniem hitlerowskim, 1939–1945, 
Wybór źródeł i opracowanie (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1976).
45 Longin Kaczanowski, Hitlerowskie fabryki śmierci na Kielecczyźnie (Warszawa: Książka i 
Wiedza, 1984). 
46 Stanisław Meducki, Przemysł i klasa robotnicza w dystrykcie radomskim w okresie okupacji 
hitlerowskiej (Krakow: PWN, 1981).
47 Jan Pietrzykowski, Łowy na ludzi: Arbeitsamt w Częstochowie (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
Śląsk, 1968).
48 Herbert Szurgacz, Przymusowe zatrudnianie Polaków przez hitlerowskiego okupanta w latach 
1939–1945: Studium prawno-polityczne (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1971).
49 Czesław Pilichowski, ed., Obozy hitlerowskie na ziemiach polskich 1939–1945: Informator 
encyklopedyczny (Warszawa: PWN, 1979).
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aspects of the Nazi economy during the war. Likely, this was due to the period 
of great changes that took place in Poland in the beginning of the 1980s and the 
development of new trade and the political movement of Solidarity. Moreover, 
on December 13, 1981 a state of emergency was announced, which included 
the return of censorship and great limitations of movement and possibilities of 
travel abroad, as well as lack of open use of the archives. It should be stressed 
that until the end of the 1980s, most researchers engaged in research of the 
period of Nazism were in some way linked to the establishment—only because 
of this did they have open access to the archives. Many of those researchers were 
employees of the Main Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland 
(GKBZHP) and martyrological museums at Auschwitz, Majdanek, and Stutthof. 
Jewish researchers and researchers of Polish origin dealing with Jewish subjects 
were active mainly in the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. Among the few 
publications of the 1980s, we may quote those of Krzysztof Dunin-Wasowicz,50 
himself a survivor of Nazi camps, Ryszard Gicewicz,51 or Władysław Misiuna.52 
The 1990s saw the new research of Józef Marszałek, a scholar employed at 
the State Museum in Majdanek.53 His important work on forced labor camps 
in the General Government was published in 1998,54 after his early and unex-
pected death in 1995. A summary of his research was published in English in 
2001.55 Also in the 1990s, yet another researcher from Lublin, named Tadeusz 
Radzik, published his papers and a book about the Lublin ghetto.56 
50 Krzysztof Dunin-Wasowicz, “Forced Labor and Sabotage in the Nazi Concentration Camps,” 
The Nazi Concentration Camps (1984): 133–42.
51 Ryszard Gicewicz, “Obóz pracy w Poniatowej (1941–1943),” Zeszyty Majdanka 10 (1980): 
88–104.
52 Władysław Misiuna, “Wspomnienia o dziewczętach z obozu pracy dla Żydów w Radomiu,” 
BŻIH 1/149 (1989): 91–99.
53 Józef Marszałek, “Rozpoznanie obozów śmierci w Bełżcu, Sobiborze i Treblince przez wywiad 
Armii Krajowej i Delegatury Rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na Kraj,” BGKBZHP XXXV 
(1993): 36–52; Józef Marszałek, “The camp of Zarzecze near Nisko in the system of Jewish labor 
camps,” in Akce Nisko (1995): 139–147; Józef Marszałek, “System obozów śmierci w Generalnym 
Gubernatorstwie i jego funkcje (1942–1943),” Zeszyty Majdanka 17 (1996): 17–35.
54 Józef Marszałek, Obozy pracy w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie w latach 1939–1945 (Lublin: 
Państwowe Muzeum na Majdanku, 1998).
55 Józef Marszałek, “Labor camps in the General Government, 1939–1945,” Pro Memoria 11 
(2001): 37–42.
56 Tadeusz Radzik, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej na przykładzie obozu pracy w 
Bełżcu w 1940 r.,” in Żydzi i judaizm we współczesnych badaniach polskich: Materiały z kon-
ferencji, Kraków, 21–23 XI 1995, ed. Krzysztof Pilarczyk (Krakow: Księgarnia Akademicka 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1997), 307–19; Józef Marszałek, Lubelska dzielnica zamknięta 
(Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 1999).
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Since the beginning of the new century, many researchers of the younger 
generation begun to publish their books and articles. In 2001, Barbara Engelking 
and Jacek Leociak published their monumental work on the Warsaw Ghetto.57 
In 2003, Barbara Engelking and her colleagues established a new Center for 
Holocaust Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences. Since then, the members of the Center, as well as many 
other researchers, have published many books and articles on the Holocaust in 
Poland. For example, Marta Janczewska published her study about forced labor 
camps in the district of Warsaw.58 Edward Kopówka,59 Sebastian Piątkowski,60 
and Krzysztof Gibaszewski61 also published books and articles about different 
labor camps in the General Government. Beata Macior-Majka published a book 
on Generalplan Ost and its economic and political aspects.62 Witold Mędykowski 
published a study concerning forced labor of POWs during World War II.63 
Although Anna Ziółkowska’s research concerned not the General Government 
but Warthegau, she also explored the transfer of workers from Warthegau to the 
General Government, and thus her work is worth mentioning.64 
In 2009, two researchers from the State Museum in Majdanek, Wojciech 
Lenarczyk and Dariusz Libionka, published one of the first books contain-
ing studies and documents on the Operation Erntefest, during which about 
42,000 were executed on November 3 and 4, 1943 in Majdanek, Poniatowa, 
and Trawniki. This volume also contains some articles about labor camps 
57 Barbara Engelking and Jacek Leociak, Getto warszawskie: Przewodnik po nieistniejącym 
mieście (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2001). 
58 Marta Janczewska, “Obozy pracy przymusowej dla Żydów na terenie dystryktu warsza-
wskiego,” Prowincja noc (2007): 271–320.
59 Edward Kopówka, “Obozy pracy przymusowej w Szczeglacinie i Bartkowie Nowym k. 
Siedlec,” Kwartalnik Historii Żydów 204 (2002): 515–19.
60 Sebastian Piątkowski, “Obóz pracy w Bliżynie (1942–1944),” Zeszyty Majdanka 21 (2001): 
97–112; Sebastian Piątkowski, “Żydowscy robotnicy przymusowi w radomskiej fabryce 
obuwia ‘Bata’ (1941–1943),” Kwartalnik Historii Żydów 227 (2008): 322–33.
61 Krzysztof Gibaszewski, HASAG: Historia obozu pracy w Skarżysku Kamiennej (Skarżysko 
Kamienna: Muzeum im. Orła Białego, 2011).
62 Beata Macior-Majka, Generalny Plan Wschodni: Aspekt ideologiczny, polityczny i ekonomiczny 
(Krakow: Avalon, 2007).
63 Witold Mędykowski, “Pomiędzy euforią a klęską: Polityka zatrudnienia jeńców wojennych 
w przemyśle zbrojeniowym III Rzeszy,” Łambinowicki Rocznik Muzealny 31 (2008): 7–28.
64 Anna Ziółkowska, “Obozy pracy przymusowej dla Żydów w Poznańskiem w czasie okupacji 
Hitlerowskiej,” Żydzi i judaizm we współczesnych badaniach polskich II (2000): 313–23; Anna 
Ziółkowska, Obozy pracy przymusowej dla Żydów w Wielkopolsce (Poznań: Wydawnictwo 
Poznańskie, 2005). 
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liquidated during this action, such as Majdanek, Lipowa 7 in Lublin,65 
Poniatowa,66 Trawniki, Dorohucza,67 and Budzyń.68 
On the other hand, the literature outside Poland concerning economic 
aspects and forced labor had a different trajectory. Already, during the war, 
books appeared dealing with economic exploitation and forced labor.69 
During the first years after the war, coming to terms with Nazism was 
determined by a number of significant events—namely, the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945–1946, during which many leaders 
of Nazi Germany were put on trial. Among them were people responsible 
for the economy and forced labor, such as Hermann Göring, Albert Speer, 
Alfred Rosenberg, Fritz Sauckel, and Hans Frank. After the main trial, 
smaller trials took place during the years 1945–1949, some of them concerned 
with different aspects of economic life and exploitation of forced labor. 
Worth mentioning is the trial of Oswald Pohl and WVHA, and the trials 
of Friedrich Flick, Alfred Krupp, and IG-Farben. The trial of Oswald Pohl 
and WVHA in particular touched many economic aspects of exploitation 
of forced and slave labor of prisoners in concentration camps. As a conse-
quence of the Nuremberg trials, thousands of documents were published 
that would serve as a basis for future research.70
During the postwar period, many important books appeared about World 
War II, Nazism, and the resistance. A study of fundamental importance was 
published in 1961 by Raul Hilberg.71 This monumental work was based on 
thousands of documents captured by the Americans and stored in Alexandria. 
Yet another important event took place the same year: the Eichmann Trial in 
Jerusalem, during which many Jewish witnesses appeared. The Nuremberg 
and Jerusalem trials changed perspectives on Nazism and marked a new period 
65 Wojciech Lenarczyk, “Obóz pracy przymusowej dla Żydów przy ul. Lipowej w Lublinie 
(1939–1943),” Erntefest 3–4 listopada 1943—zapomniany epizod Zagłady, ed. Wojciech 
Lenarczyk and Dariusz Libionka (Lublin: Państowe Muzeum na Majdanku, 2009), 37–71.
66 Ryszard Gicewicz, “Obóz pracy w Poniatowej (1941–1943),” in Lenarczyk and Libionka, 
Erntefest, 211–28.
67 Witold Mędykowski, “Obóz pracy dla Żydów w Trawnikach,” in Lenarczyk and Libionka, 
Erntefest, 183–210.
68 Wojciech Lenarczyk, “Obóz pracy przymusowej w Budzyniu (1942–1944),” in Lenarczyk 
and Libionka, Erntefest, 261–86.
69 John Price, Organised Labor in the War (New York: A. Lane, 1940).
70 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 14 October 1945–1 
November 1946 (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947).
71 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Harper & Row, 1961).
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in Holocaust research. In the 1960s and 1970s, many new documents and 
studies were published. Among them are the diaries of Adam Czerniakow,72 
documents from the Lublin ghetto,73 and the monumental work of Yeshayhu 
Trunk, entitled Judenrat.74 
Among the researchers who began to study economic aspects of the Nazi 
period was Georg Enno. He published in 1963 a study of economic enterprises 
of the SS.75 He was followed by a researcher from East Germany, Eva Seeber, 
who in 1964 published a book about the labor of Polish citizens, especially 
from the General Government, employed in the German war economy.76 
A year later, Hans Buchheim and Martin Broszat published the book Anatomie 
des SS-Staates, where one chapter was dedicated to Nazi concentration camps, 
including forced labor of the prisoners.77 In 1968, Edward Homze published a 
book about foreign labor in Nazi Germany.78 The same year, Dieter Pezina pub-
lished his book about policy of autarchy in Nazi Germany, which was intended 
to protect Germany from international blockade.79 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Götz Aly and Susanne Heim published a 
number of studies concerning the reasons for extermination of Jews. Those 
discussions were a kind of continuation of Historikerstreit, which took place 
in Germany in the 1980s.80 In 1983, Götz Aly published a study entitled 
Sozialpolitik und Judenvernichtung: Gibt es eine Ökonomie der Enlösung?81 
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During the following years, Götz Aly and Susanne Heim published a number 
of other studies in German and English dealing with the questions of social 
policy, economy, forced labor, rationalization, planning, and the extermina-
tion of Jews.82 Christian Gerlach also studied the link between the problem 
of nourishment and extermination.83 In the mid-1980s, one of the leading 
researchers of forced labor in Nazi Germany, Ulrich Herbert, began to pub-
lish his works.84 During the 1990s, a number of new researchers published 
their works concerning German administration, forced labor, and the murder 
of Jews.85 
In 1993, a young German researcher named Dieter Pohl began to 
publish his works. Pohl begun his career with a study of the Lublin District.86 
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(Cambrigde: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Urlich Herbert, Nationalsozialistische 
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Generalgouvernements 1939–1944 (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1993); Dieter Pohl, “Rola 
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In the mid-1980s, yet another leading scholar of the Holocaust, Christopher 
Browning, began to publish.87 However, his important studies concerning 
the path to the final solution and question of labor were published later—in 
the 1990s and during the first decade of the twenty-first century.88 His mon-
umental study, titled The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi 
Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942, was published in 2004.89 During the 
1990s, other scholars took interest in forced labor and labor camps. Among 
them was an Israeli scholar, herself a survivor of the HASAG labor camp in 
Skarżysko Kamienna and in Leipzig, Felicja Karay. Her study, Death Comes 
in Yellow: Skarżysko-Kamienna Slave Labor Camp,90 deals not only with the 
labor camp in Skarżysko-Kamienna, but also with the functioning of the 
HASAG Company and a complex of many different labor camps in the  district 
of Radom. In her other studies she researched additional labor camps in the 
General Government and other territories.91 Since the early 1990s, Wolf 
Gruner has written a series of publications concerning forced labor in Nazi 
Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen: 
Wallstein Vlg, 2002); Dieter Pohl, “Die ‘Aktion Reinhard’ im Licht der Historiographie,” 
in: Aktion Reinhardt (2004): 15–47; Dieter Pohl, “Die Stellung des Distrikts Lublin in der 
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Germany and the occupied territories.92 More focused studies on Galicia were 
published by Thomas Sandkühler.93 At the end of the 1990s, Bogdan Musial 
published important studies concerning the German administration of the 
General Government as well as the decision-making process leading to the 
Aktion Reinhardt.94 In 1998, Hedwig Singer published her essential book about 
Organisation Todt.95 The same year also saw the publication of an important 
lexicon of Nazi concentration camps, labor camps, and labor kommandos.96 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, there has been an inten-
sive development of research concerning forced labor, mainly in Germany 
and neighboring countries. Jan Erik Schulte published his important stud-
ies, continuing his thesis of extermination through labor.97 During the 
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same period, other authors published studies supporting the same idea.98 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, many studies appeared con-
cerning the Nazi economy, and in particular, the economic enterprises of 
the SS (such as the volumes written by Allen and Fear).99 Among the other 
authors writing about the Nazi economy were Wolfgang Benz,100 Herman 
Kaienburg,101 Ingo Loose,102 and others.103 In those years, several biog-
raphies of Odilo Globocnik were also published, which naturally deal the 
with economic enterprises that he headed.104 Studies by Finder, Bender, 
Browning, and Wenzel were dedicated to labor camps in the General 
Government.105 In 2005, Wolfgang Benz and Barabra Distel published a 
multivolume book about Nazi concentration camps, which also explored 
labor camps.106 In 2008, an important collection of documents from the 
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Nazi period began to be compiled in a volume, edited by Susanne Heim, 
Ulrich Herbert, Hans-Dieter Kreikamp, Horst Müller, Dieter Pohl, and 
Hartmut Weber.107 During that period, few research works concerning 
particular districts of the General Government were written or published. 
Among those that appeared, especially significant are the dissertation of 
David Silberklang about the Lublin District,108 the work of Jacek Andrzej 
Młynarczyk about the district of Radom,109 and Sara Bender’s study about 
Kielce and its surroundings, published in Hebrew.110
After 2010, the research of forced labor intensified due, among other 
causes, to research launched by the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility 
and Future” (Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft, EVZ). A cat-
alogue of the exhibition “Forced Labor” appeared in 2010, containing some 
important overviews written by leading researchers.111 In 2013, two books were 
published by the participants of this program.112 In the same year, a volume 
edited by Dieter Pohl and Tanja Sebta was published113 containing some essen-
tial studies by the participants of the historical program of the EVZ.114 In 2013, 
107 Susanne Heim, Ulrich Herbert, Hans-Dieter Kreikam pet al., eds., Die Verfolgung und 
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a young German researcher working on various aspects of forced labor, an 
author of many articles about forced labor, Stephan Lehnstaedt,115 edited 
Arbeit in den nationalsozialistischen Ghettos with Jürgen Hensel, which contains 
various studies concerning the General Government and the question of forced 
labor in general.116 At the end of 2013, yet another volume appeared, edited 
by Imke Hansen, Katrin Steffen, and Joachim Tauber, with articles concern-
ing forced labor and economic life in the ghettos of Eastern Europe.117 Some 
recent studies explore compensations for forced labor in camps and ghettos.118
Europa, 23–36; Karsten Linne, “Struktur und Praxis der deutschen Arbeitsverwaltung im 
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Part One
CHAPTER 1
The War against Poland and 
the Beginning of German 
Economic Policy in the 
Occupied Territory
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WAR 
One Germany’s objectives during the Second World War was economic expansion in the new territories, which was generally referred to as 
Lebensraum. However, this concept represented much more than merely 
 territory. It was, first of all, “living space for the German economy,” bringing with 
it, apart from territory, a labor force, raw materials, and agricultural production. 
On May 10, 1939, the chief commander of the armed forces sent a letter to vari-
ous OKW departments that was signed by Hitler. Attached to the letter were the 
“Instructions for the conduct of war and the economic security of their own.”1 
Thus, parallel to the preparations for the military, were preparations for sustain-
ability in economic terms. A conference in the Reich’s Chancellery was held on 
May 23, 1939 to summarize preparations in economic terms. The report from 
this meeting was called the “Schmundt protocol.”2 During his speech, Hitler 
recalled again the validity of Lebensraum and said that the war was not really 
because of Gdańsk and the Corridor, but its objective was extension of living 
space in the east.3 Also in other occasion, during a meeting with Mussolini in 
 1 IMT, Red Series (C-120), vol. 1, 692.
 2 IMT, Red Series (L-79), vol. 1, 693.
 3 IMT, Red Series (C-120), vol. 1, 693.
2 Macht Arbeit Frei?
August 1939, Hitler said: “For economic reasons also, Germany needed the 
foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions.”4 
In addition to the planned use of resources from the conquered territories, the 
exploitation of vast numbers of foreign workers was planned even before Germany 
went to war and was an integral part of the plan for waging an aggressive war. On 
May 23, 1939, a meeting was held in Hitler’s study at the Reich’s Chancellery. 
Hermann Göring, Erich Raeder, and Wilhelm Keitel were present. According to 
the minutes of this meeting, Hitler stated: “. . . the possession of extensive areas in 
the east will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even 
less in time of war than in peace. The population of non- Germans will perform no 
military service and will be available as a source of labor.”5 
Hitler did not think too highly of the Polish army; however, he feared that 
the delivery of arms from Western countries might weaken German supremacy. 
He was also speaking about the ethnic composition of Poland, which according 
to him, was composed of 14.5 million people belonging to various minorities 
like Germans, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Jews, and Ukrainians. Not all Poles 
were, according to him, “fanatics.” He believed that such a large proportion 
of non-Poles significantly reduced the fighting strength of Poland. Therefore 
Poland could be “struck to the ground” in a very short time.6 In conclusion, the 
fundamental objectives of the war against Poland were winning of war and the 
occupation of the Polish “living space.” Detailed instructions on how to con-
duct the war and the management of the new living space had been issued in 
August, September, and October 1939.
Hitler’s speech at a meeting of senior commanders of the Wehrmacht, 
which took place in Hitler’s residence in Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939,7 
produced one of the most important documents relating to the conduct of 
the war in Poland. At this time, all preparations for war had been completed. 
Before making a final decision concerning the attack on Poland, Hitler rejected 
proposals of peaceful solution, blaming Poland for rejecting German demands. 
Speaking to senior commanders, Hitler said: “Destruction of Poland is in the 
foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain 
line. Even if war should break out in the west, the destruction of Poland shall be 
 4 IMT, Red Series (TC-77), vol. 1, 697.
 5 IMT, Red Series (L-79), vol. 1, 875–76.
 6 IMT, Red Series (TC-77), vol. 1, 696.
 7 The Obersalzburg Speech. On August 22, 1939, Hitler addressed his commanders-in-chief 
at Obersalzburg, in IMT, Red Series (1014-PS), vol. 1, 702.
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the primary objective.”8 Hitler pointed out that the decision to attack Poland 
had been taken already in the spring.9 Hitler explicitly said that the causes for 
the attack would be presented, regardless whether it was true or not. “When 
starting and leading a war, not justice but victory counts.”10 Hitler also spoke 
about economic aspects of the war. “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The 
east will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which 
demands great efforts.”11 Given this, it was in a signed agreement with the 
Soviet Union that he said “They [Edouard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain] 
will not go beyond a blockade. Against that we have our autarchy and the 
Russian raw materials.”12 
One of the most important passages is located at the point where Hitler 
stopped the discussions about the war was to address the behavior of German 
soldiers on the battlefield and his plans for population of conquered Poland. 
Hitler said: “Our strength lies in our quickness and brutality [. . .]. I have given 
the command and I shall shoot everyone who utters one word of criticism [. . .] 
and so for the present, only in the east have I put my death-head formations in 
place with the command relentlessly and without compassion to send into death 
many women and children of Polish origin and language. Only thus can we gain 
the living space (Lebensraum) that we need.”13 Then Hitler continued: “For you, 
gentlemen, fame and honor are beginning as they have not for centuries. Be hard; 
be without mercy; act more quickly and brutally than the others. The citizens of 
western Europe must tremble with horror. That is the most human way of con-
ducting a war. For it scares the others off.”14 
Those words uttered to senior commanders leave no doubt as to the 
intentions of Hitler concerning the behavior of his troops and the conduct of 
war. It was to be brutal, involving the physical destruction of the enemy, which 
involved not only combatants, but civilians as well. Commanding violent 
behavior suggests that it will not be punished—quite the contrary. Therefore, 
the instructions for the conduct of war were released and passed on to the 





13 IMT, Red Series (1014-PS), vol. 1, 702; IMT, Red Series (798-PS); E. L. Woodward and 
Rohan Riftlep, eds., From Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 3rd series 
(London: HMSO, 1954), vol. 7, 258–60.
14 IMT, Red Series (1014-PS), vol. 1, 702; Woodward and Riftlep, From Documents, vol. 7, 258–60.
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soldiers. Of course, Hitler fulfilled his promises regarding both the reward of the 
soldiers and their impunity. At the beginning of October 1939, amnesty was 
announced for crimes committed by German soldiers during the campaign 
in Poland.15 
When the war broke out, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag, where he explained 
the reasons for this war, charging Poland with complete responsibility. His 
statement, quoted below, is a denial of what he said at a secret meeting with 
senior commanders in Obersalzberg. On September 1, 1939 he said: 
. . . I will not wage war against women and children. I have ordered my air force 
to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives. If, however, the enemy thinks 
he can draw from that carte blanche on his side to fight by the other methods he 
will receive an answer that will deprive him of hearing and sight.16 
Hitler continued: 
. . . and from now on, bombs will be met with bombs. Whoever fights 
with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever departs from the 
rules of humane warfare can only expect that we shall do the same. I will  
continue this struggle, no matter against whom, until the safety of the 
Reich and its rights are secured.17 
On the same day, September 1, 1939, Hitler made a speech to the German 
armed forces, in which he also presented reasons for starting the war. He said: 
I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet force with force. 
The German Armed Forces, with firm determination, will take up the 
struggle for the honor and the fundamental rights of the German people. 
I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of the eternal 
German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the end. ‘emember always 
and in any circumstances that you are the representatives of the National 
Socialist Greater Germany. Long live our people and the Reich.18
15 “Decree of Amnesty of the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich, of October 4, 1939,” in 
Szymon Datner, Crimes Committed by the Wehrmacht during the September Campaign and the 
Period of Military Government (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1962), 44. 
16 Speech by Hitler in Reichstag, September 1, 1939.
17 Ibid.
18 IMT, Red Series (TC-54), vol. 1, 721. 
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In the speeches of August 22 and September 1, 1939, Hitler did not men-
tion the Jews, but his attitude on this issue was obvious to all. On January 30, 
1939, in his speech, Hitler told the Reichstag:
The Jewish race was created by God only for the purpose of being in 
a certain percentage of a parasite living body on the productive and 
the work of other nations. The Jewish race will have to adapt itself to 
sound constructive activity as other nations do, or sooner or later it 
will succumb to a crisis of an inconceivable magnitude. [. . .] Today I 
will once more be a prophet: If the international Jewish financiers in 
and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more 
into a world war, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the 
earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish 
race in Europe!19 
BEGINNING OF THE WAR
The war began on September 1, 1939, at 4:45 a.m., with a cannonade from 
the cruiser Schleswig-Holstein on Westerplatte.20 The German aviation began 
bombing cities and military facilities. The German army crossed the Polish 
border, attacking from three directions simultaneously: from the north: from 
west Pomerania and east Prussia, from the west, and in the south from the ter-
ritory of Slovakia.21 Before the attack, the Germans prepared a series of actions 
of sabotage and instigated hostile ethnic groups, for example Ukrainians.22 On 
the same day, Hitler spoke to the Reichstag assembly, explaining objectives of 
the war. He presented them as follows: 
I am determined: first, resolve the question of Danzig, second the  question 
of the corridor, and thirdly, to ensure that in relation to Germany there will 
19 Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman et al., eds., Documents on the Holocaust: Selected Sources on the 
Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union ( Jerusalem: Yad 
Vashem, 1987), 134–35.
20 Andrzej Albert (Wojciech Roszkowski), Najnowsza historia Polski 1914–1993, vol. 1 
(London: Plus Publications Ltd., 1994); Gerhard L. Weinberg, A Worlsd at Arms: A Global 
History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Madajczyk, 
Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce. 
21 BA-MA, RW5-150, 172/673–172/677.
22 BA-MA, RW5-699, 2–3.
6 Macht Arbeit Frei?
be a reversal of Polish position, which will provide peaceful  coexistence 
and security!23
In the meantime, the situation deteriorated, and the Polish armies were 
in constant retreat. Warsaw became increasingly threatened by attack from the 
north, which forced the evacuation of the Polish government, state institutions, 
and the Bank of Poland’s gold reserves from Warsaw. On September 6, Chief 
Commander Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz and his staff left the capital and 
moved to Brest. On the same day Colonel Roman Umiastowski, in a dramatic 
appeal, asked the young men to leave the capital for the east, where he called 
for the organization of a new line of defense.24 Political leaders of party repre-
sentatives also came to the east. Umiastowski’s appeal had far-reaching effect: in 
addition to thousands of men who went east, whole families went in the same 
direction, in an atmosphere of fear and panic. The situation on the roads became 
even more difficult and refugees became an easy prey for the German airmen, 
who attacked civilian refugee columns. At that time, from September 7 to 9, the 
Soviet authorities announced mobilization in the European part of USSR. 
On September 17, 1939, at 2.00 in the night, the Commissariat of Foreign 
Affairs called for the Polish Ambassador to give him a notice informing that in 
the morning the Red Army had begun crossing the Polish border in its entire 
length in order to “take care of people in western Ukraine and western Belarus.” 
In this situation, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz commanded the Polish troops 
not to fight the Red Army troops. On the night of September 17 to 18, the 
Polish commander-in-chief crossed over the Romanian border. The Red Army 
disarmed Polish troops and captured the soldiers and officers. Only in some 
places did struggle break out between the Polish and Soviet troops. Some units, 
mainly from the region of Polesie, returned in the direction of the west intend-
ing to support the defense of Warsaw and in order not fall into the hands of 
the Red Army and be disarmed in the process. However, those units failed to 
get to Warsaw. In the meantime, as a result of heavy bombing that caused many 
23 Doc. 2322-PS, Hitler’s address to the Reichstag on the outbreak of war, September 1, 1939; 
USA-39; Adolf Hitler, The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary, ed. Max Domarus and 
Patrick Romane (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 2007). 
24 L. Dobroszycki, M.M. Drozdowski, M. Getter, A. Słomczyński, eds., Cywilna obrona Warszawy 
we wrześniu 1939, Dokumenty, materiały prasowe i relacje (Warszawa: PWN, 1964); Marian 
Porwit, Obrona Warszawy, Wrzesień 1939: Wspomnienia i fakty (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1959); 
Mieczysław Ciepielewicz and Eugeniusz Kozłowski, eds., Obrona Warszawy 1939 we wspom-
nieniach (Warsaw: MON, 1984); Mieczysław Ciepielewicz i Eugeniusz Kozłowski, eds., 
Wrzesień 1939 w relacjach i wspomnieniach (Warsaw: MON, 1989).
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 casualties and large damage, and the lack of food, water, and electricity, on 
September 26, 1939 it was decided to surrender Warsaw. The act of capitulation 
was signed on September 28, 1939. Soon, German troops entered the city. In the 
last days of September sporadic fighting was still going on. On October 5, 1939, 
Special Operational Group (SGO) “Polesie” under the command of General 
Franciszek Kleeberg capitulated, which marked the end of the war in Poland. 
OPERATION TANNENBERG
In 1939 German directions in order to carry out the extermination of the Polish 
leadership echelon (Liquidierung der polnischen Führungsschicht) and intelligen-
tsia got the codename Unternehmen Tannenberg. In May 1939, in the Main Office 
of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst), the head of the German Police, Reichsführer SS 
Heinrich Himmler, established a special cell called Zentralstelle II/P (Polen), 
whose task was to draw up proscription lists of Poles (Sonderfahndungsbuch 
Polen)25 who were considered particularly dangerous to the Third Reich. They 
were political activists; representatives of the clergy; leaders of political par-
ties; people of science and culture; activists and fighters for the Polish state in 
disputed territories, from World War I, where plebiscites and armed uprisings 
(Śląsk/Schlesien, Poznań/Posen, Pomorze/Pommern) took place. On those 
lists were the names of 61,000 Poles.26 In July 1939, an agreement was reached 
between Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) and the head of Sicherheitspolizei 
and SD Reinhard Heydrich. Under the agreement, each of the five armies 
prepared to attack Poland was to obtain Einsatzgruppe, consisting of a Gestapo, 
Kripo (Kriminalpolizei), and SD men. After the outbreak of war in the first half 
of September, a further three sub-groups of about 2,700 people operating 
similarly were added. 
At a conference held on September 21, 1939, referring to the ongoing 
operation Tannenberg, convened by the Einsatzgruppen, Heydrich said: 
Solving of the Polish question—as has been repeatedly indicated—is to be 
varied: one way in relation to the leadership (Polish intelligentsia), another 
in relation to the workers and the lower layers of the Polish population. There 
are still no more than 3% of political leaders in the occupied  territories. 
25 Sonderfahndungsbuch Polen (Berlin: Reichskriminalpolizeiamt Berlin C2, Wederscher Mark 
5/6, 1939).
26 Ryszard Majewski, Waffen SS: Mity i rzeczywistość (Wroclaw: Zakład Narodowy im. 
Ossolińskich, 1977), 53. 
8 Macht Arbeit Frei?
And these 3% must be neutralized and sent to concentration camps.  
The Einsatzgruppen should draw up a list, on which they should place out-
standing leaders and also lists containing the average layer of the Polish soci-
ety: teachers, clergy, nobility, legionnaires, returning officers, and so forth. 
They must be arrested and deported to the remaining district (Restraum).27
Heydrich clearly expressed his murderous intentions. Interesting is the fact 
that in spite of obtaining the proxies for the elimination of elements deemed 
undesirable, he continued his provocative actions in order to cause difficulties 
and even paralyzing court actions. At the conference on September 21, 1939, 
he ordered: 
Executions should be used only in case of necessary self-defense or in 
cases of attempts of escape. All other matters should be transferred to 
the martial courts. You should load military courts with so many applica-
tions, that they could not manage to deal with this C [Chef, i.e., Reinhard 
Heydrich] wants him to submit all the judgments of the military courts, 
ending with no conviction to death penalty.28
The Einsatzgruppen operating in Poland, in addition to the tasks relating 
to the liquidation of Polish activists, intellectuals and leaders also had duties 
concerning the Jews.29 One of their obligations was causing forced migration 
of Jews to the Soviet zone in the first weeks of war, when the demarcation line 
between the German and Soviet occupation zone was not yet determined. 
Forcing resettlement on Jews took place by issuing specific instructions to leave 
the immediate locality. Particularly cruel to the Jews was the Einsatzgruppe 
under the command of Udo von Woyrsch, who committed numerous crimes, 
including in the vicinity of Przemyśl.30 “Already in 1939, soon after the entry 
into Przemyśl, Germans gave an example of their methods of bandits slaughter-
ing five hundred Jews, mostly from the intelligentsia.”31
27 Document from the Conference in Security Police Office of September 21, 1939, BŻIH 49 
(1964): 68–73.
28 Ibid.
29 Jochen Böhler, “Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy during the Polish Campaign: The Case of the 
Einsatzgruppe von Woyrsch,” German Studies Review 24 (2001): 35–54; Alexander B. 
Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg , Ideology and Atrocity (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2003), 88–120.
30 Böhler, “Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy.”
31 YVA, M.49.E/1938, 1, testimony of Marian Bień.
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IDEOLOGICAL ATTITUDE OF GERMAN SOLDIERS  
TOWARDS THE JEWS 
The beginning of the war ushered in a sharp change in the life of the Jewish 
population in Poland. Persecution of Jews in Germany and the territories 
occupied by Germany after 1938 now threatened Polish Jews, who were 
much more numerous than the Jewish communities of Germany, Austria, and 
the Protectorate. Polish Jews were also different from their brethren in the 
above-mentioned countries, where not all Jews were traditional and not all 
of them differentiated themselves from the rest of the country’s population, 
even though the Jews who lived traditionally made up a fairly large faction of 
the Jewish community. For Polish Jews, the Germans invented a special term: 
Ostjuden—Eastern Jews, which indicated geographic area inhabited by those 
Jews, but also evoked a specific cultural meaning. It conjured up a different type 
of Jew: traditional in terms of clothing, appearance, including beards and side 
locks, but also traditional in terms of language and behavioral education. For a 
casual viewer, in many cases, the difference was enormous. While German Jews 
were not often distinguished by their appearance, in Poland the situation was 
completely different. Elements such as the appearance and behavior of tradi-
tional Jews were used in German propaganda for years. Especially since Hitler 
seized power, the anti-Semitic propaganda increased. Books, newspapers, 
and posters with cartoons where stylized images of Jews were portrayed were 
printed in millions of copies. Some features and characteristics of the Jewish 
body were much exaggerated: the propaganda materials showed great curved 
noses, odd-looking faces, beards and side locks. Often, such propaganda items 
were presented next to idealized drawings of the Aryan type: tall, athletic, with 
simple features and light hair, and neatly dressed. It was not only drawings and 
photos in newspapers and books that launched this type of the German man. 
There were also other means of propaganda everywhere—in film, painting, 
and sculpture. The work of Arno Breker is one of the best examples.32
The propaganda and the political climate of Germany from the years 
1933–1939 affected the consciousness of the young generation of Germans. 
After the elimination of pre-Hitler youth organizations and the establishment 
of Hitler Youth and related organizations such as BDM and Jungvolk, the 
majority of adolescents came under Hitler’s influence for a longer or shorter 
32 Jürgen Trimborn, Arno Breker—Der Künstler und die Macht: die Biographie (Berlin: Aufbau, 
2011); B. John Zavrel, Arno Breker—His Art and Life (New York: Amherst, 1985); Peter 
Adam, The Art of the Third Reich (London: Harry N. Abrams Inc, 1992).
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period of time. Germans born in 1919, for example, who reached the age of 
20 in 1939, spent a greater part of their youth in the above-mentioned 
 organizations. These organizations not only dealt with sporting activities, 
developed interests, organized trips outside the city and summer camps, but 
also  educated the German youth in the spirit of Nazism. In 1930s, the German 
youths spent the greater part of their time in school and in the Hitler Youth 
 organizations in order to reduce the impact of the family. This educational  activity 
was  intentionally propagated by the Nazi leadership. The official propaganda 
and youth organizations exerted very strong influence on young people. Their 
 activities had a great effect on the generation, which grew up in 1930s and became 
soldiers during the war of 1939, and supposedly caused generational  differences 
in the prevailing mood of the Wehrmacht.33 
A generation of young Germans educated in an atmosphere of anti-Semitic 
propaganda and convinced of its superiority was mobilized and sent to war 
against Poland. In the period preceding the war, German propaganda against 
Poland was very intense34 and focused not only on the Free City of Gdańsk and 
the “Corridor.” It also alleged the persecution of Germans in Poland. Poland 
had been presented as a country that persistently acted unreasonably. Moreover, 
Poland had never enjoyed a positive evaluation from the Germans. Above all, 
Germany, irrespective of the reigning system and the ruling government, never 
reconciled with the loss of the lands, which belonged to Germany prior to the 
World War I, in favor of Poland. Therefore, slogans such as Lebensraum, used by 
Hitler, gained social acceptance quite easily. The Polish economy was regarded 
as primitive; the common term “Polish economy” (polnische Wirtschaft) 
meant mismanagement, mess, and laziness.35 In German eyes, Poland was 
a hostile country that wanted to prevent the development of Germany. 
These two important elements of consciousness—anti-Semitism and the 
hatred of Poland—accompanied the German forces that invaded Poland in 
September 1939. 
The Jews were depicted in German propaganda as parasites who prof-
ited from the hard work of others. They did not do the work themselves but 
33 Jochen Böhler, Zbrodnie Wehrmachtu w Polsce: Wrzesień 1939: Wojna totalna (Kraków: 
Znak, 2009), 37–41.
34 Ibid., 41–45.
35 Eugeniusz Cezary Król, Polska i Polacy w propagandzie narodowego socjalizmu w Niemczech 
1919–1945 (Warsaw: ISP PAN-Collegium Civitas-Rytm, 2010); Götz Aly and Susanne 
Heim, “The Holocaust and Population Policy: Remarks on the Decision on the Final 
Solution,” Yad Vashem Studies 24 (1994): 48–55.
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 gathered the fruits of hard labor done by other people. Their exploitation of 
others did not apply solely to economic benefits, but also to political and social 
ones. The actions of Jews in culture and the arts were considered as causing 
constant disgrace. Therefore, according to the propaganda, it was necessary to 
root out the Jews and get rid of them in order to protect the German people, 
the German culture, the economy, education, the administration, and so forth. 
In turn, the Poles were depicted as rough and thriftless people who should also 
learn from the German work ethic. 
The beginning of the war also established the confrontation between pro-
paganda and reality. It was an eye-to-eye meeting with the population in Poland 
and encounter with the Jews, who represented about 10% of the population. 
However, in cities and towns their percentage was significantly higher and 
amounted to several dozen percent. Therefore, the German newcomers were 
under the impression that there was a massive concentration of Jews in Poland. 
Many German soldiers met traditional Jews, whom so far they had only seen in 
the form of propaganda, for the first time in their lives. 
Another important element accompanying the invasion of Poland (and 
later, the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe), was the contrast 
between what Germany wanted to achieve—to get rid of the Jews, to remove 
them from German society—and between what they actually found. As German 
control was established on new territories, the number of Jews under German 
rule did not reduce: on the contrary, the invaders only found more Jews. 
After a period of fighting, German troops came in contact with many 
civilians. This encounter displayed an entire range of attitudes. The expression 
of these opinions was discovered in letters written to the soldiers’ families in 
Germany. Large collections of correspondence have survived in archives.36 
A great number of German soldiers adopted the objectives of the war and con-
sidered it just and fair, designed to protect ethnic Germans. In relation to the 
local population—Poles and Jews—they felt contempt and hatred. Together 
with all the nation, they felt good and worthy to rule others, sure that their 
mission was to spread “civilization” in the east.37
36 O. Buchbender and R. Sterz, eds., Das andere Gesicht des Krieges: Deutsch Feldpostbriefe 
1939–1945 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1982); Alexander Rossino, “Destructive Impulses: 
German Soldiers and the Conquest of Poland,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 11, no. 
3 (Winter 1997): 351–65.
37 Rossino, “Destructive Impulses,” 353.
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VIOLENCE AGAINST THE JEWS
In order to collect weapons and ammunition in the occupied areas of the 
Poland, on September 12, 1939, the chief commander of the German armed 
forces, Walther von Brauchitsch, issued regulations to the civilians, calling for 
an immediate delivery of all weapons and ammunition to the nearest military 
and police posts. According to the regulation, storage of weapons and ammu-
nition would be punished by death. Similarly, any acts of violence towards 
German soldiers were to be punished by death. Judgment, and its execution by 
the court, would take place immediately.38 
Thereafter, an addendum was issued to the regulation of the Decree of 
September 12, 1939.39 Regulations to ban the possession of weapons had 
become the basis for the search for hidden arms and ammunition by German 
soldiers. The sweep for the arms was conducted in public buildings as well as in 
private homes. In practice, it gave the Germans unlimited permission to enter 
homes and private residence and to take stock. During the search for weapons, 
robbery of private property was commonplace. German soldiers “preferred” 
Jewish homes where everything of value was robbed. 
[. . .] looting took place in the city of [Warsaw] after the victory.  
The opportunity to take—and take more—is carried out gradually in the 
city in search of weapons inspections. These revisions, in some cases are 
carried out quite decently; in others, they are used for mass looting. This 
is the rule in Jewish neighborhoods—but not only there.40
Provocations and pretexts were employed in relation to the possession 
of weapons or taking part in armed resistance. Reinhard Heydrich wrote in a 
well-known Schnellbrief of September 21, 1939, inter alia: “As a justification 
for the concentration of Jews in cities should be administered, according to 
authoritative information, they took part in the partisan attacks and robbery.”41 
38 The regulation on the possession of weapons on the September 12, 1939, issued by the 
supreme commander of Armed Forces von Brauchitsch.
39 Ordinance to supplement the Ordinance on the possession of weapons on September 21, 
1939 (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Gebiete in Polen, 9); Second Order of the supreme 
commander of the Armed Forces to supplement the Ordinance on the possession of weap-
ons on October 6, 1939 (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Gebiete in Polen, 32).
40 Ludwik Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, vol. 1, Wrzesień 1939–listopad 1940 (Warsaw: 
PWN, 1962), 25. 
41 “Instructions by Heydrich on Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied 
Territories, September 21, 1939,” in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 173–78; 
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The method of searching for weapons is reflected in many testimonies 
of Jewish witnesses, who described the brutality with which the searches 
were carried out. German soldiers did not even care to justify their behavior in 
order to search for weapons. In practice, the searches were merely a common 
form of looting. 
One of the methods aimed at protecting the German forces against 
the attacks by “partisans”42 or hidden soldiers was taking hostages who 
were chosen from well-known personalities in occupied cities or represen-
tatives of municipalities. Among the hostages were also prominent Jews. 
The German troops announced that in case of attacks they would shoot 
the hostages. The arrest of hostages, in practice, served not only security 
exigencies, but often was used as an instrument of pressure on the local 
society, especially in order to force the local society or community to pay 
contributions or provide other material benefits. One of witnesses said: 
“On September 5, 1939 the German army entered Strzemieszyce. They 
began the persecution of Jews; they took hostages, tortured and beat them 
in order to get as much gold as possible.”43 
Imposition of contributions on the civilian population of the occupied 
land was a legitimate act of the occupation forces in accordance with inter-
national law.44 Contributions, however, were designed to meet the needs of 
occupying troops. According to the international norms, requests for contribu-
tions should be issued in writing by a general commander of the troops. They 
should be distributed proportionally, according to the most recent taxation. 
In World War II, contributions were often imposed on the Jewish community 
which did not take into account a balanced contribution of the population of 
a specific area of the occupied country. Such a way of collecting contributions 
can be considered collective responsibility. International law prohibited the use 
of  collective responsibility in the form of fines.45 Levying contributions was 
T. Berenstein, A. Eisenbach, A. Rutkowski, ed., Eksterminacja Żydów na ziemiach polskich w okresie 
okupacji hitlerowskiej: Zbiór dokumentów (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Wydawniczy, 1957), 27.
42 Böhler, Zbrodnie Wehrmachtu, 135–78.
43 YVA, M.49.E/1553, 2, testimony of Jerychem Frajman.
44 Marian Flemming, “Traktowanie ludności cywilnej i jeńców podczas działań wojennych w 
świetle norm prawa międzynarodowego,” BGKBZHP XXII (1987): 67; Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Signed at Hague, 18 October 1907., Art. 
51, in The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, 
ed. Dietrich Schindler and Jiří Toman (Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute, 1988), 90. 
45 Flemming, “Traktowanie ludności cywilnej”; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, Signed at Hague, 18 October 1907, Art. 50, in Schindler and 
Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, 89–90.
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a prevalent phenomenon in September 1939, as illustrated by testimonies of 
many witnesses from different regions of the country. Usually, the specified 
amount of time given to the population to collect and deliver the contribu-
tion did not exceed more than a few days. Contributions were imposed on 
the population of Lublin, Strzemieszyce,46 Jaworzno, Kraśnik, and Izbica, as 
well as many other cities. In Jaworzno, in accordance with the accepted prin-
ciples of imposing contributions, the following order was given by the military 
 commander of the city: 
During this time, the military commander of the city announced 
imposing contribution on the Jews; at the same time they detained eight 
people as hostages, who were important among the Jewish community, 
including me among them. After the payment of the contribution we were 
released.47
The following are excerpts from testimonies pertaining to a number of 
cities: “Germans laid upon the Jews a contribution of 500,000 zł. The Judenrat 
had to collect this sum and at an indicated date the contribution had been 
paid.”48 The same was true in Kraśnik: 
In September 1939, Germans entered Kraśnik. Then in our city there 
were about 8,000 Jews. Mostly craftsmen, merchants and workers, 
there were also many belonging to intelligentsia. Germans asked for 
contribution for the next few days. Then we had to give them silver 
and brass.49 
In some towns, the contribution was only a first step towards the system-
atic looting of Jewish property. This is illustrated by an example from Izbica: 
The Germans who came first to Izbica were motorcycle patrols; one of 
their first steps was a pogrom. On the first day of the occupation several 
Jews were killed. Two days later they imposed contribution on us. Jews 
had to pay it and a few days later the Germans issued a decree that Jews 
46 YVA, M.49.E/1553, 2, testimony of Jerychem Frajman.
47 YVA, M.49.E/3424, 1, testimony of Paulina Klein.
48 YVA, M.49.E/1295, 2, testimony of Franciszek Mandelbaum, Lublin
49 YVA, M.49.E/1516, 1, testimony of Abraham Olender. 
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had to deliver all the gold they had. After that they ordered the Jews to 
deliver their goods and valuable papers. After finishing that action they 
gave three more days for delivering all these items and announced that 
if they find gold, any goods or valuable papers by somebody, he will be 
killed on the spot. After a few days they began to conduct mass searches 
in Jewish homes. If they found even the smallest piece of a material, they 
shot and no excuse helped.50
International law forbade looting of private property belonging to 
the civilian population and it could not be confiscated. Nevertheless, the 
law allowed confiscation of goods for the occupying army. However, such 
confiscation should be tailored to the resources of the country.51 Still, in 
the case of requisition, the army that was carrying it out was obliged to 
give receipts or payment for the confiscated property. In many cases during 
World War II, requisitions took the form of looting, which made it diffi-
cult to distinguish between lawful and unlawful seizure of property. There 
also was a progressive deterioration of the German soldiers’ moral stan-
dards in relation to the Jewish civilians. This is illustrated by the case of 
Łańcut: “On September 9, 1939, the Germans entered to Łańcut. Initially, 
it was the Wehrmacht. Soldiers went to the Jewish shops and took things 
paying the minimum price.”52 In the above-quoted testimony, the German 
soldiers initially paid for the goods, although they preferred low prices. 
Therefore, this case can be treated as a sale; however, the merchants 
were forced to sell goods for prices much lower than the actual value of 
the goods. Nevertheless, merciless looting soon began. “A few days later, 
civilian authorities and the Gestapo came [to Łańcut]. Afterwards began 
the inspection of Jewish homes, taking valuables, furniture, clothing, 
bedding, etc.”53 In this case we have to admit that the sales were carried 
out by soldiers, while the looting was performed by the policemen, but, 
when taken together with other evidence, it also confirms the progressive 
deterioration of moral standards. 
50 YVA, M.49.E/1518, 1, testimony of Hejnoch Nobel.
51 Flemming, “Traktowanie ludności cywilnej”; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, Signed at Hague, 18 October 1907., Art. 46, in Schindler and 
Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, 89.
52 YVA, M.49.E/1501, 1, testimony of Diana Grinabaum. 
53 Ibid. 
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Ludwik Landau also wrote about the looting in his journal: 
Searches for weapons and radios were (and still are) in the Jewish  
neighborhoods and in the form, associated, more or less, with open 
robbery: the things taken are, as a rule, furs and often other valuable items. 
Even in non-Jewish districts, people often talk about questions posed  
[by the German soldiers]: Sind Sie Jude or Sind Sie Pole? Depending on 
the response, the variety of things seized changes. I do not think that the  
soldiers doing that were fanatic supporters of Hitler or sophisticated  
robbers: they simply belonged to a common—maybe the most wide-
spread in most of societies—type of man, not particularly firm in his 
beliefs, weak, giving rise to prevailing currents, and acted under these  
conditions [of the war and occupation]. They were demoralized and 
unable to resist the temptation of an easy win of such desirable valuables 
in their daily struggle for existence.54 
Ludwig observed that: 
[b]oth this looting and harassment of the people were certainly not ordered 
by their commanders; however, without a doubt, this situation in so many 
instances occurred with the approval of their officers, and in any case, they 
were not prosecuted with any particular severity. In individual cases, it  
happened to obtain effective intervention of an officer—apparently a general 
policy trend of the occupiers—was rather looking at these abuses through 
spread fingers—unless it had already exceeded the extent possible.55
Apart from the above-described individual killings of Jews, in some towns, 
mass killings also took place shortly after the entry of the German troops.56 
A well-known case of violence against the Jews during the September  campaign 
was the case of Końskie.57 Another one, the massacre in Częstochowa, on 
54 Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, 27–28.
55 Ibid., 26.
56 Jochen Böhler, Auftrakt zum Vernichtungskrieg: Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (Frankfurt a. 
M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006), 194–97. 
57 Jochen Böhler, ed., Grösste Härte. . .: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht in Polen, September-Oktober 
1939 (Osnabrück: Deutsches Historisches Institut, 2005), 121–23.
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September 4, 1939 was so fierce that it was later known as “Bloody Monday.”58 
One of the victims described it in the following manner: 
The Germans [. . .] gathered the entire male population of the city in the 
Old Market and from there they were scurried into a so-called cathedral. 
When we were entering the church, they began to shoot us with machine 
guns and rifles. Some hundreds of us were killed then on the spot. There 
were about 400 injured. I got a bullet in the right side; the wound was 
luckily not serious, since the bullet passed through my body.59 
58 Liber Brenner, Widerstand un Umekum in Tschenstochover Geto (Warsaw: Yidisher Historisher 
Institut in Pojlin, 1950), 6.
59 YVA, M.49.E/1567, 1, testimony of Henoch Diamant.
CHAPTER 2
Forced Labor from the Period 
of Military Government  
Until the Beginning  
of Ghettoization
On September 1, 1939 the chief of the Armed Forces (OKH) Walther von Brauchitsch issued a special order.1 He declared that the German army 
would have absolute power over all occupied areas. Von Brauchitsch added, 
“The Wehrmacht will not consider the [civil] population as his enemy. All prac-
tices will be respected.” Von Brauchitsch’s order also touched upon economic 
matters: “The country’s economy and public administration will continue to 
further its operation or will be rebuilt.”2 Until then, it was announced that all 
provisions relating to the occupied areas would be published in Bekanntmachung 
über das Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Gebiete in Polen.3
Further detailed orders followed the order of September 1, 1939 that 
declared the punishment of activities hostile to the German army. On 
September 5, 1939, Walther von Brauchitsch released the next order creat-
ing special courts (Sondergerichte) to examine crimes committed in the occu-
pied areas of Poland.4 On the same day, September 5, 1939, German criminal 
 1 Walter von Brauchitsch, “Aufruf des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres Vom 1. September 
1939,” in Zbiór rozporządzeń władz niemieckich, ed. Witold Święcicki and Feliks Zadrowski 
(Warsaw: n.p., 1940), 11–12.
 2 Ibid.
 3 “Bekanntmachung über das Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Gebiete in Polen. Vom 1. 
September 1939,” in Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń władz niemieckich, 12.
 4 “Verordnung des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres über Sondergerichte im besetzten pol-
nischen Gebiet. Vom 5. September 1939,” in Karol Marian Pospieszalski, Ziemie wcielone 
(Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1952), 40–43; YVA-O.21/1, 4. 
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law was introduced in the occupied territories5 as well as a decree regarding 
 punishment for juveniles.6 
Entering Poland, the German army took power from the hands of local 
representatives. Temporarily they acted as the units’ patrol officers who later 
passed control to senior officers. Subsequently, the head of the civil admin-
istration (der Chef der Zivilverwaltung, CdZ) of the High Command of the 
Army (Armeeoberkommando) nominated heads of local civil administration.7 
At that time they were called Landräte (district/county administrators). The 
Einsatzgruppen were subsequently transformed into police functionaries in local 
police stations.8 Upon entering a new village, one of the first procedures was to 
impose measures to ensure the security of the German forces. For this purpose, 
posters announcing takeover by the German army were created immediately 
after the end of fighting, or when the troops entered a village, thereby both 
informing the public and preserving the peace. Despite this, an atmosphere of 
fear reigned. One of Jewish women recalled those moments: 
After entering the city [Rzeszów] posters in Polish and German were put 
in public places, to appeal to the public that they behave peacefully and 
not be afraid, since they [Germans] came to make order (it seems that in 
those appeals there was nothing about the Jews). I do not remember the 
exact content of the poster, or the first or later, because in the city was in 
such a climate of fear and uncertainty that we lived constantly in panic.  
I was scared and worried about the children. Still, there were incidents 
of killings and beatings by the Germans. I stopped to go out in the street,  
I did not even do necessary matters and purchases but all was arranged by 
my Jewish hostesses, where I was living.9
Any action against the German army was punished severely, usually by 
death. Immediately after the entry, the authorities collected weapons and 
ammunition. In order to ensure the peace, hostages were taken, threatening 
 5 “Verordnung über Einführung deutschen Strafrechts. Vom 5. September 1939,” in 
Pospieszalski, Ziemie wcielone, 44
 6 “Verordnung über die Aburteilung von Taten Jugendlicher. Vom 10. September 1939,” in 
Pospieszalski, Ziemie wcielone, 45.
 7 AIPN, NTN, 196/270, 10–22.
 8 Einsatzgruppen were transformed subsequently into police functionaries in local police 
stations.
9 YVA, M.49.E/1549, 1–2, testimony of Stefania Rosenberg.
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throughout that in the event of any hostile action, hostages would be executed. 
Hostages in several villages were both Poles and Jews. In addition, the invaders 
often demanded a payment of contributions. It seems that the nuisance contri-
butions were especially acute for the Jews. It was precisely because of this that 
they were particularly preferred.
On September 25, 1939, Hitler’s decree regarding the appointment of 
the military administration in occupied Poland (Erlass des Führers über die 
Organisation der Militärverwaltung des besetzten ehemals polnischen Gebiete) was 
announced.10 It is important to note that it occurred before the end of hostil-
ities and the capitulation of Warsaw. According to this decree, full authority 
was transferred to the supreme commander of land forces, who in turn set up 
a military administration headed by the commander-in-chief “East,” General 
Gerd von Rundstedt. The military headquarters was in Spała. In the area of 
Poland occupied by the Germans, four military districts were established: West 
Prussia, Poznań, Łódź, and Kraków. Their commanders were respectively: 
Artillery General Heitz, Colonel General von Vollard-Bockelberg, General 
Gerd von Rundstedt, and Colonel General Wilhelm von List. Their appoint-
ment combined the supreme command of land forces with the command of 
the military administration “East.” Hitler also nominated the heads of the civil 
administration (Verwaltungschef) for each of the military districts. They were 
respectively Gauleiter Albert Forster in West Prussia, the Senate President 
of the Free City of Gdańsk Arthur Greiser in the Poznań District, and Reich 
Minister Arthur Seyss-Inquart in Kraków. The head of the civil administration 
(Oberverwaltungschef) under the supreme commander “East” and the head of 
civil administration in the district of Łódź was Reich Minister Dr. Hans Frank. 
As the supreme head of the civil administration, Hans Frank11 publicly 
expressed his ideas concerning the economic and political future of Poland, 
according to which he wished to proceed. During an interview given on 
October 3, 1939, he said:
Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country through means  
of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all supplies, raw materials, 
machines, factory installations, etc., which are important for the German 
10 “Erlass des Führers über die Organisation der Militärverwaltung in den besetzten ehemals 
polnischen Gebiete, z 25 września 1939 r.”; Mieczysław Brones, “Niektóre problemy gra-
bieży ekonomicznej w Polsce dokonywanej przez Wehrmacht w okresie 1.9–25.10.1939 r.,” 
BGKBZHP XVIII (1968): 46–79. 
11 Schenk, Dieter, Hans Frank: Hitlers Kronjurist und Generalgouverneur (Frankfurt a. M.: S. 
Fischer, 2006).
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war economy, availability of all workers for work within Germany, reduc-
tion of the entire Polish economy to the absolute minimum necessary for 
bare existence of the population, closing of all educational institutions, 
especially technical schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of 
the new Polish intelligentsia. Poland shall be treated as a colony; the Poles 
shall be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire.12 
Continuing the interview, Frank added: “It was most important now to 
make available as soon as possible raw materials, machines and workers to the 
German industry, which was short in all of these.” Most important, however, in 
Frank’s opinion, was the fact that by destroying the Polish industry, its subse-
quent reconstruction after the war would become more difficult, if not impos-
sible, so that “Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an agrarian 
country which would have to depend upon Germany for importation of indus-
trial products.”13 At that time there had been no final decision yet regarding the 
organization of the territory of Poland in terms of administration. In September, 
the ideas of the creation of a reduced Polish state which would be dependent on 
the Third Reich circulated among the German leaders, but later those ideas were 
abandoned. Frank in his speech had in mind such a reduced country (Reststaat). 
At the first conference with Department Heads of the General Government 
on December 2, 1939, Frank stated: “Decisive in the administrative activities of 
the General Government is the will of the Führer that this area shall be the 
first colonial territory of the German nation.”14 At the same meeting Frank 
explained: 
Principally it can be said, regarding the administration of the General 
Government: This territory in its entirety is booty of the German Reich, 
and it thus cannot be permitted that this territory shall be exploited in 
its individual parts, but that the territory in its entirety shall be econom-
ically used and its entire economic worth redound to the benefit of the 
German people.15
On October 3, 1939, the chief commander of the land forces issued an 
instruction regarding the armament policy of the Wehrmacht on Polish land as 
12 Interview with Hans Frank, in IMT, Red Series (EC-344-16 and 17), vol. 2, 632.
13 IMT, Red Series (EC-344-16 and 17), vol. 2, 642.
14 IMT, Red Series (2233-K-PS), vol. 2, 632–33.
15 IMT, Red Series (2233-K-PS), vol. 2, 642.
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well as regarding the designation of the commander-in-chief “East” and the 
establishment of the Inspectorate of War Economy. It was stated inter alia that: “In 
the field of industrial policy, the main goal is the extreme exploitation of industry 
producing raw materials (such as iron, non-ferrous metal, oil, coal), the security 
of existing industrial facilities and verifying which should start the production for 
the benefit of the economy of the Third Reich; in principle, only those goods 
should be produced, which are indispensable for the German war economy. 
By contrast, production of unnecessary goods should be eliminated, because it 
uses raw materials in the process of production, so needed in the Reich.”16 
On October 5, 1939, together with the new structure of the military 
administration of OKW and in agreement with the OKH, the Inspectorate 
of War Economy was established, with the task of organizing the economy 
of war in areas of occupied Poland. The head of the inspectorate (Inspekteur 
der Wehrwirtschafts-Inspektion Ober-Ost) was Colonel Nagel. Branches of the 
War Economy Inspection (Wehrwirtschaftsstelle) were subordinated to the 
Inspectorate. In the future General Government, there was an office in Kraków, 
whose head was Lt. Col. Elsässer. Branches (Außenstelle) in Warsaw, Kielce, 
Lublin, and Rzeszów were subsequently established. On October 5, 1939, 
OKH issued an order concerning the coordination of work on establishing 
the type and quantity of raw materials, semi-finished, and finished products 
in occupied Poland. Therefore, General Bührmann was nominated for this 
 purpose as a plenipotentiary for the detection of raw materials (Beauftragter für 
die Rohstofferfassung). He was subordinate to the supreme commander “East” 
and was included in the Inspectorate of War Economy. 
From the very beginning of the war, the representatives of the German 
armament industry and the CdZ, who were advancing towards the front line, 
were conducting reconnaissance and organizing protection of all industrial 
establishments that were useful to the German economy. Interesting, in this 
context, is the disparity between the ideas of Hitler and, as a consequence, 
of Frank on that subject, contrasting with the vision of people closely related 
to the armament industry and war production of the Reich. The reconnais-
sance of Polish industry took place throughout the 1930s, but was particularly 
intense in 1939. For example, in July of that year, a special report entitled: “The 
most important chemical plants in Poland,” whose author was Illgner from the 
IG-Farben, was prepared.17 
16 Brones, “Niektóre problemy,” 54.
17 Ibid., 54.
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Particularly active was Staff of War Economy inside OKW 
(Wehrwirtschaftsstab—Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) which was led by 
General Georg Thomas. In 1939, the Wehrmacht issued a publication under 
the title “War Economy of The Polish Republic”18 that included maps on the 
scale of 1:300,000, containing important information concerning economic 
facilities, transportation lines, electricity plants, and so forth. The same year, 
detailed statistical data on the population of Poland was published.19 
Even after the beginning of hostilities and gradual occupation of more and 
more areas, people specifically designated for this task were preparing in-depth 
reports on the Polish economy. This investigation could include, for instance, 
a report for Fitzner and Hütter,20 or information about the plant in Skarżysko-
Kamienna.21 Reports on population policy were also prepared.22 These reports 
were used as the basis for decisions regarding economic policies in areas of 
occupied Poland. The reconnaissance and identification by the Wehrmacht and 
 factors associated with CdZ, were also involved in protection before devastation 
and nomination of people responsible—even on a temporary basis—in order 
to maintain the facilities in readiness so they could continue their operation and 
production. 
Reich Minister Dr. Hans Frank was appointed governor general of the 
Polish Occupied Territories by Hitler’s decree dated October 12, 1939. The 
deputy of the governor general was Reich minister, Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart. 
The scope of their executive power was defined by Hitler as follows: 
The territories occupied by German troops shall be subject to the author-
ity of the Governor General of the occupied Polish territories, except insofar 
as they are incorporated within the German Reich. [. . .] The Governor 
18 Ibid., 47.
19 Statistisches Gemeindeverzeichnis des bisherigen polnischen Staates: mit Berücksichtigung der 
am 28. September 1939 festgelegten Grenze der deutschen und sowjetrussischen Reichsinteressen 
(Berlin: Selbstverlag der Publikationstelle, 1939). 
20 Mieczysław Wrzosek, “Raporty Hütera i Fitznera o sytuacji w Zagłębiu Śląsko-Dąbrowskim 
w okresie 3 września–20 października 1939 r.,” BGKBZHP XIX (1968): 165–245; Janusz 
Gumkowski, and Kazimierz Leszczyński, “Generalne Gubernatorstwo w oczach Niemca 
(Sprawozdanie dra Blaschka z podróży służbowej do Generalnego Gubernstorstwa w dn. 
21–26 sierpnia 1942 r.),” BGKBZHP XV (1965), 126–63;
21 Werkbericht, Skar.-Kam., 19.9.1939, MA, Wi ID 1/165a, 215–17, in Karay, Death Comes in 
Yellow, 9.
22 “Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach 
 rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten in Program narodowościowy Rassenpolitischen-Amt’u 
z 1939 roku na ziemiach polskich,” BGKBZHP IV (1948): 133–71; NO-3732, 
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General shall be directly responsible to me. All branches of the adminis-
tration shall be directed by the Governor General.23 
Hitler added: 
There is no authority here in the General Government which is higher 
as to rank, influence, and authority than that of the Governor General. 
Even the Wehrmacht has no governmental or official functions of any 
kind in this connection; it has only security functions and general mili-
tary duties—it has no political power whatsoever. The same applies here 
to the Police and SS. There is here no state within a state, but we are the 
representatives of the Führer and of the Reich. In final conclusion, this 
applies also to the Party which has here no far-reaching influence except 
for the fact that very old members of the National Socialist Party and loyal 
veterans of the Führer take care of general matters.24 
The decree suggests that Hans Frank had absolute power in the General 
Government, subordinate only to Hitler. Subsequently, in practice, it turned 
out that despite the aspirations of Hans Frank, his power was not absolute and 
various other factors, particularly the SS and SD, constantly undermined his 
authority. Despite his high position in the party, Hans Frank proved to be an 
insufficiently strong personality and his decisions and policy were influenced 
strongly by decision-making factors in the Reich. At least in the initial period 
of taking of power, Frank’s speeches were characterized by repeating ideas pre-
sented earlier by Hitler, Hermann Göring, and others. This also applies to his 
declarations concerning economic policy. 
On October 19, 1939, Göring gave instructions on the economic policy in 
the occupied areas.25 He said among other things: 
The General Government must export all the raw materials, scrap metal, 
machinery, and so forth. In one word everything that can benefit the war  
economy of Germany. Companies that are not absolutely necessary 
should be transferred to Germany, unless they require too much time 
or use of them in their location by carrying out German military orders 
would be more purposeful.26 
23 IMT, Red Series (2537-PS), vol. 2, 629.
24 IMT, Red Series (2233-PS), vol. 2, 630.
25 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Doc. 410–EC, 482. 
26 Brones, “Niektóre problemy,” 54.
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On October 20, 1939 a meeting between Adolf Hitler and Wilhelm Keitel 
took place, in which General Walter Warlimont was also present. During that 
meeting, the shape of future relations between the Reich and the occupied 
areas of Poland was discussed. Hitler repeated that in the Polish territories there 
could not be two administrations. The General Government’s administration 
should not be dependent on Berlin; rather, it should take responsibility for the 
management of land. Hitler believed that one of the tasks of this administration 
would be conducting a racial struggle free from any legal constraints, and the 
methods used in the General Government would be completely different than 
in other areas of Germany. 
Speaking about the future of Poland’s economy, Hitler said: 
It is not the task of the administration to make Poland into a model prov-
ince or a model state of the German order or to put her financially or eco-
nomically on a sound basis. The Polish intelligentsia must be prevented 
from forming a ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to 
remain low; we only want to draw labor forces from there. Poles are also to 
be used for the administration of the country. [. . .] The Governor General 
is to give the Polish nation only bare living conditions and is to main-
tain the basis for military security. [. . .] The Polish economy [polnische 
Wirtschaft] must be allowed to develop.27 
In addition, General Government was to receive deported Jews and Poles 
from the Reich. Therefore, the collaboration of General Government with the 
new provinces of the Reich (annexed territories) was required, in accordance 
with Heinrich Himmler’s new responsibilities as a plenipotentiary for the 
strengthening of Germany.28 
DECISIONS CONCERNING JEWS AND THE ECONOMY 
The first decisions of economic nature concerning the Jews were taken almost 
immediately after entry into the occupied towns. However, they were not coor-
dinated by the military authorities. These decisions were a result of German 
economic policy towards the Jews in Germany, which was a model of their 
position regarding the occupied Polish territories. The German troops entered 
27 IMT, Red Series (864-PS), vol. 2, 631–32.
28 “Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers zur Festigung deutschen Volkstums. Vom 7. Oktober 
1939,” in Pospieszalski, Ziemie, 176–78; BGKBZHP XII (1960): 34–35
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Kraków on September 6, 1939. On the same day, regulations concerning the 
Jews were issued, regarding movable and immovable property.29 Two days later, 
another decree by the head of the civil administration about the marking of all 
enterprises belonging to the Jews was issued.30 The decree sought to  protect 
Jewish property in order to ease the subsequent acquisition of that property 
by the German authorities. Marking Jewish shops was serving the same goal. 
Interim measures aimed at eliminating Jews from economic life and taking 
over their property by trustees had been issued in other cities. In Częstochowa 
such an order was issued by the mayor of the city on September 15, 1939.31 
A similar order was issued in Jędrzejów32 and other places. 
Reinhard Heydrich issued instructions concerning the Jewish problem in 
the occupied territories in the Schnellbrief of September 21, 1939 to the heads 
of all the Einsatzgruppen, the Security Police, and SD.33 In this way, Reinhard 
Heydrich was taking responsibility for dealing with all Jewish matters in the 
newly occupied areas. The essential task of the Einsatzgruppen, the Security 
Police, was not dealing with Jewish issues, but providing security in the rear 
areas of the front line.34 They were responsible for the arrest and liquidation 
of known leaders and local political activists who were, according to the criteria 
29 “Verordnung des Chefs der Zivilverwaltung, die eine Verlagerung und übertragung des 
jüdischen beweglichen und unbeweglichen Vermögens in den besetzten Gebiet verbietet. 
6. September 1939, Krakau,” Faschismus—Ghetto—Massenmord: Dokumentation über 
Ausrottung und Widerstand der Juden in Polen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Tatiana 
Berenstein, Artur Eisenbach, et al. (Berlin: Rütten & Loenig, 1960), 165.
30 “Rozporządzenie szefa Zarządu Cywilnego w sprawie znakowania wszystkich przed-
siębiorstw należących do Żydów, 8 września, 1939, Kraków,” in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, 
Eksterminacja Żydów, 69.
31 “Befehl Nr 7 des Chefs der Zivilverwaltung beim Wehrkreisbefehlshaber in Tschenstochau an 
die Landräte und Bürgermeister über die Ausschaltung der Juden aus dem Wirtschaftsleben, 
15. September 1939, Tschenstochau,” in Berenstein, Eisenbach, et al., Faschismus—Ghetto—
Massenmord, 166.
32 “Auszug aus dem wöchentlichen Lagebericht des Landrats Glehn in Jędrzejów an den Chefs 
der Zivilverwaltung, Außenstelle Radom, über die Einsetzung von Treuhändern für jüdische 
Betriebe, 21. Oktober 1939, Jędrzejów,” in Berenstein, Eisenbach, et al., Faschismus—
Ghetto—Massenmord, 167.
33 “Instructions by Heydrich on Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied 
Territories, September 21, 1939,” in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 173–78; 
Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 21–29.
34 Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland; Alexander B. Rossino, “Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy during the 
Polish Campaign: The Case of the Einsatzgruppe Woyrsch,” in German Studies Review 24 
(2001): 35–54; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen.
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of the occupying forces, characterized by anti-German attitudes and could 
become organizers of an armed resistance.35 
As a result of the conference of September 21, 1939, and discussions which 
took place there, it was revealed that Reinhard Heydrich planned to organize the 
life of the Jews in occupied Poland at a very rapid pace, overestimating the capa-
bilities of the Einsatzgruppen. It is important to add that, despite the fact that the 
war was not yet over, a significant part of the territory of Poland was occupied by 
the Germans. Further, the eastern provinces of Poland were occupied by Soviet 
troops and the result of that war was not yet known. It was a risky decision, based 
on the position of the western powers, who were not really interested in opening 
an additional front in the west. For Heydrich, it was  evident at that time, what the 
fate of the territories belonging to Germany until the beginning of the Second 
World War would be. They were to be annexed to Germany. Therefore, in the first 
part of the Schnellbrief he clearly distinguished those areas from other territories 
(areas not implicitly occupied by the USSR). Heydrich was well informed on the 
location of the demarcation line between the Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Heydrich’s Schnellbrief indicates, on the one hand, a certain euphoria and 
haste. Issued decisions were not based on sufficient knowledge regarding the 
size and quantity of Jewish communities in the area. Decisions  concerning the 
concentration of Jews in designated areas were not fully rational. Resettlement 
of hundreds of thousands of Jews in a very short time seemed to be an impossible 
task. It would require preparation accommodation in new places of  residence. 
Subsequent deportations from Warthegau in the General Government after 
November 1939, when thousand of Poles and Jews were deported, created very 
serious problems and protests from the part of  receiving authorities. If, how-
ever, the concentration was not feasible, remained the question remained as to 
why these tasks had been given to the Einsatzgruppen involving several hundred 
men. If the resettlement was aimed to facilitate the administration and control 
of Jewish matters, it was certain that so massive a resettlement could only cause 
chaos and inconvenience rather than validation of the situation. 
If, on the other hand, it was a matter of eliminating the Jews, no concrete 
methods and means were presented. The only way of reducing the number of the 
Jews would be to cause the forced migration from the area of southern Poland to 
the area of Eastern Galicia, which was under the Soviet administration. 
35 Kazimierz Leszczyński, “Działalność Einsatzgruppen Policji Bezpieczeństwa na ziemiach 
polskich w 1939 w świetle dokumentów,” BGKBZHP XXII (1971): 7–281.
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The primary task concerning Jewish matters given to the Einsatzgruppen 
was consolidating Jewish communities with fewer than 500 inhabitants, into 
larger towns where the absorption would take place.36 Such a task was impos-
sible under the circumstances of war and the initial organizational period of 
the German administration in the occupied territories. In the introduction to 
his Schnellbrief, Heydrich spoke about the ultimate objective, which appeared 
to be quite distant. According the content of the Schnellbrief, it was suggested 
that this goal was very close. An immediate deportation of thousands of Jews 
could paralyze transport, the economy, cause devastation of property, and dis-
rupt the equilibrium in which they lived. Despite difficulties in the function-
ing of the supply system, the population, as a rule, had some supplies at home. 
Sudden deportation would constitute an enormous burden on the administra-
tion, on the system of assistance and on providing supplies, as usually happens 
in such situations. Heydrich could not have meant liquidation of the Jews at 
that time. It may be assumed that Heydrich believed it would be possible to 
shift a  significant number of Jews across the border into the Soviet zone. Such 
tasks had been set before the Einsatzgruppen acting in southern Poland. This 
was taken into account, since Heydrich recommended only an approximate 
census of the Jewish population east of Kraków. Such a census, which contained 
detailed information about age and occupations of Jews, was necessary in order 
to facilitate the exploitation of the Jewish labor force. Concentration of Jews in 
the larger towns would facilitate the administration of that labor force.
The task set before the Einsatzgruppen had been carried out by creating 
Jewish Councils of Elders, which were to be an essential tool “of exact and 
timely implementation of any order issued” by the German authorities.37 The 
Councils of Elders were to be composed of up to twenty four people, depend-
ing on the size of the municipality. The councils had been given the responsi-
bility for conducting a census of the population according to the age, sex, and 
professional groups. An important part of the Schnellbrief concerned securing 
German economic interests. This certainly reflected the instructions given by 
the plenipotentiary of Göring’s Four-Year Plan. Also, Heydrich treated this 
matter extremely carefully. As apparent from the wording of his Schnellbrief, he 
was ready for far-reaching concessions regarding that issue. 
Among other things, in order to meet the needs of the army, he was ready to 
leave the “Jewish merchants who, in the absence of other options, must remain 
36 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 26.
37 Ibid., 26–27.
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due to the necessity of providing supplies for the army.”38 Also, as a result of 
“defending the interests of the German economy in the  occupied areas, it is 
necessary, of course, to allow for the time being, Jewish  industries and  factories 
of essential importance for life, for the purposes of the war effort and the 
 Four-Year Plan.”39 However, this was a temporary solution until Aryanization40 
and the evacuation of the Jews. Similarly, it was necessary to ensure securing 
the harvest in the fields and making certain that all necessary field works and 
sowing of winter corn crops would be done. Worthy of note is that in the min-
utes of the meeting of September 21, 1939 the following was written: “This is 
necessary that Jews will disappear from the village as a small settler. This action 
must be carried out within the next 3–4 weeks.”41
Particularly interesting is the fourth part of the Schnellbrief, in which 
Heydrich required to carry out the census of Jews in different areas  according 
to previously chosen age groups and professional categories, to indicate 
places and determine the time for the transfer of Jews. He also he ordered 
the Einsatzgruppen to perform a reconnaissance of industrial plants owned 
by Jews. It was necessary to “give a list of all Jewish branches and industrial 
plants with essential for life and for the purposes of war and the Four-Year 
Plan”42 in the given area. Heydrich called for reports on the types of plants, 
 including the possibility of transforming them into factories of basic impor-
tance for the war objectives or the Four-Year Plan. He indicated as well in which 
order they should be aryanized, without causing any damage and whether 
those  performing Aryanization could be Germans or Poles. He also demanded 
reporting the number of Jewish employees in the plant, whether they were in 
positions of management and whether the plant could lead normal production 
after the evacuation of Jews. 
Heydrich’s instructions, particularly concerning the drawing up of lists of 
establishments owned and managed by Jews and submitting recommendations 
on their further use in the war economy was a kind of curiosity. First of all, 
38 Ibid., 27.
39 Ibid.
40 It is important to mention that the Schnellbrief of Heydrich was not the first document 
regerding the Aryanization. In the order of September 15, 1939 signed by General Rüdiger, 
was said: “The Jews shall only be involved in economic life in order to absolutely exclude 
them from the future and transfer their enterprizes to the Aryans.” See “Armeeoberkom-
mando. Der Chef der Zivilverwaltung, Tagesbefehl Nr 7, Tschenstochau, den 15. September 
1939,” AIPN, NTN, 196/270, 13.
41 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 27.
42 Ibid., 27.
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the Einsatzgruppen were neither competent in economic matters nor in recom-
mending transformation in the production and management profile. It appears 
to be a sort of usurpation regarding competencies in economic matters. In addi-
tion, in actuality, other organizational units that had the task of gathering infor-
mation and registration of industrial plants and stock of raw materials for the 
further use in the war effort were active. 
Heydrich did not write in the Schnellbrief that the Einsatzgruppen were 
acquiring these plants for the SS, as was the case of the Wehrmacht that tried to 
take over plants and transfer them to their respective companies and to begin 
war production. Also, private companies expecting gigantic profits hurried up 
to be ahead of others in the takeover of plants. In the final analysis, the SS was 
not the first and not the only organization interested in economic exploitation 
of the new occupied areas of Poland. However, only at the end of 1939 did 
the SS begin to deal with organized labor camps in Lublin. Moreover, the SS 
was relatively late in taking over and creating new companies in comparison to 
other institutions.
FORCED LABOR OF JEWS DURING THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 
The issues concerning forced labor were regulated by the International 
Convention on Forced Labor of 1930, prepared by the International Labor 
Organization. Article 2 of the Convention defined the term forced labor, as 
“work or service required of any person under the threat of any penalty to 
which the person does not offered himself voluntarily.”43 However, Section 2 
of Article 2 referred to the exceptions stating that “any work, required in times 
of emergencies, that is to say, during war or the threat of disasters or misfor-
tunes [. . .] which might endanger the existence or the well-being of all or part 
of the population”44 was acceptable. Fragments of the Conventions relating 
to war were not well defined and allowed a broad margin of interpretation. 
Article 9 of the Convention provided a number of such cases. During the war, 
the competent authority may order execution of forced labor in addition to the 
above-mentioned threats. This was likewise the case in situations where such 
work was in the interest of the local people, where such work was a necessity, 
and when it was hard to get volunteer laborers in order to perform a particular 
job. According to Article 11, people under age 18 and above 45 should not be 
called to perform forced labor. 
43 Forced Labor Convention, 1930.
44 Ibid.
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In practice, during the military administration, chaos reigned in the field of 
forced labor. Immediately after the entry of the German troops into newly occu-
pied areas, rampant aggression was applied against the Jews and forced labor was 
one of aspects of that aggression.45 One can observe a lack of any rules as far as 
labor was concerned. Jews were caught on the streets and led to work. Many tes-
timonies described cases in which the basic purpose of forced labor was humiliat-
ing, as the object of harassment and abuse of Jews—such as, cleaning toilets with 
one’s bare hands, cleaning the streets, and so on. The work was, as a rule, accom-
panied by beatings. On occasion religious Jews were humiliated by having their 
beards forcefully being shaved off, their side locks violently cut, or by removing 
any other symbols associated with the Jewish religion and tradition. Additional 
steps were aimed at humiliating Jews, for instance, forcing them to do useless 
work, where the only goal was harassment and abuse. 
Particularly severe were the first days of the occupation. For the Jewish 
population living in areas of western Poland, it had already occurred at the 
beginning of September 1939. One of the witnesses described the entering of 
Germans into Olkusz on September 4, 1939 in the following manner: 
[. . .] there began a flood of tribulation and persecution of Jews. 
Immediately the Jewish population had to appear for public works, where 
supervisors beat and tortured them in a murderous way. Day by day from 
early morning till late evening, Jews often did useless work, beaten by Nazi 
criminals for which this sight served as entertainment.46 
Thr first moments of the occupation in Siemianowice were described in a 
similar way: 
Germans search for everybody and force them to do public works. Jewish 
women must with brooms and rags march in the streets of the city and clean 
public toilets. Whoever does not have rags must do the work with bare hands.47 
The same was true in Lublin, where immediately after the entry of the 
Germans, Jews were forced to do particularly humiliating work connected with 
cleaning manure and public toilets: “Soon after entering, the Germans started 
45 YVA, M.49.E/1295, 2, testimony of Franciszek Mandelbaum z Lublina; YVA, M.49.E/1442, 1, 
testimony of Rywka Grynwald; YVA, M.49.E/4600, 1, testimony of Józefa Korniło, Tarnów; 
46 YVA, M.49.E/1551, 1, testimony of Efraim Parasol. 
47 YVA, M.49.E/1545, 1–2, testimony of Dawid Pinkus. 
32 Macht Arbeit Frei?
to mistreat us. We had to work; sometimes they made us clean toilets with bare 
hands.”48 The prevalence of degrading works is confirmed in other testimonies: 
“In 1939, when Germans entered Rejowiec [. . .] the first day they ordered us 
to gather. They ordered us to remove mud with hands, clean toilets etc. They 
tortured and beat us and several elderly men were killed. We had to report to 
work every day.”49 The same was true in Warsaw: 
The enemy picks Jews particularly for the most distasteful work—clean-
ing toilets, scrubbing floors, and other jobs of this sort. And there was an 
occurrence that I heard of from a youth—“It happened to me, myself!” he 
said. They caught him for work and ordered him to clean out filthy places 
and gave him no tools. When he asked for tools, they advised him to do it 
with his hands and to use his coat in place of a vessel. When he objected 
to this, they beat him.50 
The primary method of recruitment for forced labor was the arrest of Jews 
in the street51 or going from house to house to draw men.52 In many cases, 
young women, girls,53 and boys were taken to work.54 Jews, who understood 
the danger that threatened them in forced labor, stopped going on the streets 
to avoid the chase after forced laborers; they fled or remained hidden at home. 
During forced labor, Jews were not only beaten, but there were even cases of 
murder.55 In his diary Ludwik Landau noted:
The same way as in relation to the general population, a mix of problems 
resulting from abuse and as the consequence of conscious policy, when 
it concerns the attitude of the occupiers to the Jewish population. [. . .] 
Especially Jews were called to perform various kinds of forced labor: recruit-
ment is carried out by asking the question Sind Sie Jude? in cases of doubt. It 
was without being asked that question, when the origin of the person raised 
48 YVA, M.49.E/1444, 1, testimony of Rywka Rosenblum. 
49 YVA, M.49.E/1445, 1, testimony of Józef Feifermacher.
50 Chaim Kaplan, Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim Kaplan (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianopolis, 1999), 48.
51 YVA, M.49.E/1476, 1, testimony of Chaim Hirszman. 
52 YVA, M.49.E/1443, 1, testimony of Maria Rosenzweig. 
53 YVA, M.49.E/1565, 1, testimony of Goldhust Blanka.
54 YVA, M.49.E/1445, 1, testimony of Józef Feifermacher.
55 YVA, M.49.E/1476, 1, testimony of Chaim Hirszman. 
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no doubts. I saw in those days at the military hospital a few men brought 
to unload coal to the basement: they were all Jews in long chałats.56 
German soldiers exploited the situation of occupation and inspired terror 
by using the Jews to perform various services. One such activity was washing 
cars.57 Among the jobs that were included in the category of permitted works 
by the International Labor Convention, was the work done during the war for 
the benefit of the general public. In many places, such work meant filling up the 
anti-aircraft ditches and removing barricades, which were made during the war 
in many towns. 
Ludwik Landau wrote in his diary about the situation in Warsaw: 
The population is forced to procure various personal services, of course 
without any remuneration. At the time when German troops entered 
Warsaw, the entire city was covered with a network of barricades. Germans 
demanded removing these barricades. Since the Executive Municipal 
Board did not answer fast enough or not quite vigorously enough to the 
request, the Germans accelerated the progress of these works, detaining 
men passing in the streets. At times, they even searched for men at home. 
In many cases they ‘caught’ only Jews to do the work by asking passersby 
to show their identity documents; even old people were not exempt. 
Somebody told me, about a case of dragging an old man, a former senator 
[of the Polish Republic], on the street and forcing him to dig. Obviously, 
however, it is not confined only to the Jews. In the same way, men were 
taken in the streets, as well as from their homes, to perform forced labor.58 
The Jews were preferred by the Germans, which proved that they treated 
them in a unique way, different from the rest of the Polish public. Chaim A. 
Kaplan wrote on October 10, 1939 the following: “Only Jews are taken for 
forced labor. Young, energetic, muscular Poles stand and mock from afar the 
Jews who kneel under the burden of their toil.”59 
The identification of Jews could involve certain difficulties, particularly 
when related to non-orthodox Jews, who in many cases were not different in 
56 Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, vol. 1, 27.
57 YVA, M.49.E/1512, 1–2, testimony of Chaim Nadel.
58 Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, vol. 1, 26–27.
59 Kaplan, Scroll of Agony, 48.
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appearance from the rest of society. Therefore, harassment in the initial period 
of the military occupation referred specifically to Orthodox Jews,60 who were 
dressed in traditional attire, with beards and side locks.61 “Eyewitnesses tell that 
even military officers and high officials are not ashamed to chase after an old 
Jew with scissors in their hands, to cut off his beard.”62 It was easy to distinguish 
them from others. Sometimes detained were poor, Orthodox Jews, who were 
in lines for the free food, as Chaim A. Kaplan wrote in his diary: “A broken Jew, 
standing in a food line for long hours, was picked up for a twenty-four-hour 
work detail, hungry and thirsty as he was.”63 It was only later thatthe authorities 
obliged the Jews to wear the Star of David, which, inter alia, facilitated the rapid 
identification of all Jews. Nevertheless, persecution was not limited only to the 
people, but also to the symbols and everything bringing to mind the Jewish 
religion. Germans would enter synagogues and houses of prayer in order to 
remove Jews praying there and take them into forced labor.64 The aim was not 
only to humiliate them by showing lack of respect for their religion, but also to 
humiliate them physically, abusing them by pulling them away from prayer to 
work. Often those taken were old men, who were physically unable to work. 
Some Jews, already at the beginning of the occupation, forfeited their health 
because of forced labor.65
Germans were also well informed about the Jewish holidays, and they par-
ticularly tormented the Jews on those days. During the holiday of Rosh Hashana, 
on September 14, 1939, the Jews in Częstochowa were drawn from the syna-
gogue and forced to work.66 In Warsaw during a morning prayer of “. . . Shemini 
Atzeret, a hundred and fifty men were pulled out of the Mława Street syna-
gogue, herded into a truck, and taken to enforced labor.”67 In Kraków, “on the 
Day of Atonement, they [Germans] raided the Jewish quarter. Cars stood 
next to the bridge at the end of Starowiślna Street, on which Jews who were 
caught were loaded, while all that action was accompanied by beating and 
derision. They took them to work. They returned in the evening badly beaten.”68 




64 YVA, M.49.E/1549, 1–2, testimony of Stefania Rosenberg.
65 YVA, M.49.E/1565, 1, testimony of Goldhust Blanka.
66 Liber Brenner, Widerstand un Umekum in Tschenstochover Geto (Warsaw: Yidisher Histor-
isher Institut in Pojlin, 1950), 8.
67 Kaplan, Scroll of Agony, 45.
68 YVA, M.49.E/1474, 1, testimony of Ester Fefer. 
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The humiliation and ill-treatment of Jews was accompanied by taking 
photographs, which took place in many cities in Poland. In various archives, 
many such photographs showing humiliated and harassed Jews taken by German 
soldiers are stored. The witness from Tarnów recalled: “Jews with beards were 
photographed on the streets while their beards were being torn off.”69
Forced labor took the form of humiliation and persecution. Still, the occu-
pational authorities faced the necessity to bring certain order on the streets and 
had to use local manpower to remove barricades and debris of destroyed houses. 
In some cities, like Warsaw, where fighting was intense, most of the streets were 
blocked with barricades made of brick, stones, tram wagons, destroyed cars, 
and other objects. In many places anti-aerial trenches had to be covered. Due 
to heavy bombing and sieges, in many cities squares, courtyards, and public 
gardens were turned to graves for people who died during the fighting. Those 
graves owould be removed. In many Polish towns, carcasses of horses, widely 
used for transportation and by the Polish army, also had to be removed from the 
streets. Due to destruction of local administration, organizational chaos and 
lack of available manpower, German military authorities used their powers in 
order to mobilize local citizens by force. In places where Jews did not live, the 
local Polish population was mobilized to perform urgent works, but in places of 
mixed population, the Jews were frequently preferred, which gave an occasion 
to humiliate them. Mobilization of local inhabitants during the military period 
to perform the most urgent works could serve as a solution during the initial 
period of the occupation, and in no way could substitute for organized labor.
JEWISH ORGANIZED LABOR 
Prolonged roundups of Jews on the streets of cities, in homes, and synagogues 
for forced labor had become a highly widespread phenomenon and impossible 
to bear. Chaotic roundups of Jews forced to work fully confused their economic 
and social lives. Because of the roundups, some Jews stopped going out in the 
streets. Apolinary Hartglas recalled this period in the following words: 
One of the most troubling economic measures was this: the picking up of 
people in the streets, or in their homes, for forced labor. This situation 
robbed the Jews of all opportunity of carrying on any kind of activity—no 
business, no office run by Jews can operate, because neither the owner nor 
69 YVA, M.49.E/4600, 1, testimony of Józef Korniło, Tarnów.
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the employees can be sure that they will get to their place of work. Even the 
employees of the Jewish Council are picked up while they are on their way 
to work.70
In many cities the Judenräte simultaneously came to the conclusion that 
it was necessary to take the initiative into their own hands and came up with a 
proposal to establish special labor detachments or work battalions, in order to 
ensure the continued supply of a work force for the German institutions. Such 
a solution would ensure the cessation of random roundups of Jews. Quite often 
these people were unable to do hard work that could cause exhaustion, disability, 
and even death. The orders of Reinhard Heydrich given to the Einsatzgruppen, 
concerning the census of the Jewish population, were supposed to determine 
not only their number, but also the quantity of Jews able to work, dividing the 
Jews into categories according to age and profession. In most cases, these orders 
were not completed. In Lublin, however, the registration of those able to work 
had been carried out on October 25, 1939—one day before the proclamation 
of the General Government.71 
The work battalions appeared from mid-October 1939. The Judenrat in 
Warsaw was established in the middle of October. Already on October 19, 1939, 
the Judenrat promised the security police recruitment of a required number of 
Jewish workers together with the necessary tools. The next step of regulating 
forced labor was the establishment of labor battalions. Labor battalions were 
responsible for the recruitment and assignment of Jewish workers according to 
the requests sent by the SS and police. 
Czerniaków offered to supply a certain number of workers if only they [the 
German authorities] would stop seizing whoever comes to their hands in 
the streets for forced labor. [. . .] Finally they agreed that the Judenrat will 
supply five hundred laborers a day, and that captures on the street will 
stop. Tomorrow will be the first day of this new arrangement. The Judenrat 
will pay each worker four złoty a day out of its treasury.72
The first group of 360 workers was ready on October 21, 1939.73 
70 Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 189; Apolinary Hartglas, Na pograniczu 
dwóch światów (Warsaw: Rytm, 1996), 279–30.
71 APL, RŻL-8, 39.
72 Kaplan, Scroll of Agony, 55.
73 Tatiana Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa Żydów w Warszawie,” 44. 
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Already in mid-October, the Jewish Council in Lublin send a request 
to the German Arbeitsamt proposing regulation on the assignment of Jewish 
workers for various German institutions. The Judenrat promised to deliver 100 
workers in exchange for cessation of arrests of Jews in the streets.74 In fact, the 
Lublin Judenrat created a Labor Department on October 20, 1939.75 The office 
was supposed to recruit the required number of Jewish workers and pay them 
wages from funds of the community, according to the established tariffs. Until 
end of March daily payment was as follows: single man: 2.5 zł; married man: 
3 zł; married man supporting more than four family members: 3.5 zł; single 
woman: 2.5 zł; married woman: 3.5 zł.76 At that time, for many refugees and 
deportees from other areas, that kind of employment gave a chance of gaining 
at least a minimal means for supporting themselves and their families.
DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN LEGISLATION ON FORCED LABOR  
IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF GENERAL GOVERNOR’S RULE
With the proclamation on October 26, 1939, the governor general of the 
General Government (Generalgouvernement), Dr. Hans Frank issued a series 
of acts. Two of them related to labor issues. The new authorities introduced 
obligatory labor (Arbeitspflicht) for the Polish population77 and compulsory 
labor (Arbeitszwang) for the Jewish population.78 Regulation on the intro-
duction of compulsory labor for the Jewish population was issued on the 
same day when the establishment of the General Government for the occu-
pied Polish territories was proclaimed. It is not clear why this regulation was 
adopted as one of the first regulations of the new governor general. It can be, 
however, assumed that the matter of Jewish forced labor, and labor in general, 
was one of the most important issues for the newly created administrative 
unit. Regulation on the introduction of compulsory labor for the Polish pop-
ulation of the General Government was no less important for the new author-
ity. Considering the economic policy, the introduction of forced labor and 
74 APL, RŻL-8, 47. Report on the activity of the [ Jewish] Council [in Lublin] for the period 
September 1, 1939 until August 31, 1940.
75 Ibid., 39.
76 Ibid., 49.
77 “Verordnung über die Einführung des Arbeitspflicht für die polnische Bevölkerung des 
Generalgouvernements. Vom 26. Oktober 1939,” VBlGG, 5; Karol Marian Pospieszalski, 
Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1952), vol. 2, 306–7.
78 “Verordnung über die Einführung des Arbeitszwangs für die jüdische Bevölkerung des 
Generalgouvernements. Vom 26. Oktober 1939,” VBlGG, 6; Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie 
“prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 560.
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compulsory labor was one of the steps in the direction of further measures for 
the economic  exploitation of the conquered population. A confirming fact 
is high  unemployment that was recorded at that time. It was a result of mil-
itary operations and related damage, administrative changes and creating of 
new customs  borders, lack of raw materials and fuels, chaos in the market. 
All those factors caused economic crisis and in consequence, economic 
stagnation and high  unemployment.79 Therefore, it was difficult in this 
period to introduce forced labor or, rather, require full employment. Since 
this was impossible, the authorities could on this basis remove surplus of 
labor force to Germany. Already at the end of 1940, many factories returned 
to work. According to the Kreishauptmann of Jędrzejów: 
The factories are still working to capacity and operate extremely profit-
able. It would be desirable if a decision was made soon about the future of 
the formerly Jewish factories that have been set into operation and good 
shape again by the Kreishauptmann [of Jędrzejów] and his staff, since there 
are rumors in circulation about nonsensical profits of the trustees that 
were not reciprocated.80 
In Starachowice, the situation of employment of Jews was also improving 
considerably:
As far as I could assess, 530 workers have been newly employed in 
October by the local Erzbergbau-GmbH (Ore Mining-East Ltd.). One 
has to take into account a further requirement of skilled labor in the local 
mines and smelting works in the near future. The activity of the local 
branch [in Starachowice] of the Arbeitsamt Radom can be called brisk. 
During the period under review, ca. 1,000 placements were carried out. 
The Jews were put on work detail in road construction, in work for the 
Water Management office, in agriculture and forestry, in mining and other 
places (army, administration and so forth).81
79 BA-MA, RW23-8, Rüstungswirtschaftlicher Lagebericht für 7.–28. October 1939, 134.
80 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Jędrzejów, Lagebericht für August 1940, 
September 5, 1940, scan 320.
81 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Starachowice, Lagebericht für Oktober 
1940, scan 769.
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By issuing separate orders for the Poles and the Jews, the authorities made 
formal distinctions between Polish and Jewish populations in ethno-racial 
terms. Other ethnic groups, such as the Ukrainians, were not included in those 
acts. The reason was not only the relatively low numbers of other groups, but 
also the idea that these groups could be used as a political tool in the event of a 
possible expansion to the east. The German population, after the occupation of 
the country, became a privileged group. Separate laws for the German popula-
tion were issued.82
It is important to emphasize that with the introduction of the above-men-
tioned regulations for Poles and Jews, there was no clear definition of the term 
“Jew.” This definition was introduced for the first time on July 24, 1940.83 
Probably, the German authorities at that time did not feel a need for such a 
definition, and it seemed obvious to them who was a Jew and who was not, 
or they relied on data registered in Polish documents. Representatives of the 
German administration were familiar with the legislation existing in Germany 
at that time, so the definitions of ethnicity were self-evident to them and prob-
ably were used in a somewhat subconscious manner. For example, the regula-
tion on the marking of Jewish men and women in the General Government 
of November 23, 193984 does not contain such a definition. Instead, the 
regulation of head of the Warsaw District of November 25, 193985 stipu-
lates that “under this ordinance shall be considered as a Jew, person which: 
1. which belonged or belongs to the Jewish community; 2. whose father or 
mother belong or belonged to the Jewish community.” Similar definition was 
published by the chef of the district of Kraków, Wächter, on November 18, 
1939, where he stated that “according to this regulation the Jews is: 1) that 
who is or was of Mosaic faith; 2) that person, whose father or mother are or 
were of Mosaic faith.”86 Those are simplified definitions, incompatible with 
the Nuremberg laws as well as with later regulations of the governor general. 
A definition of a “Pole” or a “Ukrainian” did not appear in the official documents 
82 Das Arbeitsrecht des Generalgouvernements: Die Regelungen der Arbeitsbedingungen, insbe-
sondere der Lohngestaltung im Generalgouvernement, Zusammengestellt und erlaeutert von 
Regierungsrat dr. iur. Heinz Melies (Krakow: Burgverlag, 1943).
83 “Verordnung über die Bestimmung des Begriffs ‘Jude’ im Generalgouvernement. Vom 24. 
Juli 1940,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 558–59; “Official defi-
nition of the term ‘Jew’ in the General Government, July 24, 1940,” in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 214–15; VBlGG, 1940, 231–32. 
84 Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń, 226–27.
85 Ibid., 227–28.
86 YVA-JM.12306, Rozporządzenie—Znamionowanie Żydów w okręgu Krakowa, scan 485. 
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as well. Therefore, the Poles were defined on the basis of the elimination of 
the possibility of belonging to the German or Jewish ethnic groups. Between 
German and Polish ethnic groups, there was certain mobility in connection 
with the introduction of the status of Volksdeutsche.87 Over time, the criteria 
for membership of this group were alleviated, thus increasing the possibility of 
changing of the status of many people, who did not have any legal base to define 
their belonging. Similar was the admission of the Ukrainian ethnic group to 
the General Government. Belonging to this group gave numerous membership 
privileges; so the number of Ukrainians in the General Government in the ini-
tial period of occupation grew to large sizes.88
Issuing of legal acts for various groups of Polish citizens was held without 
a definition of the governor general “citizenship,” which had further conse-
quences. The German authorities allowed the deportation of Polish or Jewish 
population from other areas and treated them the same way as inhabitants of 
the General Government. In this case, it would be more appropriate to use the 
term “inhabitant” and not “citizen.”
The regulation concerning the introduction of identity documents in the 
General Government uses the term “total Polish population in the General 
Government” (Gesamte polnische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements).89 
However, § 1, Section 2 contains a provision: “The identity card (Kennkarte). . . 
provides information on name, birth and ancestry, marital status, occupation, 
religion and nationality of its owner. It is equipped with a fingerprint.”90 This 
way, when Jewish religion was registered in the identity card, the Jews were 
distinguished. However, it was an indication based on religious affiliation 
rather than nationality. In such cases a person of Jewish origin, belonging to 
the Christian religion, could avoid categorization as Jewish. This, of course, 
depended on the origin of the records and names of parents. Strongly Jewish 
87 “Verordnung über die Einführung einer Kennkarte für deutsche Volkszugehörige im 
Generalgouvernement. Vom 26. Januar 1940,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 
vol. 2, 174–75.
88 Fritz Arlt, Die ukrainische Volksgruppe im Generalgouvernement, Regierung des Generalgouvernements 
(Krakau: n.p., 1940); Fritz Arlt, Polen-, Ukrainer-, Judenpolitik im Generalgouvernement für die 
besetzten polnischen Gebiete 1939/40 und im Oberschlesien 1941/43 und im Freitheitskampf der 
unterdrückten Ostvölker: Errinerungen eines Insiders (Lindhorst: Täge, 1995).
89 “Verordnung über die Einführung on Kennkarten im Generalgouvernement. Vom 26. 
Oktober 1939,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 375.
90 Ibid., vol. 2, 375. See § 1 (2). “Die Kennkarte gibt insbesondere Auskunft über Namen, 
Geburt und Abstammung, Familienstand, Beruf, Religion und Staatszugehörigkeit des 
Kennkarteninhabers. Sie ist mit einem Fingerabdruck zu versehen.”
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names and family names could indicate Jewish origin and thus arouse suspicion 
of the officials or the police.
The German authority was an occupation authority, formed as a result 
of winning the war.91 Through the nomination of Dr. Hans Frank on the 
post of governor general, Hitler entrusted him with all the executive power.92 
In terms of structures of power, the governor general was directly subject only 
to Hitler.93 On the basis of Hitler’s decree of October 12, 1939, the governor 
general had also full legislative power.94 Regulation of the obligation to work 
for the Poles (Arbeitspflicht) is important for further discussion, as a bench-
mark, and permits us to compare the status of workers in these two groups of 
occupied populations in conquered Poland: Poles and Jews. The text of the reg-
ulation of October 26, 1939 determined that all the inhabitants of the General 
Government of Polish nationality from 18 to 60 years of age are subject to 
public work. In the same document it was stated that the Jews were subjected 
to a special regulation. Persons who could demonstrate having constant and 
“useful” employment from the social point of view were not invoked to perform 
the obligation to work. In paragraph 3 of the regulation it is said that “the public 
obligation of work will be performed in particular on the on farms, construc-
tion and maintenance of public buildings, construction of roads, waterways 
and railways, regulation of rivers and work intended to meliorate agricultural 
conditions.”95 The regulation further provides that any person subjected to the 
obligation of work will receive salary, “according to the just rates.” According 
to this regulation, further provisions were the responsibility of the head of the 
Labor Department in the Office of the Governor General (Abteilung des Arbeit 
im Amt des Generalgouverneurs für die bestzte polnische Gebiete). At the head of 
this office stood Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Max Frauendorfer.96
91 “Erste Verordnung über den Aufbau der Verwaltung der besetzten polnischen Gebiete. Vom 
26. Oktober 1939, § 1,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 54.
92 “Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Verwaltung der besetzten polnischen 
Gebiete. Vom 12. Oktober 1939, § 3,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 52.
93 Ibid.
94 “Erste Verordnung über den Aufbau der Verwaltung der besetzten polnischen Gebiete. Vom 
26. Oktober 1939, § 7,” in Pospieszalski, Karol Marian, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 
vol. 2, 57.
95 “Verordnung über die Einführung des Arbeitspflicht für die polnische Bevölkerung des 
Generalgouvernements. Vom 26. Oktober 1939,” in Pospieszalski, Karol Marian, Hitlerowskie 
“prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 307; Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń, 194.
96 JD Max Frauendorfer (1909–1989) since October 1, 1939 until November 18, 1939 
was Trustee for Labor Affairs (Reichstreuhander der Arbeit), then President of the Main 
Department of Labor (Leiter des Hauptamtes Arbeit im Generalgouvernement). Due to the 
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Regulation concerning compulsory labor for Poles has suggested that 
employees not having a job and representing unused labor force could be uti-
lized to carry out public works, mainly in the reconstruction and expansion of 
infrastructure, agriculture, and the regulation of rivers. This indicated the plans 
of the German government for the occupied Polish areas. As a result of the war 
there was extensive damage to bridges, roads, and railways, which had to be 
rebuilt as soon as possible, both for strategic and economic reasons. However, 
the problem of regulation of rivers was different from the repair and expansion 
of infrastructure. It indicated significant understanding of the new administra-
tion in matters of Polish agriculture and pointed to the existence of plans for 
the transformation of Polish agriculture into more intense and extension existing 
farmland areas. It should be noted that such discussion took place in October 1939, 
which was meaning that the work could begin no sooner than six months later.97
Regulation regarding the introduction of compulsory labor for the Jewish 
population of the General Government of October 26, 1939, announced the 
introduction of compulsion to work (Arbeitszwang) for the Jewish population 
with an immediate effect on the date of publication of the regulation. Further the 
document stated in paragraph 1 that: “for this purpose the Jews are organized in 
detachments of forced labor.”98 Higher SS and Police Commander (HSSPF) 
in the General Government Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger was responsible for 
further implementing of the rules. In contrast to instructions of obligation to 
work for the Polish population, the regulation concerning the Jews did not 
mention anything more specific about locations of forced labor. It seems that 
the regulation on Jewish forced labor was, on the one hand, issued too early and 
on the other hand, too late. At the time of issuing of the regulation, October 
26, 1939, the authorities apparently wanted to emphasize the division of the 
occupied society on the Poles and the Jews. Their rights and obligations were 
different. Even in case of terminology concerning the matters of labor, dif-
ferent terms were used and they were not synonyms. At the moment of the 
 establishment of the General Government, a number of different rules for Poles 
conflict with Higher SS and Police Leader in the General Government Friedrich-Wilhelm 
Krüger, he was released of his duty and transferred to Waffen-SS. After a short leave, he was 
employed by Fritz Sauckel as his Plenipotentiary in Holland. 
97 “Verordnung über die Einführung des Arbeitspflicht für die polnische Bevölkerung des 
Generalgouvernements. Vom 26. Oktober 1939, § 3,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” 
okupacyjne, vol. 2, 307.
98 “Verordnung über die Einführung des Arbeitszwangs für die jüdische Bevölkerung des 
Generalgouvernements. Vom 26. Oktober 1939, § 1,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” 
okupacyjne, vol. 2, 560.
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and Jews were issued, but the regulations concerning forced labor appeared to 
be the most significant. Hans Frank did not specify the scope of labor more 
closely, as was the case of the Polish population, the way of its implementing, 
and its goals, whether economic or other. Furthermore, it was not stated, as it 
was in the case of Poles, whether all Jews were forced to perform forced labor, 
which age group was to perform forced labor and whether Jews employed in 
other companies also had to perform forced labor, or whether this legislation 
only concenrned the unemployed. Soon after the establishment of the General 
Government, new regulations appeared relating to employment law and pro-
tection of employment, containing no distinction between Poles and Jews, 
which would mean that all employment contracts valid on August 31, 1939 
remained in force, also in the case of the Jews.99
It should be emphasized that at the time of issuing the regulation on forced 
labor for Jews, such labor was performed by thousands of Jews in the General 
Government every day. During this period, however, kidnapping Jews from the 
street to forced labor continued. Sometimes they were taken away from their 
current places of employment to do other work. The most active factor in this 
procedure was the SS and police, though the Wehrmacht was also involved in 
the kidnapping of Jews from the streets, places of employment or homes. As the 
rule, the works where the Jews were forcibly brought were mostly dirty works, 
very difficult, and degrading.
An important point of regulation of October 26, 1939 concerning the 
introduction of forced labor for Jews was revealed in § 2. This paragraph stated 
that “the necessary measures for implementation of this regulation will be 
adopted by the higher SS and police leader.”100 This meant that forced labor 
of Jews were to be regulated not by civilian labor offices but by the SS. It was 
also a confirmation that Jewish affairs in general were in the hands of the SS. 
This decision was in the spirit of earlier documents, especially telegraphic 
message sent by Heydrich, to all operational groups (Einsatzgruppen) of the 
Sipo in Poland, from September 21, 1939, where he transferred in the hands 
 99 “Erste Durchführungsverordnung zur Verordnung vom 25. Oktober 1939 über die 
Eiführung der Arbeitspflicht für die polnische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements. 
Vom 31. Oktober 1939,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 308.
100 “Verordnung über die Einführung des Arbeitszwangs für die jüdische Bevölkerung des 
Generalgouvernements. Vom 26. Oktober 1939,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” 
okupacyjne, vol. 2, 560.
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of the Einsatzgruppen101 all the matters concerning organization of Jewish 
councils and other matters related to Jews. Operational groups of the Security 
Police became later a part of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) that was 
established on September 22, 1939. In Germany, for example, Jewish affairs 
were in the hands of the Gestapo: Referat B4 of the division IV. In the General 
Government the same system of dealing with Jewish matters was introduced as 
in Germany.
The consequences of all Jewish matters, including labor issues, being 
handled by the SS and the police were far-reaching. First of all, these were 
not the actions of the civilians, but of the police, which have obviously influ-
enced the treatment of the Jewish workers. During the mobilization of work-
ers, organization of labor, and its supervision, brutal police methods were 
often used. In addition, the SS and the police could not deal with the issues 
of forced labor of Jews in a professional manner. Brutality and the use of force 
did not ensure the rational use of labor resources. The consequence of this 
state of affairs was the lack of coordination between civilians, and SS and 
police agents, leading to numerous conflicts and irrational and uneconomical 
actions. The use of police methods was aimed at unlimited exploitation of 
the Jews in the initial period of Nazi occupation, but it led to further con-
sequences and created undue burdens, and even a financial overload of the 
Jewish communities in the General Government.
LABOR OFFICES (ARBEITSÄMTER)
Responsible for organization of labor were the labor offices (Arbeitsämter), 
which were created in general in October 1939. However, already on September 
14, 1939 the Chef der Zivilverwaltung established labor offices in Tarnowiec, 
Lubliniec, Częstochowa, Wieluń, Piotrków, Radomsko, Kielce, Radom, and 
Końskie.102 In the General Government, 23 labor offices were created and in addi-
tion 70 branches of labor offices (Nebenstellen) were set up.103 From the part of 
the government for organization of labor in the General Government, the Labor 
Department of the Office of the Governor General (Die Abteilung des Arbeit im 
101 “Schnellbrief,” 21 September 1939, in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 
532–36.
102 Armeeoberkommando. Der Chef der Zivilverwaltung, Tagesbefehl Nr 6, Tshcenstochau, 
den 14. September 1939. AIPN, NTN, 196/270, 11.
103 Max Freiherr Du Prel, Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen: Ein Überblick über Gebiet 
Gestaltung und Geschichte (Krakow: Buchverlag Ost GmbH, 1940), 288.
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Amt für die Generalgouverneurs besetzten polnischen Gebiete) was responsible. Later, 
the name “Labor Department” (Abteilung Arbeit) was replaced by “the Main 
Department of Labor” (Hauptamt Arbeit). At the head of the department stood 
Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Max Frauendorfer. Basically, department activities were 
divided into four groups.104 The first dealt with the issues relating to trusteeship of 
industrial plants (Treuhänder); the second dealt with the management and admin-
istration of labor matters (Arbeitseinsatz), and to this group were subjected labor 
offices; the third group dealt with issues of social protection (Sozialversicherung), 
with particular emphasis on the needs of the population associated with damage 
caused by the war; and the fourth group dealt with issues relating to housing and 
population settlements issues (Wohnung- und Siedlungswesen).105 To the head of 
the Labor Department were subjected appropriate positions at the level of heads 
of district offices. At the head of the Labor Department in the districts stood chefs 
of departments (Leiter der Arbeit Abteilungen bei den Chefs der Distrikt). Labor 
offices were engaged in tasks related to inspection of labor, keeping of statistics 
of unemployed and employment, as well as mandatory employment of unem-
ployed to obligatory labor (Arbeit Pflicht) in the case of non-Jewish population. 
Labor offices also mobilized Polish workers for work in German agriculture and 
industry in the Third Reich.
Labor offices registered all able-bodied Poles, shaped working conditions, 
and were engaged in the provision of forced laborers to the Reich. During the 
initial period of the occupation until the summer of 1940 and from mid-1942, 
the Jewish population was not subject to the labor offices, because the SS and 
the police dealt with their issues. In the autumn of 1939 shipment of Polish 
workers to the Reich began. According to the reports Polish population tried 
to evade the mobilization to work in the Reich. The Kreishauptmann of Jasło 
reported in July 1940: “By night police action only a very small part of the 
required workers can be detected incidentally. The eligible people are not to be 
found at home even during the night, but they spend the night in the woods or 
at friends and relatives in other villages. The fear to go to the Reich, has its basis 
in the most absurd rumors that Polish farm workers are to be used in part on the 
theater of war or in danger zones, on the other—apart from Poles’ reluctance 
before work—in reports that come to the relatives from the Reich from the 
farm workers sent there.”106 
104 Max Freiherr Du Prel, ed. Das Generalgouvernement (Würzburg: K. Triltsch, 1942), 135–40.
105 Ibid., 286.
106 YVA-O.53/101, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Jasło, Jasło, den 2. Juni 1940, Lagebericht 
über die Zeit von Mitte Mai 1940 bis Ende Mai 1940, scans 74–76.
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Systematic registration and shipment of Polish workers took place since 
1940. In fact, the shipment of Polish workers to Germany could create an impres-
sion of much harder persecution of Poles then the Jews. The Kreishauptmann 
of Jasło wrote: “The Jews pride themselves that they can do their work here, 
they do not need to go to in the Reich, where they would live in chaos of the 
war. Even though the enforcement exerted by the police had little effect on the 
deployment of farm workers because of the aforementioned circumstances, 
I would consider it inappropriate to abandon doing so. This would undoubtedly 
be interpreted by the Poles as backing off or conceding of the German adminis-
tration.”107 On the other hand, the Kreishauptmann of Końskie reported: 
The Polish population welcomed the removal of 16 to 25-year-old Jews 
for forced labor with particular satisfaction. Until now, the Jews triumphed 
over the Poles, because the Poles were sent to Germany as seasonal workers, 
while they could stay here. In addition, they troubled the Poles with rumors 
about the cession of their homeland to the Russians. With the crackdown on 
the Jewish forced laborers the rumors were quashed abruptly.108
The German authorities tried initially to persuade the Poles about the 
benefits and job prospects in the Reich, however soon it became clear that 
voluntary mobilization of Poles failed and the Germans begun to use force in 
order to mobilize required quantity of Polish laborers. Already in 1940 Polish 
resistance against their labor mobilization grew. The Kreishauptmann of Pułwy 
wrote in his report: “The employment of labor of the Polish population lately 
meets a growing resistance. One has the impression as if certain powers worked 
methodically against the willingness to work, and made counter-propaganda. 
For example, in one community of 200 requested workers 8 men reported for 
work, in another community, of 300 requested workers 27. Concerning the 
coercive measures, some expressed they would rather be imprisoned than work 
for a few pennies. In an agricultural business, the workers demanded a pay-rise 
from the manager, threatening to go on strike. That didn’t happen because 
I arrested the ringleaders and interpreters.”109
Labor offices below the district level did not coincide with the administrative 
division of districts into Kreishauptmannschaften and Stadthauptmannschaften, 
107 Ibid.
108 YVA-O.53/101, Der Kreishauptmann von Końskie, Lagebericht, September 9, 1940, scan 2. 
109 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Puławy, Lagebericht für Oktober 1940, 
Puławy, den 6. November 1940, scan 826.
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but were created in larger towns. For example, in the district of Warsaw, labor 
offices were established in Warsaw, Siedlce, Sochaczew, Mińsk Mazowiecki and 
Skierniewice. Each of these offices had branches (Nebenstellen). The biggest 
number of branches was in Warsaw (nineteen in total).110 Labor offices could 
assign people to work or impose an obligation on each municipality to indicate 
a certain number of workers. Control of labor was performed using the labor 
cards (Arbeitskarte), introduced at the end of 1940, in which the employer 
typed employment data. The employees received certificates of occupation 
(Beschäftigunsnachweis) from the employment office that had a work card.
One of the most important tasks of labor offices was to mobilize workforce 
(Arbeitseinsatz). Authorities could exercise control over the administration of 
the workforce through the introduction of registration of workers. In addition, 
the labor offices exercised control over the flow of labor force from one to 
the other jobs. This was done under the regulation on restriction of changes 
of workplaces of February 22, 1940.111 The labor offices could express their 
disagreement to change jobs thus controlling both size and quality of employ-
ment in specific industries or crafts. Labor offices also identified reserves of the 
workers, which could be sent to work in the Reich. Writing about tasks of labor 
offices in 1940, Max Frauendorfer mentioned the need to send to the Reich 
100,000 Polish workers for work in German industry and agriculture.112
Simultaneous resumption of economic activity in the General Government 
resulted in increasing need to regulate the flow of workers to particular sectors 
of the economy and individual companies.
LEGAL STATUS OF JEWS AND POLES CONCERNING  
FORCED LABOR
The term “forced labor” (Zwangsarbeit), which is crucial in the present work, 
requires further explanation. In the official German documents and regula-
tions the term appears for the first time in the Regulation of Dr. Hans Frank, 
on October 26, 1939. This term was used widely for several years and did not 
change within that time until the end of the war, but its content underwent 
110 Skorwider, Danuta, “Organizacja władz niemieckich na terenie dystryktu warszawskiego w 
latach 1939–1945,” in Raporty Ludwiga Fischera gubernatora dystryktu warszawskiego 1939–
1944, ed. Krzysztof Dunin-Wąsowicz (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1987), 62. 
111 Verordnung über die Beschränkung des Arbeitsplatzwechsels, 22. Februar 1940. 
112 Dr. Frauendorfer, “Organisation des Arbeitseinsatzes,” in Du Prel, Das Deutsche Generalgou-
vernement Polen, 291.
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continuous change. The first meaning, used by Frank, seems to mean that Jews 
not only should work, but must work, while in the case of Poles, it seems a kind 
of recommendation, or determination of direction. Under this Regulation, the 
Poles were supposed to have a permanent place of employment. There was, 
however, a substantial part of rural population in Poland, which was not offi-
cially employed in any other place than in their farms. The Germans had thus 
less control of this part of the General Government population. Nevertheless, 
according to German economic analysis, the Polish countryside was overpop-
ulated and subsequently became a reservoir for mobilisation of Polish work-
ers to be sent to the Reich. In the case of Jews, without any doubt, they had 
to work. In the official documents there is no explanation of reasons to issue 
forced labor provision, or as to why there was such a differentiation between 
Jews and Poles. Frank does not mention the elements of German propaganda, 
which defined the Jews as parasites, using the work of others, or as exploiters. 
The text of the Regulation of October 26, 1939 is laconic, and one can get the 
impression that the authors of this regulation do not really know what content 
they could insert into its framework. In the case of the Poles, a few days after 
issuing the regulation on the obligation to work, further implementing rules 
appeared, whereas in the case of the Jews, another month and a half passed 
before such regulations were published.
First supplementary directive to the Regulation of October 26, 1939, 
regarding the introduction of compulsory labor for the Polish population in 
the General Government, was issued on October 31, 1939,113 that is, five days 
after the proclamation of the General Government and the introduction of the 
obligation of labor. The regulation was signed by Dr. Krohn, head of the Labor 
Department. Under this regulation, the labor office was to forward the laborers 
required to appropriate jobs institutions and employment may be terminated 
only with the permission of the labor office. For non-compliance with the 
obligation of work, punishments of prison terms and fines were to be imple-
mented. Wages for the work were to be determined by the chief of the district 
(Distriktchef) or the head of the labor office.
On the same day, another regulation was issued, signed by Governor 
General Hans Frank: regulation to normalize the conditions of labor and to 
protect in the General Government.114 Under this Regulation, any legislation 
relating to working conditions and workers’ protection remained in force as 
113 Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń, 195–97.
114 Ibid., 189–91.
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long as they did not change the regulation of October 31, 1939. In addition, all 
collective agreements between employees and employers were left unchanged. 
However, heads of districts acquired a right to influence the contracts, regulating 
wages by means of tariffs. In case of regulations which went beyond the bound-
aries of districts, decisions on tariffs were taken by the head of the Department 
of Labor. Similarly, additional rules and regulations were to be issued by the 
head of Department of Labor. The regulation issued by Hans Frank abolished 
the existing regulation issued by the Head of Administration by the supreme 
commander “East” on the normalization of conditions of labor and the protec-
tion of work on the occupied Polish areas of September 17, 1939.115 Already on 
November 1, 1939 the first guideline implementing the Regulation of October 
31, 1939 appeared.116 The guideline was issued by Dr. Krohn, director of the 
Labor Department in the General Government, in order to regulate tariffs of 
salaries issues in the General Government. According to this guideline, district 
chefs had to submit all tariffs of salaries applicable in their districts to Krohn. 
These tariffs were to be published in the Official Regulations of the General 
Governor and the Department of Labor in the Office of the Governor General 
had to keep a register of tariffs (Tarifregister). In addition, all collective agree-
ments in force on August 31, 1939 were to be added to the register of tariffs. 
On the other hand, on November 16, 1939, a second guideline appeared.117 It 
standardized regulations on working conditions of workers and employees in 
the public service.
Regulation on broadening the obligation to work for the Polish popula-
tion in the General Government, dated December 14, 1939,118 expanded the 
duty to work for the Polish population to young people from 14 to 16 years 
old. So far, the obligation to work was applicable to adolescents as young as 
16 years old. This provision also ensured that the working conditions were 
adapted to the physical abilities of young people. On December 16, 1939 
the Regulation on granting allowances for the unemployed appeared.119 
Compensations could be paid to people able to work who were not employed 
and not responsible for that situation. However, the payment of unemploy-
ment benefits could be contingent on completion of the work requirements 
(public works). Jews were excluded from the benefit of unemployment 
115 Verordnungsblatt fur die besetzten Gebiete in Polen, 56. 
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assistance. Paragraph 2.1 says that “in cases of poverty they [ Jews] are to be 
send to the Jewish welfare organizations.”120 
THE DECISIONS OF THE HSSPF FRIEDRICH-WILHELM  
KRÜGER IN DECEMBER 1939 
Even before the issuance of two implementation decrees on December 11 
and 12, 1939, HSSPF Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger said on December 8: “The 
problem of forced labor of Jews cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner from 
day to day. The starting point in this regard is the establishment of records of 
the Jews—men aged from 14 to 50 years. It would also determine the current 
occupation by the Jews, precisely because in these areas Jews provided all kinds 
of crafts and would be a pity if these forces were not utilized in useful manner. 
In order to do this careful planning was required. As for now, we should create 
Jewish labor detachments and hire workers, where there is this urgent need. 
The task of district heads (Distiktchef or Distriktgouverneur) would be to formu-
late such needs.”121 The above quotation shows clearly that at the beginning 
of December, the German authorities had no concept of using forced labor 
of Jews and the previous acts were deprived of any realistic possibility of their 
implementation. The only real proposal was to create labor detachments in 
order to exploit them for the most urgent tasks.
The first provision for implementing of Regulation of October 26, 
1939 with the introduction of compulsory labor for the Jewish population of 
the General Government on December 11, 1939 was issued by the HSSPF 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger.122 In its content, in principle, it does not  concern 
the problems of work but rather addresses questions related to issues of 
movement restrictions of the Jewish population in the General Government. 
According to this provision with effect from January 1, 1940, all Jews residing 
in the General Government were prohibited from changing their place of resi-
dence without permission. All the Jews who came to the General Government 
120 Ibid.
121 “Wypowiedź HSSPF Krügera na posiedzeniu kierowników wydziału rządu General 
Government w sprawie pracy przymusowej Żydów,” in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Ekstermi-
nacja Żydów, 203–4.
122 “Erste Durchführungsvorschrift zur Verordnung vom 26. Oktober 1939 über die Einführung des 
Arbeitszwanges für die jüdische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements. Vom 11. Dezember 
1939,” VBlGG, 1939, 231; Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 560–62.
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within 24 hours after arrival had to register at the mayor’s office or inform the 
Jewish council about that fact. Moreover, the provision introduced a curfew 
from 9:00 p.m to 5:00 a.m. During those hours, one could move on the streets 
only after obtaining written permission. Exclusively, section 4 of the provision 
concerned forced labor, and that was because all the Jews violating the rules 
of this provisions were to be “immediately sent to severe long-term labor ser-
vice” (langdauerende Arbeitszwangsdienst).123 However, apart from forced labor 
Jews could also be punished under other laws. The first executive order treated 
forced labor as an element of punishment.
The second supplementary direction to the Regulation of October 26, 
1939, regarding the introduction of compulsory labor for the Jewish popu-
lation of the General Government, was issued on December 12, 1939,124 and 
concerned the preparation of an inventory. According to the first paragraph of 
this provision, all Jewish residents of the General Government from age 14 to 
60 were obliged to perform forced labor. It should be noted that in a regula-
tion issued two days later the duty of work for Poles also extended the group of 
subjected to labor from the age of 14,125 in contrast to previous orders requiring 
the work form the age of 16. Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger announced that forced 
laborers would be assigned to work according to their professions and skills. 
In order to conduct the registration of Jews for forced labor, all male Jews aged 
12 to 60 years had to present themselves to the registration. They were to 
be called by the mayors or the Kreis-and Stadthauptleute to appear before 
the relevant territorial Judenrat in order to register in a special card index 
(Erfassungkartei).126 Mayors were responsible for the proper conduct of the reg-
istration process. According to this ordinance, not labor offices but the Judenräte 
had to carry out the registration process of the Jewish workers under the 
supervision of the mayors, that is, in practice, the municipalities. However, the 
process of  mobilization of the workers registered to work was to take place on 
special call of the German authorities. Paragraph 4 of the provision of December 
123 Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń, 231.
124 “Zweite Durchführungsvorschrift zur Verordnung vom 26. Oktober 1939 über die Einführung 
des Arbeitszwanges für die jüdische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements. 
(Erfassungvorschrift) Vom 12. Dezember 1939,” VBlGG, 1939, 246; Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie 
“prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 562–64.
125 Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń, 197–98.
126 Bericht für den Monat März 1940. Abt. Innere Verwaltung, Judenreferat VIII. A letter about 
transfering by Kreishauptleute of card index of Jews performing forced labor, which will be 
transfered to Kraków, YVA- O.53/101, 2.
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12, 1939 did not specify what kind of authority Germans had to summon the 
Jewish workers to perform labor.127 
Paragraph 5 of the provision specifies how to prepare the Jewish work-
ers to perform forced labor. The workers called upon had to be present them-
selves in a specific collection point on time. They also had to bring with them 
food for two days and two clean sheets. Holders of workshops had to come to 
the assembly point with tools. Morevoer, they had to pre-notify the Judenrat. 
At the same time, the regulations forbade Jews to sell, rent, or transfer their own 
tools, workshops, or machinery without prior written permission of Kreis- or 
Stadhauptmann. For failure to appear on gathering points, submitting false or 
incomplete data, or situation of inability to work, the transgressions were pun-
ishable by imprisonment for 10 years. A similar punishment was to be applied 
towards the members of the Judenrat and other people who obstructed the pro-
cess of registration and attendance for forced labor or were hiding the requested 
person. Again, responsible for the execution of these orders were the mayors 
(Bürgermeister) via the Judenräte.
The provisions of December 12, 1939 theoretically only could regulate the 
registration and administration of the Jews requested to perform forced labor. 
In practice, those regulations were unclear and vaguely worded. City offices 
and the Judenrat were esponsible for the execution of the foregoing provisions. 
It was unclear, however, who and when had to perform forced labor, where it 
would take place and how it would be organized. As suggested in paragraph 
5 of the provisions of December 12, 1939, it can be assumed that the 
 workers coming with the supply for two days could be sent to labor camps 
or  long- distance facilities. It was significant, however, that the HSSPF in 
the General Government, being a part of police apparatus, transferred the 
 implementation of these laws and control of its implementation to the civil 
authorities apart from the labor office. For the administration of forced labor 
of Polish Jews the municipalities and the Judenräte were responsible, in practice.
At the time the HSSPF issued the implementing rules, the actual situa-
tion in the General Government was completely different of that depicted in 
the document. Individual Judenräte carried out the register of those who were 
able to work. These registrations were performed in Warsaw, Lublin and other 
cities. Similarly, there were the labor departments of the Judenräte that dealt 
127 “Zweite Durchführungsvorschrift zur Verordnung vom 26. Oktober 1939 über die 
Einführung des Arbeitszwanges für die jüdische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements. 
(Erfassungvorschrift) Vom 12. Dezember 1939, § 2,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” 
okupacyjne, vol. 2, 563.
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with the matters of labor on an ongoing basis of forced labor. In some cities, 
labor battalions (bataliony pracy) had been already created, which were used 
to perform forced labor. They were organized primarily in order to avoid the 
so-called “wild” arrests of Jews on the streets in order to perform the most 
varied of works. These “wild” arrests had a very negative impact on the opinion 
of the Jewish public.
After the two provisions of December 11 and 12, which were very  general 
in their nature and still devoid of detailed guidance on the organization of 
labor, new detailed regulations were not issued until January 20, 1940. On that 
day were issued the orders for the Judenräte on registration and mobilization 
of forced labor (Dienstbefehl an die Judenräte für die Erfassung und Gestellung 
der Juden zur Zwangsarbeit).128 The fact that nearly 40 days passed between 
those regulations indicated the lack of haste and lack of organization and 
 coordination on issues of forced labor of Jews. Systematic forced labor of Jews 
was also impracticable due to continuous economic stagnation and the severe 
winter. Practical exploitation of Jewish workforce could take place only during 
late spring 1940. It was dependent, obviously, on the type of work performed. 
Working in the industry was much less dependent on climatic conditions than 
the work on infrastructure and agriculture, but Polish industry was still in a 
state of stagnation due to the disruption of the supplies of raw materials and 
energy as well as the disruption of production processes due to war damages, 
change of management, and disruption of connections between producers and 
the market.
The order of January 20, 1940 concerned the method of registration and 
mobilization of Jews to forced labor.129 This order was sent directly to the 
Judenräte, whose chairman and members had been held responsible for the 
 execution of the order. Those, who did not obey the order, were  threatened with 
imprisonment for 10 years. This last detail requires attention, as it  demonstrates 
the time perspective of the occupational authorities, who  evidently supposed 
that the occupied Polish territory would still be an integral part of the areas 
under German control after decades. Supervision of implementing of orders 
was in the hands of mayors and Kreis- and Stadhauptleute. Basically, the order 
concerned two principal issues: registration and appointment for forced 
labor. Case registration was to be done by making records. Each candidate to 
forced labor should have appropriate card. Cards were produced in 6 colours. 
128 “Dienstbefehl an die Judenräte für die Erfassung und Gestellung der Juden zur Zwangsarbeit. 
Vom 20. Januar 1940,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 565–68.
129 Ibid.
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Each colour corresponded to a professional group. Cards were made for all 
men from 12 to 60 years. In the case of health problems preventing work, it 
was necessary to carry out a medical examination by a doctor employed by a 
Judenrat, and appropriate medical certificate was be attached to the card. Cards 
were filled on the basis of information supplied by the subjects of registration 
of Jews, verified by members of the Judenrat. These files had to be the primary 
instrument for the administration of forced labor of Jews.
The Jewish workers were summoned for forced labor with mediation of 
the Judenräte, who were also responsible for timely appearance of workers on 
gathering points. Workers presenting themselves to forced labor had to be clean 
and deloused. They had also been provided with two sheets, extra clothing, 
coat, two pairs of shoes (if possible, long boots), three shirts, three pants, three 
pairs of stockings, a pair of gloves, two towels, a comb and brush, a set of cut-
lery, and food for two days. All these items had to be packed in a laundry bag or 
suitcase. In the case of poor Jews, Judenräte had to take care of their supplies.130
The workers had to bring with them light tools, while heavier tools and 
machines had to be prepared for transportation and the appropriate authori-
ties had to be informed. All belonging to the groups of those called for forced 
labor factories, plants, and other possessions, such as the right to lease, were 
to be reported to Kreis-or Stadhaupleute through the mayor, having confirmed 
the truth of these declarations. The letters from the mayors had to indicate to 
whom, during the absence of their owners, was entrusted the property or how 
it should be protected by the authorities.131
The order for Judenräte concerning calling for registration and for forced 
labor enables us to follow intentions of the German authorities concerning 
forced labor of Jews in the General Government. First of all, they did not inform 
which amount of time or workdays was necessary to perform such work and who 
was supposed to perform this work. The recommendations presented above 
create the impression that the forced labor was to be performed during a few 
days. However, it seems that its duration, according to the intention of HSSPF, 
was to last longer, perhaps weeks or months. Labor camps, however, were not 
mentioned in this document. Perhaps the author of the document was referring 
to long-distance workplaces, not necessarily the labor camps. Work would be 
done away from home because, as indicated by the directives; the workers had 
to appear with two sets of bed linen or several sets of underwear. Directives to 
130 Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 567.
131 Ibid., 567–68.
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provide the tools and machines, such as sewing machines or lathes, clearly testi-
fied to the intentions to create special plants for the Jews. This was confirmed by 
the guidelines of administration concerning protection of the factories or other 
Jewish businesses and real estate, which could be of importance only during 
periods of prolonged absence of the owners.132 However, any practical steps 
were not undertaken in order to create such plants for Jews at the turn 1940. 
The above-mentioned regulations were issued in order to register and bring to 
a state of readiness the Jewish labor force rather than to ensure its practical use.
THE PROCESSES OF ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION  
OF JEWS IN THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT
The Nazi policy towards Jews in the General Government was patchy and unco-
ordinated. On the one hand, from the very beginning of the civil administra-
tion in the General Government, two parallel processes—discrimination and 
exploitation—took place. These processes in many cases were contradictory, 
since discriminatory provisions hindered both the production capacity of the 
Jews and the rational use of their workforce. Therefore, economic exploitation 
was not the primary purpose of this policy, since it had not been carried out in 
a way that ensures maximum efficiency. Nazi policy towards the Jews could be 
described as more discriminatory and punitive than operational. These orders 
were designed not only to discriminate against Jews, but also to gradually limit 
the economic opportunities of Jews in the General Government.
The regulation of November 28, 1939 concerning the establishment of the 
Judenräte defined their function clearly: 
It is the duty of the Judenrat through its chairman or his deputy to receive 
the orders of the German Administration. It is responsible for the con-
scientious carrying out of orders to their full extent. The directives it 
issues to carry out these German decrees must be obeyed by all Jews and 
Jewesses.133
The Regulation of November 28, 1939 did mention the Judenräte, regard-
less of whether they had such name or not. The Judenräte continued adminis-
tration of Jewish communities of pre-war period and fulfilled many social and 
132 Ibid., 567.
133 “Verordnung über die Einsetzung von Judenräten. Vom 28. November 1939,” in 
Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 551.
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organizational tasks. During the military occupation and the early days of the 
General Government, many Jewish councils often gained new members, and 
their composition usually changed. However, in many cases, a majority of the 
prominent pre-war Jewish activists found themselves in new councils of the 
Jewish communities. During the military administration and the initial period 
of General Government, Jewish councils were modified and took over most 
administrative functions, which previously resided at the discretion of the 
municipalities. 
GERMAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT
At the end of October 1939, a few weeks after the end of the war in Poland, the 
economy in areas that were in the General Government’s borders remained 
paralysed, due to lack of raw materials, fuels, disruption of production 
processes, and market failure. Because of this situation, there was high unem-
ployment,134 especially among Jews. Any provisions on the obligation to 
labor and forced labor were unnecessary or unviable. First, the introduction 
of compulsory labor and forced labor in the current situation of unemploy-
ment and economic stagnation was impracticable. The population was inter-
ested in returning to work which simply was not available. Moreover, Jews 
arrested in order to perform forced labor, and the responsible authorities, at 
least for the time being, did not intend to obey the rules. The absurdity of 
this situation is also made evident by the fact that the HSSPF, the most active 
agent in the persecution of Jews, responsible for detention of Jews for the 
purpose of forced labor, also issued regulations to ensure the proper perfor-
mance of forced labor. The SS continued the wild roundups of Jews and in 
this respect belonged to the category of most insubordinate elements. HSSPF 
was not a professional responsible for economic matters as well as the entire 
apparatus of the RSHA. The SS had large competence in Jewish affairs. Their 
experience and power over the fate and lives of Jews allowed the SS to collect 
a large resource of gratuitous workforce and, therefore, to create economic 
organizations. These organizations could function and generate huge profits, 
not thanks to excellent economic administration, but rather due to unlimited 
exploitation of prisoners and Jews.
134 BA-MA, RW23-7, Rüstungswirtschaftlicher Lagebericht für 28. October–10. November 
1939, 7.
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Since the beginning of the war and the occupation, development of 
Jewish exploitation continued. However, at the end of 1939 these processes 
had not yet fully develped. If there had been a real need to issue the imple-
menting rules, it would have taken place much faster. Nevertheless, in the 
months of October and November 1939, German administration at differ-
ent levels was still under construction and was not able to manage excess 
manpower. HSSPF actually issued rules implementing the Regulation on 
the introduction of compulsory labor only on December 11 and 12, 1939. 
However, these rules were very general and did not explain how the whole 
mechanism could function.
Economic planning in the General Government took place in two ways. On 
one hand, there still remained the earlier concept of the General Government 
as a colony of Germany, which should provide labor forces, raw materials, and 
agricultural products. Hans Frank was under considerable pressure from the part 
of economic factors in Germany, to which, apparently, he could not resist. He 
expressed his hesitation inter alia in a letter to Göring dated January 25, 1940:
In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the defense industry,  
it is at present fundamentally impossible to carry on a long term eco-
nomic policy in the General Government. Rather, it is necessary so to 
steer the economy of the General Government that it will, in the shortest 
possible time, accomplish results representing the maximum that can be 
gotten out of the economic strength of the General Government for the 
immediate strengthening of our capacity for defense. In particular the fol-
lowing performances are expected of the total economy of the General 
Government—supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and 
female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—among them  
at least 750,000 agricultural workers of which at least 50% must be  
women-in order to guarantee agricultural production in the Reich and as a 
replacement for industrial workers lacking in the Reich.135 
On the other hand, the Armament Inspectorate of the Wehrmacht since 
the beginning of the occupation identified Polish industrial plants belong-
ing to the war industry sector as well as many plants producing equipment 
necessary for the army—for example plants producing optic lenses and optic 
135 Letter of Hans Frank to Göring of January 25, 1940 (1375-PS), IMT, Red Series, vol. 3, 
925–29.
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equipment.136 The aim of this action was using Polish war industry plants for 
the benefit of the German war production.137
In order to facilitate the economic exploitation of the General Government, 
the German authorities confiscated both raw materials and Polish and Jewish 
enterprises. The first regulation on this confiscation of raw materials and 
products, defining the framework for plunder, was issued by General von 
Brauchitsch in October 1939. The Governor General Regulation of November 
15, 1939 ordered the confiscation of assets of the Polish state.138 According 
to the regulation of January 24, 1940, it was possible to confiscate personal 
property for public purposes.139 This regulation also provided confiscation of 
ownerless assets, that is, belonging to people who did not reside in the General 
Government. The right to confiscate the assets belonged to the district gov-
ernor or an institution authorized by him. Jewish assets were enfranchised 
entirely. For the seizure of assets there was appointed a trustee (Treuhänder). 
The Regulation of January 24, 1940 provided great flexibility in the appropri-
ation of private assets by the German administration, the SS, and the police. 
Confiscation of enemy property, that is, the property that belonged to coun-
tries with which the German Reich was at war, or to nationals of those coun-
tries, was governed by the regulation of August 31, 1940.140 War industry plants 
were, however, confiscated on the basis of Hitler’s decree and transferred to the 
Wehrmacht.141
The management of Polish state property belonged to the Department of 
Trust of the Main Economic Department (Hauptabteilung Wirtschaft) of the 
General Government and to trust departments in the districts. However, the 
property of the Polish Railways (PKP) was taken over by the Eastern Railway 
(Ostbahn). The Trust Department ordered confiscation of private  companies 
and municipal real estate. As a result of the transfer of the above powers in the area 
of agricultural land and property by the Trust Department, these matters were 
administered by the Main Department of Food and Agriculture (Hauptabteilung 
136 BA-MA, RW23-7, Liste der bis heute besuchten 19 Rüstungs- 3 Versorgungsbetriebe, 15. 
November 1939, 34–35.
137 BA-MA, RW23-7, Rüstungswirtschaftlicher Lagebericht für 29. October–18. November 
1939, 4–6; BA-MA, RW23-7, Rüstungswirtschaftlicher Lagebericht für 29. October–18. 
November 1939, 4–6.
138 VBlGG, 1939, 37; Doc. Occ., vol. 6, 128–129. 
139 VBlGG, 1940, vol. 1, 23–28, 62; Doc. Occ., vol. 6, 253.
140 VBlGG, 1940, vol. 1, 265–72.
141 BA-MA, RW23-7, Rüstungswirtschaftlicher Lagebericht für 15. Juli–13. August 1940, 
106.
59Forced Labor in the Ghettos and Labor Detachments  CHAPTER 2
Ernährung und Landwirtschaft). For this purpose, a special Board of Real Estates 
(Liegenschaftsverwaltung) had been established.142 Forests were under the man-
agement of the Department of Forestry (Abteilung Forsten).
Companies which were not liquidated had difficulties in economic activity. 
The governor’s general orders of April 23, 1940 hampered the acquisition, 
establishment, and development of Polish enterprises.143 According to 
this regulation, it was necessary to obtain authorization of the German 
 administration not only to acquire industrial or agricultural enterprises, but also 
for the  purpose of acquisition of shares, the extension of the existing workplace, 
establish subsidiaries, and launch existing but inactive companies. This was 
associated with the rationalization of the German economy and shortages of raw 
materials and especially fuel. The top-down regulation eliminated enterprises 
which were small, unprofitable, and consuming large quantities of raw  materials 
and fuel, or were producing the goods for the market, or were inconsistent with 
the  standards, priorities, and plans of the Reich.144
In order to recreate the economics of the General Government, recon-
struction and infrastructure development was necessary. This task was under-
taken by the Department of Civil Engineering (Bauwesen) in the Office of the 
Governor General, led by Bauder. The department was divided into groups 
of road and bridge construction (Gruppe Straßen-und Brückenbau), group 
for construction of waterways (Gruppe Wasserstraßen) and group for high 
constructions (Gruppe Hochbau). The group for construction of roads and 
bridges was represented in the following cities: Kraków, Kielce, Lublin, Mińsk, 
Radom, Rzeszów, Warsaw, and Zamość. The enitre existing road network 
was divided into three categories: highways, district roads, and county roads 
(Durchgangsstraßen, Distriktstraßen und Kreisstraßen). Until the beginning of 
winter 1939 and 1940, the group was able to fix just about 800 km roads of the 
first category. Plans for 1940 provided reconstruction of 1000 km of former 
national roads in order to pass them to the first category, with a width of 6 and 
7.5 m, and remodelling or construction of 250 bridges.145
142 Lageberichte, governor of the Kraków District, February 17, 1941. In the district, there were 
184 Liegenschaften having 68202 ha of land, of which 122 were administered by the German 
administration and 62 (8946 ha) were leased. YVA-O.53/101, 3 
143 VBlGG, 1940, vol. 1, 171–74; Doc. Occ., vol. 6, 253.
144 BA-MA, RW23-2, Die wesentliche Probleme, ihre Entwicklung und ihre Lösung im 4. 
 Vierteljahr 1942, 6–7, 42; BA-MA, RW23-5, Geschichte der Rü In im GG (1. Juni 1940–31. 
Dezember 1941), 67.
145 Du Prel, Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen, 296.
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The river road construction was expected to begin in 1940; particularly 
extensive works were to be done in order to use Wisła River as a waterway. 
According to a protocol: 
The General Governor speaks about the great task of regulating the Wisła. 
It would concern a length of 900 km which has not been worked on, partly 
at all, partly since more than 50 years. The regulation of the Wisła would 
give a long-term opportunity to employ a large number of workers in a 
useful manner.146 
The German authorities estimated that about 1800 km of rivers could 
be used as waterways in Poland, while only about 800 km were used in real-
ity until then. In order to adapt rivers for water transport their level had to be 
regulated, that is, proper embankments had to be built and the river current 
deepened, and in some places dams and culverts had to be built. At the end of 
the year a considerable part of those plans had been completed. For example, 
the Kreishauptmann of Puławy wrote in his report in December 1940: “Apart 
from the tasks in the sapper units, which is important for the armed forces, 
substantial roadwork was done on the communal, Kreis-, district, and through 
roads, the through road Puławy-Lublin was broadened, and the bridges were 
enhanced by new constructions. Apart from that, considerable work was done 
on the Kreis- and communal roads.”147 In addition, the administration planned 
to build water berms along the rivers in order to offset the risk of flood in 
spring time. Likewise, it was necessary to build adequate safeguards in order 
to discharge the ice damming, which resulted in floods or destroyed bridges. 
German plans were more far-reaching, because they projected construction 
of the Wisła-Bug canal near Dęblin, which would allow connection of river 
 navigation network between Poland and Russia, that is, the creation of  channel 
Dnieper-Wisła.148
The Regional Planning Department (Abteilung Raumordnung) of the 
General Government coordinated economic planning, and was headed by 
Dr. Schepers. From the standpoint of the department, the area of the General 
146 YVA-JM.21 (3508214_08004009), Hans Frank’s Diary, vol. 15, R. 5, Beschprechung von 
Fragen der Einsiedlung von Polen und Juden in das Generalgouvernement, den 15. Januar 
1941, scan 15. 
147 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Puławy, Lagebericht für November 1940, 
Puławy, den 7. Dezember 1940, scan 1028.
148 Du Prel, Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen, 296.
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Government was evaluated as an important area of interest for the German 
Reich (wichtiges deutsches Interessengebiet). The purpose of this depart-
ment was to get acquainted with Polish spatial development plans, gathering 
 statistics, and creating a new regional plan for the General Government to 
craft an organic connection with the Reich. For this purpose, in addition to the 
Regional Planning Department at the Office of the Governor General, three 
branches were initially created in the districts of Lublin, Radom, and Warsaw. 
A Statistical Office was added to the Planning Department in Kraków, which 
fulfilled the tasks of the Central Statistical Office (Statistische Zentralstelle 
für das Generalgouvernement). Similarly, there was also a Cartographic Office 
(Zentralkartenstelle für das Generalgouvernement).149 The Regional Planning 
Department, according to Oberregierungsrat Dr. Schepers, did pioneering work 
in order to create a new order for the needs of the Third Reich.150 In  practice, 
the department integrated development plans in various economic and 
 political areas, such as planning for population settlements (Siedlungsplanung), 
planning for exploitation of the resources in terms of industrial, forestry, 
 agriculture, and transport, taking into account the needs of the Wehrmacht.
The situation in the field of agriculture was evaluated very poorly. First, 
the Polish countryside was overpopulated, Polish agriculture (at least  according 
to German specialists) was inefficient, and productivity per worker in agricul-
ture was very low. The peasants produced primarily for their own needs and 
only a small part of the output reached the market. A better organization of 
agriculture was hindered by highly fragmented fields; and therefore, it was 
necessary to regroup land. In addition, many areas required improvement of 
water infrastructre in order to enlarge quantity of arable land. Melioration of 
water conditions required, on one side, the regulation of many rivers, such as 
construction of embankments preventing floods and canals and thus remov-
ing large quantities of water in the springtime, enabling increased cultivation. 
According to the head of the Food and Agriculture Department of the General 
Government, Körner, over the next four years (1940–1944) circa 700 thousand 
hectares of land had to be meliorated.151 This problem was dealt with by the 
Office of Water (Wasserwirtschaftsamt). Moreover, it was necessary to inten-
sify  agriculture with increased fertilization, switch to the market production, 
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 agriculture through mechanization, provision of modern machinery, and elec-
trification of agriculture. To ensure greater supply of electricity, the construc-
tion of new hydroelectric power plants in Rożnów was necessary. The German 
authorities argued that it was necessary to regulate the market for agricultural 
products. According to Körner, the pre-war situation was inadmissible, when 
the market for agricultural products and the seeds was dominated by Jews, and 
a new pricing policy for agricultural products was to be developed.152
Despite the negative attitude towards Jews, saturated with propaganda 
and anti-Semitism, evaluation of Jewish labor force was not uniform. At the 
basis of the decision on forced labor of Jews was their evaluation as exploiters 
who avoid heavy physical labor. Therefore, regulations concerning employ-
ment of Jews mentioned educational purpose of forced labor. However, these 
opinions were based mainly on the propaganda. Upon arrival at the General 
Government, the opinions of many high-ranking German officers underwent a 
modification. One of them was HSSPF Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, who spoke 
at a meeting of heads of department of the General Government about forced 
labor of Jews.153 He said: “precisely in these areas [in the General Government] 
Jews provided all kinds of crafts and would be a pity if these forces were not 
utilized in a useful manner.”154
INITIATIVES OF GLOBOCNIK
Despite the transfer of control over the Jewish affairs to the hands of the SS, it 
would seem that a leading factor in the field of exploitation of Jewish labor would 
still be the civil administration. Many civil administration departments were 
dealing with the economy, such as the Department of Economics, Department 
of Construction, Department of Food and Agriculture, Department of Regional 
Planning, and others, created for both planning and ongoing management of 
the economy of the General Government. In one of his statements, HSSPF 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger said, “. . . we should create Jewish detachments and 
hire where there is this urgent need. The task of the head of the district would 
by ascertainment of any needs.”155 In turn, the instruction of January 20, 1940 
152 Ibid., 272–74.
153 Statement of HSSPF Krüger at a meeting of heads of government departments of the 
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stated that the orders for Jewish forced laborers would be made exclusively 
through the appropriate Kreis- and Stadhauptleute. This expression indicates 
that, despite the formal control over Jewish affairs by the SS, civilian factors 
played a decisive role in case of economic issues. However, things went a bit 
differently because of some SS activity, especially on the part of the SSPF in 
the district of Lublin, Odilo Globocnik.156 The matters concerning the use of 
forced labor of Jews would become, over the next two years, the cause of numer-
ous disputes, primarily between the SS and civil administration, even though 
there were other actors involved such as Wehrmacht and private entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, the divisions between different interest groups were much more 
complicated and many complex lines of divisions could be drawn.
Already by the end of 1939, the SSPF Odilo Globocnik took the initiative 
to utilize forced labor of Jews. Thanks to his promptness, he overtook other 
actors, such as the civil administration and even the HSSPF in the General 
Government Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger. It should be noted that, despite 
his relatively low position in the Nazi hierarchy, Globocnik found himself in 
a key position thanks to the special ties of friendship with RFSS Himmler 
and the tasks the latter granted to him. Globocnik was entrusted directly by 
Himmler with one of the most important tasks: the implementation of the 
Aktion Reinhardt, thus avoiding the Nazi hierarchy.157 Globocnik was formally 
 subordinate to HSSPF Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, and he, in turn, to Governor 
General Hans Frank. However, thanks to close ties with Himmler, Globocnik 
was able to contact the RFSS directly and with his support, in many cases, was 
allowed to operate independently. Thanks to his special position, he had not 
reckoned with the head of the Lublin district. In some areas, Globocnik estab-
lished administrative structures subordinate to himself, similar or even identi-
cal to the official authorities, which became a source of numerous conflicts and 
overlapping jurisdiction.
The factor that served as a catalyzer in the process of exploitation of Jewish 
workforce was the “exemption” from the POW camps of Jewish prisoners, 
156 Odilo Globocnik (1904–1945) since May 28, 1938 gauleiter of Vienna, removed from the 
post on January 30, 1939 because of transactions done in foreign currency. On November 9, 
1939 he was nominated on the post of SSPF in Lublin District. He was responsible for orga-
nizing and execution of Aktion Reinhardt. Released from the post of SSPF in Lublin District in 
September 1943, transferred to Triest and nominated for the post of HSSPF for the operations 
on Adriatic seaside. Arrested on May 31, 1945 and committed suicide on the same day.
157 Poprzeczny, Globocnik—Hitler’s Man in the East; Rieger, Creator of Nazi Death Camps; 
Zygmunt Mańkowski, “Odilo Globocnik und die Endlösung der Judenfrage,” Studia Histo-
riae Oeconomicae 21 (1994): 147–55.
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ex-soldiers of the Polish army. This process began in autumn 1939, the Jewish 
POWs were forced to sign their agreement to take advantage of the exemption, 
and then they could return to their hometowns. Releasing of Jews was only 
apparently beneficial, because it really meant the termination of their prisoner 
of war status, protected by international conventions. Liberated Jews were seen 
as civilians, subject to any discriminatory provisions relating to the Jews.158 The 
Jewish officers who had not been released, at least in part, survived to the end 
of the war in POW camps for officers (Offizierslager or, abbreviated, Oflag).159
Prisoners of war who came from the areas under Soviet occupation were 
not released. Many among these prisoners were transferred to Lublin between 
December 1939 and February 1940. Prisoners who arrived to Lublin were 
placed in a camp on 7 Lipowa Street. In the area converted into a camp, there 
were previously stables for horses in several barracks. After the September 1939 
campaign, these barracks were converted into workshops, where Jews from 
Lublin worked in the framework of forced labor. In the area of Lublin, there 
were essentially two permanent places where forced labor was performed: 
in the barracks at 7 Lipowa Street and in the areas of aircraft factory Plage-
Laśkiewicz. From the autumn of 1939 forward, the barracks at the 7 Lipowa 
Street served as a gathering place for Jewish forced laborers in Lublin. Some 
of the workers were employed in workshops located in the barracks, and some 
in other places of employment in Lublin. The arrival of Jewish prisoners of 
war caused the transformation of the infrastructure at 7 Lipowa Street into a 
labor camp. This was one of the first labor camps in the General Government. 
However, even after the creation of 7 Lipowa Street labor camp, it was also a 
workplace of the Jewish workers coming there every day from the ghetto. 
Essentially, the labor camp at 7 Lipowa Street served as an exemplary camp 
for exploitation of Jewish forced labor in the Lublin district. This camp con-
tributed substantially to the exploitation of Jewish manpower through the 
preparation of cadres, which were used later as a staff in other labor camps in 
the Lublin district, mainly in the complex of labor camps around Bełżec, and 
after the beginning of the Operation Barbarossa in Lwów in the labor camp 
at Janowska Street.160 In February 1940, the camp commandant at 7 Lipowa 
Street was SS-Sturmbannführer Hermann Dolp, who later became commandant 
158 Shmuel Krakowski, “The Fate of Jewish Prisoners of War in the September 1939 Campaign,” 
Yad Vashem Studies XII (1977): 297–333.
159 YVA-O.3/3632. Testimony of Artur Loewenstein. 
160 Sandkühler, “Endlösung” in Galizien; Sandkühler, “Das Zwangsarbeitslager Lemberg-
Janowska 1941–1944”; Michał Borwicz, Uniwersytet zbirów (Krakow: CKŻP, 1946).
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of the camp complex near Bełżec. He was replaced by Franz Bartetzko, who 
later became deputy commander of the Trawniki labor camp. After February 
1940, the connandant was SS-Untersturmführer Horst Riedel. His deputy was 
Wolfgang Mohwinkel.
When HSSPF Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger issued his hesitant and inexact 
instructions on the use of Jewish labor force in December 1939 and January 
1940, a workshop in Lublin already functioned, and a labor camp on 7 Lipowa 
Street was being established. However, the process of exploitation of Jewish 
forced labor was more complex because of vague division of competences. The 
case of Lublin is very important for further understanding the development of 
the situation in all the General Government. In the hierarchy of the civil admin-
istration, the authority for Jewish affairs was the sub-division of Population 
and Social Affairs (Bevölkerung und Fürsorge, BuF), part of the Department of 
Internal Affairs. In this particular department, there was a position of clerk for 
Jewish affairs (Judenreferent). At the level of the General Government, the post 
of the first referent for Jewish affairs was occupied by Dr. Heinrich Gottong. 
However, positions of clerks for Jewish affairs was also created at the level of 
district civil administration. In addition, employment offices also had certain 
powers in cases of forced labor of Jews. In the case of Lublin District, a compet-
itive Jüdische Referat had been established in the office of SS and police leader. 
In this way, two offices for Jewish affairs functioned parallelly: one in the office 
of the chief of the district (subsequently district governor), headed by Richard 
Türk, and the other in the office of SSPF, headed by Dr. Karl Hofbauer.
With the support of the SSPF Odilo Globocnik, Karl Hofbauer con-
solidated the majority of Jewish affairs under his own authority, including 
issues related to forced labor. Despite the regulation issued by Hans Frank 
on October 26, 1939 that transferred to Hofbauer the competences of issu-
ing of implementing regulations by HSSPF, which could be understood as 
the transfer of all matters relating to the forced labor of Jews, the issue of 
competence remains unclear. The HSSPF Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger said in 
one of his speeches that the task of district chief would be identifying need 
for the employment of Jewish forced laborers.161 In turn, in the instruc-
tion of January 20, 1940 he stated that summons of Jewish forced laborers 
will be made exclusively through the appropriate Kreis- and Stadhauptleute. 
161 Statement of HSSPF Krüger at a meeting of heads of government departments of the 
General Government on the forced labor of Jews, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Ekstermi-
nacja Żydów, 203–4.
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However, in the Lublin district, it was the desk for Jewish affairs in the office 
of the SSPF that took over the matters of Jewish manpower available at the 
district. This had far-reaching consequences: the availability of the Jewish 
workforce in Lublin allowed Globocnik to undertake a long project of the 
construction of border fortifications. The German authorities decided to dig 
an anti-tank trench in order to create a line of defense in the strip of land 
between the rivers Bug and San. This line of defense was to secure the eastern 
border areas of the German occupation against possible attack by the Soviet 
Union during the campaign in western and northern Europe. Nevertheless, 
even after victory over France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the construc-
tion of these fortifications had not stopped. They were part of the German 
long-term strategic plans. Globocnik, who undertook the work on the fortifi-
cations, exploited not only Jewish workers from the Lublin district, but also 
from other districts of the General Government, which gave him a special 
position of leadership in the use of Jewish labor. His initiatives were later used 
in the economic activities of such SS companies as DAW162 and OSTI.
During a meeting on April 22, 1940, according to the minutes of the 
conference:
Brigadeführer Globocnik discussed at the outset of the conference Jewish 
desk [in his office], its aims and objectives. In short words, he presented 
the situation that existed before the creation of the desk, mobilization of 
Jews for forced labor took place in a manner that absolutely could not be 
maintained—several workers had been simply seized off the street; there 
was no guarantee that one could obtain required number of regular work-
ers. One took the Jews from another job; matter of food and maintenance 
of family members was unclear and so on. Bad results obtained using these 
methods and the conviction that without systematic planning one cannot 
ever do more work prompted the commander of the SS and the police  
to create a separate Referat that would address all issues relating to the 
Jews, and especially would have to develop a plan for Jewish forced labor 
utilization. Implementation of plans concerning the utilization of forced 
labor had been submitted to Selbstschutz. These innovations have already 
led to a whole range of achievements, which primarily include snow 
162 Various companies established by Globocnik were linked with each other. For example, 
DAW used to provide building material and different dervices to the Fleischerei des SS und 
Polizeiführers in Lublin. On October 18, 1941 they set a bill for performed works for 122.25 
zł. YVA-JM.12333, 495.
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removal and daily job placement led by Selbstschutz in Lublin in the city 
and beyond its borders.163 
One can agree with the statement that before the establishment of the 
Jewish desk [in the office of the SSPF] there was no proper coordination on 
forced labor and that there was no guarantee that adequate number of workers 
would be provided. The Jews’ avoidance of forced labor was motivated, among 
other factors, by ill-treatment of the Jewish workers in the workshops at Lipowa 
7 at the hands of their supervisors who were subordinate to Globocnik. Similarly, 
arresting casual laborers from the street was usually done by the SS or Selbstschutz 
under the authority of the same Globocnik. Functioning of the Jewish desk in the 
SSPF office did not improve the situation of the Jewish workers, whose fate was 
very difficult and subsequently even tragic. Without any doubts, the Jewish desk 
enabled systematic planning of investments on much larger scale.
The protocol further noted: 
While the job is not in area of residence, one intends to put the workers 
in the camps, especially when it comes to larger works. Cost of accom-
modation and meals will cover religious community; this way we can also 
have to our disposition Jewish property, to which otherwise we wouldn’t 
be able to reach. Supply of food and clothing will be provided by Jewish 
women and Jews already unable to work hard. Strict separation of sex 
Groups will be carried on. Since the work force is completely or almost 
free, this will allow us magnification already not too big budgets of indi-
vidual departments.164
The purpose of Globocnik’s activity became thus clear: he planned unlim-
ited exploitation of Jewish manpower while incurring the least cost. The Jewish 
communities had to cover all costs of maintenance and provisioning facilities 
workers. Forced labor in Globocnik’s meaning was to become an instrument of 
power and drain all the means at the hands of Jews. At the same time, however, 
the needs of the Jewish community had not been considered. It was one-sided 
thinking that sooner or later had to lead to pauperization of Jewish communi-
ties and their bankruptcy.
163 The minutes of the meeting at SS and Police Leader in the Lublin District O. Globocnik 
with managers in the Office of District Governor on forced labor of the Jewish population, 
Lublin, April, 22, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 207–8.
164 Ibid.
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Indeed, the exploitation of Jewish workers who were treated as free labor 
and dumping the responsibility for all logistic matters onto the Jewish com-
munities resulted in drainage of manpower and material means. The conse-
quence of this was economic weakness of the Jewish communities and their 
total pauperization.165 The communities bearing the costs of maintenance 
and provisioning of the Jewish workers at the same time were losing possi-
bility of receiving from those workers any taxes and any benefits. Morevoer, 
the issue of aid to families of Jewish forced laborers did not find any appro-
priate solution. The costs were born by the social assistance budget of the 
Jewish communities. This meant that the budgetary situation of Jewish 
communities in the General Government became catastrophic. While the 
SS and other German institutions used free Jewish labor, Jewish communi-
ties with overburdened budgets turned for help to the General Government. 
Budget deficits of the Jewish communities would be covered by the budget 
of the General Government, which was in contradiction with the principle of 
self-financing. To prevent this situation, the civil administration had to create 
new regulations.
THE AGREEMENT OF JULY 4, 1940 
Existing conflict concerning the exploitation of Jewish forced labor and the 
question of competences had led to a meeting between Hans Frank and HSSPF 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger in order to establish clear rules for the use of Jewish 
labor. On July 4, 1940, Hans Frank met with Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger in 
order to reach an agreement concerning the division of competences between 
the SS and civil administration. The decision had been made in consultation 
with various departments. On July 5, 1940, the Office of the Governor General 
published a circular letter,166 sent to all the heads of labor departments at the 
district chefs, as well as to all heads of labor offices in the General Government. 
According to this agreement, the Jewish card index or Judenkartei was to be 
transferred to labor offices, which, in turn, would have to be responsible for the 
management of this card index and for assembling data concerning the required 
quantity of Jewish workers. The main objective was to improve the exploitation 
of labor force in the General Government. 
165 Circular Lester of the Jewish Self-Assistance (ŻSS), nr. 19 concerning provision of food and 
money by the local German administration. YVA-JM.1501, scan 630.
166 Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 568–72.
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The German institutions were obliged to pay the Jewish workers’ wages 
according to the official tariff, which was 20% less than the rate for Polish 
workers. However, Jews employed in labor camps of the SS, according to the 
new regulations, would not receive any wages.167 The Judenräte would main-
tain families of workers closed in labor camps. The document underlined that 
responsibility over measures concerning registration of Jewish forced labor-
ers, rules of movement and registration of population remained in the area of 
competencies of higher SS and police leader. 
As a result of the agreement, the civilian authorities established a 
Judeneinsatzstelle ( Jewish Forced Labor Office) within the district labor offices 
(Arbeitsämter) in July 1940. This office partly took over the functions of the 
labor offices of the Judenräte. Jewish officials from Judenräte were employed at 
the Judeneinsatzstellen in order to facilitate their work. According to the report 
of the Kreishauptmann of Puławy, 
. . . for a special census of the Jews, deployment offices (Einsatzstellen) under 
Jewish administration were established, so that indeed every usable Jew can be 
deployed to a service benefiting the general public. Here, too, every measure 
ensues by coercion, if necessary. For this purpose, a Judenlager, established 
in Puławy, was reorganized as a forced labor camp (Zwangsarbeitslager).168
The implementation of the agreement met many difficulties, and further 
memos and letters were required forcing various German institutions to act 
according to the instructions. As stated by Dr. Max Frauendorfer during the 
conference of the Labor Department on August 6, 1940, 
There are arguments from various directions, that the remuneration 
for Jews was too high. Dr. Frauendorfer [head of the Department of 
Labor] emphasizes that on principle the remuneration of 80% [of the 
tariff for Polish workers] should be retained, otherwise the preservation 
of the Jewish employees is not guaranteed. If feasible, a piecework 
system should be implemented, and in cases of time pay accelerating 
incentives.169
167 Ibid., 571.
168 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Puławy, Lagebericht für November 1940, 
Puławy, den 7. Dezember 1940, scan 1028.
169 YVA-JM.2700, Protokoll über die Judeneinsatzbesprechung vom 6. August 1940 [. . .] bei 
der Abteilung Arbeit im Amt des Generalgouverneurs, scan 3.
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On August 20, 1940 Frauendorfer sent a letter to the commander of the 
Wehrmacht in the General Government, to the higher SS and police leader, 
and the commander of the Security Police about non-implementation of the 
instruction.170 Likewise, chief of the Warsaw District, Dr. Ludwig Fischer171 
sent circular letter about new system of employment of Jews on August 20, 
1940.172 But the reason this agreement was ignored by certain institutions was 
obvious. Since July 1940, all German institutions that needed Jewish forced 
labor had to pay for it when previously they had the workers gratis. Previously, 
the Judenräte paid the workers’ wages, transportation, tools, maintaining of 
their families, which caused financial bankruptcy173 of many Judenräte and lit-
erally paralyzed their functioning.174 The statistics show that after July 1940, 
requests for Jewish forced laborers dropped significantly. In Lublin, for exam-
ple, the average daily number of forced laborers reached its highest point in July 
1940 with 967. In August 1940, the average daily number was only 232.175 
The agreement of July 4, 1940 exempted the SS and police from payment 
of wages for Jews in their camps, so Globocnik could freely use thousands of 
laborers and perform grandiose projects for no cost from his side. Great proj-
ects of 1940 are linked to “Otto Program”—the plan for constructing strategic 
roads and other elements of infrastructure.176 All sectors of the economy of 
the General Government were to participate in implementation of the plan. The 
realization of the plan had to be concluded in spring 1941, prior to the attack 
170 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa Żydów w Warszawie,” 52.
171 Ludwig Fischer (1905–1947) since October 26, 1939 chef of the Warsaw District; since 
April 25, 1941 governor of the Warsaw District. Fleed from Warsaw on January 17, 1945, 
arrested on May 10, 1945, extradited to Poland on March 1946, sentenced to death on 
March 3, 1947, and executed on March 8, 1947 in Warsaw.
172 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa Żydów w Warszawie,” 52.
173 Critical conditions of the Jewish communities were caused by various reasons; among 
them, big influx of refugees from Warthegau, general pauperization because of the German 
policy and the result of the war: economic difficulties, drive of labor force to labor camps, as 
well as other reasons. In fact, many Jewish communities were dependent on the help of 
Jewish Self-Assistance, joint (until the end of 1941) and even subventions from German 
local administration on the county level. YVA-JM.1588, scans 79, 81, 83, and ff. In the ques-
tions of material support, the Jewish Self-Assistance turned also to Reichsvereingung der 
Juden in Deutschland. YVA-JM.1588, scan 84; Letter of February 10, 1942, Lublin. 
YVA-JM.1574, scans 10 and ff. 
174 Report of Höller, chef of the Cracow District, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 212.
175 Tadeusz Radzik, Lubelska dzielnica zamknięta (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 1999), 101.
176 Hans Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu w dzienniku Hansa Franka 1939–1945, vol. 1 (Warsaw: 
Książka i Wiedza, 1970), 243.
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on the Soviet Union; however, the works were still not completed in February 
1941. According to the report of Kreishauptmann of Mińsk Mazowiecki: “The 
outside work also suffered heavily in February [1941] due to bad weather. The 
preparatory work for the ‘Otto Program’ nevertheless continued on increased 
scale.”177 Improvement of the infrastructure in the framework of the “Otto 
Program,” especially of railways and roads, facilitated transportation of coal, 
coke, and raw materials. It also ameliorated economic conditions of the General 
Government, facilitating development of industry, including war industry.178 
The “Otto Program” required great quantity of labor force, in particular the 
Jewish labor force which already at the end of 1940 was in deficit. According to 
the chef of the Lublin District: 
The implementation of the “Otto Program” is confronted with difficulties 
concerning the procurement of laborers. The 600 Jews provided by the 
Judenlager Bełżec were mostly unfit for work. The subsequently requested 
1,000 laborers have not yet arrived, so that all construction sites are 
currently working with too few personnel. To be added are the familiar 
transport problem of the Ostbahn. On October 8, the Wieprz Bridge in 
Łysobyki was opened to traffic.179
The construction of roads, bridges, and railways also required large groups 
of physical workers, not necessary qualified ones, which would be able to per-
form hard work under control of a limited number of engineers and supervisors. 
Those workers were supposed to be kept in number of camps and moved from 
place to place according to progress of the work. The model of Globocnik’s 
camps was quite appropriate for these purposes and had to be enlarged.
Alongside Globocnik’s camps, another important institution exploiting 
Jewish forced labor was the Water Inspection Office (Wasserwirtschaftsamt).180 
In nearly every county of Lublin district, this office created their own camps 
(more than 27 camps in total), with at least 5,000 Jewish workers.181 The Water 
177 YVA-JM.814, Mińsk Mazowiecki, 5. März 1941, Monatsbericht, scan 1330.
178 BA-MA, RW23-7, Rü In im GG, Lagebericht für Oktober 1940, 151.
179 YVA, JM-814, Der Chef des Distrikts Lublin im Generalgouvernement, Lagebericht für 
Oktober 1940, Lublin, den 6. November 1940, scan 782.
180 In a report, Wasserwirtschaftstelle Lublin requested 22,000 workers. YVA-O.53/sc. 58. 
181 Berenstein, “Obozy pracy przymusowej”; Marszałek, Obozy pracy w Generalnym Guberna-
torstwie; “10,000 Żydów buduje nasypy i rowy: Melioracje w Dystrykcie Lubelskim—ponad 
30 obozów pracy,” Gazeta Żydowska, August 9, 1940, 10.
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Inspection Office in Radom182 established at least 14 camps. Other labor 
camps in the Radom district included work in quarries, road construction, in 
forests, removing of ruins, construction of ramparts along Wisła River, digging 
of peat, production of bricks, and agriculture.183  This kind of campt existed 
before the new type of camp attached to factories became prevalent in 1942. 
Most of the camps established in 1940 and1941 were set up to perform specific 
work and existed for a limited period of time. Camps along the roads or rivers 
moved according to the progress of work. In many places camps for seasonal 
work in agriculture were set up.184 
In places of residence, in big cities, forced labor evolved into new orga-
nizational types due to the closure of ghettos. Initially, the number of work-
ers taken out of the ghettos was reduced because of organizational problems. 
Jewish workers left ghettos in ordered, organized groups and worked in dif-
ferent places called outposts, work places, or labor detachments. They were 
guarded and counted before leaving and after returning to the ghettos. In 1941, 
with the closure of big ghettos, more and more firms began to develop their 
activity inside the ghettos, reducing all kind of costs in this way. 
During the period of two years, we observe significant changes in German 
concepts and practical forms of forced labor of Jews in the General Government, 
according to changing needs and conditions. From the initial period of military 
occupation forward, there was no clear policy regarding forced labor, and chaos 
prevailed. The attitude towards the Jews was based on ideological view of the 
Jews. Every German institution, and even individuals, could arrest, intimidate, 
and coerce Jews to do any work. Hans Frank, on the first day of his rule, issued 
a decree regarding forced labor. However, the German administration was not 
ready and able to implement this decree, partly because of uncompleted orga-
nization of administration185 and lack of intentions to rebuild the economic 
life in occupied Poland. Thus, till the springtime of 1940 they needed mainly 
workers in services. 
182 “Żydzi osuszają bagna: Jak się pracuje w Jedlance pod Radomiem,” Gazeta Żydowska, 
August 17, 1940, 4.
183 Rutkowski, “Hitlerowskie obozy pracy dla Żydów.” 
184 Note from the visit to the estates in Nieprześno, Janiszowcie, as well as to Bochnia and 
Wiśnicz Nowy concerning the labor in agriculture on July 21, 22, 23, 1941. YVA-JM.1588, 
scan 38. A note on the activity of ’’ ‘Toporol’, Kraków, November 21, 1941. YVA-JM.1588, 
scans 39–41.
185 The chef of the Kraków District Wächter nominated only on December 13, 1939 
Landkomissare in Myślenice and Gorlice, as well as Stadtkommissare in Rzeszów and 
Bochnia. YVA-JM.12277, 5.
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Only in the late spring and summer of 1940 were the Germans able 
to launch great projects in the field of infrastructure, fortifications, and 
 agriculture. However, their intentions to do it in an orderly manner, despite 
systematic registration, failed, mainly because of internal frictions between 
civil administration and the SS. Even the agreement of July 4, 1940, and in 
consequence transfer of administration of forced labor to the Arbeitsämter, 
did not reach its goal. The SS, and most of all Globocnik, managed to exempt 
the SS-administered camps from payment of Jewish laborers and from 
 providing minimal living conditions for them. This led to the exploitation of 
Jews for no compensation and harsh conditions for Jewish workers, leading 
to mistreatment and death, even some workers could return to their places of 
residence.186 The dichotomy of the SS’s attitude compared to other factors 
became clearly visible already in thet early stage of occupation.187 The model 
of temporary, dispersed camps disappeared after summer 1941 and was sub-
stituted by permanent camps in the vicinity of factories. After the beginning 
of deportations, reduced ghettos became, in practice, a kind of labor camps. 
Yet, in places of residence, as a consequence of July 1940 agreement and the 
closure of large ghettos, forced labor remained in the form of labor comman-
dos, while most production was transferred inside the ghettos. 
186 Report of Zörner, chef of the Lublin District, November 6, 1940, in Eisenbach and 
Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 221.
187 Karay, “The Conflict among German Authorities.”
CHAPTER 3
Forced Labor in the Ghettos 
and Labor Detachments 
Labor in both the ghettos and labor detachments is discussed here together because forced labor occurred in all places of residence, even though indi-
vidual or group employment was performed inside and outside the ghetto. The 
main difference lies in the fact that outside the ghetto, usually organized work-
ing groups were sent to carry out work under guard. These groups departed in 
the morning and returned in the evening after working. However, the institu-
tion of forced labor in the ghettos and labor detachments is just one aspect of 
a broader issue that included all types of work and business within the Jewish 
economy during the German occupation. In the present chapter, the issues of 
forced labor and self-employment (praca wolnonajemna) will be discussed. 
However, we have to take into account the fact that the Jewish economy during 
the Nazi occupation was not free, due to the existing legislation, which not only 
limited businesses greatly, but also resulted in a restriction of personal liberty 
and freedom of movement that actually forced the Jews into a specific state of 
affairs. Jews as a persecuted ethnic group, even in the case of free rent (wolny 
najem), were not only in a forced situation, but had been seen as inferior in 
relation to other population groups. Therefore, in addition to what is formally 
called forced labor, other work, even the free hiring, was de facto forced labor 
due to the prevailing conditions. In addition, Jewish working groups were 
 usually subordinate to a non-Jewish superior, and that caused more negative 
consequences for the Jews.
Prior to the determination of competence in the employment of the 
Jewish labor force, certain patterns of informal exploitation of the Jewish labor 
began to emerge. As mentioned above, the Jews were arrested in order to per-
form the clean-up jobs, transportation, and other work on the use and repair of 
equipment of these works, as well as different jobs for German military units 
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and institutions. This work required skilled human resources capable of execut-
ing such works as well as a constant flow of those workers in sufficient quan-
tities. Stopping passersby on the street would supply a sufficient number of 
workers, but it provided neither healthy workers, nor those having the appro-
priate qualifications. In spite of these drawbacks, during the first months of 
occupation, random people were typically stopped on the streets in order to be 
exploited for work. Because most often it concerned military units, the SS and 
police, and not the civil business organizations, this practice had a tendency 
towards ruthlessness and did not promise economic benefits to the arrested.
ESTABLISHMENT AND ACTIVITY OF THE JUDENRÄTE
One of the first Jewish institutions created by the German authorities was the 
Jewish council (Judenrat; pl. Judenräte). Superficially, it might appear that the 
Jewish Council was a continuation of the pre-war Jewish community orga-
nization of Poland. The similarity stems from the fact that both the new and 
pre-war Jewish community organizations dealt with the internal affairs of 
Jewish residents. Moreover, some leaders of Jewish communities also served 
as important functionaries in the Jewish council during the interwar period as 
well as in the Jewish administration during the occupation. On the other hand, 
the Judenrat was, primarily, a German institution, created by the occupation 
authorities to carry out their commands and to exercise the administrative 
functions of the Jewish communities and ghettos. In some localities, such as 
in Warsaw, the German authorities (Gestapo) disbanded the Jewish council 
on October 4, 1939 and appointed in its place a Council of Elders.1 Among 
the principal documents serving as a basis for the creation of Jewish councils 
was Heydrich’s telegraphic message of September 21, 1939, which contained 
specific instructions: 
Councils of Jewish Elders.
1)  In each Jewish community a Council of Jewish Elders is to be set up 
which, as far as possible, is to be composed of the remaining author-
itative personalities and rabbis. The Council is to be composed of up  
to 24 male Jews (depending on the size of the Jewish community). The 
Council is to be made fully responsible, in the literal sense of the word, 
 1 Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 188; B. Mintz and L. Klausner, eds., Sefer 
ha-Zeva’ot [Book of Abominations] ( Jerusalem: R. Mass, 1945), vol. 1, 1–2.
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for the exact and prompt implementation of directives already issued 
or to be issued in the future.
2)  In case of sabotage of such instructions, the Councils are to be warned 
that the most severe measures will be taken.2
An additional task of the Jewish councils, according to the instructions of 
Heydrich, was to conduct a census of all Jews by gender and age groups: up to 
16, from 16 to 20, and over 20. Jewish councils were also to be responsible for 
the assemblage of Jews in the cities. According to the statement: “They are to 
be made personally responsible for the evacuation of the Jews from the coun-
tryside.”3 And further: “The Councils of Elders in the concentration centers are 
to be made responsible for the appropriate housing of the Jews arriving from 
the countryside.”4 Despite the very limited task of the Jewish councils, their 
most significant feature was that they were created by the German authorities 
in order to perform administrative functions. It is important to underline per-
sonal responsibility for carrying out the instructions of the German authorities. 
However, despite the fact that the Jewish councils were set up by the Germans, 
the continuity of personnel and lack of other Jewish institutions meant that 
the Jewish councils, since their inception, were forced to take upon themselves 
considerable administrative and organizational functions, even if in formal 
terms they were not compelled to do so.
The regulation issued on November 1939 by Governor General Dr. Hans 
Frank concerning the establishment of Jewish councils, in fact, changed noth-
ing in comparison with Heydrich’s telegraphic message of September 21, 1939. 
Hans Frank ordered that in communities (Gemeinde in German, or gminy in 
Polish) of up to 10,000 people a council of 12 members was to be set up; in 
communities over that number the council would have 24 members. Members 
of the community had to choose the councils, and the Jewish council in turn 
was to choose from among its members a chairman and his deputy. Council 
elections were to be held no later than December 31, 1939, and elected council 
 2 Instructions by Heydrich on policy and operations concerning Jews in the occupied territo-
ries, September 21, 1939. See Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 174; Eisenbach 
and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 21–29.
 3 Instructions by Heydrich on policy and operations concerning Jews in the occupied territo-
ries, September 21, 1939. See Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 174; Eisenbach 
and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 21–29.
 4 Instructions by Heydrich on policy and operations concerning Jews in the occupied territo-
ries, September 21, 1939. See Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 175; Eisenbach 
and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 21–29.
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members were to be submitted for approval to the local German authorities 
(Kreishauptmann or Stadthauptmann).5 Paragraph 5 of this regulation defines 
the tasks of the board as follows:
The Jewish council is obliged to accept orders from the German author-
ities by means of its chairman or his deputy. It accounts for the correct 
and conscientious carrying out of these orders. Jewish men and Jewish 
women have to obey instructions given by it and to comply with German 
regulations.6 
In addition to this regulation, two other executive orders were issued on 
April 25 and June 7, 1940.7 In light of these provisions, all commands had to be 
directed to the Jewish councils through county governors (Stadthauptmann or 
Kreishauptmann). The orders, however, did not specify anything about forced 
labor.
Nevertheless, the Jewish councils, despite the responsibilities set before 
them by the occupation authorities, had reached a crossroads of different tasks 
and expectations on the part of the Jewish institutions and the Jewish commu-
nity. The newspaper Gazeta Żydowska worded this clearly: 
The Council is responsible for dealing with the obligations that the 
authorities have imposed on the Jewish public, and at the same time it 
conveys to the authorities the requirements of this same population.  
In this way, the Council has become the sole representative and media-
tor between the Jewish population and the authorities. For this purpose, 
it has been conferred with certain rights, and authority in some matters. 
The Council has become the central place where all the various Jewish 
affairs are organized. This gives it certain rights but also imposes duties. 
The maintenance of balance between these rights and duties is a difficult 
task, but an important one, and the satisfactory relationship between the 
Council and the public depends on its achievement.8 
The balance between the commands of the German authorities, which 
were coercive in relation to the Jewish people, and between the expectations 
 5 VBlGG, 1939, no. 9, 72; Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 74.
 6 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 74.
 7 VBlGG, 1940, vol. 2, 249, 387.
 8 Gazeta Żydowska, December 23, 1940, 206.
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of the Jewish community that Jewish councils would take care of all the 
communities’ problems, was difficult and sometimes impossible. In addition, 
problems associated with the provision of financial resources, for current activ-
ity of the councils and its administration and for social welfare and health care 
while under general impoverishment and increased morbidity, were acute. In 
fact, from the onset, Jewish councils had no choice but to deal with different 
issues and tried to reconcile different and conflicting interests.
From the beginning until the end of their activity, the Jewish councils strug-
gled with financial problems. This was related to the overall economic situation of 
the Jewish community. During the war, Jewish communities had many different 
expenses, and at the beginning of the occupation, many Jewish communities were 
haunted by Wehrmacht officers or officers of the SD, who compelled them to pay 
heavy levies (kontrybucje) and taxes. Jewish communities were forced to pay large 
sums of money and even jewellery. Usually, hostages were taken from among 
the representatives of the community, under threat of being shot in the event of 
non-payment of an expected sum. Chaim A. Kaplan summarized this situation in 
the following words: “The Judenrat [in Warsaw], which was orphaned when its 
money was stolen and its appointed president (commissar) [Maurycy Mayzel] 
fled, attempted to organize the matter of seizing people for labor.”9
The practice of imposing high contribution fees on the Jewish community 
meant that in the early period of its activity, Jewish councils were deprived of 
cash and were still forced to spend large sums of money for welfare assistance 
of refugees, and to people affected by the war. Already during the war, many 
Jewish families lost their homes in the bombing, and many others lost their 
breadwinners who had been mobilized, died, or injured. In the autumn of 1939, 
the Jewish councils had to build financially functioning mechanisms. The basis 
of their income originated from a variety of taxes that had always been difficult 
to collect. Thus, revenues of the Jewish councils were small, while expenses 
grew at a quick pace. Economic stagnation and legislation by the German 
authorities, which sought to eliminate Jews from the economy, caused rapid 
impoverishment, although the Jewish population still had cash holdings in the 
initial period of the occupation. Moreover, the economic system of the occu-
pational forces was calculated on the exploitation of the Jews, which further 
reduced the communities’ income. For example, Aryanization of businesses, 
shops, and houses resulted in loss of revenue and receipts of rent, while on the 
other hand, free forced labor deprived Jews of wages. 
 9 Entry of October 20, 1939, in Kaplan, Scroll of Agony, 55.
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The occupation authorities, busy with the persecution of Jews, did not 
need to pay attention to the normal functioning of the economy and the role 
Jews played in it. In face of the difficulties the implementation of the Jewish 
councils caused, the situation did not change until the summer of 1940. Despite 
Hans Frank’s and Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger’s agreement on payment for Jewish 
forced labor, Jews employed in the SS-managed labor camps did not receive 
payment for their work from the German authorities. Thanks to that, Globocnik 
was able to continue to manage tens of thousands of Jewish forced laborers, plac-
ing the burden of the cost of living and wages of these workers on the Jewish 
councils in general, and on the Jewish Council in Lublin in particular.10
The Jewish Council in Warsaw, as many others, was in a difficult financial 
situation. On March 25, 1940, Adam Czerniaków wrote in his diary, “Our cash-
box is empty. I owe the Labor Battalion 90,000 zł, hospital officials 25,000, and 
registration officials 50,000 zł.”11 A few months later, Adam Czerniaków’s diary 
entry stated:
We worked out a plan of payments of arrears for the Labor Battalion. The 
amount overdue on July 1, 1940 is 482,011 zł, including 282,563 to the 
workers. The loan received from our emigration account is 300,000 zł.  
If again the matter of the ghetto does not turn around, we may somehow 
find the way out from this trap. Unfortunately, I’m afraid that we cannot 
safely operate.12
The Jewish councils attempted to solve their financial problems in different 
ways such as imposing taxes on the Jewish population and issuing food vouchers, 
in addition to requests made to the Jewish councils for medical examinations to 
determine workers’ ability to perform forced labor, and so on. A relatively large 
source of their revenue was from charges for replacements during forced labor 
roundup. In Warsaw, it depended on the status of a person’s property: the person 
who was better off had to pay higher fees. In 1941 in Lublin, 4,260 people were 
paying for their replacements. However, with the time and pauperization of the 
population less and less people were able to pay for their replacement and in 
10 APL, RŻL-47, 23–25. Report from the activity of the Central Camps Council in Bełżec for 
the period June 13 until December 5, 1940.
11 Entry of March 25, 1940 in Marian Fuks, ed., Adama Czerniakowa dziennik (Warsaw: PWN: 
1983), 96.
12 Entry of June 30, 1940 in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 126.
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Lublin in 1942 only 2,587 people were still able to pay for the replacement.13 
However, all these measures were insufficient, and the Jewish councils still 
remained in a deficit. Therefore, they asked the commercial banks for loans14 
secured with real estate. When these loans were not enough, the Jewish councils 
tried to get grants from the General Government. There was the fear that the 
General Government administration would be forced to subsidize the Jewish 
councils, and that would compel German institutions to pay a fee for using 
Jewish forced labor through the mediation of labor offices.
In the area of economic activity, the performance of Jewish councils was 
diversified and depended on the quality of people in key positions. Jewish coun-
cils did not have a uniform pattern of fiscal operation, and various councils had 
different structures. Most of them were engaged in economic activity via depart-
ments of economy, forced labor, and finance. Departments of economy in different 
councils had either active or passive styles of operation. Passive Judenräte usually 
dealt with the issue of licenses for economic activity or business litigation and 
regulation. Active Judenräte in times of crisis, unemployment, and widespread 
impoverishment tried to pursue a dynamic policy of employment through the 
organization of workshops and assistance in creating associations of craftsmen. 
Those associations allowed their members to avoid the limitations of keeping 
accounts and making financial transactions, obtain permits to travel outside the 
place of residence, procure orders for their production, raw materials, and energy.
LABOR BATTALIONS
With incessant arrests of Jewish passersby on the streets, the Jewish councils 
in many towns, parallel in time and independently of one another, concluded 
that the question of labor supply to various German institutions was inevitable. 
In such a situation, to avoid the arrests of random passersby, the best solution 
was to organize several workers each day and deliver them according to a spe-
cific demand by the German institutions.15 Chaim A. Kaplan wrote in his diary:
The Judenrat [. . .] attempted to organize the matter of seizing people for 
labor. Czerniaków offered to supply a certain number of workers if only they 
13 Report of the activity of the Commission and Department of Labor for February 1942, APL, 
RŻL, syg 6, 90.
14 Letter to the Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych A.G. in Kraków, October 11, 1940. YVA-
JM.1588, scan 128.
15 Entry of October 20, 1939, Kaplan, Scroll of Agony, 55.
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would stop seizing for forced labor whoever comes to hand in the streets. 
They scarcely listened to this proposal, merely explained in passing that it 
was not detailed enough. Finally they agreed that the Judenrat will supply 
five hundred laborers a day, and that the street captures will stop. Tomorrow 
will be the first day for this new arrangement. [. . .] Let us see if they find 
people willing to work, if the Judenrat can meet its obligation, and if the con-
queror will be satisfied with the new arrangement. If, heaven forbid, the con-
tract with the enemy doesn’t succeed, the evil will be worse than it has been 
up to now. We have all become orphans. Out of the depths I called thee.16
In many places such as Warsaw and Lublin, special labor detachments were 
created. These groups had different names—in Warsaw, for instance, they were 
called the labor battalions. An important note is the fact that the organization 
of Jewish labor detachments arose even before the proclamation of the General 
Government. Therefore, the decision of Hans Frank and the announcement of 
the regulation regarding Jewish forced labor did not in effect change the situation. 
Forced labor of Jews took place before the proclamation of the General Govern-
ment as well as after it. Frank’s regulation was purely formal and mostly propagan-
distic. However, in the case of the Judenräte, they initiated organizing groups of 
Jewish workers to reduce the number of random arrests on the streets of elderly 
people, of unable to work, and the ill. Yet, among the arrested also were people 
employed on a permanent basis who held the relevant documents. In those cases, 
the documents were either not accepted or ignored. In some instances, among the 
arrested Jews forced to work were also the employees of the Warsaw Judenrat.
Labor battalions performed huge quantities of labor. For example, the Labor 
Battalion in Warsaw performed only in the first half year of 1940 as much as 
1,200,000 workdays, with approximately 8,000 workers employed every day.17 
Organization of permanent working groups funded by Judenräte was an 
important proposal because it was a quick response to rapidly changing eco-
nomic conditions. Notwithstanding the existing and growing restrictions on 
Jewish economic activity, the Jews were taking initiatives. The quotation from 
the report of Kreishauptmann of Jędrzejów may shed some light to the attitude 
of some German officials towards Jewish economic initiatives:
I have received requests from several companies to license Jewish 
traders, respectively to support those licensed by higher authorities 
16 Ibid.
17 “Warszawska Gmina Żydowska przy pracy,” Gazeta Żydowska, August 9, 1940. 
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in their business. Until now I refused to comply with these requests. In 
my County the Jews have been collected in special quarters where they 
lead their own life, among others to render them harmless in all aspects. 
In the beginning of my activities I tried to employ Jews in individual 
cases in the economy. I experienced the greatest failures. The Jews took 
the opportunity to instigate their Polish staff and for profiteering wher-
ever they could. They tried with all their means to establish a network 
extending beyond the local labor office that they did not use for its proper 
tasks but for obscure profiteering. This profiteering has stopped almost 
totally now that I let the Jews lead their own lives in special quarters. Now 
again, the Jews shall have the opportunity to travel about in the district, 
for example, to buy skins, to buy scrap material and so forth, even to use 
the railway, and on top of that my support is requested. The result of this 
will undoubtedly be, as proven by experience, that the Jews will bring the 
black market and profiteering to bloom again, even the network that has 
fortunately been torn will be woven again immediately and the activities 
of the Kreishauptmann [of Jędrzejów] will secretly be thwarted.
The Poles will again be grateful objects of exploitation and secret 
coworkers of the Jews, as it used to be before. This risk is much greater 
than the financial advantages the companies can expect when they make 
use of the cunning, deviousness, and unscrupulousness of the Jews. 
Everywhere I employed Aryans, especially evacuated Poles, instead of the 
Jews, I could push the Jews out. I can lend my hand to support Jewish trad-
ers and buyers only if the companies can prove to me that Aryans cannot 
do the same jobs. And even if their financial success will not be as big as 
with the Jews, the damage prevented by not licensing the Jews is much 
bigger than the financial loss through Aryan rather than Jewish work.
I cannot help but notice that it was more financial reasons that lead to 
the re-employment of the Jews than responsible investigation if the Jews 
can be substituted by Aryans, even risking a certain financial loss.18
The Jews in conditions of constant economic discrimination could only 
respond to new and constantly changing regulations, in order to find their 
proper niche. Because it was not possible to change or cancel German practices 
and orders, including random arrests, they had to adapt to those practices so 
as to reduce their perniciousness. Forced labor in places of residence, when 
18 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Jędrzejów, Lagebericht für August 1940, 
September 5, 1940, scans 327–28.
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speaking of organized working groups, was not to be paid for by the German 
authorities and institutions. To reward the labor of the workers, the Judenräte 
paid their wages from their own resources. Chaim A. Kaplan wrote in his diary: 
“The Judenrat will pay each worker four złoty a day out of its treasury.”19 In other 
areas, the heads of local administration decided what kind of Jewish work should 
be paid or not. The Kreishauptmann of Jasło wrote in his report of May 1940:
The Jewish obligation to work will be done here on a rotational basis for 
every Jew who is able to work (regardless of whether he is employed), busi-
ness owner, or an employee will be obliged to perform compulsory labor. 
The Judenräte will set up Jewish Labor Offices, which are under the super-
vision of the Labor Office in Jasło and works according to my instructions. 
Requirements of Jewish workers have to be directed to the Labor Office 
in Jasło; compulsory labor in the public interest is not paid. Jews working, 
on the other hand, at an authorized service station or a company receiving 
benefits of such work as car washing, gardening, legged of spaces, that that 
are not dedicated to the public transport must be paid. The institution 
performing the work is required to pay for it.20 
Non-payment for forced labor was overt exploitation of the Jews, because 
not only were the Jews subject to economic discrimination, which was intended 
to eliminate them from the country’s economy, but also since the authorities 
benefitted from Jewish labor without paying for it. It was a seemingly absurd 
situation. However, its significance was as follows: the Jews were banned from 
the country’s economy not in an absolute way but by means of their declassifi-
cation, which in the end led to their impoverishment due to the maximum use 
of their material resources in addition to their physical labor.
Labor battalions, or labor detachments established in different localities 
of the General Government, seemed to be at first fragile and instable institu-
tions that depended upon the temporary satisfaction of German demands for 
labor. However, they appeared to be an important institution and, therefore, 
continued their work after the proclamation of both the General Government 
and the top-down organization of forced labor by the German authorities in the 
General Government.21
19 Entry of October 20, 1939, in Kaplan, Scroll of Agony, 55.
20 YVA-O.53/101, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Jasło, Jasło, den 2 Juni 1940, Lagebericht 
über die Zeit von Mitte Mai 1940 bis Ende Mai 1940, scans 74–76.
21 AIPN, NTN, 196/270, 10–22. 
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REGISTRATION OF JEWS FOR FORCED LABOR
Judenrat labor departments were required under the regulations of December 
11 and 12, 1939, and supplementary regulations from January 1940, to conduct 
a registration of all Jews and to determine their ability to work. This process, 
especially in large cities with their large Jewish communities had encountered 
persistent difficulties. These resulted from evading registration and attempt-
ing to obtain exemption from forced labor due to illness. It was fully justified 
because the German authorities’ attitude towards Jews and the persecution of 
Jews in the streets and public places was widely known. Many Jews were direct 
participants in forced labor or had at least witnessed it. Forced labor was often 
meaningless and demeaning. Therefore, the registration process, in large com-
munities, was long and lasted for weeks. Repeatedly avoiding the registration 
process resulted in incomplete or inaccurate data.
The mere fact that one had to register resulted in great anxiety among Jews:
There is deep concern over the forced labor camps. The Jewish commu-
nity will perform from the third [of February 1940] the registration of all 
[the Jews] from the age of 12; the information will be transferred to the 
Municipal Board. Six groups will operate—five in Poland and one in East 
Prussia. The five groups are employed near Wisła.22
In Warsaw, the first registration took place between February 5 to 14, 
1940, when 121,265 people reported.23 A few days later, the next registration 
took place. 
February 19 [1940]. News of the re-registration to forced labor. In each 
place there will sit a Jewish doctor responsible for the diagnosis of disease. 
The Jewish community is responsible for the statements of registrants.  
All artisans and industrialists should submit their tools. They [the 
Germans] will print those statements in German at the expense of the 
Jewish community.24
22 Entries of January 28–30, 1940 in Emanuel Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego: 
wrzesień 1939–styczeń 1943, ed. Artur Eisenbach (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1988), 85–86.
23 Ibid.
24 Entries of February 21, 22, and 23, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego: 
wrzesień 1939–styczeń 1943, 9ó.
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This second registration listed Jews between the ages of 16 and 25, while 
others were to be registered at a later date. “Please report tools. Supervisors of 
the Council of Elders (Ältestenrat) of the Jews are responsible for the [veracity 
of the] information.”25
After registering, based on a special card-index, the Jews received a 
 summons to appear for forced labor. The spring directory of those capable of 
working also served as a reference for summoning Jews to forced labor camps. 
Data regarding the scale of dodging forced labor is provided in Ludwik Landau’s 
chronicle: 
The second recruit concerns people who avoided the warrants distributed 
by the Labor Battalion. Of 90,000 people about 6,000 paid money for the 
replacements, about 25,000 did not come to work, and two thirds did not 
respond to the summons at all. From among the “stubborn” a sample of 
several hundred people were chosen to act on behalf of the others. The 
Jewish community selected only bachelors, removing family men from 
the list. Those who were chosen were supposed go to the camp designated 
after medical examination.26
Ludwig Fischer also wrote in his report about the registration of forced 
labor:
The Jewish census that was ordered by Higher SS and Police Commander 
in Kraków and was planned as a prelude to the great action of forced labor 
is now almost complete. There are 250,000 Jewish men total who are 
subject to the work [to be forced laborers], and the entire directory was 
divided according to particular professions.27
Special labor departments of Judenräte were created in order to deal with 
taking orders and delivering appropriate numbers of workers for forced labor. 
In large cities, such as Warsaw, the labor battalions were subjected to the Labor 
Department, which were directly responsible for the organization and super-
vision of the working groups that were to be sent to the appropriate outposts. 
The problem of showing up, supervision, and attempts of exemption from 
25 Ibid.
26 Entry of August 13, 1940, in Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, vol. 1, 637. 
27 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 196.
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forced labor at any cost led to constant conflicts and great corruption. In addi-
tion, forced laborers initially did not receive remuneration for their work. This 
placed the members of the Judenrat in an uncomfortable position: on the one 
hand, they were required to fulfil the commands of the German authorities, 
and on the other hand, the Jewish community sensed their pressure and sus-
pected them of corruption. The chairman of the Judenrat in Warsaw, Adam 
Czerniaków, who had repeatedly reorganized labor battalions, wrote about it.28 
One of ways to avoid forced labor in Warsaw was by counterfeiting stamps. The 
counterfeiters were subjected to corporal punishment. The forgers were sent 
for prolonged forced labor.29 News of counterfeiting stamps that would exempt 
people from forced labor even reached the Gestapo, which conducted its own 
investigation into this issue.30 On June 10, 1940, Adam Czerniaków wrote in 
his diary, 
The Gestapo on Labor Battalion. They are apparently investigating coun-
terfeit stamps of the [Labor] Battalion. Those arrested explained that, 
after all, they only cheated the [ Jewish] community. Thrown out of the 
hospital, administration officials denounced the office of allegedly hiding 
information regarding those forced to work.31
The above quotation illustrates how much emotion and tension had been 
created around the subject of forced labor. Gestapo investigation, mutual denunci-
ations, forgery, and corruption were all on the agenda. In an almost overt manner, 
large sums of money were required for exemption from the forced labor. Adam 
Czerniaków noted inter alia: “In the filth Battalion—extortion of money from 
people (Lekachmacher paid 100 zł for May; they required 400 zł from him).”32
The extent of evasion from forced labor and problems in recruiting workers, 
to the outposts as well as to work in labor camps, prompted further street arrests. 
For example, in Lublin in February 1942, of about 430 workers a day obliged to 
perform forced labor, only 35 came. In other words, of 12,044 workdays, only 
968 workdays were actually done. Given the fact that 790 people were paid for 
28 Entries of April 20–May 1, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 129; Entry of 
April 15, 1940 in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 105; Entry of May 5, 1940, in Fuks, 
Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 109. 
29 Entry of May 6, 1940, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 110.
30 Entry of June 1, 1940, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 118.
31 Entry of June 10, 1940, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 119–20.
32 Entry of May 19, 1940, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 113.
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their work [790 × 4 weeks = 3,160] and absence in amount of 822 workdays 
was justified, it gives only 40 percent workdays of 12,044 expected.33 Emanuel 
Ringelblum wrote about the situation in the following words: 
Recently Jewish catchers (section leaders) from the Jewish community 
are going around. They face a gate, suddenly run into [the house], the Jews 
are hiding in the doorways, and there they are dealt with by the policemen.  
A week ago, on April 20 [1940], there was a terrible raid to capture workers. 
They were pulling people from the trams and out of the flats.34
Sometimes those arrests were selective in nature; and only a particular 
group of people was stopped. “From Gertner’s restaurant they pulled all the 
Jews to work. On the streets, no one moved. They surrounded Kercelak [market 
place], and all were taken to work; likewise, in the trams.”35 Sometimes they 
selected only women: “Today, September 19 [1940] they seized the women, 
but only the very elegant, those wearing lipstick, to perform hard labor—appar-
ently, to dig potatoes.”36 The German authorities loved to “celebrate” all kinds 
of Jewish religious holidays by the persecuting Jews.37 Particularly on those 
special days, they tried to humiliate the Jews. In Lublin, for example, in order 
to prevent wild arrests on the streets on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, the 
Forced Labor Department of the Judenrat mobilized a special reserve group 
of workers, paid by the Judenrat, to be ready to answer any request for forced 
laborers in those days.38 
In the towns where large and medium construction sites were located close 
to Jewish communities or ghettos, Jewish workers left for work in the morning 
and returned home in the evenings. In a report we can learn about such project 
near Włodawa. According to the Water Management inspector:
In Włodawa itself it is not a camp, but a construction site of the Water 
Management, where about 400 Jewish workers are employed. The working 
33 Report of the activity of the Commission and Department of Labor for February 1942, APL, 
RŻL, syg 6, 88. 
34 Entries of April 20–May 1, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 132.
35 Entries of May 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8, 1940 in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 135.
36 Entries of September 17, 18, and 19, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 152.
37 APL, RŻL-41, 41, Letter written by the head of Department of Forced Labor of December 
23, 1941.
38 Ibid.
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hours are 48 hours per week. Sometimes Sundays are also workdays.  
All Jewish workers on this construction site made a good impression phys-
ically, but clothing and footwear were very poor. For the Jewish workers, 
there have already been procured rubber boots by the Water Management. 
Moreover, on this construction site, there were 6 Reichsdeutsche foremen 
who oversee the Jews during the work. For the Jewish workers, good tools 
were also provided.39
In addition to labor battalions organized in some cities, Jews were often 
employed to perform cleaning work. In autumn, it was elimination of debris 
from the streets. From the first snowfall, it began to be customary to hire Jews 
to shovel the snow on roads and sidewalks in the cities.40 In the early 1940s, 
winters in the Polish territories were very severe, characterized by frosts and 
heavy snow. After a major snowfall, most of the roads became impassable and 
required treatment. In rural areas, snow removal was the responsibility of local 
authorities, while in urban areas, Jews were commonly employed. The Jews 
were used to remove snow not only during the winter of 1939 and 1940, but 
also in following years.41 One of the Jewish chroniclers wrote about this in the 
following way: 
When snow begins to fall, we have additional trouble. According to the 
agreement between the Judenrat and the government, the Jews are liable 
for the forced labor of snow removal throughout the whole city. Every 
morning several hundred Jews, at the “order of the Judenrat,” go out to 
forced labor. You can recognize them not only by the “Jewish insignia” on 
their sleeves, but also by “their gestures” and by the sorrow implanted on 
their faces. They receive no pay for this, not even food. The Gentiles, too, 
are required to work, but they are paid.42
The German administration and various German institutions and service 
companies that were subject to the municipally created cleaning enterprise 
(Zakład Oczyszczania Miasta, ZOM) marked the beginning of organized labor 
39 YVA-JM.2700, Vermerk, Lublin, November 19, 1940, Report from the inspection of Water 
Inspection forced labor camps in Siedlicze, Sawin, and Włodawa, scan 33. 
40 Entry of March 6, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 99.
41 “Obowiązek uprzątania śniegu w Krakowie,” Gazeta Żydowska, January 7, 1940, 3; “Obrazek 
krakowski: śnieg. . . śnieg,” Gazeta Żydowska, January 17, 1940, 3.
42 Entry of March 4, 1940, in Kaplan, Scroll of Agony, 129.
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detachments in the places where Jews lived. This was associated with the stabili-
zation of the situation. It must not be forgotten that in the General Government 
several divisions of the Wehrmacht, military police, and civil police were sta-
tioned. Polish airports were transformed into the German military airfields. 
Most of these institutions needed workers to do a variety of jobs and they often 
benefitted from Jewish labor. This was due to their position and discriminatory 
attitude towards Jews as well as the ease with which it was possible to arrest 
Jews without the risk of being punished. At least in the initial period of the 
occupation, the German authorities tried not to provoke the Polish population 
unnecessarily. It was only after 1942 that intensified mass arrests of Poles for 
forced labor took place. In the years 1939 to 1942, the easiest way to get work-
ers free of charge was to apprehend Jews. By using that method to mobilize 
workers, not only the Jews complained, but so did the representatives of the 
German administration. In the report of Ludwig Fischer, the governor of the 
Warsaw District, the following text can be found: 
We must again conclude that the troops, making independent roundups in 
the Jewish quarter, greatly interfere with normal employment. Managers 
of workplaces every day complain that their Jewish workers are delayed for 
hours or do not show up for work at all because they were arrested or stayed in 
their flats due to the ongoing roundup. In order to satisfy the requirements of 
military facilities in an orderly fashion at all times, it is expected to introduce 
an obligation to work for all Jews between the ages of 14 to 60. According to 
this, anyone who does not have permanent employment will be required to 
serve 2–5 days a month, for which he will receive remuneration.43 
The problem of roundups was difficult to solve. Despite attempts to regu-
late forced labor, many German institutions felt completely unpunishable and 
therefore continued to hold on to Jews for work.
WORKSHOPS
For many of the Judenräte, the best solution was to create workshops in which 
Jews were employed in order to satisfy the demand for services from German 
institutions. In some places those workshops were called “urban workshops” 
(Germ. Städtische Werkstätte; Pol. warsztaty miejskie). Establishment of workshops 
43 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 405.
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prevented wild roundups, helped to stabilize the employment of Jews, and even 
gave prospects for further development. Workshops dealt not only with repairs 
but also with production of new items that could be sold on the open market.
It is difficult to determine the origins of the proposal to create workshops 
and whether it had come from the Jews themselves, or whether the idea devel-
oped earlier within the circles of the German authorities. The chapter on forced 
labor camps describes the creation of workshops in former military barracks of 
the Lipowa Street No. 7 in Lublin. Already from the autumn of 1939, on the 
order of SSPF Globocnik, workshops of this kind—in which Jewish workers 
from Lublin were employed—had been functioning. Such workers arrived to 
work every day and left in the evening. Numerous workshops were set up by 
the Germans in the autumn of 1939 and in the beginning of 1940. However, 
it seems that most often workshops were created at the initiative of the Jews 
themselves, although establishing them required approval from the authorities.
Workshops were created in the cities like Lublin,44 Warsaw,45 Bochnia,46 
Zamość,47 Kielce,48 Częstochowa,49 Tarnów,50 Wieliczka,51 and others. They 
were also a response to attempts to exclude Jews from the Polish economy, 
thereby leaving them destitute. Aryanization of Jewish businesses, shops and 
stores, and registration of machines and tools was a very dangerous process; 
therefore, creation of workshops, with the assistance of the Judenräte, allowed 
the salvaging of some of the tools and machines that were still owned by Jews. 
Jews could also make use of existing buildings to create workshops and thus 
continue to keep them under their management. For example, “In Międzyrzec 
[. . .] workshops were built in the streets, from which, as is feared, the Jews 
will be removed in connection with the intention of creating a ghetto.”52 
Top-down organization of workshops by the Judenräte allowed circumventing 
all the bureaucratic and legal constraints, such as, the financial  appropriation 
44 APL, RŻL-8, 40–41. Report from the activity of the [ Jewish] Council [in Lublin] for the 
period from September 1, 1939 to August 31, 1940. The workshops in Lublin were created 
already in December 1939 and employed 300 workers.
45 “Z Warszawy: Wytwórczość żydowska,” Gazeta Żydowska, September 3, 1941, 3.
46 “Z miast i miasteczek: Bochnia,” Gazeta Żydowska, July 7, 1941, 2.
47 YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 12; YVA-O.3/2940, testimony of Lea 
Białowicz, 1–11.
48 “Placówka dla rzemieślników-fachowców w Kielcach: Nowe warsztaty kamsznicze,” Gazeta 
Żydowska, December 10, 1940, 4
49 “Zbiorowe warsztaty w Częstochowie,” Gazeta Żydowska, August 21, 1942, 2.
50 “Wiadomości z Tarnowa,” Gazeta Żydowska, May 20, 1941, 4.
51 Henryk Schönker, Dotknięcie Anioła (Warsaw: Ośrodek Karta, 2005, 113).
52 Entry of April 13, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 125.
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of bank accounts that would have been insurmountable for individual 
entrepreneurs. Ludwig Fischer wrote, furthermore, in his report about the 
improvement of employment among the Jews:
Compared with the last month (February 1941), the employment of Jews 
has improved. Many thousands of unemployed Jewish artisans received 
jobs again thanks to the establishment of large workshops. At the moment, 
in the Jewish quarter, there still are about 62,000 unemployed Jews willing 
to work, including 28,000 artisans. There is an effort to incorporate into the 
production  process those able-bodied Jews. [. . .] In this connection, the 
Jewish quarter, in which all Jews must present themselves for the examina-
tion conducted by Jewish doctors will be carefully inspected. Jews who are 
classified as “unfit” [to work] will be re-examined by German physicians.53
Workshops developed relatively quickly; however, in the larger towns 
many Jewish workers were unable to secure employment. In big cities, the 
numbers of workers employed ranged from several hundred to several thou-
sand. “The craft workshops in the Jewish quarter of Warsaw employed in June 
[1941] an average of 2,325 artisans daily.”54 Shortly afterwards, we find infor-
mation about an increase in the number of workers in workshops: 
When it comes to economic issues, it should be noted that the number of 
workers employed in the workshops has grown to approximately 3,000 
people. However, in general, there are still doubts about whether the eco-
nomic potential of the Jewish quarter in the near future will develop, so 
that in a stricter separation from the outside world—it could use the sur-
plus production in order to cover the necessities of peoples’ lives.55 
Development of workshops was initially slow, but in the summer of 1940, 
it became increasingly dynamic. Since the spring of 1941, in connection with 
the preparation for Operation Barbarossa when the need to increase supplies 
for the army had grown, the demand for supplies and labor was very high.56 
53 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 294.
54 Ibid., 343.
55 Ibid., 375–76.
56 In his report, the governor of the district Lublin wrote about poor condition of people 
deported from Warthegau. The new migrants to Lublin were 5,000 Poles and 2,000 Jews, many 
of whom were unable to work. Moreover, 1540 Jews from Kraków also came to the district. 
At the same time, firms constructing roads needed 20,000 workers: Bauleitung der Flugwaffe 
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In addition to workshops, artisan craft unions were created, which 
were gradually able to unite small businesses into big economic conglomer-
ates. In Warsaw, such organizations included, for instance, the Association of 
Jewish Artisans (Związek Rzemieślników Żydowskich)57 and Jewish Industrial 
Supply Company Ltd. (Spółka Dostawcza Przemysłu Żydowskiego z o.o., or, in 
German, Lieferungsgesellschaft des jüdischen Gewerbes GmbH). The Association 
of Jewish Artisans was active also in Kraków58 and other places. Until end of 
July 1940 it registered 2381 masters (majstrowie), 4360 assistants (pomocnicy), 
588 apprentices (czeladnicy), and 287 pupils (praktykanci). All registered arti-
sans received personal documents and were enlisted in one of seven basic 
categories: wood workers, building, textile, food processing, metal workers, 
leather processing, and general artisans.59 The arrangement of economic rela-
tions with the Jewish district in Warsaw was followed by establishment of the 
Society of German Companies Warsaw, Ltd. (Deutsche Firmen Gesellschaft 
Warschau GmbH), which was supposed to unite many German industrial com-
panies. That society was the first to take care of all contracts in order to ensure 
employment of the Jews.60 
Some Jewish communities attempted to develop the possibility of work 
in agriculture, despite limited possibilities. The Judenrat in Warsaw was in 
the best situation, as it managed to renew activity of the agricultural farm in 
Grochów, which before the war belonged to He-Chalutz. It was a relatively large 
farm, possessing about 38 hectares of land and buildings. After the beginning 
of the war, the farm was devastated and all the animals from there were slaugh-
tered or stolen. However, after investing a lot of work, the farm was restored 
and employed 60 young people in the ages from 16 to 23. All its products were 
destined for the market.61 There were also similar agricultural Jewish farms 
outside the General Government, for example, in Będzin.62 In Tarnów, a group 
requested 8,000 to 10,000 workers, and Wasserwirtschaft requested 22,000 workers. See 
Lagebericht of the Governor of the Lublin District, March 6, 1941. YVA-O.53/101, scans 
47–50.
57 “Zespolenie rzemieślników żydowskich,” Gazeta Żydowska, December 10, 1940, 6.
58 “Rejestracja rzemieślników żydowskich w Krakowie,” Gazeta Żydowska, July 30, 1940, 3.
59 Ibid.
60 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 290.
61 “Ferma rolnicza w Grochowie,” Gazeta Żydowska, August 6, 1940, 2; “Ferma rolnicza w 
Grochowie,” Gazeta Żydowska, September 13, 1940, 6.
62 “Ferma rolna pod Będzinem: Dzień pracy na fermie,” Gazeta Żydowska, October 23, 1940, 2
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of young people volunteered to the work in agriculture and was sent by the 
labor office to the estate Łęg and Partyń, near Żabno.63 
CHANGES IN THE MECHANISM FOR PROCUREMENT  
OF FORCED LABOR AND SALARY
In early spring of 1940, some measures were taken in order to reduce the unpre-
dictability of certain German institutions, especially the police and the army, 
who carried out arrests for forced labor on the streets, in homes, and at places of 
Jewish worship; there was an attempt to regulate that problem on the local level 
by requiring the German authorities to direct requests for workers to the local 
administration. “In Kraków a copy of the regulation that the Jews can be taken 
to work only through the Jewish community had been received; this means that 
other forms of forced labor are prohibited.”64 Similar information is included in a 
report by Ludwig Fischer (May 9, 1940), who wrote: “The matter of giving orders 
to Judenräte by the German offices was regulated. From then on, the Jewish forced 
laborers should be obtained only by means of the mayors or heads of cities.”65 
Despite the regulation, some chiefs of local administration still supported arrests 
of Jews for forced labor. The Kreishauptmann of Puławy wrote in his report:
On behalf of a strong performance of the employment of labor and  
the fastest possible accomplishment of the building projects, coercive 
measures were imposed and implemented, because despite the decree 
of the Arbeitsamt only ca. 40 % of the men called upon reported. The  
40 men who were unwilling to work were brought to the forced labor 
camp Kazimierz. The length of stay of these indolent men in the forced 
labor camp is limited to 3–4 weeks. After that ensues service obligation 
to a new workplace to vacate the camp for other indolent elements. This 
measure proved to be successful throughout.66
It seems that other chiefs of local administration also used punitive 
measures freely. The Kreishauptmann of Jasło reported about initial failure of 
63 “Grupa młodzieży w Tarnowie zgłasza się do robót rolnych,” Gazeta Żydowska, September 6, 
1940, 5.
64 Entries of March 9, 12, 15, and 16, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 104.
65 Raport of May 9, 1940, Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 196.
66 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Puławy, Lagebericht für November 1940, 
Puławy, den 7. Dezember 1940, scan 1028.
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mobilization of Jewish workers, and about punitive measures directed towards 
the whole Jewish Community in Jasło:
After I had to make in recent weeks the observation that the local Jews 
had been challenging in their appearance and in particular the Judenrat 
destined to deal with compulsory labor of Jewish workers did not com-
plete allocated quotas, I have arrested 150 Jews in a prompt police action 
on May 25, 1940. These Jews were housed 2 days without food in a larger 
room; on the third day they had to work for 12 hours. On the same day the 
following notice was published in Jasło:
“The Jewish community in Jasło has failed to comply with my orders 
and shirked all of the work.
In addition to earlier adopted measures, I order therefore that as of 
today, Saturday, May 25, 1940 no Jew, not a Jewess, and not a Jewish child 
may go out on the streets in Jasło. Also looking out from the windows is 
strictly prohibited.
Against the Jews who do not adhere to this arrangement, the stron-
gest measures will be adopted.
Jasło, May 25, 1940, the County Chief in Jasło
Signed: Dr. Losacker”
Compliance with the house arrest was monitored strictly. The Jewish 
community has strictly adhered to the arrangement that triggered joyful 
echo in the Polish population. The Jews endeavor since that time to adhere 
strictly to the instructions.67 
Allocation of forced labor through local governors was meant to regulate 
the manner of mobilization and the introduction of control over the distribution 
of labor. Naturally, governors passed their orders on to the Judenräte, which were 
required to obey them. Already at that time, it was clear that forced labor, in the 
form as introduced in the autumn of 1939, did not work and that the situation had 
to be changed. Economists who dealt with forced labor, however, clashed with the 
conservative attitudes of party ideologues that had a poor grasp of the economy. It is 
shown by the following information taken from the reports of Hans Frank: 
Head of the Department of Labor [Dr. Frauendorfer] made the request 
to allow the Jews to seek employment on their own. This request must 
67 YVA-O.53/101, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Jasło, Jasło, den 2. Juni 1940, Lagebericht 
über die Zeit von Mitte Mai 1940 bis Ende Mai 1940, scans 74–76.
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be firmly rejected, because it is contrary to the decree of the Governor 
General, which allows the employment of Jews only in the context of 
forced labor.68 
However, in the summer of 1940, there was no other choice than to 
develop the employment of Jews and fix remuneration for their work. If the 
system of non-paid forced labor were continued, it would be necessary to 
ensure a budget that could cover the expenses associated with maintaining 
Jewish communities. This would not be accepted by anyone of importance in 
the General Government administration. As discussed earlier, the agreement 
of July 4, 1940 between Hans Frank, representing the civilian administration, 
and Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, representing the police and SS, undoubtedly 
Dr. Frauendorfer’s suggestion, among others, had merit. Thanks to that agree-
ment, German institutions were forced to pay wages to the Jews for forced labor 
and at the same time, employment opportunities of the Jews in the system 
of free hiring (praca wolnonajemna) were developed. Information about the 
change towards the use of forced labor of Jews was reflected in the release of 
information. Ludwik Landau, a renowned economist and observer of the reality 
of war, wrote, with surprise, in his diary about these modifications. He noted:
In Lublin a new meeting of administrative leadership of the district was 
held. Upon examination of cases mentioned in Warschauer Zeitung . . . 
regarding the matter of the employment of Jews, besides forced labor for 
“running away from work and criminal Jewish elements,” oddly enough, 
normal placement by labor offices for the jobs paid according to tariff 
rates and resulting in the compulsory insurance was discussed; even while 
speaking about forced labor, bonuses are mentioned for better perfor-
mance: is there a desire to leave good farewell memories?69
THE COLLECTORS OF RECYCLED RAW MATERIALS
There was a special group of Jews, who were distinguished from all other 
groups—Jewish collectors of recycled materials. Emanuel Ringelblum wrote 
68 Minutes of the meeting dedicated to the entirety of police matters related to the security sit-
uation in the General Government, Krakow, May 30, 1940, in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, 
vol. 1, 208.
69 Entry of July 20, 1940, in Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, vol. 1, 595. 
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about them: “A larger number of Jews—say, a thousand—has received the 
green armband, which authorizes the collection of [scrap] metal. They shall 
be exempt from compulsory labor. They do not wear Jewish armbands.”70 This 
policy was completely opposite to the previous elimination of the Jews from 
the trade. In November 1940, the chef of the Lublin District wrote in his report: 
“The Jewish iron trade is off. All Jewish stores were taken over by the Aryans.”71 
At the same time, the authorities employed thousands of Jews to collect scrap 
iron and metal. The quantities of scrap and metal were quite considerable. For 
example, the Kreishauptmann of Puławy reported in September 1940: “In the 
course of scrap and metal collection, 500,000 kg scrap and 20,000 kg of metal 
in total were shipped out of the County area. 300,000 kg of scrap and 1,000 kg 
of metal are currently awaiting shipment.”72
Those Jews had an advantage because they could move freely throughout 
the General Government. In another place, Ringelblum wrote, “In Międzyrzec, 
workers employed to produce the bristles [przy szczecinie], are considered 
economically useful Jews. They can drive around the country.”73 The fact that 
they have authorization to move out of places designated for Jews seemed to 
be highly exceptional at the beginning of the occupation because of the impor-
tance of their work, but those Jews were able to move freely around the country 
also in 1942, when liquidation of the ghettos and deportations to death camps 
began. Their freedom of movement continued even in the first half of 1943, 
when most of the concentrated small ghettos were completely liquidated.74
The German economy, especially after the campaign in Western Europe, 
and to a greater extent after the start of the war with the USSR, was cut off from 
supplies of many key raw materials due to the blockade. Raw materials such as 
non-ferrous metals were very important for war production, so the Germans 
were looking for the possibility of obtaining non-ferrous metals from scrap 
taken from various old and useless items. However, the raw material  collectors 
were searching not only for metal. They collected scrap iron, paper, rags, and 
many other raw materials. Collecting groups, consisting of a few people, in 
70 Entry of April 13, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 124.
71 YVA-JM.814, Der Chef des Distriks Lublin im Generalgouvernement, Lagebericht für 
Oktober 1940, Lublin, den 6. November, 1940, scan 783.
72 Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Puławy, Lagebericht für August 1940, den 7. September 
1940, scan 184.
73 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 125.
74 YVA, JM-1478. This document contains lists of names of some thousands Jewish ‘rags- 
collectors’ in different counties of the Lublin District.
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general had horse-drawn carriages available, which roamed the area and actively 
searched for raw materials, or re-purchased them at low prices, delivering them 
later to special warehouses. Such depots were, for example, in Okęcie and in 
Warsaw, where workers from the Labor Battalion sorted scrap and loaded it on 
wagons.75
The Germans even created a special facility called the raw material office 
(Rohstoffstelle), whose task was to coordinate the collection of raw materials. 
The development of these facilities was very dynamic throughout the General 
Government; they coordinated the work of several thousand such collectors of 
raw materials. In one of the entries in his diary, Adam Czerniaków wrote: 
This morning, the community lieutenant from the Rohstoffstelle [raw 
material office] came by and paid workers 4,000 zł for 3 days of work. He 
also handed out 1,500 green armbands to functionaries working for them 
and to workers with the appropriate Ausweis.76
In 1942–1943, the raw materials were so sought after that the act of collec-
tion had become a lucrative activity. Special companies were founded for that 
purpose; one of the most famous among them was Victor Kremin’s company. 
It operated mainly in the Lublin District and Galicia. The scale of the collec-
tion is reflected in some sources. According to a report in 1941, 47,369 tons of 
scrap iron were collected in the General Government.77 According to infor-
mation published in Gazeta Żydowska, an official Jewish newspaper published 
in Galicia, 3,000,000 kg of wastepaper were collected in 1942. About 3,500 
people were employed there to collect wastepaper, rags, and other raw 
materials.78 The following excerpt from Ludwig Fischer’s report explains why 
the collection of rags was so important. Felt was produced by using special 
equipment for shredding rags and the new material was then used in cloth 
manufacture. Ludwig Fischer wrote about the difficulties of the textile industry: 
The situation of the textile industry has deteriorated further. Some 
plants—among them one of the largest in the district, an artificial 
silk factory in Chodaków—had to stop production due to lack of fuel. 
Furthermore, owing to the suspension of Jewish rag collectors, the influx of 
75 Entry of April 26, 27, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 128.
76 Entry of April 6, 1940, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 103.
77 BA-MA, RW23-5, Geschichte der Rü In im GG (1. Juni 1940–31. Dezember 1941), 127.
78 “3 miliony makulatury z Okręgu Galicji,” Gazeta Żydowska, August 30, 1942, 1.
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rags, which in recent months was in average of 70,000 kg, fell to 14,000 kg. 
Everything is ready to replace the Jewish traders by Poles.79
WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE OUTPOSTS
Working conditions in the outposts depended largely upon the institution 
organizing the work and its relation to the Jews. On the other hand, conditions 
were generally poor. The workers were subjected to harassment by the police 
and SS troops that engaged them to work. They were often beaten. Somewhat 
better conditions prevailed in outposts that were managed by civil institutions. 
The Jewish workers were employed in these outposts usually from dawn to 
dusk. They should have received meals; however, it did not always happen, 
or time for dinner was insufficient. In some other outposts, workers did not 
receive meals at all, and the Jewish workers had to work throughout the day 
while hungry, or bring food with them. In one of the entries to his diary, Adam 
Czerniaków wrote: 
Workers who did not report for labor in the outposts are caught on the 
streets. They tried to escape because they weren’t given food but 2.80 zł 
instead [as a substitute of food]. I applied to Kamlah [a German official] 
to feed [them]. For now, no avail. The Jewish masses facing the immen-
sity of Jewish misery are quiet and composed. [. . .] It is said that there is 
no inflation, but it is expensive. No one considers the fact that a worker 
cannot live on 2.80 zł.80
The workers employed in the outposts performed all sorts of work 
depending upon the needs. For example: “To work outside the Jewish quar-
ter [in Warsaw], the Jews are directed in columns, which everyday number 
about 2,000 people, to perform a variety of ancillary works for different agen-
cies.”81 Such works could involve clearing rubble of buildings destroyed during 
a bombing, repairing buildings,82 unloading and demolition work,83 sorting 
metal scrap,84 and so forth. Jews were also employed in the ZOM (Department 
79 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 239.
80 Entry of July 8, 1941, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 199. 
81 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 278.
82 Entries of May 2–9, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 138.
83 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 457.
84 Entries of April 26 and 27, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 128.
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of Municipal Cleaning Services), which at certain times needed up to 1,000 
workers per day.85
The positive side of the work on the outposts, from the Jewish point of 
view, was the possibility of trading with other workmen or people outside the 
ghetto. This was especially important after the closure of the ghetto, when 
opportunities to import food into the ghetto were limited. Delivery of food to 
the ghetto was a key issue—decisive when considering survival in the ghetto. 
At this point, an explanation is required as to why the Germans limited 
official food supplies and combated smuggling and illegal trade in food. This 
was related to the war economy and the role of the General Government in the 
economy of the Third Reich. Since the General Government had to exercise 
a subordinate role and to serve as a reservoir of raw materials, food, and labor 
for the Third Reich, it was necessary to obtain a surplus of food by reducing 
the consumption of the non-German population living under the General 
Government. Therefore, the official ration of food was possible only through 
the use of special vouchers (karty żywnościowe). The war economy of the 
Third Reich functioned in a system of allocating resources, where all agri-
cultural production was to be under control and its transfer could take place 
only through authorized channels from producer to consumer. Therefore, 
black market trade interfered with the functioning of the official distribution 
of food and meant that large quantities of food circulated outside the offi-
cial circuit, controlled by the German administration. This, in turn, lowered 
the amount of reserves that the economy of the General Government could 
donate to the Third Reich. The Jews were especially blamed for the existence 
of black market trade, although Jewish involvement in it was very limited in 
comparison to the Polish population that participated in the black market. 
The Polish urban population living in big cities particularly suffered from 
serious deficiencies of food. The Jews, in turn, in order to survive, had to use 
black market trade to make up for the food shortages. 
During the growing isolation of the ghettos, the products brought into the 
ghetto by the workers employed in the outposts outside the ghetto served as a 
major source of food supply. Ringelblum wrote in his chronicle: “People work-
ing outside the ghetto are standing at every step [on the streets]. They bring 
full bags of bread and other products.”86 In another place, he wrote: “Some Jews 
penetrated the Aryan side thanks to the Polish outposts in the ghetto. Then, the 
85 Entry of April 8, 1940, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 103.
86 Entries of November 29–December 2, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 209.
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German factories in the ghetto employed Jews and Poles who worked alongside 
one another (Kurt Rohrich, KG Schultz, Brauer, and others); it was thought 
that Polish workers would take the place of Jewish workers later on. Jews pro-
vided with Aryan papers joined the group of Polish workers.”87 The incidence of 
employees smuggling from food establishments was also known to the German 
authorities. This information was featured in reports by Ludwig Fischer: 
The Polish peasants and traders continued to sell large quantities of bread 
and other foods to Jews working outside the ghetto. Those Jews were 
bringing enormous quantities of food with them into the Jewish quarter 
and selling it there at astronomical prices.88
However, the German authorities tried their best to hamper business, and, 
therefore, undertook additional measures to restrict trade, increase control, and 
reduce workers’ contacts with the local population centres. In one of the subse-
quent reports, Fischer stated: 
Jewish columns that have been most actively engaged in black market 
trade, can now cross the border of the Jewish residential district only 
through two special gateways where they are subjected to strict control. 
Outside the Jewish quarter, an operating column can move only under 
the supervision the Wehrmacht and SS. Probably even now, goods are 
smuggled by secret ways into the Jewish quarter, but black market trade, 
compared to the previous period, is insignificant. We can therefore con-
clude that by creating the Jewish residential district significant progress 
was achieved in combating trafficking.89
TRANSFER TO GHETTOS
One of the most important processes, hardly noticed by the researchers, 
was the transfer to the Jewish quarters. As a result, one of the most dramatic 
practices of looting of Jewish property took place. Already before the estab-
lishment of the ghettos, most Jews lost their businesses. In most cases, it was 
purely ideological and not an economically motivated decision. For example, 
87 Emanuel Ringelblum, Stosunki polsko-żydowskie w czasie drugiej wojny światowej: Uwagi i 
spostrzeżenia, ed. Artur Eisenbach (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988), 78–79.
88 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 240.
89 Ibid., 254.
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the Stadtkommissar of Ostrowiec wrote in his report: “Jewish businesses that 
were possible to transfer to trustees (brauchbar) have received a trustee or shall 
still get a one. The purpose is to bind the Jewish capital and expand a decent 
 business.”90 The German authorities were very interested in taking over the 
Jewish apartments, especially in the city and town centers. According to the 
report by Kreishauptmann of Opatów: 
For the near future, 1,000 people are announced for resettlement in the 
Kreis. They will be accommodated in several villages. To remedy the hous-
ing shortage in the main town and to secure the housing needs of employ-
ees of the Reich and the administration, conveniently located, spacious but 
partly destroyed houses with 1 or 2 rooms will be quickly repaired. The 
Kreissparkasse (County Savings Bank) will cover the costs. In contrast to 
that, the construction of new homes starts only reluctantly. In communities 
affected by war damage the reconstruction of damaged houses achieved 
a nice progress. In the district’s main town Opatów, the Kreishauptmann 
initiated a systematic de-judification [Entjudung] and arranged in prepa-
ration that the Jews have to leave the spacious market square apartments. 
In this context, the ghetto will be established as convenient as possible.  
It is questionable if the simultaneously prescribed decrease of the number 
of Jews of about 2,500 can be effected by December 1 [1940] because a 
migration to other districts is not feasible.91 
The Stadthauptmann of Częstochowa also reported extensively on the 
problems of housing and eviction of Jews from their apartments: 
It may be connected to the fact that there are more German troops deployed 
in the General Government and hence in the town of Tschenstochau 
(Częstochowa), that the present quarters are insufficient and I had to 
arrange for new quarters in a greater extent. This initiative occurred not 
without frictions. Jewish houses that are suited for military quarters are 
not existent anymore, so that I had to revert to Poles as well. I did this in 
the following manner: I moved scattered Jews from their houses, confis-
cated their furniture and allocated the houses with the furniture to those 
90 YVA-JM.814, Stadtkommissar der Stadt Ostrowiec an den Herrn Kreishauptmann in 
Opatów, Lagebericht für August 1940, Ostrowiec, den 5. September 1940, scan 309.
91 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Opatów, District Radom, Lagebericht für 
August 1940, Opatów, den 7. September 1940, scans 306–7.
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Polish families that were evacuated from a cohesive block of houses. Since 
the accommodation of the troops that are now coming to Tschenstochau 
is for long-term, my position is that the troops must have decent winter 
quarters. I also intend to arrange for decent permanent living quarters for 
those German civilian officers and personnel that partly still live in very 
poor housing.92
During the formation of ghettos and the move into them, many families 
who found themselves outside the designated boundaries of the Jewish 
neighbourhoods, lost their entire life’s possessions, including property that 
had accumulated over generations. During the transfer into the ghetto in 
Kraków, furniture was primarily sold since when it was being thrown out 
of their apartments, owners could not take furniture with them, especially 
given the very short time left at their disposal and the scarcity of new apart-
ments. Many, mostly from the intelligentsia and without the possibility of 
work, were forced to sell their belongings to obtain necessary monetary 
resources for basic living.93 Transfer to the ghetto was connected with 
losing a large part, if not a complete loss, of property that caused a sudden 
and almost total impoverishment of displaced Jews. .94 The consequences 
of this act were in many cases immediate, but sometimes they became 
apparent later. The rapid transfer of refugees made them destitute. This 
was true, for example, in the case of the evacuation of Jews from the west-
ern counties of the Warsaw District to the Warsaw Ghetto.95 In other cities 
rapid impoverishment ensued as well. 
The Jewish population of Kraków rapidly was becoming more and 
more impoverished. This process was particularly intensified among the  
pensioners, the disabled, as well as among unemployed civil servants, and 
especially among the growing numbers of displaced.96
92 YVA, JM-814, Tschenstochau, Bericht für den Monat August 1940, September 14, 1940, 
scans 338–39.
93 Aleksander Biberstein, Zagłada Żydów w Krakowie (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
1985), 31. 
94 Barbara Engelking and Jacek Leociak, Getto warszawskie: Przewodnik po nieistniejącym 
mieście (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2001), 453. 
95 To Live with Honor and Die with Honor: Selected Documents from the Warsaw Ghetto 
Underground Archives “O.S.” (Oneg Shabbath), ed. Joseph Kermish ( Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 
1986), 537.
96 Biberstein, Zagłada Żydów w Krakowie, 32. 
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The process of impoverishment of a well-established Jewish merchant, 
who was taken to a forced labor camp, became sick, and had his life in danger, 
all due to a series of anti-Jewish measures, is illustrated by the following 
fragment of a report: 
At the request of Israel Grünwald addressed by Dr. Bieberstein, I visited 
him in the epidemic hospital and stated: Grünwald, Israel, born January 
29, 189[?], Son of Isaac and Sarah b. Neugröschl, permanent residence 
in Gorlice, a month ago had been assigned to the camp in Płaszów, the 
father of two children—according to his claims, he is a merchant and ran 
a haberdashery shop until May [1942], which store was sequestrated by 
the authorities, together with the entire inventory and revenues from this 
shop are made on a blocked account, so that his wife and children are 
in complete poverty and are not able to come to his aid material. He is 
entirely without funds, without any footwear (no. 43), starving, because 
the hospital board is insufficient. Dr. Bieberstein gained for him free 
lunches in Beit Lechem, but he didn’t receive them because no one brought 
them to him. He asked to intervene in that matter, to obtain for him the 
bread and shoes. 
On my request, director Mrs. Feuerstein sent ward of the Institute 
for Orphans, with whom I went to Beit Lechem and there I have learned 
that they promised to give meals only two days a week, Mondays and 
Thursdays. I pledged to send lunches for the petitioner. At my request, 
they gave him a free dinner today.97 
Transfer to the ghetto had many consequences. Firstly, it resulted in the 
deterioration of the displaced Jews’ situation and brought about the creation 
of the poorest sectors of society. Since then, people became dependent on 
their work, selling the rest of their belongings, until finally they were depen-
dent on the support of Jewish welfare institutions, if available. As a rule, during 
the planning process for the ghettos, the worst neighbourhoods were chosen. 
They were mostly in areas with poor infrastructure and buildings in the worst 
condition. Further degeneration took place owing to the concentration of large 
numbers of Jews into a small congested area. According to a report sent to 
the government of the General Government: “Most of the Jews are settled 
on the outskirts. The rental prices got into complete disarray. The Jews pay 
97 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Notatka, Kraków, August 16, 1942, scan 230.
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extraordinary high rental prices.”98 This process of crowding the Jewish 
population was also a process of depriving them of property and freeing up 
Jewish homes for other purposes. The unoccupied apartments and houses were 
earmarked for offices and housing for German officials, German settlers, Poles 
expelled from other districts, and refugees. Empty homes sometimes became 
the target of looting. Many Jewish residences were passed on to the Board of 
Trustees (Zarząd Powierniczy).
For example, in Zamość, Jews were transferred to the so-called Nowa 
Osada, which was described by one witness in the following words: 
The Nowa Osada was [. . .] composed mostly of small, wooden houses.  
At the time of transfer, of course, better houses were occupied by the Polish 
population. For us, there were the worst slums and huts left by the poor Jews, 
many thousands of whom left Zamość in 1939, along with the Soviet troops. 
[. . .]; the need to locate people could not be avoided—wherever—in fac-
tory premises, shops and halls. There were no waterworks or sewers; people 
used public wells. Then, as part of the Polish population moved from Nowa 
Osada to Zamość, flats vacated by Jews (mieszkania pożydowskie), were used 
and some relief was felt. The housing situation deteriorated significantly 
again, however, after the arrival of the first transports of Jews from abroad.99
Losses of property during the transfer of Jews to ghettos were huge. In terms 
of material value, this stage was undoubtedly one of the most painful for the 
Jews and caused the sudden impoverishment of the population. For example, 
during the evacuation of Jews from the western counties of the Warsaw District, 
the whole towns became judenrein. This meant not only that property belong-
ing to the Jewish communities was in the hands of non-Jews, but also that pri-
vate property was taken away from individual Jews. This hapened in concerned 
shops and workshops that had not yet been aryanized, as well as private homes 
with all their possessions. During the transfer to ghettos, there was virtually no 
way for the Jews to convert their possessions into capital. The situation forced 
upon the Jews caused the sudden decline in the market value both of real estate 
as well as movable property, and so even in cases of the sale of property, the 
Jews were not able to get a fair price for the offered items or for their real estate. 
98 YVA, JM-814, Abt. Innere Verwaltung, Auszug aus den Lageberichten der Kreis- und 
Stadthauptleute für August 1940, Krakau, den 30. September 1940, scan 349.
99 YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 11–12.
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Transfer to the ghettos was made in a hurry, usually within a few days.100 In 
such a short time, there were transport difficulties caused not only by the great 
demand for moving belongings, but also increased haulage prices. In the new 
places of residence, there was such crowding that Jews could take only the most 
basic everyday items with them when they were transferred. Previously intro-
duced rules on bank account ownership and market diffuclties during the occu-
pation led to substantial losses of cash resources. Therefore, during the transfer 
to ghettos, the Jews were able to bring a maximum of 5–10% value of their pre-
war resources of cash and valuables. In most cases, less than 5% seems more cor-
rect. When the Jews moved into the ghetto, what could serve as a basis for their 
maintenance were the remnants of their resources and their labor.
Jews whose apartments were already in the ghettos were in a much better 
situation; at least temporarily, they managed to keep their property. It allowed 
them a more prosperous life because they could sell off their property for a 
longer period, and thus remain at a better standard of living. They did not 
undergo sudden impoverishment and had a longer time to adapt to the new 
conditions. Thanks to this, they were in better shape both physically and men-
tally during the critical period of deportation to the camps and escape from the 
ghetto to the Aryan side.
An extremely important factor in the early days of the ghettos was their 
isolation from the external environment. This was particularly evident in the 
Warsaw Ghetto. As a rule, smaller ghettos were less isolated from their sur-
roundings. Some provincial ghettos remained “open” up to the end of their 
existence. In the case of the ghetto in Zamość, in spite of its isolation, going out 
of the ghetto was not a problem. In the words of a witness: 
At first [in May 1941], there were no restrictions regarding the movement 
of Jews in Zamość, but soon such a ban was issued. This prohibition wore 
a rather symbolic character, since many Jews worked in Zamość or in var-
ious outposts outside the city and all those, in accordance with an agree-
ment concluded by us with the German authorities, had the right to leave 
Nowa Osada and enjoy free movement in Zamość on the basis of a pass 
issued by the Jewish council.101
100 For example, in Kielce Mayor’s Regulation was published on March 31, 1941, while the 
completion date of transfer to the ghetto was set on April 5, 1941. See Regulation of Mayor 
of Kielce Drechsel on the creation of the ghetto, Kielce, March 31, 1941, in Eisenbach and 
Rutkowski, Ekstermnacja Żydów, 117.
101 YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 13. 
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And the witness continued: 
The fact that the Jewish quarter until the last minute was not closed can 
be explained only by efforts of the Jewish council, supported by regular 
donations and payments, which permitted a large number of Jewish laborers, 
who had to constantly leave the [ Jewish] quarter, to work outside the 
quarter.102
These two factors—transfer to ghettos and isolation—had a major impact 
on the economic conditions of the Jews. They not only robbed the Jews of most 
movable and immovable property, but they also isolated them from the external 
environment in economic terms, thereby creating a kind of economic enclave 
in the economic system of the General Government. This produced a new type 
of economic system in isolated ghettos. Creating economic enclaves resulted 
in the reduced quality of life of the Jews in their surroundings and allowed the 
increased exploitation of both human and material resources. The flow of raw 
materials and goods across those borders gave additional benefits to interme-
diaries and created a hedge against prices,103 resulting in inflated payments 
for raw materials and products, including food from and outside the ghetto, 
while at the same time, making all products and raw materials from the ghetto 
became cheaper. 104
The labor force in the ghettos was less expensive because of high unem-
ployment. The products of the ghetto, in order to remain competitive, also had 
to be cheaper than in the outside market, even after deducting the cost of deliv-
ery through the walls of the ghetto. The same principle also applied to the trade 
and services in the ghetto. Goods sold in the ghetto, as well as services, needed 
to be very cheap to allow a profit chain for intermediaries—yet still remain 
cheaper than the product on the outside.
ACQUIRING THE MEANS OF SUBSISTENCE IN THE  
EARLY DAYS OF THE GHETTO
Earning a living in the ghetto can be divided into several key areas. In the early 
days of the ghetto, the livelihood of many Jews was from trade and services. 
The reason for this was, among other things, the fact that development of 
102 Ibid., 18. 
103 Engelking, Barbara and Jacek Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 472.
104 Ibid., 375.
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production on a large scale in the new economic environment required time 
and not merely because of the lack of appropriate conditions and equipment. 
It was also an arduous procedure because it required complex processes associ-
ated with creating an entire network of links between markets and producers, 
solving a number of problems associated with the acquisition of raw materials, 
procuring adequate equipment, labor, the creation of distribution networks, 
and so forth. No less important was obtaining the relevant licenses and the 
establishment of appropriate contacts to enable the flow of cash or barter 
exchange.
All these circumstances meant that trade had become the easiest and fast-
est way to earn a living. Together with the relatively poor isolation of ghettos 
from the general public or the existence of places for the exchange of goods 
with the outside populace, the ghetto became a supplier of a multitude of local 
and external market goods.105 It is worthwhile to pay attention to the fact that 
under the conditions of the occupation, the production of some consumer 
goods actually ceased entirely or was very limited.106 This situation created a 
huge market for used items. One could virtually sell and buy everything. Much 
of this involved footwear and clothing, including underwear. Residents of 
the ghettos sold almost everything in bulk; however, it was at the expense of 
reducing their own resources, for example, leaving only one set of clothes for 
themselves, while selling all the rest. Many goods from the ghetto reached the 
external market. Trade in used goods took place during the entire period of the 
ghetto existence. The increased supply of certain goods was also associated, in 
a tragic way, with the fate of Jews in the ghettos. For instance, during the period 
of increased mortality, the remaining items of the dead appeared on the market. 
Arrival of Jews from abroad to transit ghettos in the Lublin District was reflected 
in the increased supply of rare and luxury goods. Finally, during the partial liq-
uidation of the ghettos, once again, a variety of goods appeared on the market.
With the phenomenon of trafficking in closed ghettos—that is, those 
ghettos where the population was locked inside and not able to freely leave 
it—additional trade related economic activities developed, namely, smuggling 
of goods, also known as szmugiel in Polish (from Germ. Schmuggel). Henryk 
Bryskier describes this new type of economic activity in the following words: 
There is a new industry—smuggling. Individuals deprived of sources of 
income on the Polish side, decided to go by trams through the ghetto 
105 Engelking, Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 454, 378.
106 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 527, 596.
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and, with risk, dropped off food packages at agreed points where their 
Jewish partners in smuggling expected them. This resulted in fairly sub-
stantial profits, given the huge price differences. In addition to these 
rather numerous small smugglers, entire organizations with vast sums and  
balances were created.107
Labor was also an important means of obtaining funds to survive. Jews 
living in ghettos worked inside or outside the ghetto. Groups of Jews were 
employed in various German institutions, so-called placówki (outposts, labor 
detachments),108 or labor camps. Inside the ghetto, Jews were given jobs by 
Judenräte, by the Jewish police, and by other institutions. Jews also worked in 
the private sector, mainly in the crafts. In addition, Jews were obligated to per-
form forced labor, mainly in labor camps and German institutions. Despite the 
fact that Jews worked in labor camps as well as outside the ghetto, the effect of 
this, in many cases, was negative for their families who remained in the ghetto 
and for the ghetto economy in general. This was mainly because working in 
labor camps and some external labor detachments did not bring any payment 
or at best resulted in a very low salary.109 Taking labor forces from the ghettos 
was a drain of productive elements from the ghetto society, which caused the 
deterioration of the overall balance of productivity in the ghettos.
During the transfer of Jews to ghettos and their isolation, a sudden shift in 
job opportunities took place. Throughout this period, extremely high unem-
ployment emerged in the ghettos, along with a surplus of specialists in certain 
fields.110 However, over time, the Jews adjustmed to life in the ghettos. One of 
the witnesses of those events describes his feelings in this manner:
We all thought that we were surrounded by a Chinese wall; that we were 
lost; that we would die of hunger. Indeed, many people perished and  
[. . .] even more died at this time. This is due to the prevailing conditions: 
an epidemic of typhus, hunger, and overpopulation. However, to date, 
most of the Jews adapted to these conditions.111
107 Henryk Bryskier, Żydzi pod swastyką, czyli getto w Warszawie w XX wieku (Warsaw: Aspra, 
2006), 49. 
108 Engelking and Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 154, 396–97.
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ADAPTING TO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE GHETTOS
The process of rapid adaptation of Jews to the conditions in the ghetto took 
place thanks to the extraordinary ingenuity and initiative of the Jews. In this 
process, not only institutions of the Judenräte were involved, but also, and per-
haps above all, were involved Jewish entrepreneurs. Adjusting to new conditions 
included an intensive search for raw materials, machines, and tools, analysis of 
market needs, or initiating new demand by offering various goods and services.
In most of the ghettos, there was not a sufficiently large internal market 
that could provide a self-sufficient economy. In the case of the Warsaw Ghetto, 
when it was closed up, there were approximately 350,000 Jews inside and 
there was a relatively large internal market. Moreover, such a large commu-
nity required a complex and extensive administration. It should be noted that 
during the Nazi occupation, the Judenrat was much more complicated than the 
institutions of Jewish communities before the war, because the Judenrat had to 
concentrate in its hands all the administrative functions of the pre-war Jewish 
communities, and, in addition, to act as municipal offices and police, as well as 
perform other administrative functions that, before the war, were filled by gov-
ernment offices. Therefore, the Judenrat was also one of the biggest employers 
of Jews. For example, in December 1940, in the Częstochowa Ghetto, number-
ing at its peak about 42,000 people, 676 of them were employed by the Judenrat. 
In this period, the number of employees represented an escalating trend.112 
However, the ghettos had to not only maintain themselves, but also provide 
manpower and to make available funds in order to pay for various fees, taxes, 
contributions,113 and bribes.114 For their survival, the ghettos had to abandon 
an autarchic economic system and to begin export goods, services, and labor in 
order to obtain food, raw materials, energy, and so forth. Therefore, even in the 
Warsaw Ghetto, the autarchic economy could no longer exist. In small ghettos 
isolation from the external area was practically impossible. 
112 YVA-O.6/348, Tab. no. 1.
113 YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 15. 
114 According to the witness, “the biggest financial problem of the [ Jewish] Council was the 
need to invent how to cover the increasing costs associated with bribery, gifts, and other 
expenses for the various dignitaries and higher and lesser Gestapo officers, the German 
police, gendarmes, and officials. As it turned out, it was the only way, the only platform of 
understanding, on which could be arranged relations, the only way to acquire relative 
peace.” See YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 16. 
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The transition from trade to production took place in all the ghettos. This 
process was the easiest in small provincial ghettos, where the majority of Jewish 
artisans, even in the interwar period and in the first months of the occupa-
tion, were working as craftsmen for the non-Jewish population. Jews engaged 
in trade were in a much more difficult situation because in the Aryanization 
process they had lost many stores and stock of goods and cash. Some Jews deal-
ing in trade switched to illicit trade, mainly on a relatively small scale. Others 
began to sell different goods on the streets or started to work as peddlers. 
Developing trade in the ghetto environment depended on the possibility of 
finding new customers as well as establishing contacts with regular commercial 
clients or individual customers. Since there was a very limited supply of con-
sumer goods, given the constant food rationing and control of other products 
that were difficult to obtain, the black market grew rapidly.115
Most of the Jews previously dealing in trade had to switch to services, 
crafts, or production for the non-Jewish market. This production consisted of 
different fields, depending on local needs. In small provincial ghettos most tra-
ditional areas of service and craftsmanship, such as shoemaking, tailoring ser-
vices, saddler, blacksmithing, and repair of tools were needed. In the cities, the 
list of areas in which there was a need had greatly expanded and included more 
technologically related fields. The urban market was more receptive because 
of the higher concentration of population and a greater range of requirements. 
In addition, urban Jews could sell not only to the local residents, but also to 
the rural population from the surrounding area, German officials, and German 
companies.
DEVELOPMENT OF WORKSHOPS
In large ghettos, the development of productive activity was associated with 
the demand for laborers and with orders from German officers and German 
institutions for services provided by artisans. This development was uneven. In 
different places, workshops were created for residents of the ghettos to provide 
work. Under the existing provisions of the General Government, any new busi-
nesses had to be approved by the authorities and be registered in the commercial 
register. In order to obtain the permit, the person assuming charge of the 
company would have to demonstrate his Aryan origin, thereby making it impos-
sible for Jews to set up new businesses or to transform existing ones, since all 
115 BA-MA, RW23-8, Tabelle über den Verhältnissen von amtlichen Preisen uns Scheichhan-
delspreisen nach dem Stande vom Marz 1941, 96.
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companies had to be registered.116 In addition, provisions concerning the oper-
ation of bank accounts also prevented Jews from making financial transactions 
that were necessary for doing business. Due to that situation, at the beginning 
of the occupation, the establishment of workshops and production enterprises 
were arranged by the economic departments of the Judenräte. Such workshops 
were created independently in different localities. Adam Czerniaków wrote in 
his diary about attempts to open a locksmith shop, a tailor shop, and a corsetry 
workshop in Warsaw in mid-December 1939.117 In early January 1940, the first 
decisions on the production profile of workshops in Warsaw were taken.118 
In Warsaw, besides the Judenrat, the workshops were established by the ORT, 
where in the middle of 1940, 120 workers were employed. The organization 
intended to open professional courses and attempted to receive the authori-
zation during the school year of 1939 and 1940. However, such authorization, 
came only in August 1940. ORT planned therefore to open professional courses 
for artisans and courses preparing for work in agriculture in Warsaw and other 
towns of the General Government.119 Organization of professional courses for 
Jews continued to develop also in 1941. There were some courses preparing to 
work in agriculture,120 but most of the courses concerned manufacturing and 
industrial production.121 
Economic initiatives came from a variety of factors which influenced the 
operation of such workshops. In some cities, the establishment of a workshop 
was initiated by the representatives of the Judenrat and entrepreneurs. Although 
initiatives to set up a framework to permit use of existing economic potential in 
the ghettos took different organizational form, their main goal was quite similar. 
We can show it using some examples of small ghettos like Bochnia or Zamość 
and a bigger ghetto of Częstochowa. For example, in Zamość, a workshop 
was initiated by the Judenrat in order to cope with the continuing orders for 
the execution of various works for German functionaries and institutions.122 
However, an additional goal of the organizers of the workshop in Zamość was 
to keep buildings belonging to the Jewish community in Jewish hands and to 
116 Wiadomości Gospodarcze, January 31, 1940, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 159.
117 Entry of December 15, 1939 in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 71.
118 According to the entry of January 8, 1940, they intended to produce metal beds. In Fuks, 
Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 76.
119 “Z działalności T-wa ‘ORT,’” Gazeta Żydowska, October 24, 1940, 3.
120 YVA-JM.1501, scans 620–21.
121 Jüdische Handwerker-Ausbildungskurse für Erwachsene und Jugendliche. YVA-JM.1501, scans 
610–19.
122 Adam Kopciowski, Zagłada Żydów w Zamościu (Lublin: Wyd. UMCS, 2005).
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protect them from damage. The chairman of the Judenrat in Zamość, Mieczysław 
Garfinkiel,123 put it this way:
Wondering before the exodus [to the area designated for the ghetto] 
over the fate of synagogues and other Jewish public edifices, located in 
Zamość, which would inevitably be doomed to annihilation and destruc-
tion after our departure, I had an idea. I made an agreement with Zygmunt 
Zipser,124 a local industrialist (as I later realized, contrary to appearances, 
he helped during the occupation of Poles and Jews); and in all the syna-
gogues and other buildings in the public domain of the Jews, he founded, 
with the help of the Judenrat, carpentry and furniture workshops. Thanks 
to that, these buildings were saved from burning and destruction, which 
was the fate [of Jewish public buildings] in almost all Polish cities, and 
among others in Warsaw and Lublin.125
The Judenrat in Bochnia set up urban workshops (Germ. Städtische 
Werkstätten; Pol. warsztaty miejskie) in order to provide new jobs for the Jews 
and to encourage production.126 Development of workshops in the ghettos 
was a type of compensation for the earlier prohibitions on Jewish businesses 
outside the ghettos and forced Aryanization. These were precisely workshops, 
in which establishments and functioning experts in different fields of econ-
omy took part and that led to the launch of production under the aegis of the 
Judenrat. All formalities relating to the creation of those enterprises and finan-
cial transactions with companies outside of the ghetto were organized with the 
assistance or mediation of the Judenrat. Without this, no financial transactions 
would have been possible due to restrictions on Jewish bank accounts. 
Particularly important was the creation of workshops after the transfer and 
closure of the ghettos. In the case of the Kraków ghetto, Jews were transferred to 
the Podgórze District, which was a small area surrounded by walls and deprived 
123 Despite the fact that Judenräte and Jewish Self-Assistance (ŻSS) were two separate 
organizations and the ŻSS had to be financially and organizationally independent, the 
head of Zamość Judenrat was also the head of ŻSS, registered as Mendel Garfinkiel. 
The official name of the ŻSS in Zamość was Jewish Self-Assitance, Jewish Assistance 
Committee Zamość (in Polish, Żydowska Samopomoc Społeczna, Żydowski Komitet 
Opiekuńczy Powiatowy w Zamościu, or, in German, Jüdische Soziale Selbsthilfe, Jüdisches 
Hilfskomitee Kreis Zamość). A letter from ŻSS Kraków to Mendel Garfinkiel, October 
29, 1940. YVA-JM.1551, scan 479. 
124 The context shows that this was a person of German descent.
125 YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 12.
126 “Z miast i miasteczek: Bochnia,” Gazeta Żydowska, July 7, 1941, 2.
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of not only facilities, but also having only a small internal market and a negligi-
ble reserve of goods and raw materials. After the expulsions in June 1941, Jewish 
shops, workshops and enterprises beyond the walls were closed down. Therefore:
On the initiative of the Association of Jewish Artisans in Kraków, com-
munities (Gemeinschaften) of tailors, furriers, cobblers, and other skilled 
workers, were established, which since then began to operate in workshops, 
located in a former chocolate factory “Optima” on Węgierska Street, which 
[also] had great facilities at Krakusa Street and premises on Targowa Street. 
These communities had their representation at Słowacki Avenue 26, called 
Zentrale für Handwerks-Lieferungen, which took orders from the Germans 
and Poles. Until then, most Jews left the ghetto every day in order to work 
in German factories that were housed in barracks close to those factories. 
Individual passes were no longer issued. Contact with the city and thus the 
ability to purchase food, became extremely difficult.127
The creation of workshops by communities of craftsmen was contingent 
on their members contributing their machines and work to those communi-
ties. On the other hand, the Housing Committee of the Jewish Community 
allocated appropriate accommodations to the Association of Craftsmen—as 
mentioned, the building of a former chocolate factory “Optima” at Krakusa 
Street and two other facilities. Because it was believed that working in the 
craftsmen’s association could prevent the deportation from Kraków, many, not 
only craftsmen, but also many white-collar workers, tried to get a job there. 
According to statistics of employment, in the ghetto the number of office work-
ers decreased in favor of craftsmen.128
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES
In large ghettos, the development of productive activity was associated with the 
demand for laborers and orders from German functionaries and German institu-
tions for services to be provided by artisans.129 This development was irregular. 
The workshops were created in order to provide employment for residents of the 
127 Katarzyna Zimmerer, Zamordowany świat: Losy Żydów w Krakowie, 1939–1945 (Krakow, 
Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2004), 126. 
128 Biberstein, Zagłada Żydów w Krakowie, 61–62. 
129 Betr Notiz, Produktivisierung der Juden in den Grossstadten des Generalgouvernements. 
YVA-JM.1588, scan 42.
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ghettos depending on their various abilities, so that the type of workshops set 
up was different from place to place. Economic initiatives came from a variety of 
sources, which influenced the operation of such workshops. In some cities, the 
establishment of a workshop was initiated by representatives of the Judenrat and 
entrepreneurs. For example, in Zamość, the workshops were introduced by the 
Judenrat to cope with the continuing orders for the implementation of various 
works for officers and German institutions.130 The Judenrat in Bochnia estab-
lished workshops131 to provide new jobs for the Jews and develop production.
Expansion of workshops in the ghettos was a kind of compensation for 
the earlier prohibitions on Jewish businesses out of their ghettos and forced 
Aryanization. It was precisely the establishment of workshops, supervised with 
expert help, that led to the launch of production under the aegis of the Judenrat. 
All formalities relating to the creation of enterprises and financial transactions 
with companies outside of the ghetto were organized with the assistance or 
mediation of the Judenrat. Without this, any financial transactions would not be 
possible, or at least, would be very difficult due to restrictions on the conduct 
of Jewish bank accounts.
PRIVATE INITIATIVE
Engineer Bryskier stated that the “[. . .] private initiative, therefore, gave more 
scope for expansion of profit, than the relatively narrow section of official 
actions.”132 By his account, all the activities of an official character were always 
late. However, one cannot entirely agree with this view, since at least at early 
stage of development, workshops or crafts associations sponsored by official 
factors were very important simply because they allowed the establishment of 
official Jewish business in the ghettos, at a time when it was otherwise impos-
sible to register enterprises. Only in the wake of this came the development 
of economic activity in the ghettos and the creation of companies of various 
kinds, including private Jewish companies.
An example of private initiative was described by Emanuel Ringelblum: 
One of the most characteristic phenomena in the ghetto is establishment 
in Warsaw of about 50 looms. [The founders] are usually from Łódź.  
130 Kopciowski, Zagłada Żydów w Zamościu.
131 Sandkühler, “Endlösung” in Galizien: Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsinitiativen 
von Bertold Beitz, 1941–1944 (Bonn: Dietz, 1996), 214.
132 Jerzy Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” BŻIH 35 (1960): 67–68.
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They produce their products, understandably illegally: various cajgi  
[textiles], quilts, et cetera. It is a testimony of remarkable adaptation to the 
conditions. Obtaining the yarn is not an easy thing.133
Testimony of the development of entrepreneurship can be seen by the 
amount of fees paid for permits in order to conduct business in Częstochowa. 
For example, in 1940 the following quantities of industrial-tax cards were 
purchased: 1,101 in the field of trade, 866 in crafts, and 265 in industry.134
Outside the ghetto, Jewish businesses that had undergone a process of 
Aryanization also operated. In some cases, it was a pure formality and non-
Jews, having no knowledge or experience in leading companies, were engaged 
in contacts with other institutions and agencies. Their task was limited primar-
ily to signing documents while company executives and the entire production 
were still in Jewish hands. In such cases, the Jews could be officially hired as 
employees of the company. These companies generally were located outside 
the ghettos, but provided employment for the inhabitants of the ghettos.
A key factor in enabling the competitiveness of production in the ghettos 
was using all available resources. Almost every superfluous thing in the ghetto 
could be used to produce something else. The Jews gathered rags, remnants of 
wool, glass, scrap metal, ferrous metals, paper, and other waste. Thanks to the 
ingenuity of Jewish businesses, many of these recycled materials could be used 
for further production. For example, grass was used to manufacture mattresses; 
old watches, after dismantling, served as a source for spare parts to repair other 
watches;135 leather and fur remnants were used to fabricate gloves. Many 
products in the ghetto were created thanks to the ingenuity of specialists from 
various fields of technology: engineers, chemists, or craftsmen. For instance, 
Alexander Donat, a trained chemist, was producing briquettes from coal dust 
and sulfur candles, whichhad been used in the ghetto for disinfection.136 
There was not a single profession, in which a Jewish craftsman could not 
profit from existing opportunities. In the second half of 1941, the demand 
for different goods increased, especially for iron beds, so metal workers 
had lot of work. The main supplier was the “Balbinder” company (Twarda 
Street 8). Running out of new raw materials, the workers used all kinds of 
133 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 339.
134 YVA-O.6/348, drawing no. 29.
135 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 64.
136 Aleksander Donat, The Holocaust Kingdom: A Memoir (New York: Talman Co, 1978), 37.
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old iron pipes. Therefore, at that time an upsurge in prices in the market 
for pipes, particularly gas pipes, was reported.137
In the ghettos the production of prohibited goods should be distinguished 
from illegal manufacturing. Illegal production, also referred to as the “gray 
economic zone,”138 was the production of items in factories or workshops 
that were not registered in the Judenrat as establishments engaged in business 
activities. Owners of such facilities or those working from home did not pay 
taxes and were not registered as employed. The end of the underground econ-
omy in the Warsaw Ghetto was marked by the great deportation action in 1942. 
After this period, there were only shops realizing military orders.139
Yet another advantage of the ghetto was the fact that Jewish enclaves and 
zones could be proclaimed “threatened with typhoid fever,” which resulted in 
reducing the direct control of the German authorities.140 Therefore, production 
of illicit goods141 developed in the ghettos that were tightly controlled by the 
occupation authorities associated with the production of allocated or prohibited 
products. Among the manufacturing and services produced were: meat process-
ing,142 leather tanning, milling of grain,143 bread bakeries, production of soap,144 
tire retreading, and the like. In such cases, the non-Jewish partners from outside 
the ghettos, who gained huge profits from the illegal production, were very inter-
ested in providing raw materials and distributing the finished products.
In general, it is difficult to estimate the volume of production and exports 
from the ghettos, because of the lack of statistical data and large-scale illegal 
production and marketing. Production was home-based, on a high volume, 
consumed low energy, and used cheap raw materials. For example, the manual 
production of sweaters, gloves, and socks was very popular. One witness 
described the production of gowns from sheets, which occupied his entire 
137 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 84.
138 Engelking and Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 395.
139 Ibid., 396.
140 YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 19. 
141 Engelking and Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 383.
142 “Jewish butchers in the ritual slaughter house located in a building opposite the tannery of the 
Altman Family ran great risk of slaughter calves purchased in the country. At slaughter of bigger 
cattle they benefit from barns of their neighbors—Poles.” Ryszard Adamczyk, Izbicy dni 
powszednie—wojna i okupacja: Pamiętnik pisany po latach (Lublin: Norbertinum, 2007), 73.
143 Ita Diamant, Moja cząstka życia (Warszawa: Twój Styl, 2001), 82. 
144 The decree of the head of the Warsaw District on of the seizure of fatty materials and soap, dated 
November 18, 1939, in Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń władz niemieckich, 181–83.
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family consisting of several people.145 Old linen was bought, dyed, cut, and 
sewn at home. The facilitator who bought the old sheets also sold the finished 
products. Such home-production remained outside official statistics and can 
hardly be estimated.
The profitability of Jewish businesses and the cottage industry in the 
ghettos was quite low. Production required long work hours under difficult soci-
etal conditions in order to earn only a meager living. In some cases, despite the 
hard work, the money earned was not enough to survive.146 Inadequate nutri-
tion and impoverishment caused marginalization of those who were not able to 
make a living. Thus, even working Jews could fall into poverty. This situation 
prevailed in the Warsaw Ghetto from when it was enclosed until early 1942, 
when welfare institutions were unable to help the growing number of Jews 
who could not support themselves and were dying from starvation. The lack 
of food caused Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto to escape. The German author-
ities had troubles to cope with this phenomenon. During internal discussions 
the problem of escapees was much exaggerated. During the discussion at the 
office of chief of the Lublin District a report by the Warsaw authorities, was 
mentioned, according to which, every day about 5,000 Jews escape from the 
Warsaw Ghetto, of whom probably a part return, but the rest hangs out in the 
adjoining districts. Initially the director of the labor office requested that appre-
hended Jews should be put for a while in quarantine in Lublin prison. There was 
also a request to supply Jews apprehended by police or gendarmerie officers to 
the district towns or their prisons, due to lack of police forces.147 Already at that 
period the German authorities tended to take the strictest measures: 
It was determined that following on from a request of the Governor, he put 
forward in the last main session, after which any Jew who is not in posses-
sion of valid identity documents will be shot immediately, the Governor 
obtains the required consent of the Governor General. Afterwards, this 
decree is to be brought to the Judenrat in Warsaw to its knowledge.148
One way to circumvent the restrictions on the Jews was by  subcontracting. 
Formally, the “Aryan” firms signed contracts, procured raw materials, dealt 
145 Engelking and Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 378. 
146 Ibid., 463.
147 YVA-JM.12331, Notiz für Brigadeführer über die Besprechung beim Amtschef am 8. August 
1941, 10 Uhr ist festzuhalten, scam 221. 
148 Ibid. 
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with distribution of final products, and handled financing and other simi-
lar activities, while companies in the Jewish ghettos were involved in the 
production process. This activity was associated with a common interest. 
Some non-Jewish companies, in order to be able to compete in the outside 
market, had to cut prices as well as other elements influencing the cost of 
production. One important aspect of production expenditure was the cost of 
labor. Therefore, the use of cheap labor in the ghettos gave, on the one hand, 
the possibility for non-Jewish firms to compete in the market, and on the 
other hand, it gave more employment opportunities to those in the ghettos. 
“During the war, the Jewish craftsman, due to the nature of things, had to be 
cheaper, because, when the economic cycle was switched off, he was looking 
for a possibility of earning [a living] at any cost. This fact was exploited by 
newly created Christian contractors (nakładca chrześcijański) who entrusted 
their delivery to a Jewish craftsman.”149
Isolation of craftsmen producing different goods in the ghetto for direct 
recipients contributed to the division of roles for producers and intermediaries. 
This division was inevitable because small producers were not yet able to deal 
in parallel with issues of production, finding ways of transfer to the Aryan side, 
and distribution. Manufacturers in the ghetto also remained dependent on raw 
materials and opportunities that could expand their market, which, in their 
case, was crucial. Because the internal market of the ghetto was very limited, 
the distribution of products in the outside market, or finding contractors who 
depended upon their production, was vital. It is worth paying attention to the 
fact that the majority of production in the ghetto was intended for the external 
market. Often, in such a situation, a whole chain of relationships was created. 
On the one hand, the non-Jewish manufacturers struggling with the competi-
tion were looking for opportunities to cut costs. Such prospects were available 
in any ghetto, especially in large ghettos with a sizeable potential labor force. 
The labor force in the ghettos, particularly in isolated ones, was much cheaper 
than the non-Jewish labor force outside the ghettos.
In the ghetto, there was no free market of labor and payment. Due to their 
isolation, the Jewish workers were not able to move freely, and mechanism of 
regulation of supply and demand of labor did not exist. As a consequence of 
the restrictions against the Jews, there was a surplus of labor in the ghettos in 
relation to available employment. In such circumstances, many Jews were ready 
to perform any work, even in return for a wage below the average level and, 
149 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 70.
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in some cases, in exchange for food.150 The manufacturer outside the ghetto, 
who could directly or through intermediaries mobilize Jews from the ghetto to 
work in the sub-contracting system, used, on the one hand, cheap labor in the 
ghetto, and on the other hand, distributed finished products outside the ghetto. 
This gave him an advantage over other producers.151 He could charge lower 
prices for finished products. In so doing, such a manufacturer became more 
competitive, while his profit margin could be greater than that of other produc-
ers using a non-Jewish labor force, which was inherently more expensive. The 
difference in rates between non-Jewish and Jewish artisans ranged from 25% 
to 30%. Therefore, using a Jewish labor force was for the external producers 
very attractive. In the case of bulk supplies such a difference in the cost of labor 
could produce very large profits.152 Nonetheless, the desire to exploit cheap 
labor in the ghettos also had its positive results, since an increase in demand 
for some products that could be produced in the ghetto caused an increase in 
demand for labor in the ghetto, which gave employment to growing numbers of 
Jews. Growth in demand for labor, especially for specialized labor, could cause 
an increase in wages of Jewish workers.
Despite the prevailing bad opinion, and contrary to appearances, the role 
of intermediaries was very important in the organization of the production and 
marketing chain, linking the ghetto with the external world. The most common 
accusation against the intermediaries was exploitation of Jewish workers. 
Undoubtedly, this was, to a large extent, justified, because in many cases, interme-
diaries were the factor that controlled the situation at the ghetto and its link with 
the external world. In cases when a non-Jewish contractor had no direct contact 
with large numbers of laborers working for him (and often there was no contact at 
all), the intermediaries were the masters of the situation, because they were able 
to choose the workers and to dictate their own terms. Of course, on a global scale, 
the market within the ghetto set the prices, but in individual cases, agents were 
able to exert pressure on specific workers. Similarly, in the case of entrepreneurs 
from the outer world, intermediaries with a network of agents and knowledge of 
relations inside the ghetto, could put pressure on enterprisers. Nevertheless, it 
had to be reasonable, because businessmen could turn to other intermediaries.
The role of intermediary in the production process under contract was 
to create links between the entrepreneur providing the raw materials and 
150 Engelking and Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 393.
151 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 67.
152 Ibid., 70.
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the producers. A clever agent could make a series of relationships with work-
ers, provide continued supplies of raw materials, and control the manufactur-
ing process. This had a significant impact on the quantity of production. The 
action mechanism of home-production work can be defined in a simplified 
manner as follows: 
[. . . the] Jewish producer, in spite of some form of independence, was 
primarily a home-producer. His autonomy is expressed as follows: 1) the 
artisan receives money from his contractor, which was paid in advance for 
the execution of the contract rather than raw and auxiliary materials, that 
being a fundamental feature of cottage industries; 2) in cases where even 
the carpenter receives raw materials, they were treated as cash, which is 
then deducted from total order value.153
ILLEGAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE
In practice, it turned out that the ratio between official and unofficial export was 
just like relationship of official provision of food and the actual supply. In effect, 
the ghetto still maintained business relationship with the Aryan side. The eco-
nomic ties created long before the war had not ceased, even after the walls divid-
ing the ghetto from the Aryan world grew higher and higher. In addition to the 
official production for the German army, and in general for the German market, 
the ghetto used for production its existing supply of raw materials, as well as raw 
materials smuggled into the ghetto from the Polish market. These materials were 
obtained from the stores of companies in Tomaszów Mazowiecki, Częstochowa, 
Łódź, and other cities. Needless to say, they were received in an illegal way from 
allocations of raw materials for these companies. Jewish industrialists and crafts-
men showed incredible ingenuity in finding alternative products instead of the 
absent materials. For the Aryan market everything was produced as it had been 
before the war. Weaving factories produced excellent fabrics from wool stolen 
from the factories of Częstochowa, from the “Wola” factory in Warsaw and 
other cities. Tallitot were dyed and made into scarves, sweaters, and other arti-
cles of clothing. Production of scarves for women, sweaters, jackets for peasants, 
and other items developed. The locals made them from old clothes (ciuchów) 
that were bought in great quantities in a huge square on Gęsia Street (also 
called Gęsiówka), where a massive sale took place, gradually making the Jewish 
153 Ibid., 72.
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population needy. Day after day, special agents of various companies bought up 
in Gęsiówka thousands of pounds of old sheets and old clothes.154
Gęsiówka became the center of trade of old clothes from Warsaw and 
other cities. On the Polish market traders rushed a large shipment of old things 
(Werterfassung), amounting to 20,000 kg, from Lublin, acquired with the 
liquidation of the ghettos in the Lublin region. All these old clothes underwent 
dyeing in a special installation on Niska Street or in private homes,155 and then 
a variety of patterns were printed on them. The manufacturing industry, orga-
nized by former entrepreneurs from Łódź, flourished. Woolen stockings and 
gloves of cotton blended with wool were produced there. Cotton haberdashery, 
wool, and leather industries prospered. Pressed cardboard suitcases were pre-
pared from remnants of old books and all kinds of other materials. A large-scale 
brush industry also developed. Brushes were made—apart from bristles—
from old beaters, with goose feathers and similar rubbish, which was carefully 
collected in the ghetto. This industry employed several thousand workers. 
Mattresses for troops and for the Aryan side were made of various Ersatz 
resources. Illegal tanneries processed smuggled leather to the ghetto. Children, 
6–10 years old, produced toys in bulk in private homes, attics, basements, and 
other such locations. From aircraft debris “imported” into the ghetto, the alu-
minum industry (production of bowls, spoons, and other private consumption 
goods) developed. In addition, stoves, hinges, and other steel articles were 
made in the ghetto for the Aryans. Shoes with wooden soles and upper parts of 
pressed cardboard were mass-produced. Beautiful pipes and cigar boxes were 
made from processed wood.156 There was a booming chemical industry, phar-
maceutical industry, processing of fats business, oil manufacturer, soap factory, 
and other enterprizes, as well as developed wood industry (i.e., sawmills and 
production of furniture), a rubber industry, and the like. 
Even after the action in July (1942), when the whole business collapsed due 
to the deportation of three hundred fifty thousand Jews from Warsaw, the 
ghetto still was able to produce for the Polish market, but to a lesser extent. 
This production took place under the guise of the newly established “shops,” 
employing the remainder of the Warsaw Jews. From soldiers’ trousers the 
“shops” produced thousands of pairs of trousers for the rural population, 
154 Ringelblum, Stosunki polsko-żydowskie, 57–58.
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naturally, after dyeing the material. Besides, windbreakers were made from 
trousers. And so was the manufacture in almost all “shops.” Both the import 
of raw materials and export of the finished goods were performed by means 
of smuggling, in which the help of Transferstelle, created officially for the 
exchange of goods with the Aryan side, was instrumental. These rather small 
factories worked from cellars, in disguised rooms, in specially built shelters, 
and other locations. By day, it was not possible in any way to know that at 
night there is an active factory! The owners of these companies had to pay 
various “leeches,” preying on the economic organism of the Jewish popula-
tion. One branch of the Gestapo in the Jewish Quarter—the Authority for 
Combating Usury and Huckstering [Urząd Walki z Lichwą i Paskarstwem]—
the so-called “Thirteen” [Trzynastka], Preisüberwachungsstelle [The Office 
for Price Surveillance], and police agents who were active in Polish police 
stations in the ghetto belonged to these “leeches.”157
THE TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE ACQUISITION  
OF MATERIAL RESOURCES
Within a few years of the ghettos’ existence, many significant changes occurred 
in the ways to acquire the means of survival. Despite the initial high turnover of 
trade in this area, there was a depletion of stock for sale, and, therefore, a gradual 
decrease of trade in favor of labor. There was also a gradual increase in both the 
number of employees and their percentage in the Jewish population between 
the spring of 1942 and the final liquidation of the ghettos in the summer of 
1943. That was followed by mass deportations to death camps when ghettos 
were transformed into so-called “small ghettos.” These were, for all intents and 
purposes, turned into forced labor camps. During that period the employed 
ghetto population proportionally increased. For example: 
At the end of the existence of the Jewish Community in Zamość, over 70% 
of Jews, both men and women were employed in various locations. We 
gave false certificates to children younger than 14 stating that they were 
older in order to place them at some outpost through Arbeitsamt, and in 
this way, for the time being, to save them from destruction.158 
157 Ibid.
158 YVA-O.33/322, testimony of Mieczysław Garfinkiel, 31. 
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In this last period of the ghettos—in the spring of 1942, and until the 
summer of 1943, a drastic reduction in the number of elderly people, children, 
and women running households ensued. In some small ghettos, the percent-
age of employees reached almost 100% due to the elimination of children, the 
elderly, and the sick. This period was also marked by an increasing loss of ability 
to make independent business decisions by Jewish entrepreneurs and Jewish 
institutions, in favor of external actors. In the Warsaw Ghetto, such actors were 
German companies working for the army, the best-known among which were 
the companies of Walter Caspar Többens and Fritz Schultz. They had state-of-
the-art modern assemblies and focused on a variety of professionals engaged in 
various activities. With time, these professionals were concentrated in  specific 
areas, and the production units were transformed into factories, or, more 
appropriately, workshops. In some shops, the work was divided into various 
specialized activities; in others, mostly fur and tailors’ workshops, the great-
est part of the activities were performed by the artisans producing finished 
products.159 In shops, most decisions were taken by the German businessmen 
and Jews that constituted the main labor force.
As stated above, with the depletion of items for sale, the share of labor in the 
ratio of acquiring material resources in order to enable the maintenance of the 
ghetto increased. In the final stages of the ghetto, labor was the main source of 
income and the “small ghettos” had become a reservoir of cheap labor. Along with 
this process of changes in the proportion of income, the autonomy of action of 
entrepreneurs and artisans from the ghettos gradually declined. In the early days 
of the ghettos, the Judenrat’s great initiative in adapting the production profile 
for opportunities of entrepreneurs and artisans was evident in the ghettos. In the 
later period, in the shadow of deportation to death camps, possessing documents 
that confirmed official employment, preferably in production for the army, had 
become increasingly important. Organization of work passed into the hands of 
German officials, who directed the Jews to various institutions. The development 
of the shops was also a reflection of this process. German companies took the 
workers together with their equipment, such as sewing machines. Many times in 
the last period of the ghettos, employees not only brought the equipment with 
them, but also paid fees just to be accepted to work and to receive certificates of 
employment, which were to protect them from deportation to death camps.
159 Helge Grabitz, Letzte Spuren: Ghetto Warschau, SS-Arbeitslager Trawniki, Aktion Erntefest: 
Fotos und Dokumente über Opfer des Endlösungwahns im Spiegel der historischen Ereignisse 
(Berlin: Hentrich, 1988), 23–27.
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As in many areas of production, manufactured items required intensive 
manual labor. The share of labor costs in calculating the unit cost of product 
was high and ranged, for example, in carpentry from 30% to 50% of produc-
tion costs.160 The value of production carried out by Jews in ghettos in many 
cases amounted to quite a bit. Because of the various tracks of goods: the 
official, illegal, internal market, and production for the army without formal 
factors (as in the case of the Warsaw Ghetto Transferstelle), it is difficult to 
make detailed calculations, and it certainly would require extensive research. 
In one case, a person working in the Statistics Department of the Warsaw Jewish 
Council gave the monthly data showing the volume of production. 
The value of such supplies in the craft of carpentry was at certain times 
4–5 million zł per month; in the brush industry—about 3 million zł. So 
with only those two branches of export, although important, there was a 
yield of 7 million zł per month. Add to this export for military purposes 
of tinsmithing, upholstery, metal industry, and so forth, plus a huge array 
of illegal exports to the private Aryan market. No exaggeration, if we  
estimate the total exports of 10 million zł a month.161 
As Winkler suggests, “assuming that in total labor is 30–40%; it appears 
that it has provided the ghetto with 3–4 million zł [salary] per month, and so 
several times more than the ‘shops’ and similar enterprises.”162
Undoubtedly, the value of labor and production carried out by the Jews was 
significant in the economy of the General Government. It should be born in mind 
that the statistics from the period of occupation does not show a true picture of 
Jewish participation in the economy and not only because of the lack of data. Even 
if we take into account the existing partial data, the value of Jewish participation 
will also be underestimated because several factors will reduce the value of work 
and production. Importantly, the official rate paid for the work of the Jews con-
stituted 80% of the rate paid to the Poles.163 It should also be taken into account 
160 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 73.
161 The German authorities have assessed the turnover of the Warsaw Ghetto at 8–9 million zł 
per month, Document no. 108, June 18, 1942, Kraków, Minutes of the meeting of the state 
police on security situation in the General Government and the relationship between the 
administration and the police in connection with the establishment of the State Secretariat 
for Security Affairs, in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, 479. 
162 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 67.
163 APL, RŻL-6, Stundenlöhne der Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen—Lohnordnung, 1941, 80.
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that forced labor was not paid for or payment was from the Jews’ own resources 
through the Judenrat. In addition, different rates were used for work on the “free” 
market in the ghettos. Considering the existing situation of constraints in the 
ghettos, the “market” value of Jewish labor was much lower than in the real free 
economy. The difference between the fair value of labor in the ghettos and the 
value of work outside the ghettos created a profit for intermediaries and organi-
zations that relied on Jewish labor. It should be taken into account that the wages 
of the General Government, both official and of the free market, did not reflect 
the true value of wages, since the Polish population was economically exploited 
as well. Function of the labor market in relation to the goods market may serve as 
a comparative example. In the General Government, there was a well-developed 
alleged “black market” of food, and not only of food. The market price was dis-
proportionate in relation to salaries of German arms factories that paid workers 
the official rates. This resulted in a frequent reduction of work, as these factories 
responded to the price of additional food or provided free lunches in order to 
encourage workers to work.164 Despite the significant exploitation of Jews, over 
time the adaptation to the conditions of the ghetto transpired. One witness said 
that after adjusting to living in the ghetto, mastering the methods of production, 
and the creation of a distribution network, despite poverty, one could survive for 
a long time, measured in months and years.165 Unfortunately, this period was very 
short, since the extermination of the Jews was soon to begin.
In discussing the economic issues of the ghettos, it would be worthwhile 
to consider a few remarks of Jerzy Winkler,166 who was a graduate of economics 
from the University of Vienna and who until the great deportation had been 
an employe of the Statistics Department of the Judenrat in Warsaw. He wrote: 
[. . .] under the concept of the “ghetto,” we understand here not territo-
rially closed Jewish quarter, and not a period that closely coincides with 
the consequences of November 16, 1940 [closure of the Warsaw Ghetto], 
but rather the entire period of war when Jews were excluded from free 
economic activity. It must be assumed that the endurance before the cre-
ation and closure of the ghetto became a natural source of this economic 
movement, which in this framework subsequently developed.167 
164 Meducki, Przemysł i klasa robotnicza, 156–59.
165 Engelking and Leociak, Getto warszawskie, 378. 
166 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 55–86.
167 Ibid., 56.
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Despite the walls surrounding the ghetto, the Jews were seeking to acquire 
material resources, both through trade and work together with the normal 
desire to break the isolation. This was expressed in the statements of those 
involved in economic activity: 
Locked in the ghetto, a Jewish merchant and artisan had to do something 
to stay alive. A Polish entrepreneur, even though everything was open to 
him, had to use Jewish labor to profit. Admittedly, the Jew was exploited 
in every field but his flexibility overcomes the obstacles and walls.  
He worked at a loss, but stuck to the surface of life, proving by his exis-
tence that Jewish positions cannot be completely eliminated from the 
rump of Polish economic life.168
In another passage, the author stated: “. . . inherent economic forces in the 
ghetto blow up the narrow walls.”169
The economy of the ghetto was unstable due to isolation, because of its 
limited domestic market, limited supplies of raw materials, and lack of energy. 
These conditions forced the Jews in the ghettos to adjust the production 
profile to the existing conditions, using accessible materials or manufactur-
ing goods that required cheap and available materials. The production profile 
was characterized by low energy consumption and high share of labor, using 
simple tools and machines. However, the great amount of work required long 
hours under poor conditions.170 On the other hand, in order to ensure com-
petitiveness in the market, products had to be cheap. Erroneous management 
of the ghetto forced Jews to innovate, simplify production methods, and seek 
new industries. Isolated economy required a special mode of operation, in 
which a large part of the Jewish population was involved. That system was 
the main battleground between Nazi policies of exploitation, extermination 
of the Jews, and the struggle for survival through work. However, the objec-
tives of the economic system, formed mainly by external conditions, were 
not economical. The main economic goal was to survive, and all funds were 
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PRODUCTION IN THE WARSAW GHETTO
Establishment of the ghettos always had its supporters and opponents, 
even among the German administration. Waldemar Schön, the head of the 
Department of Resettlement in the Warsaw District, in his lecture on January 
20, 1941, proclaimed:
It was clear that this idea [of establishment of the ghetto] must at first appear 
to be incapable of execution, owing to the specific and extremely compli-
cated conditions in the city of Warsaw. Objections were raised on various 
sides and in particular by the City Administration. It was argued that the 
forming of a ghetto would cause serious disruption to industry and the econ-
omy. As about 80 percent of all the skilled labor was Jewish, it was indispens-
able and could not be shut away. Finally, it was argued that the feeding of the 
Jews would not be possible if they were concentrated in a closed area.171 
Despite all such arguments, the Warsaw Ghetto had been established. 
Nevertheless, we have to admit that, in fact, the establishment of the ghetto 
caused disruption of the economy, serious shortage of a skilled labor force, and 
great difficulties in providing food. At the peak of the famine, about 5,550 Jews 
died there in one month ( July 1941).172 This happened not because the Jews 
were not capable of earning a living, but because they were forcibly cut off from 
the general labor force and the food market, and they received starvation food 
rations. Continuing his speech, Waldemar Schön said:
The Department for Interior Administration in the office of the Governor 
General on August 20, 1940, confirmed that it was necessary to establish 
Jewish areas of residence, but these would not be hermetically closed 
ghettos, but Jewish districts, which would permit just enough economic 
contact with the Aryan surroundings to keep the Jewish quarter viable.173 
171 From a lecture by Waldemar Schön, head of the Department of Resettlement in the Warsaw 
District on the steps leading to the establishment of the Warsaw Ghetto, January 20, 1941, 
in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 224.
172 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 376.
173 From a lecture by Waldemar Schön, Head of the Department of Resettlement in the Warsaw 
District on the steps leading to the establishment of the Warsaw Ghetto, January 20, 1941, 
in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 222.
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This quotation explains in rather general terms the intention of the ghet-
toization policy, butit does not explain the actual application of this policy. 
In fact, in May 1942, 3,636 people died in the Warsaw Ghetto.174 The correla-
tion between effective labor and the provision of food was well understood by 
Heinz Auerswald, the commissar of the Warsaw Ghetto; however, there was a 
lack of coordination between the official food ration policy and the General 
Government authorities. This policy was expressed, although ironically, by the 
governor general, Hans Frank: 
The Jews for us also represent extraordinarily malignant gluttons. We have 
now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the General Government— 
perhaps, with the Jewish crossbreeds, and everything that goes with them, 
3,500,000 Jews.175
The basic difference between the ghettos and the world outside their 
walls was that the Polish population was always able to buy additional food, 
which was not possible in the ghetto, thus causing famine. Official food rations 
and the policy of exaggerated isolation were deadly for ghetto inhabitants. 
On September 26, 1941 Heinz Auerswald said:
. . . the quantity of legally supplied foodstuffs is far from enough to counter 
the acute starvation in the Jewish quarter effectively. The quantity of food-
stuffs smuggled into the Jewish quarter is not small, but owing to the high 
cost, it is available only to the wealthier section of the Jews. If there is to be 
any successful large-scale exploitation of Jewish labor, it will be necessary 
to increase their food supply considerably.176 
Continuing, Auerswald said: 
The increase in the food supply described above was insufficient to stop 
the rise in the number of deaths resulting from the generally wretched 
condition of the Jews since the beginning of the war. [. . .] It is seen that in 
August [1941], for the first time mortality remains unchanged at the level 
174 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 530.
175 IMT, Red Series (2233-D-PS), vol. 1, 1007. On the same subject see Christopher Browning, 
“From Ethnic Cleansing to Genocide,” in Browning, Nazi Policy, 22–25.
176 From a report by Auerswald, commissar of the Warsaw Ghetto, September 26, 1941, in Arad 
and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 246.
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of the previous month. Improved nutrition appears now to be having its 
effect. This is confirmed by preliminary figures for September, which indi-
cate that [the final figures] for this month will scarcely exceed the figures 
for each of the past two months.177 
The situation concerning food provision and increased production 
improved in the second half of 1941, and continued in this way until the begin-
ning of the great deportation in July 1942. 
Regarding the Warsaw Ghetto, as well as other ghettos, an important 
external factor causing the improvement was the discovery of their production 
capacity by the Wehrmacht. With stabilization of the economy and the winning 
campaigns on the Western Front, many German units were placed in the General 
Government. The military formations were obliged to cover their needs for differ-
ent items within the General Government. Quartermasters, therefore, started to 
look for suppliers that could provide various items needed for the army. Military 
units permanently residing in the area contributed to establishing business con-
tacts and stabilizing contracts affecting the increased yield.178 Production for the 
army was privileged, which meant the army not only made supplies available, but 
also provided a market for manufactured goods. The stable situation on the front 
line also called for better equipment of the soldiers’ barracks, causing a demand 
for furniture and other everyday objects, for example, brushes.
Many units were moved to the General Government when, in the summer 
of 1940 after the campaign in Western Europe, the front was stabilized. From 
that summer until the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, increasing numbers 
of soldiers regularly entered the General Government. A particularly strong 
arrival came in the spring of 1941. At that time, a period of great economic 
growth in the area was noted. This had an impact on increased military orders 
for many products and services. During that period, the demand for labor for 
the construction of various facilities such as barracks, airports, roads, bridges, 
and others was also amplified. Housing in general and public buildings, in par-
ticular, had to be adapted for the army. This work also required the labor of 
many artisans. The Jews were employed in many craftsmanship assignments, 
but they particularly preferred requests for finished products, since work—
often in the form of forced labor—was low-paid, or, as was in the case of labor 
camps in the Lublin region, was not paid in any way.179 Forced labor caused 
177 Ibid.
178 Winkler, “Getto walczy z niewolą gospodarczą,” 69.
179 BA-MA, RH53-23-27, Lublin, September 23, 1940, 148–49; APL, RŻL-8, 54.
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financial detriment to the Jewish communities because, in many cases, the 
Jewish communities had to pay for work done in labor camps and to the insti-
tutions that exploited those Jewish workers.
In a time of increased military contracts—in 1940 and 1941—well- 
developed German companies did not yet exist in the General Government, 
so most orders were given to Polish companies. These, in turn, were inter-
ested not only in increased profits, but also in cooperation of the Jewish 
craftsmen. In this way, simple entrepreneurs became more competitive in the 
market, allowing them to capture the bulk of the contracts. In some cases, 
Polish firms were not able to realize bigger contracts without adding to the 
number of workers.180 The military issued increasing demands for furniture 
for their barracks. In many cases, soldiers were placed in public buildings such 
as schools or offices, which were not suited for the army. Then, these build-
ings had to be provided with beds or bunks, cabinets, tables, and the like. The 
amounts of furniture needed for the army were enormous, given the fact that 
a large number of army divisions and air force units involved in Operation 
Barbarossa were stationed in the General Government territory. Furniture 
was delivered within a short time. Its production was quick and, in general, 
of poor quality, but the requirements were also not particularly high, because 
they concerned products intended for short-term use. Therefore, suppliers 
met the demands of providing huge amounts of furniture by looking for pro-
ducers that might fill such orders. In this way, some Polish companies created 
partnerships with Jewish craftsmen, thereby becoming subcontractors.181
According to Jerzy Winkler, “The period of peak supply in the field of 
carpentry falls in the first half of 1941. Turnover in this period reached 4–5 
million per month (including the value already in the raw materials at market 
prices).”182 After the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, there was a 
sudden drop in demand, because most military units moved to the east, leav-
ing their accommodations in the General Government. Therefore, many firms 
changed their production profile. Orders for barracks supplies stopped, but 
more and more office furniture and equipment for hospitals, such as tables, 
stools, desks, and wardrobes were ordered. Besides, fine sets of furniture were 
produced for the German officials in the General Government.183
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The brush industry was almost entirely dominated, if not monopolized, 
by Jewish producers. It developed first of all in Warsaw in the first half of 1940. 
Since then, the industry expanded in a very dynamic manner. Most of the 
brush industry production in Warsaw was intended for the German army, 
although some of the production reached the general market. In 1941, about 
2,000 Jewish families in Warsaw earned a living from the brush industry.184 
Mass production of brushes meant that manufacturers in the Warsaw Ghetto 
held a monopoly in this field through market operation mechanisms. In 
this case, they practically took over of the entire production of brushes in 
the manner described below. Huge orders for the German army from the 
spring of 1940 were responsible for the strong growth of the brush industry. 
Thus, there had been interest in businesses outside of the ghetto for this 
kind of production. To reduce production costs and become competitive 
in the market, Polish or German entrepreneurs entered into an agreement 
with companies in the Jewish ghetto that carried out the production. In this 
case, the Aryan company acted as a contractor, engaged in providing the 
ghetto with raw materials and receiving finished goods. Taking advantage 
of cheap labor for mass production, companies cooperating with producers 
in the ghetto had gained an advantage in the market, because, by reducing 
production costs, they could offer lower unit prices than other producers. 
The decline in market prices caused many companies that manufactured 
the same brush to go under and they discontinued production. Thus, only 
Jewish companies and Aryan companies closely cooperating with them 
remained in the market.
Military orders had become a stimulus for mass production, with 
contracts amounting to hundreds of thousands of brushes per month. This 
allowed obtaining the necessary raw material allocations and ensured a steady 
market. The quality of the products was low, but the unit price of the product 
was also low, and it did not prevent the placing of new orders for brushes. It 
is possible that some of the military orders were the result of corruption, as 
suggested by some witnesses active in the economic field during the occupa-
tion.185 Sales of mass-produced supplies to the army enabled production devel-
opment on such a magnitude that it was possible to redirect a significant part of 
that production to the general market and control it in its totality. In this way, 
184 Ibid., 77.
185 Ibid.
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producers held a Jewish monopoly in both the supplies to the troops as well as 
in the private market.186 As Winkler explains:
It is difficult to estimate the brush production quantitatively. One time, 
a larger supply of brushes ranged from five hundred thousand different 
pieces. There were periods (September and October 1941) when the 
ghetto was producing about 25,000 brushes daily. Prices of individual 
brushes are different, which makes it difficult to determine the value 
of total exports. However, one can assume that in periods of high 
volume supply of brushes, the ghetto produced for about 3 million złoty  
per month.187
The main difference between the woodworking industry and the brush 
industry was the issue of providing the raw material. In carpentry, military 
orders were dependant on the official provision of raw material supplies; 
however, the brush industry received less aid. While it was possible to provide 
wood for brushes, which even in mass production was not required in large 
quantities, a much bigger problem was caused by other raw materials, which 
were scarce. Without doubt, the matter of providing raw materials for brushes 
was a factor in the prevailing tide of competition among the Jewish producers. 
Seeing the provision of raw materials as a great opportunity, the Jews started 
the whole process of collecting and processing raw materials to manufacture 
brushes. Most of these raw materials came from recycled materials or had sub-
stitutes. To quote Winkler:
In this area, Jewish brush manufacturer[s], as above noted, revealed a high 
degree of inventiveness, starting with the uses of each Ersatz, thus: goose 
feathers, some species of straw, some species of veneer, reed (reworked 
old beaters, bamboo sticks, and baskets), and so called pierzawę (part of 
feathers).188
Undoubtedly, the value of labor and production carried out by the Jews 
was significant in the German economy. It should be born in mind that the 




133Forced Labor in the Ghettos and Labor Detachments  CHAPTER 3
participation in the economy, and not only because of the lack of data. 
The wages, both official and “free market,” did not reflect the real value of wages 
for work performed.
Despite significant exploitation of the Jews, adaptation to the conditions 
of the ghetto evolved in which the source of livelihood was work. In one of the 
notes from the Ringelblum Archive, we find the following words: 
It is quite clear that the basis of existence of the [ Jewish] quarter is not 
imaginary wealth, nor the existing stock and the hidden goods, nor finally 
the notorious “Jewish dollars,” but above all, productive labor.189 
The Jews adapted to the conditions of ghetto life, mastered the methods of 
production, and established a distribution network. Thanks to that, and despite 
their poverty, they could endure long periods of time. On the other hand, it was 
not economic policy, but the ideological stance of the highest authorities of the 
Third Reich that prompted the decision to liquidate the ghettos and perpetrate 
the mass extermination of Jews in Poland. Just a few survived in hiding, while 
the others endured in concentration camps and forced labor camps in condi-
tions over which they did not have the slightest influence.
189 AŻIH, AR 1/250 (103), 4.
CHAPTER 4
Forced Labor in the  
Labor Camps
From September 1939 to the beginning of winter, only the most important work of repairing roads and bridges was performed. Part of the work 
was done by German technical services—Technische Nothilfe (TN). During 
the war, these services were used, for example, to build makeshift bridges, or 
repair communications. Some activities of TN were not strictly and exclu-
sively related to the military.1 After the military campaign of September 1939, 
TN was still engaged in repairing electrical wiring, gas, and other such works. 
However, the main task of TN was to ensure technical assistance during the 
war and immediately after the war. After the war, following the organization 
of the civil administration, TN was replaced by other services. Some of the 
urgent works in the field of infrastructure were also performed by Reich Labor 
Service  (Reichsarbeitsdienst, RAD). However, extensive work in the field of 
economy and infrastructure could not be carried out by TN or RAD, because 
people mobilized to perform these services were diverted from their regular 
jobs in the Reich, to which they returned after the period of mobilization. 
Similarly, RAD was not designed to perform a wide range of works in the occu-
pied territories. Later in the war, a lot of engineering work was performed by 
officers and prisoners within the Organization Todt.
At the end of the military administration and with the proclamation of the 
General Government on October 26, 1939, intensive planning of economic 
development began. A group of young German economic experts and planners 
came together in the departments of planning and management. They intended 
to develop General Government economy, despite initial intentions of unlimited 
 1 Tagesbefehl nr. 6, Armeekommando, Der Chef der Zivilverwaltung, Tschenstochau, 
September 14, 1939, AIPN, NTN, 196/270, 12.
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exploitation of raw materials and labor. Creation of this loosely associated group 
was associated with a way to recruit professionals for various positions in the 
newly established administrative structure. Frequently they had previous personal 
contacts.2 These mostly young people saw potential for advancement in taking 
responsible positions and implementing their knowledge and their ideas.
Therefore, in autumn of 1939, extensive work was undertaken in the field 
of regional planning and economic exploitation. This work covered a few basic 
areas: reconstruction and development of infrastructure, work on projects 
involving the military field—such as the construction of airfields, training 
areas, fortifications,3 and projects relating to agriculture, particularly relevant 
among which were projects in water management and reconstruction and 
development of the industry. After the General Government was established, 
its administration was not completely established in the initial period. The 
two months remaining until the end of the year were too short of a time to 
implement any new projects. In addition, weather conditions did not allow 
any work beyond necessary repairs and maintenance of acceptable state of 
communication. Extensive works in many industries: communications, agricul-
ture, water management, and so forth, were planned for the year 1940. These 
works required a high expenditure of labor. In addition, they were to take place 
in remote areas, far from urban centers. Therefore, it was decided to create work 
camps to provide on-site permanent contingent workforces. Because it was 
necessary to prepare appropriate economic plans, in practice it was impossible 
to undertake any work on a large scale in 1939.
However, in the autumn of 1939, no formal regulations on working in the 
camps were issued. In the first implemented regulation of December 11, 1939, it 
was only mentioned in paragraph 6 that the Jews who transgress the provisions 
mentioned in the regulation “will be sent immediately to the strict long-standing 
labor service.”4 However, the implemented regulation did not specify whether 
the work would take place in the labor camps. On the basis of the second 
 2 Aly and Heim, “The Economics of the Final Solution”; Aly and Heim, “The Holocaust and 
Population Policy.”
 3 “January 30, 1940, Berlin. From the speech of the head of the Reich Security Main Office, 
Heydrich and senior SS and police commander in the General Government Krüger, 
presented at a Berlin conference, concerning the forced resettlement of Polish and 
Jewish population of Warthegau to General Government,” in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, 
Eksterminacja Żydów, 44.
 4 “December 11, 1939, Kraków, The first executive order of the higher SS and police leader 
in the General Government, Krüger on compulsory labor for the Jewish population,” in 
Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 205–6.
136 Macht Arbeit Frei?
regulation issued by the HSSPF in the General Government Friedrich-Wilhelm 
Krüger on December 12, it can be assumed that he meant the work in the 
camps.5 First of all, in paragraph 1 of the regulation of December 12, Krüger 
set the length of labor for two years. However, in case of failure to achieve the 
educational aim (erzieherischer Zweck), this period could be extended.6
In the same piece of legislation in paragraph 2, Krüger pointed to the pos-
sibility of creating labor camps: 
[the Jews] subject to forced labor are employed, in order to use their labor, 
according to their profession, if this is possible, and are put to work in the 
camps. Those able to work do not find an employment corresponding 
fully to their abilities.7 
Speaking of forced labor and its educational purposes was confus-
ingly similar to the “educational” goals of the concentration camps in Nazi 
Germany before the war.8 Besides, it would be difficult to imagine how the 
educational aim could be realized outside the labor camps in the General 
Government, indicating the inconsistency of this argumentation. The reg-
ulation of December 12 in section 5 sets out the items that the workers 
should carry with them, including lunch for two days and two clean sheets, 
which implies at least a two-day period of forced or compulsory labor.9 In 
turn, the regulation of January 20, 1940 in the section concerning mobi-
lization to work also lists items that people called for forced labor should 
bring with them. These include: two sheets, extra clothing, a coat, two pairs 
of shoes, three shirts, three pants, three pairs of stockings [socks], pair of 
gloves, two towels, a comb and a brush, cutlery, and food for two days.10 
 5 “Zweite Durchführungsvorschrift zur Verordnung vom 26. Oktober 1939 über die 
Einführung des Arbeitszwanges für jüdische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements. Vom 
12. Dezember 1939, in Pospieszalski,” Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 562. 
 6 Ibid. 
 7 Święcicki and Zadrowski, Zbiór rozporządzeń władz niemieckich, 232; Pospieszalski, 
Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 562–63.
 8 Martin Broszat, “The Concentration Camps 1933–45,” in Anatomy of the SS State, ed. 
Helmut Krausnick et al. (London: Collins, 1968), 402–7.
 9 “Zweite Durchführungsvorschrift zur Verordnung vom 26. Oktober 1939 über die 
Einführung des Arbeitszwanges für die jüdische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements. 
(Erfassungvorschrift) Vom 12. Dezember 1939,” VBlGG, 1939, 246; Pospieszalski, 
Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 562–64.
10 “Dienstbefehl an die Judenräte für die Erfassung und Gestellung der Juden zur Zwangsarbeit. 
Vom 20. Januar 1940,” in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 567.
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This list is also compiled of objects needed at least for two or three days, 
but these objects could also serve for a much longer stay.
In the winter of 1939 to 1940 no labor camps existed in the General 
Government except for POW camps, which had place for more people, and 
could provide the newcomers with food and work. As a result of the September 
1939 campaign, about 450,000 Polish POWs, including about 60,000 Jews, 
were captured by the Germans, which caused considerable problems for the 
German administration.11 Therefore, the use of Jewish forced labor could take 
place close to home, or in labor camps created on ad hoc basis.
FIRST LABOR CAMPS
The labor camp at 7 Lipowa Street in Lublin was created in December 1939 
by the SSPF in the Lublin District, SS-Gruppenführer Odilo Globocnik.12 
This camp was set up in already existing barracks and sports grounds of the 
Academic Sports Association (Akademicki Związek Sportowy, AZS). In hind-
sight, we can say that it was a typical labor camp, but with an unusual mixed 
character. In the existing barracks, craft workshops originally were created: 
carpentry, locksmith, shoe repair, tailoring, and watchmaking. There were also 
working groups responsible for the work on the expansion of the camp. The 
Jews of Lublin served as a workforce at the camp.
The structure at 7 Lipowa Street would have consisted of typical craft 
workshops. It is not for the fact that already in February 1940 the German 
authorities had begun to send transports of POW, essentially making it a camp. 
The newcomers were Jews who were billeted on the spot. Lublin received 
Jewish POWs who came from Polish eastern territories occupied by the Soviet 
Union.13 Up to December 1940, the 7 Lipowa Street camp served as a transit 
camp for POWs, and the prisoners spent a relatively short time in the camp. 
After a few days or weeks, they were dismissed or sent away. Releasing Jewish 
11 S. Kisielewicz, “Żydzi polscy w obozach jenieckich Rzeszy Niemieckiej w czasie II wojny 
światowej,” BŻIH 3 (1999): 3; Krakowski, “The Fate of Jewish Prisoners of War,” 299.
12 Marta Grudzińska and Violetta Rezler-Wasielewska, “Lublin, Lipowa 7: Obóz dla Żydów—
polskich jeńców wojennych (1939–1943),” Kwartalnik Historii Żydów 4/228 (2008): 
490–514.
13 Initially, the prisoners were promised to be repatriated, but the agreement in this case was 
not working. While other Jewish prisoners, coming from areas under the control of the 
Germans, were released. It should be noted that such a release from bondage automatically 
made them lose their status as prisoners of war. Notable exemptions are Jewish officers who 
survived the camps by the end of the war.
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POWs from the camp was conditional upon a declaration from residents of 
Lublin, who had to confirm that they were willing to take the prisoners for a 
living.14 An additional element that transforms the complex at 7 Lipowa Street 
into a camp was that the Jewish workers were prevented from returning to their 
homes for the night. These steps were taken due to the difficulty in ensuring 
the presence of a Jewish labor force, as many Jews tried to evade forced labor.
In the early days of the General Government’s existence, there were no 
clear ideas of how Jewish labor could be used in the camps. Therefore, the 
camp at 7 Lipowa Street also had no clearly defined functions. Newly created 
workshops were primarily aimed at providing skilled workforce to support the 
police, military, and civilian German institutions. Similar workshops were set 
up in many other cities in the General Government.15 The workshops were 
located in existing barracks or other industrial or storage buildings, and the 
workers came to the workplace. Only after the Jewish POWs were transported 
to 7 Lipowa Street, it did become a closed camp. However, in many respects 
the camp at 7 Lipowa Street served as a model for many other camps that were 
created in 1941. This regarded also the camp staff, which gained experience 
used subsequently in other camps, especially in the complex of labor camps 
in Bełżec and later in the camp at Janowska Street in Lwów. Until mid-1940, 
guarding functions at the camp were performed by Selbstschutz (self-defense 
units), under the command of Walter Gunst, Ludolf von Alvensleben, Franz 
Bartetzko, Horst Riedel, and Wolfgang Mohwinkl.16 In addition to the obli-
gation to provide labor, the Judenrat in Lublin was also responsible for other 
matters relating to the maintenance of the camp. Organization of workshops 
in the labor camp at 7 Lipowa Street undoubtedly influenced the decision of 
Globocnik to continue creating similar facilities of this type.17 He was not the 
only one who worked towards the creation of labor camps, but certainly he 
became a pioneer in the field, not only because of the number of camps he set 
up in his district, but also due to the high number of workers in these camps.
14 Prisoners released from the camp were required to surrender their uniform, and thus lose 
their POW status. 
15 Similar workshops can be found in Warsaw, Kraków, Bochnia, Zamość, and other cities.
16 Lenarczyk, “Obóz pracy przymusowej.”
17 Grudzińska and Rezler-Wasielewska, “Lublin, Lipowa 7”; Silberklang, The Holocaust in the 
Lublin District; Jacob Frank, Himmler’s Jewish Tailor: The Story of Holocaust Survivor Jacob 
Frank (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000); Browning, “Nazi Germany’s Initial 
Attempt”; Poprzeczny, Globocnik—Hitler’s Man in the East; Rieger, Creator of Nazi Death 
Camps; Tuvia Friedman, Himmlers Teufels-General SS- und Polizeiführer Globocnik in Lublin: 
Dokumenten-Sammlung (Haifa: Center of Documentation for Israel, 1977).
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CATEGORIZATION OF LABOR CAMPS 
Labor camps can be divided in terms of the organizing factor of the camps, 
the nature of the work, the camp regime, and the ethnic composition of the 
workers and prisoners.18 This last factor requires further explanation, as it 
causes much confusion. Jewish labor camps often had the following names: 
labor camp (Arbeitslager), forced labor camp (Zwangsarbeitslager), Jewish camp 
or camp for Jews (Judenlager), labor camp for Jews (Judenarbeitslager), collective 
camp (Sammellager), camp for certain tasks (Einsatzlager), and administrative 
labor camp (Verwaltungarbeitslager).19 In terms of ethnic composition, we can 
categorize the labor camps established in the General Government as Polish, 
Jewish, and mixed. Among the latter were representatives of other nationalities, 
including Gypsies and Ukrainians. During the early days of the occupation, the 
majority of inmates in labor camps were Jews, both in numerical terms as well as 
in terms of number of camps designed exclusively for them. According to Józef 
Marszałek, among the 850 labor camps existing in the General Government 
during the occupation, 400 contained only Jews, and in 200, Jews were one of 
the many ethnic groups.20 
In terms of the regime, we can distinguish regular camps, labor camps 
(Arbeitslager), and penal camps (Straflager). Regular camps were created in 
order to perform specific work regarding economy and infrastructure of the 
General Government, such as work on roads and bridges, railways, work on 
the regulation of rivers and land drainage, and agricultural work. Labor camps 
had in most cases strict regime, although the difference between regular camps 
18 Czyńska and Kupść, “Obozy zagłady, obozy koncentracyjne i obozy pracy na ziemiech 
polskich w latach 1939–1945”; Pilichowski, Obozy hitlerowskie; Weinmann, Kaiser, 
and Krause-Schmidt, eds., Die Nationalsozialistische Lagersystem; Pohl, “Die Grossen 
Zwangsarbeitslager der SS- und Polizeiführer für Juden im Generalgouvernement 1942–
1945”; A. Ungerer, Verzeichnis von Ghettos, Zwangsarbeitslagern und Konzentrationslagern: 
Vorgelegt nach Beschluss den Vertreter den obersten Wiedergutmachungsbehörden und der 
Entschädigungsgerichte den Länder Baden-Württemberg , Bayern und Hessen (Munich: n.p., 
1955); Allen, The Business of Genocide; Gruner, “Terra Incognita?”; Allen, Jewish Forced 
Labor; Łukaszewicz, “Obóz pracy w Treblince.”
19 Marszałek, Obozy pracy w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie, Pilichowski, ed., Obozy hitlerowskie; 
Edward Dziadosz and Józef Marszałek, “Więzienia i obozy w dystrykcie lubelskim w latach 
1939–1944,” Zeszyty Majdanka 3 (1969): 54–125; Zygmunt Mańkowski, “Obozy zagłady 
na terenie dystryktu lubelskiego, ich system i funkcje,” Zeszyty Majdanka 17 (1996): 39–49; 
Czyńska and Kupść, “Obozy zagłady, obozy koncentracyjne i obozy pracy na ziemiech pols-
kich w latach 1939–1945.”
20 Marszałek, Obozy pracy w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie, 12.
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and labor camps remained quite fluid. A large group of labor camps was created 
for Poles who were obliged to work under the regulation of duty of labor of 
October 26, 1939 (even without this regulation, unemployed Poles were sent 
to the camps). Camps in this case should be treated as temporary residences 
of employees performing certain works. The second group of forced labor 
camps was created especially for Jews. These camps were known under vari-
ous names, among others: labor camp for Jews (Arbeitslager für Juden), Jewish 
camp (Judenlager), or Julag for short. According to Józef Marszałek, during all 
the time of existence of the General Government, it had 491 such camps, which 
accounted for 58% of all labor camps. The largest development of such camps 
was noted in 1942, when in all districts together, there were 322 labor camps for 
Jews.21 Some of them existed only for several weeks or months, others lasted 
some years. Their number and development were closely linked to the Nazi 
policy towards the Jews: with the extermination of Jews, the number of camps 
decreased.
Penal labor camps (Strafarbeitslager) were mixed in terms of ethnicity. In 
general, these camps contained people who were sent there for a limited period 
of time, accused of evasion of the obligation to work, not paying the contin-
gents of agricultural products,22 illicit trafficking, and other criminal offenses.23 
Jews who had committed various offenses were also sent to such camps. These 
camps had strict criminal regime and offered extremely heavy works. The 
prisoners were sent to work in quarries, drainage, and road-building.
STATUS OF WORKERS
The status of the Jewish workers in the camps requires further explanations. 
The Jews, according to existing regulations, were required to perform forced 
labor. At the same time, the official regulations limited stay of Jews outside 
the areas designated for them—that is, in Jewish residential districts. Staying 
in other places was only possible for Jews who had special permits. However, 
despite these limitations, they could move freely in designated areas. The labor 
21 Ibid., 14.
22 YVA-JM.814, The Kreishauptmann of the County of Puławy wrote in his report that every-
body who did not deliver 100% of contingents would be sent to a penal camp. Lagebericht, 
Kreishauptmann des Kreises Puławy, Lagebericht für Oktober 1940, Pulawy, scan 821.
23 “December 9, 1940, Lublin, part of the report of the Lublin District Governor to Division 
of Interior Affairs of the Office of the Governor General about draconian repression of the 
peasants for non-delivery of quotas,” in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 312–13.
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departments of the Jewish councils appointed them to work in labor camps. 
Some workers reported on a voluntary basis. Others were arrested and trans-
ported to labor camps against their will. Formally speaking, they were not 
prisoners, unlike the prisoners in the penal camps. Workers in the ordinary 
labor camps could be treated as hired workers (wolnonajemni), and indeed, 
in many places (particularly in agricultural labor camps), they were treated 
in this way and their freedom of movement was not limited. They could leave 
the camp. In some camps the workers remained unguarded, but they could 
not permanently leave the camps without permission, because it had severe 
consequences.24
In most SS camps the situation was fundamentally different. There, the 
workers were treated as prisoners, although they did not have this formal 
status.25 Certainly, it was a result of the attitude of the SS to the Jews. Many SS 
men were trained in German camps before the war. They were a highly indoc-
trinated group, so that their attitude towards the Jews was particularly negative 
and they were inclined to use repressive methods. Jews in the SS labor camps 
could not leave the camps. Workers went to work in groups under heavy guard. 
All attempts to escape were thwarted. The workers were shot when trying 
to escape. In cases of capture during a raid on refugees, they were publicly 
punished, in some cases by death. Prisoners were beaten and humiliated during 
the work. Jewish workers in labor camps designed to perform drainage work 
were treated like prisoners: they were held in custody and were subjected to 
severe discipline of the camp.26
The main problem here is still the matter of terminology. Labor coercion 
in camps was due to the racist Nazi system, which treated the Jews as inferior 
race. As such, Jews had to be subjected to exacerbated treatment, discrimina-
tion, and criminalization, and eventually completely destroyed. Such treat-
ment of the Jews resulted from the alleged harm they caused that could not be 
corrected by educational methods. Jews were sent to labor camps mainly as a 
result of racist policies and not after commission of certain crimes. They were 
preferred as a labor force in early labor camps due to their availability. Because 
24 A note of ŻSS about a case of arresting 70-years-old father in Działoszyce, because his son 
fled from a labor camp in Kostrze near Kraków. YVA-JM.1581, scan 119.
25 Situation of prisoners changed with the development of labor camps. For example, the camp 
at the 7 Lipowa Street in Lublin, although organized by the SSPF Globocnik, went through 
various stages. In the early months of its existence the Jewish laborers and POWs in this 
camp had freedom of movement. With time only, this freedom was limited.
26 Łukaszewicz, “Obóz pracy w Treblince.”
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of the racial policy, they were eliminated from the Polish economy, then in 
the situation of unemployment, lack of sources of income, and overcrowding 
of the Jewish quarters, they could be forcibly mobilized and sent to the labor 
camps to do the worst and hardest works. Most of the labor camps were not 
punitive camps,27 but despite that, their administration applied severe punitive 
measures and harsh discipline.
Usually, the term “prisoner” refers to a person in custody or camp who 
has committed a crime or suspected of a crime. Political prisoners are and were 
considered a separate category of prisoners who were detained as a result of dif-
fering political views and not as a result of some offense. The Jews were locked 
in prison camps and treated like prisoners in consequence of discriminatory 
provisions under the racist ideology. In contrast to other inmates, the difference 
in their status was mainly due to the fact that the Jews were treated as prison-
ers, although from the formal point of view they were not prisoners. They did 
not have any designated period of residence in the camp, because there were 
not sent there on the basis of a sentence. They could also be released from the 
camp. Indeed, after the completion of their tasks, in general seasonal work, 
most of the prisoners were released to their original settlements. Some Jewish 
workers were released from the camps for health reasons.
THE COMPLEX OF LABOR CAMPS IN BEŁZ ∙ EC
The complex of labor camps in Bełżec and the surrounding area had a signifi-
cant impact on the development of labor camps in the General Government, so 
their discussion is important for understanding the processes associated with 
the use of forced labor of Jews.28 Labor camps in Bełżec and the surrounding 
area have been created for fortification works, so-called Grenzgraben, between 
the rivers Bug and San, on a territory of several dozen kilometers. These lines 
of defense were planned specifically by Wehrmacht.29 Most of the demar-
cation line between the areas occupied by Germany and the Soviet Union 
ran along the natural boundaries: the rivers Narew, Bug, and San, while the 
27 One of the best known punitive camps was the labor camp in Treblinka, established by the 
governor of the Warsaw District, Ludwig Fischer on November 15, 1941. This order was 
retroactive and was actually valid since September 1, 1941. YVA-JM.12307, 136.
28 Silberklang, The Holocaust in the Lublin District, 102–27; Radzik, “Praca przymusowa”; 
Radzik, Lubelska dzielnica zamknięta.
29 BA-MA, RH53-23-56, Oberbefehlshaber Ost, Sicherung des Gebietes Oberost, Lodsch, 
den 6. Dezember 1939, 104–15.
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southern part of the line took place in mountainous terrain. The remaining part 
of the line that separated these two areas was not supported by any natural bor-
ders. Therefore, it was decided to fortify this sector of the demarcation line by 
digging anti-tank trenches in conjunction with other means of defense. It 
is difficult to accurately reconstruct the decision-making process on this 
matter, but already in January 1940, Himmler suggested30 that the army high 
command (OKH) use about 2.5 million Jews to build fortifications along the 
Soviet border.31 This decision was supported by Heydrich at a conference in 
Berlin on the resettlement of population from Warthegau. He expressed the 
need to organize a network of labor camps for hundreds of thousands of Jews, 
for the construction of these fortifications.32 At the turn of 1939 and 1940, 
when the plans for the invasion in Western Europe were already accepted, 
it has become extremely important to secure the eastern border against a 
possible surprise attack by the Soviet Union.33 Despite previously signed 
agreements of August 23, 1939 and a basic understanding on the division of 
spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, the attack on Western Europe would 
have been a violation of the balance of power against the USSR. Therefore, the 
reactions of this country could not be entirely predictable.
The section of the borderline between the Bug and the San was the most 
important, as it could be the perfect place for an invasion by land. The German 
strategy of Blitzkrieg prescribed massive attacks mainly with armored forces, 
with the support of troops and mechanized infantry.34 To perform such attacks, 
it was necessary to transfer the majority of forces on the Western Front, thereby 
exposing the eastern border. Similar measures were used in 1939, when the 
western border of Germany remained almost devoid of troops. Preparation of 
30 From a discussion on the compulsory evacuation of the Jewish Population of the Wartheland 
to the Government-General, January 30, 1940. NO-5322; Arad and Gutman, Documents on 
the Holocaust, 183–85.
31 Madajczyk, “Lubelszczyzna w polityce okupanta,” 6.
32 “In connection with that matter, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich mentions that the construction 
of the shaft and other projects in the east will enable concentration of hundreds of thou-
sands of Jews in forced labor camps,” January 30, 1940, Berlin, From the speech of the head 
of the Reich Security Main Office, Heydrich and Higher SS and Police Commander in the 
General Government Krüger, presented at a conference in Berlin, decicated to the forced 
resettlement of Polish and Jewish population of Warthegau to the General Government, in 
Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 45.
33 BA-MA, RH53-23-56, Oberbefehlshaber Ost, Sicherung des Gebietes Oberost, Lodsch, 
den 6.12.39, 104–15.
34 Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (New York: Knopf, 
1980), 213–20; 241–313.
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the fortification line against any attack could give a chance to defend the eastern 
border (even with a small force) and allow the Germans to gain time to bring 
extra troops.
An additional argument on the use of the Jews to build fortifications was 
the fact that the Jews deported from Warthegau had no chance of any employ-
ment in the General Government. In a situation of economic stagnation and 
high unemployment,35 there were greater opportunities to find employment 
for Jewish labor in public works. Such tendency had already been seen in 1938 
in Germany, when as a result of mass arrests of Jews following Kristallnacht, the 
sudden inflow of large amounts of manpower to the concentration camps was 
an important factor in the development of prisoners’ labor and development of 
companies that employed it. Similarly, in this case, the inflow of large amounts 
of labor and the need to carry out large-scale works in the area were important 
factors in the decision to set up labor camps.
It was possible to start work before the spring of 1940. For this purpose, 
SSPF Odilo Globocnik established a special unit for the construction of 
fortifications (SS-Grenzsicherungs-Baukommando), based in Bełżec. Originally, 
construction of fortifications on the stretch of 140 km between the rivers Bug 
and San were planned. An essential element of these fortifications was to be an 
anti-tank ditch of 7.5 m wide and 2.5 m deep. Discussions about the validity 
of border fortifications were also conducted at the meetings of the leadership 
of the General Government.36 In one of his speeches, HSSPF Friedrich-
Wilhelm Krüger described the intentions of the construction of fortifications 
35 In fact, deported Jews caused lot of problems to the authorities of the General Government 
because of lack of accommodation for thousands of arriving ausgesiedelte Juden. During 
January, the number of people searching employment in the district of Kraków increased 
from 19,616 to 23,586. 6127 places were offered, and assistance in searching for employ-
ment was given to 14,304; among them 2,411 were Jews. See in Der Chef des Distrikts 
Krakau. Lagebericht für Januar 1941, 17. Februar 1941, YVA-O.53/101, scan 26. 
36 August 9, 1940, Kraków, Minutes of meeting held on August 6, 1940, in the Department of 
Labor of the General Government, devoted to forced labor of the Jewish population: “The 
meeting was held under the chairmanship of Frauendorfer, assisted by representatives of 
the General Directorate of Eastern Railway, the higher SS and police leader in the General 
Government, the commander of the Security Police, Security Service of the General 
Government, and certain departments of General Government—[Department of] Food 
Supplies and Agriculture, Economy, Construction, Forestry, and Labor Departments in the 
offices of heads of Kraków, Warsaw, Lublin, and Radom Districts, and Labor Office (depart-
ment of Employment Jews) in Kraków and other departments.” In April 1940 the German 
authorities ordered the resettlement of Jews from Krakow to various places in the districts 
of Krakow and Lublin. The Lublin Jews were to be employed in the fortification works. 
See Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 217–18.
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in following words: “In consultation with the Supreme Commander of the 
East are organized now works for the Jews near the so-called green border 
between the Bug and San, yet as an experiment; the future will prove what 
results it will produce.”37
The first group of 1,140 prisoners at Bełżec was composed of Gypsies 
deported from Germany, Protektorat,38 and Gypsies who were arrested in 
the General Government, brought to Bełżec in late May 1940.39 The first 
group of 100 Jews arrived to Bełżec on May 29, 1940;40 and before August 
14, 1940, the camp already contained 350 Jews from Lublin and Piaski. 
However, the great influx of Jewish workers to a labor camp in Bełżec was 
only in mid-August 1940.41 
The organizational model of the camp at Bełżec42 reflects Globocnik’s 
ideas. Despite the criticism of irrational use of Jewish labor as it was expressed 
at the meeting in April 1940,43 Globocnik himself contributed to a no less irra-
tional attitude towards that labor force, directed against Jewish institutions in 
general. It is worthwhile to consider a possible cause of such attitude. From the 
37 June 7, 1940, Kraków, Minutes of the meeting on economic issues—situation of hunger in 
the Polish population, the task of the German police, policy towards the Jewish population 
in the General Government, in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 223.
38 At the January meeting, which was attended by Seyss-Inquart and Krüger, one of the 
items discussed was relocating 30,000 Gypsies from Germany and eastern marches to the 
General Government. January 30, 1940, Berlin. From the speeches of the head of the Reich 
Security Main Office, Heydrich, and the higher SS and police commander in the General 
Government, Krüger, presented at a conference in Berlin and dedicated tothe forced reset-
tlement of Polish and Jewish population of Warthegau to General Government, in Eisenbach 
and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 45.
39 Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” 308; Januscz Peter, “W Bełżcu podczas okupacji,” in 
Tomaszowskie za okupacji, ed. Janusz Peter (Tomaszów: Nakł. Tomaszowskiego Towarzystwa 
Regionalnego, 1991), 180.
40 APL, RŻL-8, 52, Report from the activity of the [ Jewish] Council [in Lublin] for the period 
September 1, 1939 until August 31, 1940. 
41 Beginning of September 1940, Warsaw, Report of the Warsaw District governor, Ludwig 
Fischer for August 1940, about situation of the Jews sent to labor camps in the Lublin region, 
in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 218–19; September 7, 1940, Lublin, 
Report of the Department of the Interior Office of the Lublin District Governor for August, 
1940 about the use of Jewish labor and difficulties of planned employment of the Jewish 
professional labor forces because of arbitrary moves of the commander of SS and police, 
Globocnik, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 219–20.
42 Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” 310.
43 Krzysztof Pilarczyk, ed., Żydzi i judaizm we współczesnych badaniach polskich: Materiały 
z konferencji, Kraków, 21–23 XI 1995 (Krakow: Księgarnia Akademicka Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, 1997), 308; Peter, “W Bełżcu podczas okupacji,” 180.
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very beginning of his activity in Lublin, Globocnik tried to exploit the Jews. 
He did not take into account the many other economic factors. First of all, the 
continuous exploitation of the Jews and shifting all the costs of forced labor 
on them had its limits. Going beyond such limits not only accelerated impov-
erishment of the Jewish society, but also caused the collapse of Jewish insti-
tutions. Another important element of the unlimited exploitation of the Jews 
by Globocnik was paralysis of many important economic assets and facilities 
in the General Government.44 Perhaps, Globocnik deliberately tried to push 
forward his interests, hoping that other people will deal with the problems he 
created. However, shifting costs and responsibility on the Jews had their source 
also in official documents. It was Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, who in his regula-
tions of December 1939 and January 1940 required the Judenräte to supply the 
poor Jewish workers.45
Organizing his camps, Globocnik intended not only to exploit Jewish 
workers for free, but also to pass on to the Judenräte any responsibility for their 
administration and financing. In this way, he exploited Jewish community both 
through people able to work and financially, by shifting costs on them. The 
drainage of able-bodied Jews to the labor force caused a serious economic weak-
ening of the Jewish community in Jewish residential areas and ghettos, creating 
imbalance between working and not working people.46 In this way, Globocnik 
received not only free labor, but also escaped administrative costs. In addi-
tion, he objected to the agreement of July 4, 1940 between Friedrich-Wilhelm 
Krüger and Hans Frank, who required from German institutions hiring Jews 
to pay for their work. Globocnik was exempted from paying the wages to Jews 
who worked in his labor camps.
The organization of the camps complex in Bełżec was conducted in accor-
dance with Globocnik’s idea of unlimited use of the Jews. Although the SS was 
responsible for the organizational framework and for the engineering service 
of the camp, matters related to workers were entirely left to the Jews. The Jews 
had to supply labor to the camps. However, this did not end their role. The Jews 
were responsible for the organization, activities, and funding of the camp.
44 September 7, 1940, Lublin, Report of the Department of the Interior Office of the Lublin 
District Governor for August, 1940 about the use of Jewish labor and difficulties of planned 
employment of the Jewish professional labor forces because of arbitrary moves of the com-
mander of SS and police, Globocnik, in Eksterminacja Żydów, 219–20.
45 Ibid.
46 N. Rosen, “The Problem of Work in the Jewish quarter—July 1942,” To Live with Honor 
and Die with Honor: Selected Documents from the Warsaw Ghetto Underground Archives “O.S.” 
(Oneg Shabbath), ed. Joseph Kermish ( Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1986), 259.
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The condition of the camps and their bad organization was noticed by 
the civil administration and reported to the General Government in Kraków. 
For example, the Kreishauptmann of Zamość wrote in his monthly report in 
September 1940: 
It is known that in order to create the border fortifications, large Jewish forced 
labor camps, which were set up [in the area of Bełżec], have grown greatly 
in the last period. The sanitary and general conditions are, of course, quite 
primitive. Recently complaints have been lodged by the Wehrmacht, which 
I have forwarded to the solely responsible SS-Office in Lublin. In the man-
agement of Jewish camp, only the Department of Food and Agriculture is a 
participant when it has to make the necessary allocations for the catering.47 
In those conditions, the physical state of the workers was quickly deterio-
rating and after a few months the released workers were totally unable to work. 
For example: 
The Jews who were sent  from the Jewish camp Bełżec  to the water  
management authority, unfortunately, had to be dismissed again, as they 
had been extremely exploited by the agency then responsible for the  
measure (SS) and are now totally unable to work. The further use of these 
Jews is impossible, even in future.48 
COMMITTEE OF THE CAMP AT BEŁZ ∙ EC
The first group of Jews sent to the camp at Bełżec was from Lublin, and Bełżec 
itself was within the province of Lublin. Therefore, the Jewish Council in 
Lublin took action to care for the workers from their area.49 So, the decision 
was made on June 1, 1940 to establish the Department of External Labor 
Camps. However, the German camp headquarters in Bełżec also set up a 
so-called Committee (Gremium),50 which was a representation of the Jewish 
community. Task of the committee was “to organize the camp services and to 
47 Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Zamość, Lagebericht, Zamość, den 10. September 1940, 
scan 172.
48 YVA-JM.2700, Vermerk, 20. November 1940, Betr: Arbeiteinsatz von Juden, scans 40–41.
49 Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” 311.
50 APL, RŻL-8, 52, Report on the activity of the [ Jewish] Council [in Lublin] from September 
1, 1939 to August 31, 1940.
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gain material means of subsistence in order to maintain the camp.”51 Members 
of the Committee were composed of members of the Jewish Council in Lublin, 
headed by its President Engineer Henryk Bekker. The Committee was to 
prepare the rooms for the workers, providing food, transport, medical care, and 
provision of correspondence and parcels.
According to Globocnik’s idea, the Jewish community should bear all 
costs associated with camp maintainance. The money was to be transferred by 
the Jewish Council of the Lublin district. Therefore, the committee requested 
that 57 Jewish councils transfer money for this purpose. However, only 9 of 
them sent money. By September 1, 1940, 37,178 zł were spent on the camps, of 
which only 10,525 zł were sent by the Jewish councils of the district.52 The rest 
was covered by the Jewish Council in Lublin. The money came from tax collec-
tions and the Jews of Lublin. Lack of cooperation from the Jewish councils in 
the district of Lublin has caused many conflicts between them and the Jewish 
Council in Lublin. First of all, the cost of living in most parts of the camp fell on 
the Jewish community in Lublin. This uneven burden-sharing, given the bad 
economic situation of the Jewish population, worsened their condition.
This situation was well-known to the German authorities. During the 
meeting devoted to the security situation in the General Government, the 
following minutes were recorded:
If we will continue to use the robbery tactics against Jewish communities, 
then one fine day, millions of Jews will become a burden to the General 
Government. Finally, we cannot let them to die of hunger. The means 
available to Jewry are quite limited; as in the General Government there 
are no more rich Jews, mostly Jewish proletariat has remained on the spot. 
The speaker therefore considers that a fundamental decision on the super-
vision of the Jewish Councils of Elders and religious communities would 
be highly desirable. Security Police is by no means interested in additional 
hassle, but practice has shown that the current procedure in this section 
was not appropriate.53
51 Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” Radzik, Tadeusz, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej na 
przykładzie obozu pracy w Bełżcu w 1940 r., ” in Żydzi i judaizm we współczesnych badaniach 
polskich: Materiały z konferencji, Kraków, 21–23 XI 1995, ed. Krzysztof Pilarczyk, Księgarnia 
Akademicka Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Kraków, 1997, 311.
52 Pilarczyk, Żydzi i judaizm, 307–19.
53 May 30, 1940, Kraków, Minutes of the police conference dedicated to issues of the security 
situation in the General Government. In Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, 211.
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To ensure the influx of the workforce, Dr. Frauendorfer organized a 
meeting of the Labor Department in Kraków on August 6, 1940. It was not 
possible to send thousands of Jewish workers to perform fortification works 
in the camps in the area of Bełżec without any coordination and cooperation 
with labor offices. During the conference, there was a discussion concerning 
demands for Jewish workers in the General Government.
At the meeting, problems with the recruitment of labor force were discussed. 
The original design of employing 2.5 million Jews was totally unrealistic. Such eval-
uation of the available labor force was unfounded and not supported by any calcu-
lations. Even providing much more modest number of Jewish workers exceeded 
the capabilities of the Lublin district, which is why it was necessary to call a confer-
ence of the Labor Department—to provide Jewish workers from other districts.
At the beginning of the discussion about Bełżec camps, strategic reasons for 
building the belt of fortifications were mentioned. However, the strip of fortifica-
tion had not been completed before the end of the campaign in Western Europe. 
Winning the campaign and changing the strategic balance in favor of Germany 
did not cause the abandonment of the construction of the strip of fortifications. In 
response to the campaign in Western Europe, the USSR began to implement the 
provisions of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, annexing Bessarabia and Northern 
Bukovina, and  proceeding to the direct occupation of the Baltic States. Despite 
these steps, there was not any hostile action or deterioration of relations between 
Germany and the USSR. Germany had no reason to suspect the USSR of offen-
sive action. However, the construction of fortifications belt was the result not 
only of immediate threat, but rather of long-term strategic plans that played an 
important role in land-defense system. Therefore, despite the winning campaign 
and stable relations with the Soviet Union, the German authorities continued to 
work on the belt of fortifications in the Bełżec area.
The head of the Labor Department under the chief of the District Lublin 
stated that 
. . . the demand for labor at construction projects related to water man-
agement could be covered by the district [. . .] but it is impossible to get 
accurate data on the number of Jews who can be mobilized to work on the 
basis of the filing of the Jewish cards. Recently there have been noticed 
considerable uncertainties in cooperation with SS.54
54 YVA-JM.2700, Protokoll über die Judeneinsatzbesprechung vom 6. August 1940 [. . .] bei 
der Abteilung Arbeit im Amt des Generalgouverneurs, scan 6.
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According to Dr. Hofbauer’s assessment, 10,000 Jewish workers had 
to be mobilized immediately in Lublin.55 As stated by the head of the Labor 
Department under the chief of the District Warsaw, in August 1940 about 
6,000 to 8,000 Jews were employed. After meeting the demand of the district, a 
significant number of Jews can be sent to the fortification works in the district 
of Lublin.56 The representative of the district of Kraków stated: 
Kraków District cannot send workers because of the high demand in the 
district. There is a great need to provide workers for the roads and the con-
struction of a hydroelectric dam in Rożnów, which is also covered by the 
district. Therefore, it is not possible to send Jewish workers to Lublin.57 
In the case of Lublin, the most important was the demand for 2,700 
Jewish laborers to be employed at the water management, and then at 
the construction of fortifications.58 It was agreed that districts of Warsaw 
and Radom would immediately set transports to district of Lublin, and 
district of Kraków primarily would cover the demand of hydroelectric dam 
in Rożnów, and later, if possible, would send workers to Lublin for the 
construction of border fortifications.59
In order to increase the number of workers, on August 14 to 16, 1940 mass 
roundups were held in various towns60 of Lublin District,61 as well as in other 
districts. Here are just two examples of correspondence on this matter and lack 
of communication between the SS, labor offices, and civil administration:
On the night between November 14 and 15, 1940, a police raid (Razzia) 
took place, where 250–300 Jews were arrested. The Labor Office in Lublin 
is registering Jews, but the SS is disturbing, since it conducts police raids 
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., scan 5.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., scan 4.
59 Ibid.
60 Lageberichte, Kreshauptmann des Kreises Chełm, September 9, 1940. Information about 
374 Jews arrested during Special Action (Sonderaktion) of August 14, 1940, who were later 
brought by train to Bełżec. YVA-O53/101, 3.
61 Letter of August 20, 1949 to Frauendorfer about the arrests of Jews. YVA-JM.12307, scans 40–41. 
The Governor of the District Lublin Zörner ordered the Arbeitsamt in Lublin to cooperate with 
the police. This letter describes sending 5500 Jews to build border fortifications. No Jews were 
sent to the road-building firms (Strasssenbau) or water administration (Wasserwirtschaft).
151Forced Labor in the Labor Camps  CHAPTER 4
without informing other institutions. [. . .] most of the Jews have regular 
identity cards issued by the Labor Office in Lublin, but the SS does not 
take this fact into consideration.62 
In another document, the chef of the Labor Office in Łuków 
. . . reported by telephone that today a police raid occurred in the county 
of Radzyń. The SS has detained 60 Jews, who were shipped off to Lublin. 
The documents were not taken into consideration by the SS, despite valid 
stamps. Part of those Jews was employed by the German authorities. 
Further police raids in Radzyń County are expected. The Kreishauptmann 
of Radzyń informed Governor Zörner about this matter.63
As a result of these raids, more than 10,000 Jews arrived to Bełżec.64 The 
haste and vehemence of the action meant that people unable to work also 
wound up in Bełżec. As was also agreed during the conference in Kraków: 
“As the camps in Lublin [District] are infested with lice, shipments will not 
be passed delousing. Jews will be examined by Jewish doctors, and those 
unable [to work] will be further examined by SS physicians or contracted 
physicians.”65 They were devoid of any personal items, essential in the camp.66 
Since this action was organized by the police, in most cases labor offices 
did not participate in it. In some cases, they did not really know about the 
action. In fact, there is a correspondence to Globocnik from labor offices 
complaining that this wild action did not permit the checking of the Jewish 
card index (Judenkartei) taken over by the labor offices after the agreement 
between Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger and Hans Frank concerning administra-
tion of Jewish forced labor by the labor offices. This meant that many arrested 
workers were already employed or unfit for this kind of work.67 The number 
of Jewish workers in Bełżec had increased to about 11,00068. The camps in 
62 YVA-JM.2700, 15.11.1940, Vermerk, scan 27.
63 Ibid., scan 28.
64 APL, RŻL-8, 52, Report on the activity of the [ Jewish] Council [in Lublin] from September 
1, 1939 to August 31, 1940.
65 YVA-JM.2700, Protokoll über die Judeneinsatzbesprechung vom. 6 August 1940 [. . .] bei 
der Abteilung Arbeit im Amt des Generalgouverneurs, scan 4.
66 Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” 309.
67 YVA-JM.12307, scans 45, 50.
68 Vermerk, August 20, 1940. Probably due to quantity of Jews arrested in different districts 
and sent to the district of Lublin and lack of appropriate facilities, Globocnik decided to send 
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Bełżec now hosted many thousands of Jews from other districts. For example, 
2975 workers in the camps were from Lublin,69 and about 5,200 workers came 
from Warsaw District. The others came mainly from the district of Radom.70 
Jewish workers from the other districts were shipped to the district of Lublin, 
despite high demand in other regions. The Kreishauptmann of Skierniewice 
wrote in his report: 
In the County Skierniewice high demand for workers to perform 
melioration works continued in August, and could hardly be covered.  
[. . .] 200 Jews were sent to the assembly place in Warsaw for the work  
enterprises in Lublin.71
THE COMPLEX CAMPS IN BEŁZ ∙ EC 
The arrival of many thousands of workers led to the rapid growth of camps 
not only in Bełżec but also in the surrounding area.72 Most of the shipments 
arrived within three days. As a result of this action, the following camps were 
established: Bełżec-Dwór (Bełżec-Manor), Bełżec-Młyn (Bełżec-Mill), Bełżec-
Parowozownia (Bełżec-Roundhouse), and the camps in Cieszanów, Lipsk, 
Płazów, and Dzików. Accommodation in Bełżec and other places was not suit-
able for such a large number of workers. After few days, most of workers were 
placed in the camps. 2,800 workers remained in Bełżec,73 2,086 people arrived 
in Lipsk; 1,250 people went to Płazów; 3,000 people to Cieszanów, and 1,000 
people to Dzików.74
a part of Jewsh workers to perform works for Wasserwirtschaftamt. He ordered to send 65% 
of workers to Bełżec complex and 35% to be deployed by the labor offices in the district of 
Lublin. YVA-JM.12307, scan 43. 
69 APL, RŻL-6, 72, Annex nr 5, Forced labor of Lublin’s Jews in 1940 in the city of Lublin and 
outside. 
70 On August 19, 1940, 1192 Jews from Ostrowiec, Radom, and Warsaw arrived in Lublin. See 
YVA-JM.12307, 49. On August 20, 1940, 500 Jews from Radom arrived in Lublin. See YVA-
JM.12307, scans 40–41. Kiełboń, Janina, “Deportacje Żydów do dystryktu lubelskiego,” 
Zeszyty Majdanka 14 (1992): 69–70; Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” 310. 
71 YVA-JM.814, Kreishauptmannschaft des Kreises Skierniewice, Lagebericht, September 9, 
1940, scan 283. 
72 Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” 310. 
73 APL, RŻL-47, 25. Report on the activity of the Central Camps Council in Bełżec from June 
13 to December 5, 1940.
74 Ibid.
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The sudden arrival of thousands of workers to Bełżec as a result of raids 
from August 14 to 16, 1940 caused a crisis in the camp. The arrival of so many 
people was not in any way prepared for, and not agreed with the commit-
tee. Accommodation was not ready; there was lack of food and money. This 
resulted in the collapse of the functioning of the committee. The committee, 
consisting of several representatives on the spot while other members were 
away from Bełżec, could not meet the new requirements of the organization; 
therefore, on August 21, the Central Camp Council in Bełżec was established.75
Organizational changes concerning new methods of the operation of camps 
concerned Bełżec and Lublin. As in Bełżec the committee ceased to exist and 
the Central Camp Council appeared in its place, so also in Lublin a Committee 
for Aid to Workers in the Camps was established. The Committee had asked for 
assistance from other Jewish councils.76 In Warsaw and Lublin conferences of 
Jewish communities were held, but without significant results. According to the 
calculations, 60% of all money spent on the maintenance of the camps in Bełżec 
(amounting to about 100,000 zł) was covered by the Judenrat in Lublin, while 
only about 15% of workers in the camps came from Lublin.77
In addition to Camp at 7 Lipowa Street in Lublin and the camps in Bełżec, 
many other labor camps arose after the spring of 1940. These camps had different 
structures, which will be discussed below. As a basis for the establishment of 
labor camps, the regulation issued by Hans Frank on October 26, 1939 was 
always mentioned. This document introduced forced labor for Jews between 
the ages of 18 to 60 years. On December 12, 1939 the age threshold had been 
lowered to 14 years of age. In the same piece of legislation, in paragraph 2, 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger pointed to the possibility of creating labor camps.78 
However, no legal document dealing exclusively with the establishment and 
organization of labor camps had been issued. 
Some labor camps for Jews were created by SSPF. Under Frank’s regulation 
of October 26, 1939, all responsibility for Jewish forced labor was transferred 
to HSSPF, which allowed the SS and police in various districts to create labor 
75 Pilarczyk, Żydzi i judaizm, 311. 
76 “O obozach pracy w Lublinie,” Gazeta Żydowska, September 3, 1940, 2; “Zorganizowanie 
pomocy dla obozów pracy: Co zdziałała Rada Żydowska w Warszawie,” Gazeta Żydowska, 
October 11, 1940, 2; “Akcja pomocy dla przebywających w obozach pracy,” Gazeta 
Żydowska, October 14, 1940, 2; “Z obozów pracy: Akcja zbiórkowa na rzecz obozów pracy 
w Warszawie,” Gazeta Żydowska, December 3, 1940, 2
77 Radzik, “Praca przymusowa,” 312.
78 Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 562–63.
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camps. Camps in Bełżec and its surroundings in the district of Lublin were set 
up on this basis. Forced labor camps subjected to SS and police leaders were 
created in other districts as well.79
THE CAMPS ESTABLISHED BY THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
The administration in most of the labor camps was in the hands of the relevant 
German institutions. The complex in Bełżec was an exception in this respect, 
because it was a big camp complex performing important strategic tasks and 
run by the SS, where most of the administrative work was performed by Jews.80 
Typically, the division of the camp administration was as follows: in the camps 
under the management of SS and police commander in the district, the author-
ity which exercised command in the camp was made up of SS members. Guard 
functions were in the hands of SS auxiliary services made mostly of Ukrainians 
and other nationalities (after June 1941). Guard service at the beginning of the 
camps in Lublin District was also Selbstschutz units composed of Volksdeutsche 
(ethnic Germans).81 According to the report by an Abwehr officer: 
Custody is completely inadequate, in the camp as well as at work. In the 
camps of Lipsko, Płazów, and Cieszanów the Volksdeutsche are currently 
active, but they do not have sufficient numbers to prohibit deliberate 
border crossings, especially at work. So I observed in Lipsko, shortly 
before 6 p.m., two gangs of 40 men each mustering up on a road 10 m from 
the border, without any guard near. The groups were mustered and tallied 
by Jewish wardens. In Bełżec there are only two guards with rifles and in 
the tower two guards with a machine gun at hand to watch the allegedly  
6 km road to work and 3.000–4.000 men. But in this woodland one can 
only see a part of the road from the tower. So here, too, border crossings 
are easily possible. In Lipsko, once again, four people have crossed the 
border on September 22 [1940]. If, despite this insufficient watch, the 
number of transgressions is relatively small, it is due to the fact that most 
people have relatives on this side, and they don’t want to lose connection 
with their relatives, or they fear retaliatory measures against their relatives. 
On the other hand, it is the supervision of the Jewish watch, who are afraid 
of reprisals if they lose men from their group. Often the incertitude about 
79 Łukaszewicz, “Obóz pracy w Treblince.” 
80 Marszałek, Obozy pracy w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie.
81 Lenarczyk, “Obóz pracy przymusowej,” 39.
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the Russians’ attitude towards escapees might curtail the inclination to 
escape. Customs officials are of the opinion that Jews are generally shot by 
the Russians. In one instance, a customs official observed three escaped 
Jews waving their hands from the other side, and shortly after shots were 
heard, so it was assumed that these Jews were shot by the Russian border 
patrol. The German command dealt with the administration of the camps, 
but the office support functions were performed by the prisoners. All 
work in camps linked to the maintenance was performed by prisoners.82
The tasks for which the camps were created were in the hands of profes-
sional staff: mainly engineers and technicians. In labor camps, where Jewish 
workers performed only auxiliary works, the essential work was performed 
by firms responsible for carrying out the tasks. Those firms provided profes-
sional management: managers, engineers, and supervisory workers, as well 
as average technical supervision—technicians and craftsmen. Usually, some 
part of the work was performed by wage-earning Polish workers. However, in 
those cases where most of the work was done by Jewish workers, only techni-
cal supervision was performed by German or Polish engineers and foremen 
employed by the company. The German administration, as a part of the organi-
zation structure of the General Government, supervised the work of several 
camps or in a particular area.
RECRUITMENT TO LABOR CAMPS
Recruitment to labor camps took place in the Jewish quarters and was orga-
nized by the Labor Departments of the Judenräte. Based on previously pre-
pared files, men, mostly aged 18–25, were chosen to work in the camps. Soon, 
however, the maximum age was raised to 35 years.83 According to the regula-
tions issued by the HSSPF Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger of December 11 and 12, 
1939, the Jews had to perform forced labor. The initial practice was to serve 
one day a week for free in the framework of forced labor. However, working in 
the camps was different. Due to the remoteness of the place, this work had to 
be carried out continuously. Distance from home and family caused additional 
difficulties. Therefore, the call to work in labor camps posed a serious dilemma 
82 BA-MA, RH53-23-27, Tgb. Nr. 1433/40 gIIIC, Judenlager an der Grenze, Lublin, 24.9.40, 
145–47.
83 Kermish, To Live with Honor, 250.
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before the Jews.84 Naturally, failing to appear for work in the camps led to spe-
cific consequences. It should be emphasized that during the summer of 1940, 
when the first groups of workers were recruited, the work in the camps was an 
unknown phenomenon, and many of those called to the work agreed to go, 
for the prospect of having jobs and income. For many displaced people from 
the territories annexed to the Reich and deported to the General Government, 
who did not have any background information, the opportunity to work in the 
camps, where they would get food and payment, seemed tempting.85
The workers chosen for labor camps received personal summons and had 
be present at rallying points with specific items of equipment. Some of the 
summoned tried to obtain an exemption, which was associated with obtaining 
appropriate medical certificate or paying the appropriate sum of money. From 
the first days of forced labor, the practice of substitutions was developed in the 
area. However, finding substitutes for work in the camps was much more dif-
ficult. This resulted, on the one hand, in increased corruption, because people 
having material means attempted to pay money in order to avoid shipment to 
the camp; and on the other hand, it caused increased exploitation of weaker and 
poorer Jews, who belonged to the lowest social strata of society. From among 
those called to work in the camps, many people did not present themselves 
due to medical exemptions, because they paid, or simply because they did 
not bother to find excuses. Lack of adequate numbers of workers meant that 
those absent or exempted had to be replaced with other recruits. The possibil-
ity of shipment to the camps caused the Jews to find other permanent places 
of employment, which was also noticed in the province. The Stadkomissar of 
Ostrowiec wrote: “There are already several hundred skillful Jews who were 
sent by the labor office to Lublin. This is a success that there are many Jews 
now, who are more willing to come to work in order not be sent [to the labor 
camps in Lublin]. They also make more effort to get permanent work.”86
In the first phase of recruitment to the camps in the summer of 1940, 
particularly in the Warsaw Ghetto, there was a very high unemployment, not 
only because of the lack of jobs. The influx of refugees and deportees from 
other locations, in the early days of the areas incorporated into the Reich, only 
increased the number of residents, even worsening the employment situation. 
Many refugees did not have the means to feed themselves, so for some of them 
84 Rosen, “The problem of work,” 258.
85 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 200.
86 YVA-JM.814, Stadtkommissar der Stadt Ostrowiec an den Herrn Kreishauptmann in 
Opatów, Lagebericht für August 1940, Ostrowiec, den 5 September 1940, scan 309.
157Forced Labor in the Labor Camps  CHAPTER 4
work in the camps seemed to be the only chance. Therefore, in the initial stage 
of the recruitment many of the unemployed people who did not have means 
of support reported to work in the camps.87 Intelligentsia was particularly 
 vulnerable because their previous jobs were now useless; moreover, they often 
lacked the knowledge and experience in carrying out other work and there-
fore they simply became unskilled workers. The difficult situation concerning 
employment was also known to the German civil administration. In the report 
delivered to the Secretary of the State Dr. Josef Bühler we find the  following 
information: “7,604 Jews were sent to labor and 9,000 were still available at the 
end of this month; at the end of October, around 2,000  workplaces were still 
open for Jews.”88 However, with the spread of news about  difficult conditions 
in labor camps, disease, and violence, even the unemployed displaced people 
began to avoid reporting to work, which resulted in arrests of men and their 
forceful transfer to work in the camps.89
A common way of recruiting labor was arrests90 of random passersby on 
the streets of the Jewish quarters. Arrests were also made during the night.91 
Usually, transported men were taken to rallying points where they waited until 
a sufficient number of people could be collected for further transportation to 
the camp. At the collection points they had to pass a medical inspection, after 
which those unable to perform hard physical work were released. According to 
the report by the Kreishauptmann of Opatów:
Various actions to secure the provision of Jewish labor by the Arbeitsamt 
did not always achieve the desired success because the listed people were 
almost without exception untraceable. A totally unsuspected action with 
the support of the Wehrmacht came off best.92 
87 Rosen, “The problem of work,” 258; Henryk Bryskier, Żydzi pod swastyką czyli getto w 
Warszawie w XX wieku (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2006), 63–64.
88 YVA-JM.814, Blatt zum Schreiben an Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler vom 18 November 1940, 
Judeneinsatz, scan 483.
89 Bryskier, Żydzi pod swastyką, 63–64.
90 Vermerk, October 10, 1940, concerning arrest of Jews in Lublin for performing the works on 
Krakowskie Przedmieście. YVA-JM.12307, 51. A letter of December 10, 1941 mentions a Razzia, 
during which 500 Jews were arrested. The medical services and labor office had infirmation 
about the action, however, the latter did not have any decisive power. YVA-JM.12307, 59.
91 “Six weeks in a forced labor camp,” AR I/399, in Kermish, To Live with Honor, 270; 
H. Huberband, “Dynasy—Summer of 1940,” in Kermish, To Live with Honor, 262.
92 YVA, JM-814, Der Kreishauptmann des Kreises Opatów, District Radom, Lagebericht für 
August 1940, Opatów, den 7 September 1940, scans 306–7.
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According to the data contained in Rosen’s report from the Warsaw 
Ghetto, about 60% of all summoned were found unable to work in the camps. 
The reason for this was their bad health condition or emaciation  resulting from 
malnutrition.93 But medical control was not always carried out. During the 
great wave of arrests of August 14–16, 1940, thousands of Jews were arrested 
and transported to labor camps without any medical control. Only in the camps 
it became clear that many of them were unable to work. The arrested were led 
under guard from assembly points to the train station, where the transports 
departed. In the case of local camps, some dozens of kilometers away, the pris-
oners could also be transported on trucks.94 Upon arrival at the camp, frequent 
beatings and abuse of newcomers took place in the first moments.
In some cases, Jews unable to work were intentionally sent to the camps. 
For example, on October 22, 1940, Stalag II B Hammerstein, near Königsberg, 
sent 1,550 Jewish prisoners of war to the train station Ryki, from where they 
should march to Biała Podlaska.95 In fact, only about 800 POWs arrived for 
the Water Management Inspection and the Constructions Management of the 
Luftwaffe (Bauleitung der Luftwaffe) in Biała Podlaska;96 and among those 800 
Jews from Königsberg, 250 were crippled and sick. They had to be released and 
transferred to the Assistance Committee at the Judenrat in Biała Podlaska.97 
From further correspondence on this matter we learn that 
. . . among other [ Jewish] POWs from Hammerstein, 200 Jews had pros-
theses and were unable to work. They should be released and the costs [of 
their transport] will be covered by the Water Management and Luftwaffe. 
The problem is that they come from the lands of the Russians—they are 
destitute and without clothes. Due to bad weather and lack of clothes, a 
great part of the Jews does not work, and there is decline in performance. 
Please contact the BuF to get assistance.98
93 Rosen, “The problem of work in the Jewish quarter—July 1942,” in Kermish, To Live with 
Honor, 258.
94 Kermish, To Live with Honor, 262–63, 270–71.
95 YVA-JM.2700, Chef des Districts Lublin, 24 Oktober, 1940. Arbeitseinsatz Kriegsgefangenen 
Juden, scan 20.
96 YVA-JM.2700, Arbeitseinsatz der jüd. Bevölkerung, Biała Podlaska, October 28, 1940, scan 21.
97 YVA-JM.2700, A letter from the Department Labor, Referat II to the Department of Internal 
Administration, Subdivision BuF, November 5, 1940, Arbeitseinsatz Kriegsgefangenen 
Juden, scan 22.
 98 YVA-JM.2700, 13.11.1940, Amt des Generelgouverneurs, Abteilung Arbeit, Einsatz der 
Juden, an den Herrn Leiter der Abteilung Arbeit beim Chefs des Distrkits Lublin, scan 26.
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As in many other cases, the Jewish POWs were treated by the Wehrmacht 
as a burden, and therefore every possible way of getting rid of them seemed 
acceptable, even by sending the infirm to labor camps.
In some places agreements between the police at the labor offices and the 
civil administration were made to end police raids. For example, in Lublin, the 
chief of the Lublin District wrote a letter on November 11, 1940:
All police stations shall, when they need Jewish workers, contact the 
Department of Labor on the allocation of the required number of work-
ers. The Department of Labor, in turn, ensures further processing of this 
request by way of negotiation with the labor offices. If the department of 
Labor or competent Labor Office will not provide the necessary number 
of workers within the required time, the police can independently detect 
the Jews by the way of a police raid. In what number and in which locations 
Jews shall be tracked forcibly by the police, will be established together 
with the Department of Labor or relevant Labor Office.
In particularly urgent cases, the police can independently decide 
to conduct police raids on Jews. In this case, however, it is necessary to 
provide timely and immediate information to the Labor Office or Labor 
Department. These forces may only be used temporarily, and must 
be replaced by the Jews properly mobilized by the Labor Offices. The 
Labor Offices are obliged to inform in advance the competent Kreis- or 
Stadthauptmann about the proposed measures.99
. . . During the police raids on Jews, the police will detain no Jews 
that have the newly introduced work permit (brown card with the Star of 
David).100
LIVING CONDITIONS IN CAMPS
The living conditions in labor camps varied greatly depending on the type 
of camp. The hardest were in the camps of Bełżec and the surrounding area, 
which were under the direct management of the SS and were designed to 
construct very heavy earthworks. They were very large camps numbering 
several thousand workers who came there in very short period of time. The 
 99 YVA-JM.2700, Der Chef des Distrikts Lublin, Lublin, am 28.11.1940. Wegen Zusammenar-
beit der Polizei mit der Abteilung Arbeit beim Distriktschef und den Arbeitsämtern über 
Fragen des Judeneinsatz, scan 56.
100 Ibid.
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camp infrastructure was not originally prepared to receive such large num-
bers of people, so the new arrivals were placed in primitive conditions in a 
room suddenly adapted to the needs of workers. The situation in other camps 
was difficult as well because most of the temporary labor camps were created 
at random in the field, in public buildings, or service buildings not designed 
to accommodate people. This was basically the rule, and only in some cases 
did workers build special barracks. Most barracks were constructed in areas 
remote from villages.
The fundamental problem of labor camps in the first years of the 
 occupation was their temporary character, which meant that they did not 
have a well-organized infrastructure. Most of the work performed during 
this period took place in the field. After the execution of the works, the 
inmates were transferred to another place to continue their work. In such 
cases, either the whole camp was moved, or the route march to the place of 
work was lengthened. In better situations were probably small labor camps 
designated to carry out field work in agriculture. Usually, they were located 
in agricultural estates, in barns or other areas,101 but the ruling regime there 
was not as severe as in the larger SS camps or in the camps for amelioration 
works, construction, road construction, and others. In the camps designed 
to perform agricultural work, there was a better board and the supervisor 
did not bully the workers to such an extent. In such camps, supervisors were 
usually regular workers of the property and not members of Selbstschutz 
or Ukrainian formations, and they treated the Jewish workers more mildly. 
Some labor camps in  agriculture were not guarded at all. For example, Jews 
in Lublin were mobilized for summer work in agriculture from mid-June to 
mid-August. In more than 30 estates, 770 men and 59 women worked for 
0.50 zł per day plus  accommodation. There was no lack of volunteers for 
such works.102 However, even if some camps were unguarded, this did not 
mean that there was a  possibility to run away, because in such cases both 
the fleers and their families in places of residence were threatened by seri-
ous consequences.
Particularly severe living conditions prevailed in the camps of Bełżec com-
plex and the camps performing drainage work. They were the result of extreme 
exploitation of Jewish labor force by authorities who did not have the skills to 
101 Extract from a letter of a nurse from the camp in Oszczów of September 26, 1940, 
Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 223.
102 APL, RŻL-47, 54–55. Report on the activity of the Central Camps Council in Bełżec from 
June 13 to December 5, 1940.
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deal with the economy and proper organization of labor. SSPF Odilo Globocnik 
was responsible for Bełżec camps complex. For the rest the responsible author-
ity was the Water Management Inspection; however, the ill-treatment of the 
workers was the result of ‘exploitory attitude’103 of both the SS and economic 
authorities involved. During the meeting on April 22, 1940, Globocnik said: 
“Unless labor place is not in the area of residence, we intend to put the workers 
in the camps, especially when it comes to larger works. The cost of living and 
food will be covered by the [ Jewish] religious community, in this way we can 
also have the Jewish property, which otherwise we could not grab. The food 
and clothing will be supplied by Jewish women and Jews already unable to 
work. Strict separation of sexes will be conducted.”104 Globocnik also stated: 
“As the work force is completely or almost free, we will be able to increase the 
relatively small budgets of individual departments.”105
The exploitation of the Jews was made difficult by the chaos that prevailed 
in the area of their employment, as noted by Bruno Streckenbach at the meet-
ing on May 30, 1940: 
The authority of the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) over the Jews, 
however, has been gradually somewhat restricted, since all political orga-
nizations and formations used a Council of Elders and religious commu-
nities in a completely chaotic manner. Without setting any plan, it had 
been ordered to send work force; moreover, it was arbitrarily demanded 
that the Council of Elders provides a variety of objects—sometimes even 
amounts of money. In that case, a clear decision must be taken. First we 
must solve the problem which authorities are to exercise oversight over 
the Jewish Councils of Elders—Stadthauptmann, district head, mayor, or 
the Security Police. The speaker has a specific reason to believe the latter 
case is the most appropriate.106 
103 The organizations exploiting forced labor of Jews were interested in performing certain 
labor at minimal cost and exploiting Jewish workers to the maximum, disregarding their 
health, living conditions, and safety. 
104 Lublin, April 22, 1940, Statement of HSSPF Krüger at Meeting of Heads of Government 
Departments of the General Government, dedicated to the Forced Labor of Jews, in Eisen-
bach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 209.
105 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 209–10.
106 Speech of Streckenbach (May 30, 1940, Kraków). Minutes of the police conference dedi-
cated entirety of matters related to the security situation in the General Government, in 
Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 210.
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Further, Streckenbach said: 
The Security Police, seeking to regulate such matters [the use of Jewish 
labor], by no means intended to secure all the benefits that we can pull 
of the Jews, nor the seizure of the fattest bites. It strictly observes the 
framework set out in the order on requisition. It receives funding from 
the Reich and does not feel the need to accumulate wealth, the more so 
since we do not find any administrative or technical considerations that 
support this. Therefore, the speaker proposes to solve the problem by 
transferring the Jewish Council of Elders and all the Jews put together 
under the supervision of the Security Police and address to it any request 
from the Jews.107
Discussions on the question of to whom Jews were to be subjected lasted 
for a long time and caused many disputes between the various authorities. 
Even the agreement of July 4, 1940, between Frank and Krüger did not end the 
dispute, which lasted until the end of the war, even when the number of Jews was 
very limited.108 Unfortunately, this agreement of July 4, 1940 left Globocnik 
free to manage the Bełżec camps and exploit the Jews residing there. The situa-
tion in other camps was also very difficult. The authorities’ willingness to work 
as scheduled in order to execute planned works at the lowest cost meant that 
individual institutions and offices responsible for these camps were not inter-
ested in their conditions. Isolation of camps, lack of proper control,109 abuse 
from the guards, and the prevailing corruption meant that in most of camps, the 
conditions were quite tragic.
Conditions deteriorated with the passage of time spent by the Jewish 
workers in the camps. Since they received no new clothes or shoes, but stayed 
in what they had brought with them or on themselves, after a short time, their 
situation was desperate. Here is a brief description of the situation in Bełżec: 
Poverty in the camp is terrible. I cannot describe it. Naked, barefoot, 
and hungry, and in addition, sick—they are not people, they are walking 
shreds. One has to see. This is not a camp that was few weeks after its 
107 Ibid.
108 Karay, “The Conflict among German Authorities.” 
109 Even if there were external controls, they did not improve the situation of workers for a long 
time. See “Six Weeks in a Forced Labor Camp,” 275.
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creation. Everyone washes their hands; no one can help them—because 
there is no money.110
The vast majority of camps in the Lublin area performed drainage works: 
regulation of rivers and streams. During this work, most inmates dug canals and 
drainage ditches, strengthened levees, and equipped them with wicker edges. 
The work lasted many hours a day—practically from dawn to dusk. Much of 
the work was carried out in water, but 
. . . inmates employed in this work did not receive any special clothing or 
shoes for work in water; the type of work forced them to stand 8–10 hours 
a day in the water. They could not dry their clothes and had to remain in 
wet clothes due to lack of clothes and spare linen. When working in the 
water without shoes and bottom clothing, especially exasperating were 
the leeches, which terribly bit their feet.111
Some camps managed by the Water Management office were visited by 
inspectors, who delivered special reports on this matter. As one report goes:
In Siedlicze Camp, there are about 200 Jewish workers, including about 
60 Jews from Warsaw, and 50 Jews from Arbeitsamtsbezirk Siedlce. All 
Jewish workers in that camp made a relatively good impression, they were 
well-dressed and had reasonably good shoes. The camp itself is guarded 
by an SS-Scharführer and Ukrainian auxiliary police. The good nutrition 
is provided with the help of the Jewish Council of Siedlicze. Meat rations 
are not administered, because this cannot be obtained. The accommoda-
tion rooms were clean and tidy. Furnaces were also available in accom-
modation. In about 3 weeks the works of water management in Siedlicze 
will be completed and the foreign Jews will be dismissed. The Judenrat of 
Siedlicze has informed me that in the spring 1941, it can provide about 
200 Jewish volunteers for the Water Management in Lublin.
110 Extract from Report on the Camp at Bełżec (late November), end of 1940, Warszawa, 
Excerpts from a paper prepared by the desk handling camps by the Labor Battalion in 
Warsaw, on the inhuman conditions in labor camps for Jews in the Lublin, in Eisenbach and 
Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 224.
111 End of 1940, Warszawa. Excerpts from a paper prepared by the desk handling camps by the 
Labor Battalion in Warsaw, on the inhuman conditions in labor camps for Jews in the 
Lublin, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 222. 
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The camp no. 2 in Sawin housed about 250 Jews. These Jews (mostly 
from Warsaw) were released on November 17, 1940, after completion 
of the work. The camp is located in a former Polish school and is solidly 
built. The rooms are very large and in good condition. Furnaces are also 
available. This camp will be set up by the Water Management Lublin as 
winter camp, with about 100 Jews employed, which shall bring the tools 
of the Water Management in order. Mr. Holzheimer made every effort to 
ensure that only Jews from Lublin, mainly carpenters and joiners, will be 
employed there. The wages are paid according to the tariff rates and the 
Jews also get food. I have promised Mr. Holzheimer to settle down this 
matter with the Labor Office in Lublin.112 
However, Oberregierungsrat, the author of a memorandum to the Labor 
Department in Kraków, had a slightly less optimistic impression in comparison 
to the above report. He wrote: 
I have further checked the abilities of the Jewish workers in the camps of 
the Water Management Office and found that these workers are very poorly 
provided with clothing and shoes. The Department of Water Management 
Inspection adopts all effort to provide these Jewish workers with shoes and 
clothing. To date, they did not succeed. Rubber boots have been bought only 
for the Jewish workers who perform their work in the ditches. The health 
status of Jews employed by the Water Management is consistently regarded 
as good. The Jewish workers are paid according to tariff and will also get more 
food. Jewish doctors are present in almost all camps. [. . .] To prevent a serious 
accident with the Jewish workers in the future, it would be appropriate if aid in 
form of clothing and shoes were allocated for the Jewish workers. From here, 
unfortunately, no remedy can be found in this matter.113
The work that Jewish workers performed was very difficult; besides, there 
were many other inconveniences, such as the distance to be overcome between 
the camps and places of work: 
All kinds of work required a great effort on the part of workers [whose] work 
day lasted 8–10 hours. Conditions of work were very inconvenient: the need 
112 YVA-JM.2700, Vermerk, Lublin, November 19, 1940, Report of Water Inspection on forced 
labor camps in Siedlicze, Sawin, and Włodawa, scans 33–34. 
113 YVA-JM.2700, Vermerk, 20.11.1940, Betr: Arbeiteinsatz von Juden, scans 40–41.
165Forced Labor in the Labor Camps  CHAPTER 4
to stay in the water or on wet meadows, the long route march to the workplace, 
where the distance from the camp was from 4–6 km up to 12 km (Dzików).114 
Another passage describes the work conditions during the drainage: 
The work was to smooth down with spades the surface of a canal; [and that’s] 
hard work since we were unused to it. But we were quite nicely stimulated by 
our overseers. The stomachs behaved wildly with only 180 grams of bread 
in them. As if this were not enough, it started raining badly, and quite soon 
water mingled with our sweat in the sogged clothes. They stopped us only 
toward 3 p.m., and our hungry, wet, perspiring and shivering party started 
dragging feet back to camp, carrying on the way the first few gravely ill.115
Working in the camps was a typical example of overuse of labor, having 
nothing to do with rational planning, based on economic calculation. Predatory 
exploitation was based on lack of interest in the physical condition of workers, 
their nutrition, providing the appropriate clothing, footwear, and tools. Most 
of the work was performed using the most primitive tools. Here is an excerpt of 
speech on this subject: 
In other camps road works were performed: bringing and unloading mate-
rial (stone, cement, and gravel), breaking stones, [and] paving. And here 
the work was carried out using very primitive tools or directly with bare 
hands while appropriate tools, assigned in sufficient numbers, could have 
greatly improved this work. One of the easiest works in the camps was 
earthworks (excavation and construction of embankments).116
Food in the labor camps was often bad and did not provide enough energy 
for workers doing heavy physical work. From a letter of a nurse staying in the 
camp in Oszczów we can learn how meals looked for the hard-working workers: 
They get up at 4, at 6 they go to work—they work up to 4 p.m. The diet 
consists of black coffee without sugar and, apparently, 1/2 kg of bread (in 
114 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 222–23. 
115 “Six Weeks in a Forced Labor Camp,” 271.
116 End of 1940, Warsaw, Fragments of the work carried out by the desk handling camps in the 
Labor Battalion in Warsaw, on the inhuman conditions in labor camps for Jews in the Lublin 
region, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 222. 
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fact it is less), and when they get back from work, 1/2 liter of soup, which 
in addition to porridge, potatoes, and peas has to include 50 g of meat per 
capita (this is calculated with the bones). And this is all the food they have 
during the two meals I mentioned. No fat—only as much is attached to 
meat, and this is certainly very little.117
Alexander Biberstein describes the ration of the Jewish workers in labor camps 
where Jews from Kraków lived: “The daily diet consisted of 100–150 grams of 
bread, black colored water called coffee, given twice a day, and a soup of turnip or 
rotten beets, with individual potatoes, most often previously frozen in the winter.118
As follows from the above descriptions, food in the camps was very bad. 
It was mainly bread, vegetables, and potatoes served in insufficient quantities. 
All this was greatly diluted with water—whether in the form of soup or coffee. 
Meat and fat, if at all, were given in negligible amounts. In terms of calories, 
the food was far from enough for people doing heavy physical work in harsh 
weather conditions. According to a report of the Jewish Self-Assistance, 
Without the aid in the form of feeding, the results of staying in the camp must 
become devastating for those workers. 200 grams of bread and a fairly thin soup 
is much below the minimum in order to manage to do so heavy and unhealthy 
work. Those who may receive home help are a very small  percentage. Only 8 
people reported for paid lunches issued by the caretaker.119 
The result of malnutrition was a continuous deterioration of the physical 
conditions of the workers. Hard work, harassment, and bad food very quickly 
weakened the workers so that after a few weeks the results of their situation 
became visible. Add to this poor housing, as the workers lived in cramped 
conditions, poor sanitation, lack of spare clothing, and dirt everywhere. Lice 
and bedbugs multiplied in the camps, which did not only weaken the workers, 
but also helped spread diseases, especially typhus.120 As a result, the workers 
very quickly succumbed to exhaustion, different diseases, and injuries and 
117 Extract from a letter of a nurse from the camp in Oszczów, September 26, 1940, in Eisen-
bach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 223. 
118 Biberstein, Zagłada Żydów w Krakowie, 28.
119 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Notatka z odwiedzin obozu pracy w Koszczu dnia 17 i 18 kwietnia br., 
Kraków, April 19, 1942, scans 120–21.
120 YVA-JM.12331, Notiz für Brigadeführer über die Besprechung beim Amtschef am 8. August 
1941, 10 Uhr ist festzuhalten, scan 221. 
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accidents at work. In some camps, there were whole weeks when most of the 
workers were unable to work. 
One of the witnesses describing the stay in the labor camp mentioned the 
overwhelming feeling of hunger, which always accompanied them: 
The hunger has suppressed every other thought and banned all sensation, 
one does not think of anything else, not even of one’s helpless, closest, and 
most loved people. All that fills one’s thoughts is a dream: “To eat!” [. . .] 
our desires went no further than to black bread and potatoes, in all our 
wolfish craving. Hunger! It tortured us day and night, never letting up, not 
even in our fleeting nap—for a deep sleep was unknown to us now, amidst 
the cold and the lice. [. . .] And again the hunger! At rising and going to 
sleep, at work and after work, before eating and after. A steady companion 
is nagging—a killer!121
The problem of insufficient food and its poor quality was not only a 
result of corruption and lack of control. Additional factors were mentioned by 
Emanuel Ringelblum in his diary: 
The scandal of forced labor camps became clearer and clearer. It turns out 
that the German company that undertook the execution of those works 
receives 2 zł for each worker and spends only 1.08 zł per day on the food. 
Doing so, it makes savings at the employees’ expense.122 
In the later period of existence of labor camps, mainly in 1942, and espe-
cially in the District of Kraków, the main force aiding the workers in labor camp 
became the Jewish Self-Assistance. According to a report: 
We stand up to this position that one cannot leave these campers, and it 
is our duty to help them according to our resources and opportunities. 
Besides, the Jewish Self-Assistance does not neglect any means to influ-
ence the Jewish Councils and Delegations from which the campers are 
recruited to come with precious help, such as food and clothing for their 
workers.123 
121 “Six Weeks in a Forced Labor Camp,” 273.
122 Entries of September 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 148.
123 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Notatka z przewodniczącym Gminy żydowskiej p. Dr. Rozenzweigiem. 
Kraków, May 10, 1942, scans 732–33.
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Paralell to the Jewish Community in Lublin, which became a kind of 
umbrella organization and supreme Jewish council in the district of Lublin, the 
Jewish Community in Kraków felt the same towards the Jewish camps in that 
district. Although the local Judenräte were invited, asked, and encouraged to 
assist the workers in the camps coming from their communities, those Judenräte 
were not always willing or able to bring relief to their countrymen. The Jewish 
Self-Assistance reported on this matter: 
We have extensively discussed this case, pointing to the fact that the 
workers located in the vicinity of Kraków in quantity 1,500 people suffer of 
 malnutrition, hunger, and bad accommodation. Until now the  communities, 
where these workers come from, did not give them  considerable assistance, 
except Działoszyce, which sent one parcel. We emphasized that the most 
important order of the day would be to run the kitchen in Wola Duchacka 
to allow serving the campers extra soup at lunch time, when the workers 
are outside the camp. The Committee of Women in Wola Duchacka wants 
to take on that matter, but this committee should be assisted and, above 
all, we should mobilize funds for this purpose. Rosenzweig pointed out 
that the municipality as well as the Jewish community in our area, which 
gives money in a substantial way to maintain necessary institutions, are 
not able to nourish better workers coming from Miechów and Kraków 
Counties.124
According to a report of the Jewish Self-Assistance, the Jewish Community 
of Kraków took the responsibility of aiding Jewish workers in labor camps: 
After a long discussion, Dr. Rosenzweig showed that it is difficult to commit 
to the full board of campers and in the end agreed with our position that 
population of Kraków should help those campers and for this reason he is 
ready to allocate a subsidy of 1,000 zł granted outside the monthly amount 
to the popular kitchen in the Wola Duchacka for boarding campers. He also 
mentioned that to relieve the misery of campers we divided or assured more 
than 100 pairs of clogs, 50 sets of underwear, and several pairs of pants.125
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
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Housing conditions of the Jewish workers were also a reflection of their 
exploitation. Alexander Biberstein describes the living conditions of the Jews 
from Kraków in labor camps: 
[The people] deported to forced labor camps were placed in barracks not 
adapted to live in: not heated, with no latrines and other sanitary facilities, 
no doctors and medicines, hellish nutrition; they were beaten, dirty, often 
sleeping on the bare ground, and had different diseases.126 
Workers from Kraków District were assisted by the representatives of the 
Jewish Social Self-Assistance (ŻSS). In a report there was description of very 
hard conditions in labor camps in Winnica, Kostrze, and Płaszów. Young men 
particularly needed new clothes, underwear, and shoes.127 Similar descriptions 
of the harsh conditions we can find in the case of the Jewish worker sent from 
Warsaw to work in the camp: 
We sleep in a big brick horse-barn, on straw unclear blankets. Some have 
brought little pillows from home, but the majority put their pants or 
shirts under their heads. By now lean and sunburnt bodies are getting up 
from all the pallets. They put on torn and mostly dirty underwear and 
even shabbier clothes.128 
Similar information can be found in official Jewish reports prepared by the 
medical committee: 
[The conditions] are in generally fatal, the worst in Narol. The room 
is completely unfit to accommodate so many people, dark and dirty, 
although very big. Up to 30% of workers do not have shoes, pants, and 
shirts. They sleep all on the floor, without straw.129
The above descriptions show that in most labor camps housing conditions 
were very poor. Sometimes workers were placed in public buildings such as 
126 Biberstein, Zagłada Żydów w Krakowie, 28.
127 YVA-JM.1581, PDF frame 105. 
128 “Our Day in the Camp,” in Kermish, To Live with Honor, 267.
129 From the annex nr. 5, Report of medical visit in the camps of Bełżec group (mid-September 
1940), in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 223–24.
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synagogues,130 but usually in warehouses, stables, and barns, where they slept 
on straw in cramped conditions. Everywhere was the impression of temporar-
iness. The camps were not solidly planned and prepared; in most cases they 
had primary planning of the work schedule as well as technical and engineering 
plans. The matters regarding workers were the least important. Workers were 
placed in temporary spaces, not prepared for such a large number of people, 
which resulted in narrowness. There was no adequate sanitation. Workers often 
did not have the opportunity to wash and change clothes, which meant that 
they continued to remain in the same clothes, both during work and after work, 
or even while sleeping. Not having spare clothes, they could not wash or disin-
fect what they had.131
Especially in the camps, where difficult, debilitating work and malnutri-
tion prevailed, many workers succumbed to disease, or had traumas and inju-
ries; and that resulted in their inability to work. In the camps of Bełżec complex, 
doctors who could provide care and examine patients were available, but they 
had limited options: there was no money for medicine.132 In smaller camps 
there was no health care; assistance could be provided by doctors from the 
neighboring village, on the condition that the inmates obtained authorization 
to go to the doctor. Because many sick Jewish workers met with harassment 
and were accused of simulation by their supervisors and guards, they often 
preferred to hide illness or injury and continue work, and reported inability 
to work only in obvious cases. Heavy physical work, often without adequate 
clothing and tools, and weakening due to malnutrition caused frequent diseases 
and traumas. Drainage, in particular, was the cause of many illnesses. The Jews 
working there worked for many hours in cold water reaching about their knees, 
not having proper footwear.
Staying in cramped random buildings favored the spread of disease. This is 
part of the description of one camp of the Bełżec complex: 
. . . everywhere damaged roofs, windows without glass, and terrible  
narrowness. For example, in a room with dimensions of 5 × 6 m, 75 people 
sleep on the floor, one on the other. Under these conditions, there is obvi-
130 “Impressions from a Labor Camp,” in Kermish, To Live with Honor, 269.
131 Ibid.
132 Kraków ŻSS was distributing considerable quantities of medicine in the district, which was 
then distributed in the ghettos and labor camps; however, it was insufficient. As an example, 
see confirmation of receiving shipment of medicine by the ŻSS in Lublin in December 
1941. YVA-JM.1574, scan 75.
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ously no question of undressing. In addition, there is too little soap, and 
even water is acquired with difficulty. Patients lie and sleep together with 
the healthy wardens. At night, they cannot go out of the barracks, so that 
all the natural needs must be dealt with on the spot. No wonder that under 
these conditions a lot of cases of disease appear. It is very difficult to get 
time off work even for 1 day. So the sick must also go to work.133
Similar conditions prevailed in Oszczów,134 also in the Lublin region. 
Here is a detailed description of this camp:
The center of the camps was the village Oszczów, where we currently 
reside under the command of the district physician in consultation with 
the municipality of Hrubieszów. Workers live in barns—50–100 in each—
and they work 10 hours a day. We have not enough shirts, pants, shoes, 
and soap. Workers should be mainly fed bread, fat, and kasza (porridge). 
These products can be obtained in Hrubieszów or in nearby villages. As 
for the drugs, one has to specify each item carefully. The Warsaw boys 
live in terrible poverty. Many of them walk barefoot, despite cold weather, 
because we do not have shoes. We perform 40 wound dressings of arms 
and legs daily for wounds from accidental injuries by spade, pickaxe, and 
other tools, and soreness because of dirt. The dressings [bandage] run out 
rapidly in spite of the extreme savings.
Given the great difficulty in combating lice (no underwear and soap, 
and crowded rooms), it is imperative to build a disinfectant furnace at 
expense of 3,000 zł. Among the patients, there are numerous cases of  
dysentery and now there is a fear that typhus will spread. The boys sleep 
in sheds, the barns are completely open and cold, the boys cannot breathe, 
and there are lice, lice, and lice again. They are so dirty and ragged, that 
the greatest pauper in Warsaw looks Vornehm [elegant, noble] in compar-
ison with them. Few people have two spare sets of underwear, and a lot of 
people have never changed their shirt and pants. Chaff, which was once 
straw, is also horribly polluted. The people wear rags so terrible that they 
no longer resemble clothes.135
133 From the annex nr. 5, Report of medical visit in the camps of Bełżec group (mid-September 
1940), in Eisenbacj and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 224.
134 YVA, O.3/3180, testimony of Jakow Jachimowicz, 5–6.
135 Extract from a letter of a nurse from the camp in Oszczów, September 26, 1940, in 
Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 223.
172 Macht Arbeit Frei?
The description of the situation in the labor camps given above demon-
strates the fatal organization on the part of the German authorities. They were 
not in the least interested in improving or stabilizing these conditions. Rather, 
all indicates that they did not show even minimal interest in working and living 
conditions of the laborers, despite numerous attempts at intervention136 on 
the part of Jews.137 The most important were economic plans implemented 
with minimal funding from the budget. This was consistent with the idea of 
Globocnik, who wanted to shift all costs onto the Jews. Other institutions have 
followed in his footsteps. The repressive attitude towards the Jewish workers 
was reflected in the lack of control over the conditions in which they were living. 
In most cases, the technical staff was not interested in the conditions of Jewish 
life. The fate of the Jews was in the hands of various camp commanders, who 
became masters of life and death. The workers depended on them to deter-
mine whether the sick inmates will be exempt from work. They influenced 
the attitude of the guards to the prisoners, sanitary and living conditions, and 
access to medical care. In the summer of 1940, the workers unable to work in 
the camps were not yet selected for physical elimination, but already present 
were the first signs of murderous tendencies on the part of the commanders 
and the guards. This became most evident when the workers escaped. The 
punishment was severe, because in the eyes of the staff the workers were already 
prisoners of labor camps. Here is a description of some attempted escapes: 
136 One of the organizations that had the fullest information on Jewish labor camps was ŻSS. 
On January 9, 1942, Lublin ŻSS received a letter asking for detailed information concerning 
labor camps in the district—such as the number of workers, relation of work and renumer-
ation, accommodation, nutrition, treatment, and sanitary conditions. The central office in 
Kraków asked for exact and detailed information, based on written documents, letters, and 
protocols. They also wanted to know the names of all commanders, guards, and the institu-
tions taking care of the inmates (obozowicze) and their families. Moreover, they asked to 
send requests and complains. YVA-JM1574, scan 50.
137 For example, in the camp organized by the company Siemens Bau-Union in Płaszów and at 
the airport in Kraków, there were 70 workers from Książ Wielki (50 young men and 
20 young women), who were living and working in severe conditions. On May 7, 1942, 
Kraków ŻSS came to talk with the director of the company. The director answered that 
there is a Jewish physician, Dr. Kohn, who, according to the agreement with the Social Secu-
rity, is treating the workers. If the representatives of the ŻSS had further requests, they were 
invited to use the post or call the manager of the construction site, engineer Müller. In order 
to improve the conditions, ŻSS tried to establish a kitchen for the workers. They also tried 
to arrange a meeting with Dr. Kohn. Besides, they tried to order wooden shoes with the 
help of the companies employing the workers because those companies were able to over-
come the system of reglamentation. 
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The less food, the more beatings, the more split heads, the more bloodied 
and ill people, the more murderous the blows, [and] the wilder the Polish 
guards.138 This caused a wave of desertions; people were fleeing from 
camp. One morning, the commandant gave a speech, saying we should 
not desert, things will turn better, but if the desertions continue, there 
will be fatal results. This was illustrated by such example that inspired fear 
about deserting. [He suddenly] appeared pulling a wheelbarrow with the 
bodies of the two brothers.139 
Commanders of the camps felt comfortable when they could punish 
escape. The workers, on their part, felt helpless. Although there was  contact 
between many labor camps and the Jewish communities from which the  workers 
came, it was very limited. The Jews were too weak to let their  interventions have 
effect. Sometimes the visits of commissions or arrival of doctors gave hope, but 
those hopes proved to be unreliable. Below is an example of such situation: 
The arrival of the doctors in our camp raised hope that the savage guards, free 
of any restraint until now, will have to cease their brutal beating. This was a mis-
take. After their arrival as before, and even in their presence, there was no end 
to flogging and beating, with sticks and with clubs, on our backs and heads. 
Bodies of bloodied inmates used to fall to the ground and be carried away by 
nurses. The doctors were helpless in the face of those spectacles, quite unex-
pected and surprising, but there was never time enough for any treatment: the 
guards kept supplying them with business. [. . .] They [doctors] intervened 
with the commandant of the camp and quietly tried to convince him of the 
beatings that increased the number of sick and dead—all to no avail.140
The German authorities knew quite well the conditions that were in 
the camps, but were unwilling to improve those conditions. Their fear mainly 
regarded the possibility of outbreak of epidemics. According to a German report: 
In Płazów, for example, the Judenlager is situated in the center of the  
village on the main road. The enclosure is on both sides of the village 
138 According to an announcement of the Warsaw District governor (February 17, 1941), the 
camps guards (Lagerschutz) coud be recruited from Poles, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. 
See Ekspertyza Historycznej Komisji Żydowskiej, AIPN, NTN, 196/59, 190.
139 “Six Weeks in a Forced Labor Camp,” in Kermish, To Live with Honor, 272.
140 Kermish, To Live with Honor, 272–73. 
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brook, so the Jews wash their lice infested clothes in the brook and thus 
put the local residents at risk. If it is not feasible, because of lack of super-
vision, to enforce the use of the camps latrines, then any control during 
work on the Himmlergraben is impossible. There exists an order that 
every Jew has to carry a spade when going to defecate. But very often this 
doesn’t happen. Thus, walking in this area is risky for the residents and 
the customs officials. If despite this the cases of contagious diseases are 
relatively few, according to information by the Jewish physicians, this may 
be caused partly by the season, and partly by the tenacity of the inmates. 
However, the last 10 days there have been several cases of dysentery. The 
sick people from the camps were taken care of in the Polish military hos-
pital in Tomaszów. Since that hospital can accommodate only 94 patients, 
the staff surgeon of the regiment based in Tomaszów was ordered by his 
commander to find other accommodation for the sick Jews. A building 
complex between Tomaszów and Narol has already been inspected. The 
sick Jews shall be placed there, and Jewish physicians shall take care of 
them. The customs officials of the offices close to the Jewish work places 
and camps have been vaccinated yesterday by staff surgeon Schiller. He 
and the town commander (Ortskommandant) of Tomaszów see a grow-
ing danger of epidemics when the weather gets worse. This would not 
happen if the Jews were discharged on the November 1, 1940, as the 
Lagerkommandant in Płazów and other man of the watch assume.141
As already mentioned in this work, repressive attitude towards the Jewish 
workers from the part of the German authorities meant that they had practically 
no possibility to appeal their commanders’ decisions. Since the camps were located 
in the provinces, far from major urban agglomerations, the commanders of the 
camps felt that they could go unpunished. Attempts to intervene, as described 
above, ended in nothing, because the camp commanders and guards were more 
interested in economic results than in reworking their repressive attitudes towards 
Jews. Both commanders and camp staff were corrupt. They benefited from their 
privileged position and stole food rations from the camp kitchens, leaving only 
bread and potatoes for the workers, and often in already truncated quantities.
Testimony confirming the difficult food situation in the camps is 
also provided by statements from residents of these villages where Jewish 
labor camps were located. Jewish workers were asking people for a piece of 
141 BA-MA, RH53-23-27, Tgb. Nr. 1433/40 gIIIC, Judenlager an der Grenze, Lublin, 
September 24, 1940, 145–47.
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bread.142 Another witness confirms that Jewish workers were starving and 
did not despise any food. In the words of the witness: 
. . . prisoners very often asked me to give them something to eat: even 
when I carried food for pigs, they did not let me go, and took with their 
hands from the bucket and ate. Usually I had to throw potatoes through 
the wire, and the prisoners ate them.143 
The Jewish inhabitants of the villages next to the labor camps tried to 
help them.144 
In the report of ŻSS of June 20, 1941, we find at least a partial explanation 
as to why the work in the camps, especially drainage work, was so devastating 
and why the Jews were so often employed for these works: 
Water and drainage works exhaust the human body so far, that the period 
of employment of Polish workers, even before the war, when food was 
quite normal, could not exceed three weeks, after which there would have 
been interruption or replacement of workers. It is thus clear that the work 
of the Jews, already malnourished and exhausted by the war, which lasted 
already 20 months, could not be efficient in conditions of poor nourish-
ment, often taking a form of real hunger, and lead to disastrous conse-
quences to health and even life of campers.145
This is confirmed by another passage from that report, about Przyrów:146 
In Przyrów (Radomsko County) the working conditions are terrible. The 
workers stand all day up to their knees in swampy ground or even in water. 
Often, they are beaten and do not receive any food. Before the war it was 
very difficult to keep the Polish workers there, even though they were paid 
8 zł a day.147 
142 YVA-TR.17/316, 5–6, Ko80/66/15; YVA-TR.17/222.
143 YVA-TR.17/316, 8–9, Ko80/66/15.
144 “Impressions from a Labor Camp,” AR1/414, in Kermish, To Live with Honor, 269.
145 June 30, 1941, Kraków, Report of the Bureau of Jewish Social Self-Assistance in the General 
Government to the authorities of the General Government on the situation of Jews in labor 
camps, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 228–30.
146 YVA, O.3/3180, testimony of Jakow Jachimowicz, 5. This testimony confirms very hard 
condition in Przyrów.
147 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 230.
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Not only the drainage work was devastating. In other camps where hard 
work was performed the workers were starving. For example, in a camp in 
Stąporków (Końskie County), Jews employed in heavy and exhaustive works 
did not receive any food during working hours, and were paid only 3 zł a day.148
The bad situation in terms of food caused numerous interventions from 
members of the Judenräte. Not all of them could greatly alter the situation; 
however, Judenräte in smaller towns were able to have a significant impact 
on improving conditions at the local level, even if they did not have access to 
higher German authorities. In the case of the Warsaw Judenrat, its activities 
were at least partially effective. Adam Czerniaków says in his diary that after 
representatives of the Judenrat and the commander of Lagerschutz visited the 
camps in order to check the conditions there, they confirmed that: 
Eating is below any criticism. The workers were to receive 180 g of bread, 
1–1.3 kg of potatoes, sugar, marmalade, meat, coffee, and so forth. They 
receive no potatoes, and [only] 120–150 g of bread. No fats. The firm 
Juske, [Three] Crosses Square 23, reduces lon [wages] for food, taking 
double prices in relation to the quota price of the product. [. . .] The 
workers usually provide good material [i.e., they are in good condition]. 
Everything depends on the nourishment.149 
In another entry, Czerniaków wrote: “The conditions [in the camps] are 
terrible. No one can endure a month. Companies steal food [from the work-
ers]. Beating will not stop. Performance [effectiveness] of hard work is, in fact, 
small.”150 Czerniaków went to Auerswald. He was even received by Governor 
Fischer. According to him, Fischer “says his goal is not starving Jews. Ration 
may be increased; work or obstalunki [tasks] for the workers will come.”151
Jewish Welfare Committees actively helped the Jewish workers and 
sought to improve working conditions and increase their rations. This assis-
tance was funded by the Jewish councils because the workers were paid very 
low wages that were not sufficient for food.152 Workers also received food 
148 Ibid., 228–30.
149 Entry of May 10, 1941, in Fuks, Adama Czerniakowa dziennik, 179.
150 Ibid., 184.
151 Ibid., 184.
152 June 30, 1941, Kraków, Report of the Bureau of Jewish Social Self-Assistance in the General 
Government to the authorities of the General Government on the situation of Jews in labor 
camps, in Eisenbach and Ritkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 228–30.
177Forced Labor in the Labor Camps  CHAPTER 4
parcels and clothing. With help from the outside, the conditions were signifi-
cantly improved.153 
The Committee of aid to workers in this camp [in Zagacie (Końskie 
County)] assigned to them—as long as there are enough means—
additional 50 g of bread a day and 10 zł a week. Housing conditions are 
good: workers are placed in barracks and equipped with sufficient number 
of bunks. They wash or bathe twice a day. The cleanliness is exemplary. 
Generally, they are treated tolerably.154
Similar interventions led to improvements in other camps. For example: 
In the labor camp in Dąbrowice (near Skierniewice), camp guards were 
removed and replaced by Jewish police. As a result, productivity [of work] 
has increased by 50%. German company therefore increased rations.155 
RELEASE FROM THE CAMPS
Sick and physically tired prisoners could be released from the labor camps and 
sent back to their places of residence.156 The release depended largely on the 
treatment of workers by camp authorities. Where the camp regime was more 
severe, the release of unable workers was more difficult. In extreme cases there 
was no release at all. Then the Jewish workers, even after the onset of the disease 
were forced to work hard, causing starvation and death.157 The authorities of 
some camps, with designated sections of the work, tried to perform their tasks 
at all cost, regardless of the health status of the workers. Another limiting factor 
153 Bryskier, Żydzi pod swastyką, 63–64.
154 Ibid.
155 Entry of May 20, 1941, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 289.
156 Bryskier, Żydzi pod swastyką, 63–64; APL, RŻL-48, 12, Judenrat in Lublin, Abteilung für 
Zwangsarbeit, Hilfskomitie für die Arbeitenden in den Arbeitslagern, Delegatur in Belzec, 
September 11, 1940; APL, RŻL-48, 137–45, Register of cases of death in labor camps (in 
the Lublin District, September–beginning of December 1940). 169 cases were entered in 
the Register. Moreover, the same file includes a sheet dated November 3, 1940, listing 
23 Jews, who died in hospitals after transportation from labor camps. There were also 
reports about 300 Jews who died of exaustion in the Warsaw Ghetto after returning from 
labor camps. See Ekspertyza Historycznej Komisji Żydowskiej, AIPN, NTN, 196/59, 185.
157 Bryskier, Żydzi pod swastyką, 63–64.
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was the bad availability of additional workers to replace the released inmates,158 
and, therefore, the camp commanders sought to exploit their Jewish workers 
to extremes. In some cases, the release from the camps happened thanks to the 
activity of the Jewish community. For example, the visit of a representative of 
the Judenrat in Częstochowa, Bernard Kurland, to the camp in Oszczów and 
other camps, his negotiations with commanders of the camps, use of bribes, 
and procurement of medical certificates resulted in release of many workers. 
They returned in several trains to Częstochowa at the end of 1940 and the 
beginning of 1941.159 
In some camps, due to a high degree of disease and mortality, the number 
of workers was strongly reduced, which led to liquidation of the camps. In the 
words of one witness: 
. . . after the departure of the first party of the sick, there remained for 
work only some 50 men, not counting the functionaries, the techni-
cians, overseers, and administrators. No new people came to work, so 
everybody understood that the camp was to be liquidated, and this is 
what happened.160
CLOSURE OF LABOR CAMPS
Most of the labor camps for Jews established in 1940 were seasonal camps, 
which were designed to perform a variety of seasonal work in the open air. 
Weather and climate determined the ability to perform such work. In Bełżec 
camps, digging anti-tank ditches was possible until late autumn, but only before 
the severe rain showers. The advent of cold weather meant that digging works 
became impossible. Melioration works—digging channels and embankments 
to prevent floods or changing the flow of rivers by digging fragments of new 
riverbeds—were also regulated by weather conditions. These works began in 
late spring when the water level dropped enough in wetlands. The work was 
completely impossible, however, with the advent of the rains and cold, when 
water level simultaneously increased. When cold and rainy autumn came, the 
continued maintenance of the camps became useless and the Jewish workers 
158 Entries of September 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1940, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 
146–47.
159 YVA, O.3/3180, testimony of Jakow Jachimowicz, 5–6.
160 “Six Weeks in a Forced Labor Camp,” in Kermish, To Live with Honor, 275. 
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were gradually dismissed to their places of residence. According to the report 
from Water Management:
On 176 construction sites, there are 8,395 workers employed, namely: 
5,950 Poles, 1,824 Baudienst, and 621 Jews. The number of workers dimin-
ished by ca. 1,000 men, because since December 1 this year [1940], most 
of the construction sites are discontinued. 14 activities on ca. 423 hect-
ares were terminated. On 25 construction sites, contractors are appointed. 
Here, ca. 100 km of embankments enlargement works are carried out,  
267 km river regulation, and torrent control on 18 mountain torrents.161
Labor camps created in 1940 were temporary. They were mostly estab-
lished in existing buildings where workers were placed. The tasks, for which 
the camps were created, were seasonal field works. Such works could not be 
performed during the winter, and the existence of the camps during this period 
became redundant. According to the decision of the German authorities, all 
labor camps in Warsaw District were closed on June 18, 1941.162 All the Jews 
employed there were released and returned to their places of residence. 
One of the consequences of the existence of labor camps for Jews was 
widely prevalent fear and terror, which led to rumors about what happened in 
the camps and what conditions were there. Ringelblum wrote in his diary the 
following: 
[. . .] The Jewish population is impressed with the terrible news from labor 
camps— from which a lot of people who escaped or were released due to 
illness come to Warsaw, among other places. The main cause of death acci-
dents (91 deaths until May 6 [1941]) is the terrible treatment of campers 
by the majority of Ukrainians camp guard, as well as bad, just starving food 
supply. [. . .] The worst was in Kampinos Forests [Puszcza Kampinoska], 
which recorded 37 victims, amounting to 10% [of the campers]. The camp 
guards simply stole the campers’ food (18 g of bread, watery soup, and a 
glass of black coffee). Those who returned from the camps died on the 
premises of the Jewish community [in Warsaw]. Some of them were shot 
while fleeing from the camp. The camp regime is terrible. The returning 
161 YVA, JM-814, Blatt zum Schreiben an Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler vom 18 Dezember 1940, 
scan 887.
162 “Rozwiązanie obozów pracy,” Gazeta Żydowska, June 24, 1941, 2.
180 Macht Arbeit Frei?
men are completely exhausted. Some are still under influence of severe psy-
chotic camp experience and tremble at the sight of every man in uniform.  
[. . .] You can imagine the mood of those who need to go to the camps. 
People from transport, which went yesterday (May 5 [1941]), raised a ver-
itable revolt, refusing to go [to camp]. We now understand how to trust 
their promises that the camp will be better than last year.163
The fact that many Jews were unable to do hard physical work was well 
known to the highest German authorities in the General Government. The 
chef of the Lublin District wrote in his report in November 1940: 
From the Judenlager Bełżec, 4,331 Jewish forced laborers were released 
and employed in road construction and buildings of the “Otto Program.” 
Their condition was such that they could not be considered as totally fit 
for work. The OKW Berlin allocated 800 former Jewish-Polish prisoners 
of war to work on the airfield Biała [Podlaska]. 250 (of them) could not be 
utilized because of invalidity.164 
From a report to the State Secretary Dr. Josef Bühler, dated December 1940: 
The physical condition hampers their [ Jews] employment; in many cases 
their use for the earthwork they are slated for is impossible. Their outfit 
with work wear is inadequate; many companies refuse the employment 
of Jews because of their earlier experience. During November, 8,286 Jews 
were placed to work.165
163 Entry of May 6–11, 1941, in Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 279–80.
164 YVA, JM-814, Der Chef des Distrikts Lublin im Generalgouvernement, Lagebericht für 
Oktober 1940, Lublin, den 6 November 1940, scan 782.
165 YVA, JM-814, Blatt zum Schreiben an Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler vom 18. Dezember 1940, 
scan 900.
CHAPTER 5
The War in the East:  
Galicia during the  
First Weeks of the War
THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PLANS FOR THE  
EASTERN AREAS AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION AT THE  
BEGINNING OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA
Prior to the formulation of any practical plans of armed conflict with the Soviet Union, there already existed a basic ideological conflict between 
Nazi Germany and the USSR. Germany during the Weimar Republic and the 
USSR enjoyed a relatively good relationship, despite the restrictions imposed 
on Germany that prevented the development of the armed forces and pro-
duction of certain weapons. In the 1920s, the Soviet paradigms were precisely 
implemented by German military experts to test new weapons. Despite the 
maintenance of diplomatic relations after Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, 
communist ideology, also called Bolshevism, became the object of many 
attacks by Hitler. In one of his speeches in 1935, he said: 
Bolshevism destroys not only private property but also private initiative 
and the readiness to shoulder responsibility. It has not been able to save 
millions of human beings from starvation in Russia, the greatest Agrarian 
State in the world. National Socialists and Bolshevists both are convinced 
they are a world apart from each other and their differences can never be 
bridged. Apart from that, there were thousands of our people slain and 
maimed in the fight against Bolshevism. If Russia likes Bolshevism, it is 
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not our affair, but if Bolshevism casts its nets over to Germany, then we 
will fight it tooth and nail.1
Only after winning the campaign in Western Europe could Hitler consider 
turning against the USSR. As early as August 1940, in the highest circles of 
power, information concerning commencement of preparations for war with 
the USSR began to circulate. 
On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rü [Wirtschaft Rüstung—Armament 
Production Management], during a conference with Reichsmarschall 
Göring, was informed that the Führer desired punctual delivery to the 
Russians only until spring 1941. Later on we would have no further inter-
est in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the 
Chief of Wi Rü to give priority to matters concerning the Russian War 
Economy.2 
It is worth mentioning that economic exchange with the Soviet Union 
was very important, since the naval blockade of Germany caused difficulties in 
obtaining important raw materials for the war economy. This message showcases 
the double-faced German policy towards the USSR. On the one hand, Germany 
was preparing for war against the Soviet Union; on the other hand, its war 
production was based on raw materials obtained from the USSR. We may also 
see, from the following quotation, the importance of commerce with the USSR: 
To date the Russian deliveries have been a very substantial support of the 
German war economy. Since the new economic agreements have become 
valid, Russia has delivered raw materials for more than 300 million 
Reichsmark; this includes grain for approx. 100 million Reichsmark. So far 
Russia has received an equivalent amounting to only approx. 150 million 
Reichsmark. [. . .] Our only economic connection with Iran, Afghanistan, 
Manchukuo, China, Japan, and beyond that to South America, is the 
way through Russia, which is being exploited to an increasing degree for 
German raw material imports.3
 1 Hitler’s Speech, May 21, 1935. 
 2 IMT, Red Series (2353-PS), vol. 1, 796.
 3 Memorandum concerning economic contact with USSR, Berlin, September 28, 1940, 
signed by Schnurre (3579-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 278.
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The war with the USSR did not only have its ideological and strategic 
goals, but also economic ones. This mainly concerned the war economy. 
Until the outbreak of the war, the Germans received supplies of raw materials 
from the Soviet Union. However, with the outbreak of hostilities these supplies 
ceased to arrive. Therefore, the extension of hostilities was dangerous to 
Germany, as it could quickly lead to the exhaustion of stocks of raw materials 
and the collapse of German war production. For that reason, one of the most 
important tasks in the occupied territories was to recognize the  economic 
objectives of strategic importance and, as soon as possible, to start the required 
work. For this purpose, already in November 1940, the chief of the Wi Rü along 
with secretaries of State Körner, Neumann, Backe, and General von Hanneken 
were informed by the Reichmarschal of the action planned in the east. 
By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in 
the east were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at the end of 1940:
1.  Obtaining a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its 
location, its capacity and its associate industries.
2.  Investigation of the capacity of various big armament centers and their 
dependency one on the other.
3.  Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the 
Soviet Union.
4.  Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude oil).
5.  Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in 
the Soviet Union. 4
These points were concentrated in one big compilation called “War 
Economy of the Soviet Union” and illustrated with detailed maps and other 
materials. Furthermore, a card index was to be made containing all the import-
ant factories in Soviet Russia and a German-Russian lexicon for economics for 
the use of the German War Economy Organization.5
By the end of February 1941, preliminary planning had proceeded to a 
point where a broader plan of organization, recognition, and protection of war 
production objectives in the occupied territories had to be prepared. General 
Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on February 28, 1941 to 
 4 IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 809.
 5 Ibid.
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prepare such a plan. A memorandum of this conference, classified “top secret” 
and dated March 1, 1941, reads as follows: 
1.  The whole organization is to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal. 
Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the Four-Year Plan.
2.  The organization must include everything concerning war economy, 
excepting only food, which is already under special responsibility of 
State Secretary Backe.
3.  It should be clearly stated that the organization is to be independent of 
the military or civil administration. Close cooperation is welcome, but 
instructions should be directed from the central office in Berlin.
4.  The scope of activities is to be divided in two steps:
 a.  Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front 
lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the 
removal of important goods.
 b.  Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation 
of economically complimentary districts.
5.  In view of the extended field of activity, the term “war economy inspec-
tion” is preferable instead of armament inspection.
6.  In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be gener-
ously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous. 
The main mission of the organization will consist of seizing raw mate-
rials and taking over all important concerns. For the latter mission, reli-
able people from German concerns will be suitably interposed from 
the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only 
be performed by the aid of their experiences. (For example, lignite, ore, 
chemical supplies, and petroleum).6
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH THE USSR
Preparations for Operation Barbarossa took a long time: in essence, they began 
at the end of the campaign in Western Europe and Norway. At that time, deci-
sions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and Jews became more 
radical. Already on February 26, 1941, Hermann Göring said in an interview 
with General Georg Thomas that one must quickly dispose of Bolshevik leaders. 
On March 13, 1941, it was decided to entrust this specific task resulting 
 6 IMT, Red Series, vol. 1 (1317-PS), 810–11.
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from the struggle between two opposing political systems to Heinrich Himmler, 
enabling the use of the Einsatzgruppen. Heinrich Himmler was, according to 
this directive, to act in a manner independent of the Wehrmacht, although the 
functional area of activities of his operational groups (Einsatzgruppen) coin-
cided with the frontline zone, where the administrative authority belonged 
to the army. The army high command was to help operational groups in their 
tasks. The commanders dealing with the agreement concerning the division 
of competences were the main army Quartermaster General Eduard Wagner 
and SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich. The Commissars’ Order of June 
6, 1941 gave a basis not only to eliminate political commissars, but primarily 
to disregard existing rules of warfare and the “purity of arms.” The first part 
of the instruction stated that in the struggle against Bolshevism it was “. . . 
not expected that the enemy act in accordance with the rules of warfare and 
international law.”7 
In addition to the existing directives concerning division of powers 
between the Wehrmacht and special operational groups (Einsatzgruppen), 
on July 2, 1941, Reinhard Heydrich issued an instruction for the elimination 
of selected groups on Soviet territories occupied by German troops.8 In this 
instruction, inter alia, it was written: 
4) Executions. All the following are to be executed: Officials of the 
Comintern [. . .], top and medium-level officials [. . .], People’s Commissars; 
Jews in Party and State employment, and other radical  elements (sabo-
teurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins, inciters, etc.).9
INVASION
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany, supported by Romanian, Hungarian, and 
Slovak troops in the south, launched Operation Barbarossa and began mili-
tary operations against the USSR. Soviet troops were surprised by the fierce 
attack. Unprepared for war, they were not able to resist their enemy and began 
to retreat in disarray. During the first few weeks, the German troops advanced 
 7 Extract from the Commissar’s Order for the Operation Barbarossa, June 6, 1941, 
 NOKW-484; Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 376.
 8 Extracts from guidelines by Heydrich for higher SS and police leaders in the Occupied 
Territories of the Soviet Union, July 2, 1941, Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 
378; see the same document in YVA, O.54/53-1. 
 9 Ibid.
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deep into the territory under Soviet control and took over most of the Polish 
territories that had been occupied by Soviet troops after September 17, 1939. 
Among those territories was also the future Galicia District that encompassed 
part of the former province of Lwów, Stanisławów, and Tarnopol.
The Red Army, unable to face the German troops, began a disorderly retreat. 
Only in a number of fortified positions did longer resistance take place. However, 
the Luftwaffe managed in its operational sphere to reach and destroy the majority 
of Soviet aircraft still on the ground, which gave the Germans almost complete 
domination in the air. The German Air Force destroyed not only military facili-
ties, but also other objects of strategic importance, such as road and rail bridges, 
communication centers, and other important installations. A powerful armored 
thrust forward meant that in many cases, small Soviet units did not manage to 
escape and remained at the front line. Individual soldiers or smaller units were 
captured by the German rearguard units. Thousands of Soviet soldiers fell into 
German custody. By the autumn of 1941, that number had turned into millions.
At that time, the Soviet penitentiaries were filled with prisoners from 
recent waves of arrests in June 1941. The Soviet authorities in larger cities, who 
could not or did not want to evacuate prisoners and, on the other hand, did not 
want to free them, had decided to liquidate the inmates. In this way, thousands 
of prisoners were murdered in the prisons in Lwów, Stanisławów, Tarnopol, and 
many other places. Shortly before the arrival of the German troops in Galicia, 
several thousand prisoners were murdered, and their bodies were left in closed 
prisons and areas of mass executions. 
Simultaneously, in many towns where there were no Soviet troops, or 
where they managed to withdraw and the German troops had not yet entered, 
a vacuum of power was created which started to fill up at the local level by 
self-proclaimed Ukrainian authorities.10 These were more or less armed mili-
tias made up of local people. The local Ukrainian population, who hated the 
Soviet authorities and had, perhaps, hopes of establishing an independent state 
supported by Germany, was favorable to them. Then again, during the chaos 
after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and authorities, hatred towards the Jews 
erupted again. Unarmed Jews, who identified with Soviet powers, suddenly 
became the embodiment of the hatred towards the Soviets. The vacuum of 
10 Ukrainian Nationalist Movement (OUN), as well as its paramilitary organization, was in 
close contact with the German authorities during the period of 1939–1941, and relayed 
them a lot of information on the situation in the part of Ukraine occupied by the Soviets 
after September 17, 1939. See Bericht über die Lage in der Westukraine unter der jetzigen 
Sowjetherrschaft, Krakau, 13 November, 1939. YVA-JM.12306, scans 687–741.
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power in many rural areas and a renewed outbreak of hatred, in general, sparked 
anti-Semitic pogroms.11 In some localities, rural councils convened to make 
conscious decisions about the murder of Jews. Not all such decisions were 
implemented, but the mere fact that they were made testified to the attitude 
towards the Jews even before the entrance of the Germans. With the German 
troops, Ukrainian battalions also entered.12 Their significance was largely 
symbolic; however, it indicated political options of these organizations and testified 
to attempts of establishing a temporary Ukrainian government by the assailant. 
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN
The Einsatzgruppen began to operate in the areas occupied by the Soviet Union 
from 1939, as well as in the Soviet Union itself.13 In Eastern Galicia Einsatzgruppe 
C acted under the command of SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei 
Dr. Otto Rasch, who was replaced at the end of 1941 by SS-Brigadeführer und 
Generalmajor der Polizei Dr. Max Thomas, the commander of Einsatzgruppe C 
until 1943. In accordance with the guidelines of RSHA chief Reinhard Heydrich, 
Einsatzgruppen were responsible for murder of communists and Jews. 
Einsatzgruppen, together with local militias and with the cooperation 
of local people, systematically murdered Jews in many towns of Galicia. 
Information on this subject may be found in the reports sent by the Wehrmacht. 
One of these reports describes how the actions of liquidation of the Jews by the 
Einsatzgruppen were conducted in cooperation with the local police: 
Immediately following the military operations, the Jewish population 
remained undisturbed at first. It was only weeks, in some cases months, 
11 Witold Mędykowski, W cieniu gigantów: Pogromy 1941 r. w byłej sowieckiej strefie okupacyjnej. 
Kontekst historyczny, społeczny i kulturowy (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2012).
12 The Ukrainian Legion was composed of two batallions—“Roland” and “Nachtigall,” and was 
commanded by Theodor Oberländer and, from the Ukrainian side, by Roman Shukhevich.
13 Helmut Krausnick, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der 
Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1943 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981); P. 
Klein, ed., Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/1942. Die Tätigkeits- und 
Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1997); 
Arad, Krakowski, and Spector, The Einsatzgruppen Reports; Trials of War Criminals before 
the Nuerenberg Military Tribunals, vol. 4, The Einsatzgruppen Case, [Green Series], 
Nuernberg, 1946–1949; H. H.Wilhelm, Die Einsatzgruppe A der Sicherheheitspolizei und des 
SD 1941/42 (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1996); MacLean, The Field Men; Dempsey, 
Einsatzgruppen and the Destruction. 
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later that systematic shooting of the Jews was carried out by units of 
the Order Police specially set up for this purpose. This Aktion moved 
in the main from east to west. It was carried out entirely in public, with  
the assistance of Ukrainian militia; in many cases, regrettably, also with the 
voluntary participation of members of the Wehrmacht. These Aktionen 
included aged men, women, and children of all ages, and the manner in 
which they were carried out was appalling. The gigantic number of execu-
tions involved in this Aktion is far greater than any similar measure under-
taken in the Soviet Union up to now. Altogether about 150,000 to 200,000 
Jews may have been executed in the section of the Ukraine belonging to 
the RK [Reichskommissariat]; up to now no consideration was given to the 
interests of the economy.14
Despite many statements in various documents quoted above, from the 
very beginning it was completely clear that economic interests were in the 
background, while ideology dominated. As in the beginning of the war, not 
only political commissars, but civilian population, who were only presumed 
to be communists, were usually shot en masse because nobody tried to prove 
anything. Soviet POWs were mostly treated in an inhumane manner. Their 
increased mortality could already be observed after several months, especially 
during the winter of 1941–1942. The POWs, many of whom were reservists, 
could have proved to be an excellent source of labor that was totally lost. The 
same was true in regard to Jews—in addition, they were particularly skilled 
workers. This problem was noted even in the Einsatzgruppen reports. Here is 
an example from such report: 
After the carrying out of the first large-scale executions in Lithuania and 
Latvia the total elimination of the Jews already proved to be impossible 
there, at least at the present time. As a large part of the skilled trades is in 
Jewish hands in Lithuania and Latvia, and some (grazers, plumbers, stove 
builders, shoe makers) are almost entirely Jewish, a large proportion of 
the Jewish craftsmen are indispensable at present for the repair of essen-
tial installations, for the reconstruction of destroyed cities, and for work 
of military importance. Although the employers aim at replacing Jewish 
14 From a Wehrmacht Report on the Extermination of the Jews in Ukraine, Inspector of 
Armament in the Ukraine (December 2, 1941) to the Office of Wi Rü [Industrial Armament 
Department] OKW [High Command of the Wehrmacht] General of the Infantry Thomas 
(PS-3257), in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 418.
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labor with Lithuanian or Latvian workers, it is not yet possible to replace 
all the Jews presently employed, particularly in the larger cities. In coop-
eration with the labor exchange offices, however, Jews who are no longer 
fit for work are picked up and will be executed shortly in small Aktionen.15
The Inspector of Armaments in Ukraine reported the fact that mass exe-
cutions of Jews brought immediate and irreparable harm to the war economy. 
He also was aware that ideology superceded all other interests. Nevertheless, 
he tried to propose a solution for the partial elimination of the Jewish labor 
force. Worth emphasizing is the fact that he did not present any type of moral 
arguments, but only “practical” considerations:
To sum up, it could be said that the solution of the Jewish Question as 
carried out in the Ukraine, evidently motivated by ideological principles, 
has the following consequences:
a.  Elimination of some, in part superfluous, eaters in the cities.
b.  Elimination of a part of the population that undoubtedly hated us. 
c.  Elimination of urgently needed craftsmen, who were in many cases 
indispensable for the requirements of the Wehrmacht.
d.  Consequences, in connection with foreign propaganda, which are 
obvious.
e.  Adverse effects on troops, which in any case have indirect contact with 
executions.
f.  Brutalizing effects on the units (Order Police), which carry out the 
executions.16
THE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA  
FOR THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Issuing instructions to proceed with the Otto Program was the first step in 
implementing the strategy of preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union. 
However, the idea of using the territory of General Government as a base to 
15 Extracts from a report by Einsatzgruppe A in the Baltic Countries, October 15, 1941 
(L-180), in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 392.
16 From a Wehrmacht Report on the Extermination of the Jews in Ukraine, Inspector of 
Armament in the Ukraine (December 2, 1941) to the Office of Wi Rü [Industrial Armament 
Department] OKW [High Command of the Wehrmacht] General of the Infantry Thomas, 
in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 418–19; PS-3257.
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attack the east significantly preceded the release of specific directives. Already 
in the autumn of 1939, Hitler defined his plan to use Polish territories that were 
not incorporated into the Reich, as a series of strategic objectives. According to 
this plan, a high level of infrastructure, especially roads, railways, and the like, 
in the General Government had to be maintained. Already then, work on the 
modernization of national and regional roads was started. The Otto Program, 
though, covered many areas of the economy, not just transportation. The General 
Government was to hold one of the largest concentrations of German troops 
before the attack on the USSR. Therefore, in the first half of 1941, especially in 
the spring, an extensive work effort was performed in order to prepare military 
bases. For this purpose, accommodations for millions of soldiers, repair garages, 
equipment, fuel supplies, airports, and other army facilities had to be prepared. 
Concentrated military units required ongoing upkeep and maintenance. 
The General Government was also obliged to provide food for millions of 
soldiers. It was necessary to set up military hospitals as well as other arrangements.
On the one hand, all these works constituted an economic burden, because 
they required intense labor, while raw materials and food had to be  delivered 
exclusively by the General Government. On the other hand, large orders 
for the military resulted in development of the economic situation in the General 
Government. For example, the need to prepare accommodation for the soldiers 
caused an increase in orders for wooden furniture. As the Polish companies that 
received contracts were also interested in greater profits, they looked for cheap 
labor, which often could be found in the ghettos. For example, in the spring of 
1941, a huge increase in the production of wooden furniture in the Warsaw Ghetto 
could be noticed.
The outbreak of the German-Soviet war was also of great importance for 
the General Government, because this area became close to front zone with a 
high concentration of troops. Thus, the General Government changed from 
a peaceful area to the rear of the front line, forced to provide many products 
and supplies for the army. In the wake of the Operation Barbarossa, Governor 
General Dr. Hans Frank explained:
With the proceeding victory of our marvelous armed forces in the East,  
in a time of great courage and most excellent probation of German  
soldiership, we, who have the honor to be so distinguished by the Führer 
to act as a bridge between the opening gigantic space in the East and the 
closed realm of our people, see the noble duty to think solely of this task. 
No one will take this land of the Poles away from us again. We will facilitate 
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here for all Germans a reconstruction on the foundations we built, which 
shall be a glorious work. I am looking forward to calling the German 
settlers back to Galicia and to begin the task of regulating the Wisła in a 
completely different perspective; I am looking forward to the plan and the 
realization of the plan of a navigable connection between Wisła, San and 
Dniestr, through which we will develop gigantic transport routes every-
where. The General Government will be a balanced entity in East and 
West, North and South.17 
However, from a political point of view, the shift of the front to the east 
and reaching new areas also meant new opportunities to solve demographic 
problems. This concerned first of all the Jews, since the acquisition of new 
territories could mean finding new evacuation places. Until then, the General 
Government was playing that role in the region, hosting deported Jews in 
both the Reich and the Protectorate.18 Many gauleiters could boast that their 
administration areas became judenrein. For example, Gauleiter of Warthegau 
Arthur Greiser attempted to cleanse his Gau by deporting Jews and Poles to the 
General Government.
Hans Frank wrote, inter alia, in his diary: 
During the conversation, which I had with the Führer at the Reich 
Chancellery three days before the entering [the territory of Soviet Russia], 
the Führer told me, among other things, that Jews were the first to leave 
the General Government. In the next days I will issue an order on the initi-
ation of preparations for the evacuation of the Warsaw Ghetto. We have to 
make every effort to remove, as soon as possible, the Jews of the General 
Government. In the spirit of Hitler’s own words, in the future the General 
Government will not be a place of their final concentration, but only a 
transit camp.19
Hans Frank, who previously occupied a rather secondary position of 
the governor general, attempted to acquire more meaning and importance. 
17 YVA-JM.21 (3508214_08004009), Hans Frank’s Diary, vol. 15, R. 5, Wirtschaftstagung, 
den 22. Juli 1941, scans 134–35. 
18 YVA-JM-1476 (AIPN, GDL-5) lists of names transported from Wien and Stettin to the 
district Lublin.
19 Frank Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 374; YVA-JM.21 (3508214_08004009), Hans Frank’s 
Diary, vol. 15, R. 5, Wirtschaftstagung, den 22. Juli 1941, scans 134–35.
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Therefore, during the invasion of the Soviet Union he saw himself in a new and 
significant role. After the invasion, he wrote: 
The victorious march of our glorious Wehrmacht in the east results for 
us—blessed with honors from the Führer, whose will be that we now 
become the bridge between the gigantic area of the East, which is opening 
up before us, and the Reich, the compact seat of our people. This means 
that we should honor the obligation to devote all our attention only to 
this complex task in these times of highest heroism and the impressive 
achievements of the German soldiers.20
20 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 374. 
CHAPTER 6 
Jewish Labor in Galicia
During the initial period of the German occupation of Galizien [Galicia], authority passed into the hands of the military administration, which was 
represented by the chief of the civil administration (Chef der Zivilverwaltung, 
CdZ). In Lwów, before the arrival of the Germans, the local Ukrainian Nationalist 
Organization (OUN) tried to take power into their own hands, but the German 
authorities were readied against such a possibility. Perhaps, this was the cause 
that brought about the “Days of Petlura” in late July 1941, nearly a month after 
the Wehrmacht entered Lwów. This allowed the Ukrainians to celebrate and to 
organize a pogrom against the Jews, which ultimately reduced social tensions. 
The “Days of Petlura” occurred shortly before the bitter truth—that there will 
be no independent Ukraine—was announced. On August 1, 1941, Hitler’s 
decree officially proclaimed the incorporation of the Galicia District (District 
Galizien) into the General Government, which the Germans had created on 
October 26, 1939.1 In this way, the General Government acquired additional 
51,000 square kilometers and 4.4 million people—mainly Ukrainians, Poles, 
and Jews. After joining the General Government, the power and legislation 
structures in the Galicia District were gradually incorporated into the rest of the 
General Government. The whole district was divided into 16 administrative 
units: Stadthauptmannschaft in Lwów, and another 15 Kreishauptmannschaften. 
Dr. Karl Lasch2 was nominated as the new district governor. From 
 1 “Verordnung über die Verwaltung von Galizien. Vom 1. August 1941,” VBlGG, 1941, 443; 
Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, vol. 2, 71–73.
 2 Karl Lasch (1904–1942) was the governor of the Radom District in 1939–1941 and became 
the governor of the Galicia District in August 1941. He was arrested on January 24, 1942 on 
charges of corruption, appropriation of goods belonging to the Reich, and trade in foreign 
currency. He was condemned to death and died in prison in unclear circumstances.
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February 1, 1942, SS-Gruppenführer Otto von Wächter3 served as district gover-
nor. The head of the governor’s office was Regierungsrat Dr. Ludwig Losacker. 
From 1944, commissary manager Dr. Josef Brandl was the head of the district. 
Friedrich Katzmann4 was nominated as the SS and police commander. He was 
later replaced by Theobald Thier, and then Christoph Diehm. The comman-
der Orpo (Ordnungspolizei), Paul Worm, was in charge of the military police 
(Oberstleutnant der Gendarmerie); Franz Gansinger was the commander of the 
Sipo; and Dr. Helmut Tanzmann headed the SD.
Despite annexation of the newly acquired land into the General 
Government, all indications show that this territory from the very beginning 
was different from the rest of the General Government. The reason here was 
not only the ethnic composition of the new district, where the dominant role 
was played by Ukrainians, but the fact that they considered the Germans 
their allies, thinking that thanks to them it would be possible to establish 
an independent Ukrainian state. After August 1, 1941, these hopes faded, 
but comprehensive cooperation with the Germans still prevailed. This col-
laboration took place in different fields, but mostly in administration, inclu-
ding local police cooperation with the Einsatzgruppen in the murder of Jews 
and military collaboration. The new district, also from Hans Frank’s point of 
view, had a separate character. For example, in the guidelines of September 
15, 1941, Hans Frank recommended the district governor of Galicia, Karl 
Lasch, to make decisions on all matters regarding the police, because, accor-
ding to the structure of government, the district governor had full execu-
tive authority and had to cooperate with SSPF Katzmann. At the same time, 
Frank reminded Lasch that the SSPF was not permitted to issue police direc-
tives for Galicia.5
Jews have been persecuted from the very beginning of the occupation of 
former Soviet territories. In addition to the previously mentioned pogroms, 
there were also popular forms of persecution associated with forced labor. 
First of all, after discovering the murder of prisoners by the NKVD, the work 
 3 Otto Gustav von Wächter (1901–1949) was the governor of the Kraków District in 1939–
1942 and the governor of the Galicia District in 1942–1944. In September 1943 he was 
transferred to northern Italy.
 4 Fritz Katzmann (1906–1957) was the SS and police leader in the Radom District in 
November 1939–July 1941 and held the same post in the Galicia District from August 1941 
to April 20, 1943. Then he was nominated to the post of commander of the SS-Oberabschnitt 
Weichsel/Danzig-Westpreussen im Wehrkreis XX. At the end of the war he was responsible for 
the evacuation of the concentration camp in Stutthof.
 5 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 375. 
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to remove the corpses of those murdered in order to identify and bury them 
began. Many Jews were engaged in this work. A new massacre of the Jews was 
linked to this labor because there were frequent incidents of beatings, unpre-
meditated killings, and abuse of Jewish workers. This was true not only in 
Lwów, but also in other cities of Eastern Galicia. In places where executions 
took place, the Jews were engaged in digging mass grave.
Jews were also employed for various humiliating and difficult tempo-
rary work. In this case, the 1939 paradigm of Poland was repeated—when 
during the period of military administration, people were taken from the 
street for temporary work. Jews were the most common and preferred sub-
ject of these arrests.6 As in central Poland, it was the result of ideological 
indoctrination of the Germans—of the negative image of the Jews pre-
sented in German propaganda. On the other hand, the Polish population 
was also treated in a humiliating manner. As for the Ukrainians of Eastern 
Galicia, who were sympathetic to the Nazis, the Polish people, did not have 
an influential position and often accepted ambivalent attitudes. The Jewish 
population was again at the bottom of the social hierarchy. As such, the Jews 
were easy and preferred prey. Moreover, the ideological attitude towards the 
Jews in the Ukraine was much worse than in Poland, since the Jews were 
associated with communist ideology and accused of collaboration by the 
Ukrainians. According to the guidelines issued to the Einsatzgruppen, the 
Jews were destined for liquidation.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DISTRIKT GALIZIEN
The Germans considered Galicia and especially Lwów their bridgehead to the 
east. According to Karl Lasch: 
Lwów is the last city with a proper culture far into the East. At the same 
time, it is the link in the economic interrelations between Southeast 
Europe and the General Government and the eastern part of the Reich, 
and especially the great traffic hub of the General Government towards 
East and Southeast Europe. It cannot be that in this city Jews should be 
treated differently from Kraków and Warsaw. Therefore, in the next days 
 6 YVA, M.49.E/3773, testimony of Herman Ringer; YVA, M.49.E/4654, testimony of Henryk 
Szyper; YVA, M.49.E/4950a, testimony of Abraham Schall; YVA, M.49.E/4682, testimony 
of Izrael Szor; YVA, M.49.E/3551, testimony of Sara Frydman; YVA, M.49.E/1260/100, 
testimony of Samuel Plutman, YVA; M.49.E/2314, testimony of Aba Reiner.
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the Jews in Lwów shall be gathered in Jewish quarters and vanish from the 
streetscape, as in the other towns in the district of Galicia. This shall take 
place under consideration of the experiences with the establishment of 
ghettos and Jewish quarters in other towns of the General Government. 
The quarter for the approximately 100,000 Jews has been chosen, and the 
completion of the preliminary work is imminent. Hereafter, this problem 
will be solved most quickly.7
August 1, 1941, and increasing integration of the Galicia District 
into the rest of the General Government, was followed by unification in 
legal terms and organizational issues. This also applied to legislation on 
employment. On August 7, 1941, Governor General Hans Frank issued 
a decree for the Galicia District regarding the application of his previous 
regulation of October 26, 1939 and the regulations of December 11 and 12, 
1939, issued by the higher SS and police leader in the General Government 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger. All the male Jewish population of the district 
between the ages 14 to 60 had to perform forced labor; while boys from 12 
were subjected to registration only.8 In case of the non-Jewish population, 
initially, regulations were issued, which applied in the General Government in 
1939, but on September 6, 1941, Hans Frank signed a new regulation, where 
one section had been modified to include the duty of work (Arbeitspflicht) 
of the entire non-Jewish population of the district, whereas the regulation of 
1939 explicitly mentioned the Polish population.
In terms of organization, forced labor can be divided into four periods.9 
The first was the period of military administration (until August 1, 1941); the 
second period lasted from the creation of the Galicia District up to the beginning 
of the deportations to death camps in the spring of 1942; the third period was 
the time of deportation to death camps from spring 1942 to late 1942—when 
Jews working in labor detachments (placówki) were enclosed in labor camps 
and small ghettos (Julag); and the last period, when all Jews were contained in 
labor camps. Already at the beginning of the German occupation, guidelines 
were prepared concerning introduction of forced labor for the Jews.10 
 7 YVA-JM.21 (3508214_08004009), Hans Frank’s Diary, vol. 17, Referat des Gouverneur 
Dr. Lasch auf Regierungssitzung am Dienstag, den 21. Oktober 1941, scan 807. 
 8 VBlGG, 1941, 462.
 9 Tatiana Berenstein distinguishes three periods, not including the period of military adminis-
tration, in Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa,” 4.
10 “Bericht über die Judenfrage in Lemberg,” YVA, JM.15083, PDF frames 2–3. 
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In terms of forms of forced labor in Galicia we may distinguish between 
two basic types: labor detachments working in specific places and forced labor 
camps.11 However, even here, in addition to these fundamental divisions, other 
forms of forced labor should be considered. One of these was the collection of 
raw materials (by people known as rags collectors, or zbieracze szmat), in which 
Jews were involved. The rag collectors were provided with special passes, accor-
ding to which they were free to move around the district. They could be called 
individual workers. Organized forced labor, as in other districts of the General 
Government, can be divided into activities managed by public authorities (gover-
nment departments of the General Government), the army (Wehrmacht), the 
war industry, the SS and police, private German enterprises, and non-German 
companies. This division was blurred by the fact that arms plants were in private 
hands as well as part of the SS (DAW, OSTI) and the Wehrmacht. In terms of 
distribution in the different branches of the economy, the division may be as 
 follows: industry, transport, agriculture, water, infrastructure, trade, and services.
ECONOMIC PLANS FOR GALICIA
The Galicia District, as with other districts of the General Government, became 
the object of interest for the state enterprises, the war industry, the civil admi-
nistration, and private entrepreneurs. It seems that in this case it was treated as 
a new area of expansion, where existing industrial plants12 and other facilities 
related to the infrastructure could be taken under control, enabling their use 
for economic expansion.13 In the case of Galicia, where the model of economic 
exploitation of newly conquered territory was repeated, it was similar to that of 
the rest of the General Government. However, in comparison with the General 
Government in 1939, these processes in Galicia were much faster. First, it was 
related to the fact that economic aspects of such restructuring were unclear in 
1939, when the general Government was created, and the administrative orga-
nization of the area proceeded slowly. In 1939 and 1940 a pattern of acquisition 
11 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 4.
12 Beschaffung von Unterlagen für Plannungsarbeiten über die holzbearbeitende Industrie im 
neuen Ostraum. YVA-JM.12331, scan 126.
13 Bericht des SS-Obersturmführer Gebauer an den SS-und Polizeiführer Brigadeführer 
Katzmann, Betr. Sägewerke u. Ziegelein in Umkreis von Lemberg, Lemberg, 21. August 1941. 
YVA-JM.12331, scans 86–87; Bericht und Vorschläge auf Grund der Besichtigungsfahrt des 
SS-Ustuf. mit SS-Stubaf Manbach vom 22.–26. September 1941. YVA-JM.12331, scans 
90–95; Bericht: Übernahme von geeigneten Objekte, 28. September 1941. YVA-JM.12331, 
scans 98–100.
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and development of industrial facilities had to be worked out, and a legal system 
along with implementing instructions had to be developed. As far as Galicia 
was concerned, even if a decision on annexation to the General Government 
had not yet been taken, the process was much faster, and various German 
agents, almost immediately after crossing the front line, began to identify busi-
ness enterprizes which might be suitable for them and planned the takeover of 
those ventures.14 This time, DAW was one of the first. The representative of 
the company, SS-Obersturmführer Wolfgang Mohwinkel, arrived in Lwów after 
its occupation by the Germans to organize new branches of this company.15 
He took over the old mill machine factory and the Steinhaus Company (TBM 
Building Society) at Janowska Street. Other companies taken over were subject 
to the Treuhandstelle administration being its property.
The role of the district of Galicia, which was annexed by the General 
Government on August 1, 1941, differed significantly from that of the other 
districts. The situation in which this district was annexed and its strategic posi-
tion meant that it remained a separate district in the General Government in 
terms of its character and the situation of the Jews living there. The fact that 
Galicia remained under the Soviet rule for two years made the economic situa-
tion of the Jews living there different from that of other districts in the General 
Government and in a way facilitated taking possession of private property by 
the German authorities. In most cases, the Soviet powers had already national-
ized the private property.
The process of nationalization carried out by the Soviet authorities eased 
the acquisition of numerous factories and other businesses by the occupation 
forces. In contrast to Poland in 1939, on the territories previously occupied by 
the Soviet authorities the process of both taking over companies and economic 
expansion was much faster. First of all, in Poland after the entry of the German 
troops, there was a period of economic stagnation. Cutting off the General 
Government from the markets and sources of raw materials, the destruction of 
transportation and the establishment of a customs border, which separated the 
area of the General Government from other parts of former Polish territories, 
struck the economy very hard. Another important factor was the initially unclear 
14 One of the leading people interested in reconnaissance of different enterprises in Galicia 
was SSPH in the district Lublin, Globocnik. He was authorized to do this among others as 
Beauftragte des RKFDV in the east. YVA-JM.12331, scan 101.
15 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 5.
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concept of exploitation of the Polish territories within the economy of the Reich. 
Originally proposed was the dismantling and evacuation of industrial equip-
ment from Poland to the Reich in order to give that area a strictly agricultural 
character and to constitute a reservoir of labor and raw materials for the Reich 
while providing important strategic functions as a bridgehead. Only the needs 
of war industry preceding Operation Barbarossa resulted in a change of percep-
tion and led to the development of war industry in the territories of the General 
Government. It should be noted that Poland in 1939 was the first area under 
direct German occupation, which meant that the German authorities were still 
inexperienced in the organization of economic life in the occupied territories.
Areas of the Galicia District in 1941 were at the center of various polit-
ical and military happenings—the general course of events was much more 
dynamic than in other areas of the General Government. First, the military 
government of Galicia lasted a relatively short time—only about five weeks. 
After the advance of the German army and shifting the front lines to the east, 
Galicia became the immediate hinterland of the Eastern Front. Due to the prox-
imity of the front and the distance from the industrial centres in the Reich, it 
had to satisfy various needs of the army without waiting for imported goods 
and resources. In particular, it was necessary to provide all kinds of services for 
the army, such as repairs of military equipment, military vehicles, and weapons. 
It was also essential to meet various requirements, such as mending uniforms, 
providing communication services, and the like. Most towns in the Galicia 
District were located on transport routes—both rail and road—enabling the 
supply of war material, fuel, and other goods to the front. Therefore, Lwów 
became an important railway and road junction, and the transportation lines 
from the west to Lwów, and further to the east, acquired strategic importance.
Huge frontline requirements concerning military items, food, and services 
resulted in an immediate expansion of the various elements wishing to exploit 
the positive economic trend for their own interests. This went according to 
the rule “first come, first served.” Being the first gave priority right to control 
all domains of production, including the most privileged. An additional factor 
was the ability to take over existing facilities and adapt them to the necessary 
production profile. This made possible the use of existing production facilities 
and equipment with minimum investment from new companies. Therefore, in 
contrast to Poland in 1939, in Galicia following the occupation, people, wishing 
to multiply their profits, were interested in starting production based on the 
existing infrastructure.
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THE ORGANIZATION OF FORCED LABOR
On August 22, 1941, Dr. Seifert, head of the Trust Department, had issued 
instructions to the representatives, managers, and trustees of companies, 
declaring that it was now possible to keep Jewish employees that were under 
their control on the condition that 
. . . they [the Jews] did not act against the Reich or its citizens and if they 
were absolutely needed; in exceptional cases that were difficult to settle, it 
is recommended to communicate with the Trust Department. The Jewish 
workers left in the enterprises had to—according to the instruction—be 
reported, on a monthly basis, to the Department of the Trust, including 
at the same time an exact record containing personal data (name and sur-
name, address, profession and monthly salary).16 
This order appeared due to practical considerations, because by allowing 
the former owners to retain the Jews in the workplace as business managers or 
specialist staff, continued and uninterrupted operation of these enterprises was 
ensured. Many new managers did not have suitable qualifications or were not 
able to replace the expert staff in such a short time. However, during the next 
few months, the replacement of Jewish workers by non-Jewish employees took 
place. The usefulness or necessity of Jewish workers was checked every month, 
with appropriate decisions taken.
In September 1941, the authorities of the Galicia District established spe-
cial branches for employment of Jews (Judeneinsatz) in German labor offices 
(Arbeitsämter). At that time, the head of the Labor Department in the district 
was Dr. Nietzsche. On September 20, 1941, he issued a notice, in which he relied 
on the decree of Hans Frank from August 7, 1941, and ordered the registration 
of people aged 14 to 60 who were obliged to perform forced labor. Mayors and 
the Judenräte were responsible for carrying out the registration. The announce-
ment distinguished two forms of employment of the Jews: the first was a call 
to perform forced labor and the other was a free employment relationship. The 
registration ordinance required absolute obedience; it called the Jews to come 
to registration point and to perform forced labor at every  summons. A sentence 
of 10 years in prison could be expected for failing to come forward for regi-
stration at the designated time and place; for providing false personal data; for 
16 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 5.
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simulating inability to work; or for failing to appear for work. A similar penalty 
was expected for members of the Judenrat and other people responsible for per-
forming of the registration and organization of work, if they did not perform 
the task imposed upon them.17
The next ordinance, issued by Nietzsche on September 20 (this time as 
the head of the Labor Office in Lwów), was for implementing the instructions 
of the first order. According to it, from October 1 until November 15, 1941, 
registration would take place of all male Jews between the ages of 12 and 60 
and women fit for work who had no place of permanent employment. At the 
same time, the instruction did not specify the age limit of women who were to 
appear for registration. During the registration, it was necessary to present an 
appropriate certificate of employment. For not complying with the instruction, 
a sentence of hard labor for 10 years could be expected.18
The Jews were, undoubtedly, a valuable labor force, able to perform many 
complex jobs in war industry. Other workers, including Ukrainians, could 
hardly be expected to do the same. We can learn about the high regard of the 
Jewish labor force from a Wehrmacht report: 
The settling of the Jewish Question in the Ukraine has been made more 
difficult because in the cities the Jews constituted a major part of the pop-
ulation. [. . .] The great majority of the Jewish masses remained under the 
German administration. The entire situation was complicated by the fact 
that these Jews carried out almost all the work in the skilled trades and 
even provided part of the labor for small and medium-sized industries; 
apart from trade, some of which had become superfluous as a result of 
the direct or indirect effects of the war. [Their] elimination was therefore 
bound to have profound economic consequences, including even direct 
effects on the military economy (supplies for troops).19
As a consequence of the registration, branch offices for employment of Jews 
established records (card-index) for all people subjected to forced labor and the 
registered Jews received their Meldenkarte. Since then, these cards were used 
both as employment certificates and as identity documents. Those branches of 
employment offices were headed by the Germans and the employees there were 
17 AŻIH, poster 102.
18 AŻIH, poster 104.
19 From a Wehrmacht report on the extermination of the Jews in the Ukraine. PS-3257; Arad 
and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 417.
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mostly Jews. Until the end of June 1942, the branch offices were decisive in all 
cases involving forced labor of Jews and work in free employment. All authorities, 
institutions, and private companies interested in engaging Jewish employees 
had to turn to employment offices. In Lwów, the head of the Judeneinsatz was 
Heinz Weber and his bureau was located on the Zamarstynowska Street.20 By 
the end of the year, all Jews in the district obligated to perform forced labor were 
registered. In Czortków, the registration was conducted in December 1941 and 
those compelled to perform forced labor were women aged 16 to 45. Similarly, in 
Stanisławów, women up to age 45 were required to perform forced labor.
At the end of winter 1942, the labor office announced a new registration 
of Jews obligated to perform forced labor, in order to verify that all people 
were indeed employed by German authorities and other institutions and com-
panies.21 Re-registration allowed the creation of an index to exclude people 
not designated for deportation. This category included all craftsmen and the 
young and healthy individuals employed by the Germans. All Jews belonging 
to various groups of professions were also registered, and given documents pro-
tecting them from deportation.22 
In Lwów, on March 13, 1942, on the eve of the first deportation to the 
camp in Bełżec, an ordinance was issued. Those employed by the authorities, 
companies and institutions had received a German band with the letter “A” 
embroidered in the middle of the Star of David, and registration cards, with 
a photograph and an official stamp. The bands also bore the numbers of the 
registration cards and a stamp of the labor office. Holders of these special cards 
and bands were able to obtain permits protecting members of their households 
from deportation. About fifty thousand people, who constituted about half of 
all Jews in Lwów, received such new Meldekarten. Some of the men who did 
not receive Meldekarten were sent to forced labor camps by the labor office.23 
On April 20, 1942, Nietzsche issued an order stating that as of April 30, all old 
certificates and registration cards lost validity, and from that time onwards only 
new registration cards would be honored.24
20 YVA, M.49.E, rel. 2550, testimony of Joachim Schönfeld.
21 “Offizielle Registerung der jüdischen Händwerker und Fachleute,” Mitteilungen des Judenrates 
in Lemberg für die Jüdische Gemeinde, 3 (March 01, 1942): 2 (YVA-JM.15083). 
22 “Arbeitsumlage für jüdiechen Heilberufler,” Mitteilungen des Judenrates in Lemberg für die 
Jüdische Gemeinde, 3 (March 01, 1942): 2 (YVA-JM.15083).
23 YVA, M.49.E/4691, testimony of Róża Wagner; YVA, M.49.E/4833, testimony of Berl 
Potruch, AŻIH, 301/44, Leon Weliczkower.
24 AŻIH, poster 12.
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The time and manner of the new registration varied in different loca-
lities. During the registration in Stanisławów, the physical condition of people 
was also checked. In this city, a committee composed of Gestapo chief Hans 
Krüger and his helpers, Brandt and Schott, assessed the physical condition of 
the individuals and divided them into three categories: A, B, and C. Category A 
included all craftsmen employed by the Germans, as well as healthy young 
men. Some of those in category B were sent to labor camps and others were 
deported to the extermination camp. All Jews who were assigned category C 
were sent directly to the extermination camp in Bełżec. In Kołomyja, however, 
the registration was conducted in April 1942 parallel with the selection of Jews 
for deportation.
JEWISH REACTION TO THE DEPORTATIONS
The actions of the Germans concerning the registration and categorization of 
employees caused a fierce reaction among the Jews, who understood that in 
order to survive in their current location they had to seek employment— ideally 
in companies producing goods for the German army. Facing the deportations 
to the death camps, the Jews in other districts of the General Government also 
took initiative, hoping to save their lives. It should be noted that the experience 
of the Jews in Galicia was different from those in other parts of the General 
Government. Firstly, the Jews of Galicia passed through the initial period of 
pogroms and mass executions already in summer 1941, so that now they under-
stood the cruelty of the German occupation and their hostile,  predominantly 
Ukrainian environment. Their initiative to create places of employment came 
together with the beginning of the Aktion Reinhardt in spring 1942, while the 
Jews in other parts of the General Government initiated development of differ-
ent forms of employment and creating new places of employment mainly due 
to hard economic situation, and not to save their lives.
The efforts to obtain supplementary jobs in particular factories, for 
example, in the German firm Schwartz and Co., came together with the efforts 
of the Germans to enlarge their activities and exploit the Jewish labor force. 
However, in the situation of imminent danger of the deportations, the company 
felt free to require that all applicants bring large sums of money or provide their own 
equipment, such as sewing machines.25 In this way, the Jewish employees 
25 YVA, M.49.E/4648, testimony of Dawid Bertisch; YVA, M.49.E/2171, testimony of Dawid 
Berber; YVA, M.49.E/1398, testimony of Szaja and Roza Feder. 
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themselves, in order to obtain the relevant documents protecting them from 
deportation, financed the activities of the companies employing them. These 
companies did not have to incur additional expenditure for expensive equip-
ment or tools, and, consequently, further increase their profits at no extra 
investment. But the actions of the Jews themselves went beyond the individ-
ual applications for a job. In Lwów, the Department of Industry and Trade of 
the Judenrat decided to found craftsmanship companies. These companies 
employed workers of different specialties: shoemakers, tailors, blacksmiths, car-
penters, and others. In addition, the Committee of Jewish Mutual Aid Society 
in Lwów organized workshops, known as urban workshops (Germ. Städtische 
Werkstätte; Pol. warsztaty miejskie). These workshops were created in the build-
ing of a school at Kazimierzowska Street. In this case also, the person apply-
ing for employment provided the machines, tools, and money that facilitated 
the operation of these workshops. Initially, five thousand jobs were planned 
there. In the second half of April 1942, 4,300 people were employed in these 
workshops. The workers received documents and armbands with the letter “A.” 
The workshops secured contracts to sew uniforms and the like from the mil-
itary authorities. The workshops in Lwów were developed along the lines of 
similar workshops in Bochnia. For this purpose, a member of the presidium 
of the Jewish Self-Assistance (ŻSS), Dr. Eliasz Tisch, visited Bochnia on April 
12, 1942 and prepared a comprehensive report on this subject. In April 1942, 
in order to assist in the establishment of the urban workshops, Salo Grajwer 
visited Lwów.26 Workshops and enterprises which provided additional jobs 
were also set up in other cities of the General Government, for instance, in 
Warsaw and Częstochowa.
In June 1942, when the Aktion Reinhardt was already in progress, the ŻSS 
tried to encourage establishment of collective production workshops in its cir-
cular letter: 
A long time ago, collective production workshops in Warsaw, Bochnia, and 
Tarnów had been organized without our support, and more recently, work-
shops in Drohobycz, Lwów, and Kraków appeared with our help. Workshops 
in Warsaw, Bochnia, and Tarnow have gained, in a relatively short period 
of time, not only the recognition of authorities and companies, but also 
markets, providing work and bread for thousands of families in Warsaw and 
26 YVA, M.49.E/4734, testimony of Rudolf Reder; YVA, M.49.E/4630, testimony of Róża 
Hochberg; S. Szende, Der Letzte Jude aus Polen (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1945), 285.
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hundreds of families in Bochnia and Tarnów. These workshops have given 
employment not only to qualified craftsmen and professional force, but also 
merchants and white-collar workers, and even lawyers, teachers, and the 
like, who in a relatively short time learned a craft.27 
To increase employment, the Jews themselves initiated similar estab-
lishments in various cities of the Galicia District: Stanisławów, Drohobycz, 
Borysław, and others. They were mostly businesses for tailoring, brush making, 
carpentry, metalwork, basketry, shoemaking, furriers, sheet metal, watchmak-
ers, electrical workshops, sign painting, weaving, and milliners. In some places, 
service companies, such as laundries and sewing rooms, were set up. For this 
production, a relatively low investment and low material costs were neces-
sary, but they required much labor. A sewing business could count on military 
orders and, on the whole, most of the production was intended for the army. 
In this case, the Jews applying for jobs supplied the sewing machines themselves. 
A basket maker produced, first of all, baskets for ammunition and artillery 
shells. A brush production business also required relatively simple and inex-
pensive materials but involved a large number of workers. An important factor 
was the low demand for energy, which at that time was a very important factor, 
because energy was rationed and plants producing marketable goods or items 
considered unnecessary for the war economy did not receive allocations of 
energy and fuel. Furthermore, from 1943, these businesses were reviewed by a 
special committee and closed down by administrative decisions.
Workshops were mostly situated in the ghettos or on the outer edge, 
but they also existed beyond the walls or fences of ghettos. For example, in 
Stanisławów and Kołomyja the so-called Umschlagstellen were created out-
side the ghettos.28 Actions taken by the Judenräte and Jewish Self-Assistance 
were of great importance, because they increased employment of Jews who 
had no work in German plants, and thereby protected them from deportation. 
In this case, the Jewish initiative had taken advantage of the existing produc-
tion capacity that called for relatively low investment. Often it meant simply 
adapting existing buildings for production purposes. It should be noted that the 
working conditions of the Jews were very difficult. They worked many hours 
a day in poorly lit and badly heated rooms. The production program of the 
27 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Okólnik nr 61. Dotyczy pomocy w dziedzinie pracy, BARDZO PILNE, 
Kraków, June 11, 1942, scans 702–3.
28 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 12–13.
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Jewish community also allowed employment of young people who were unpre-
pared from professional standpoint. They had to learn new skills quickly while 
performing lighter and simpler jobs. Jewish establishments also had to be 
competitive: they had to work efficiently and cheaply to secure contracts. 
That is why they worked many hours a day and were willing to receive very 
low wages. The newly established plants very often used recycled materials 
and trash of various kinds. In this case, recovery of raw materials and ingenuity 
knew no bounds.
TAKEOVER OF JEWISH AFFAIRS BY  
THE SS AND THE POLICE IN 1942
In mid-1942, all matters pertaining to the employment of Jews were handed over 
to the higher SS and police commander in the General Government, Friedrich-
Wilhelm Krüger. Then the SS and police again began to stamp personal identity 
documents that had been issued by the labor offices. From that time onwards, 
only the SS and police determined the assignment of Jewish forced laborers to 
the German authorities, institutions, and businesses.29 Therefore, the heads 
of the major departments in the administrative authorities of the General 
Government convened on June 22, 1942 to discuss matters regarding the fur-
ther employment of Jews. Krüger was also present at this meeting. Dr. Max 
Frauendorfer presented the difficulties associated with acute labor shortages 
in the General Government and declared that he would not give up Jewish 
labor. According to him and the Inspector for the Armament in the General 
Government, General Schindler, Jewish experts and specialists were also indis-
pensable in the armaments industry. Similar views were expressed by Naumann, 
the head of the Department of Food and Agriculture, who highlighted particular 
difficulties in recruitment of manpower in the Galicia District, which had caused 
the collapse of production plants, such as sugar beets. Difficulties in recruiting 
manpower appeared due to the fact that in Galicia, Ukrainians massively evaded 
agricultural work because it was hard and poorly remunerated, and therefore, unat-
tractive. However, the problem of labor recruitment in the General Government 
was far-reaching. First of all, there were not enough professional workers capable 
of working in the armaments industry. Because there were many professionals 
among the Jews or because of the threat of deportation, adding to the realization 
that jobs in the armaments industry could save their lives, Jews undertook the 
29 Berenstein, “O podłożu,” 68–69; Karay, “The Conflict among German Authorities.” 
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work, even in areas where no experience was required. Moreover, they tried to 
learn the required operations as rapidly as possible, learning from the others and 
gaining experience directly at the workplace in order not to lose their jobs and, 
consequently, their lives.
For the non-Jewish population, work in industry, despite the use of various 
incentives in the form of additional vouchers for food and material necessities, 
was not very attractive because the official salary tables suggested an amount 
that did not keep pace with inflation. Those who could find additional earnings 
in the private sector or trading on the black market clearly preferred this way 
of life. It should be noted that throughout the occupation, permanent recruit-
ment for forced labor took place in Germany, which caused a large outflow of 
labor. At the meeting on June 22, 1942, Naumann had asked Krüger to provide 
Jewish workers for agriculture in Galicia to resolve the employment crisis. If the 
agricultural work was not done, there would be a risk of incurring large losses 
and not meeting yield quotas. At that time, the Jews were reported en masse to 
work, desiring to be protected against actions. Krüger agreed to the allocation 
of Jewish laborers to work in agriculture, providing they had strict and severe 
supervision. It was preferable because the police force did not have sufficient 
manpower to control the Jews.
The extent of the difficulties is evident: 1,800 large farms in Galicia 
demanded about 30,000 to 40,000 workers. About a month later, Himmler 
arrived on a visit to Lublin, during which he issued a decree, dated July 19, 
1942, ordering to end the deportation of all Jews from the General Government 
until December 31, 1942. After then, Jews could still inhabit five collective 
camps in four districts of the General Government. Galicia was not even 
mentioned in this document, nor were the collective camps in the district.30 
This may have been an oversight, or, more likely, it could have indicated that 
the SS treated the district differently. Despite the annexation to the General 
Government in 1941, many facts indicate that Galicia was perceived as a 
separate entity. First of all, throughout the course of the war and the occupation, 
the management of Galicia was different. The first period of the occupation 
was characterized by violent pogroms against the Jewish people and the activ-
ities of the Einsatzgruppen, which launched the mass destruction of the Jewish 
population in those areas. Then the process of harmonization of legislation 
with the General Government went very quickly, albeit with some differences 
30 Order by Himmler on July 19, 1941 for the completion of the “Final Solution” in the 
Government-General (NO-5574), in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 275.
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due to the ethnic composition of these areas. This led to economic expansion. 
However, in comparison with other districts, Jewish life in Galicia constantly 
proceeded in the shadow of death. In summer and autumn months of 1941, 
actions took place in many locations. For example, in Stanisławów on October 
12, 1941, about 12,000 Jews were murdered. In terms of strategic importance, 
Galicia occupied a significant location because of its railways and roads leading 
to the east. Thus, the majority of supplies for the army passed through Galicia. 
Moreover, Galicia also fulfilled the role of the army’s rear: production carried 
out in this district to supply the army could be delivered much faster, better, 
and cheaper than from the depths of Germany. In order to improve transport 
capacities, construction of a major road leading to the east was launched. To 
achieve this goal, a number of Jewish workers were mobilized from forced labor 
camps along the future road. The Todt Organization (Organisation Todt, OT) 
performed the basic construction work. It is therefore possible that Himmler 
did not mention Galicia in his order of July 19, 1942, leaving himself and the 
others freedom of action regarding the Jews in Galicia.
Despite the fact that Galicia was not listed in Himmler’s decree, the severe 
reduction of the Jewish labor force continued to take place there. This process 
was implemented through a new selection during which the registration cards 
were either stamped with new stamps, or invalidated. In Lwów in August 1942, 
certificates of Jews employed in urban workshops were not stamped. In October 
1942, about 500 people employed there were liquidated by the Gestapo and 
100 other professionals were imprisoned in the Łąckiego Street Jail. Similarly, 
in Stanisławów, many identity cards of those employed in the German institu-
tions and companies were not stamped. In October 1942, the workshops at the 
Umschlagstelle had been liquidated and the cards already issued were cancelled. 
Moreover, some employees of the Judenrat and the Jewish Self-Assistance did 
not receive new stamps. The stamps with the inscription Haushalt issued earlier 
by the labor offices were cancelled. Only a few dozen people remained in some 
locations where several thousand ghetto residents once lived. Those left in the 
ghettos were the Kommandos whose job was to clean up (Räumungskommando). 
Their task was to search the ghetto vicinity after the evacuation of the Jews and 
to collect items of interest for the Germans. These were primarily hidden trea-
sures, but also valuable and useful furniture, carpets, ceramics, objects of every-
day use, and eventually recycled raw materials such as glass, rags, non-ferrous 
metals, iron, furs, and paper. In addition to the special Räumungskommando, 
so-called rag collectors, were involved. In May 1942, instead of plaques 
with numbers they received new ID cards and armbands with the letter “A.” 
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During the deportation, their ID cards were stamped again, as they were 
found indispensable. This was a particularly privileged group, because in the 
period of the greatest terror, selections, actions, and deportations to the exter-
mination camps, they could move freely within the whole district.
SOCIAL CONDITIONS, REMUNERATION, AND  
SIZE OF FORCED LABOR IN GALICIA
In the first phase of the occupation, Jews were forced to work in a disorganized 
and chaotic way. This applied above all to the time of pogroms and the “Days 
of Petlura” in Lwów, when Jews were brutally murdered on the streets and in 
houses. Jews were forced to perform different jobs, for example, to remove 
and bury corpses of murdered prisoners, to clean streets, and so forth. Apart 
from the period of pogroms, the Jews were apprehended in the streets by the 
Ukrainian militia, the German police, or the army and herded to different jobs. 
Their work was often completely useless, and its goal was only humiliation 
or mistreatment of the Jewish population. In other cases, they were assigned 
specific jobs such as cleaning up the streets, washing German cars, cleaning 
offices, transporting, loading or unloading all kinds of materials, and other 
various services. At that time, there were no standards or regulations on the part 
of the “employers,” and they were free to take advantage of arrested Jews. First 
of all, this was done under the threat of loss of life or injury, so the Jews could 
not in any way ignore or refuse to perform work. The only way to avoid such 
labor was to escape, but that was connected with huge risk. The “employer” did 
not feel obliged to grant any compensation for their services. The laborers also 
received no food and often had only basic tools. Moreover, Jews had no possi-
bility of appeal to any authority.
The situation changed after the establishment of the Judenräte. The 
Judenräte, seeing the chaos in the field of forced labor, tried to change this situ-
ation by providing the required quantity of workers for forced labor, on the one 
hand, and by handling demands for workers from the authorities, institutions, 
and German companies, on the other. The Judenräte themselves paid the work-
ers’ wages, while German firms did not bear any costs. This condition evidently 
led to financial difficulties for the Judenräte. Part of the forced labor expenses 
was borne by those who paid the appropriate sums for a replacement worker, 
so that the Judenrat only transferred this money to other workers. Each person 
obliged to perform forced labor had to work one day a week, and later, two 
days a week. For the poorest, who had no possible earnings except for those 
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from forced labor, that meager salary gave a minimum income to allow their 
survival. At the end of 1941, the Judenrat could not cover expenses of forced 
labor and introduced special taxes.31 In addition to payments for work, vouch-
ers for bread were also issued. Initially it was 1 kg of bread per day of work, 
and then this quantity of bread was systematically reduced. Salaries for work 
also were low and paid irregularly, and sometimes not at all. After changes in 
the procurement of forced labor in the summer of 1942 and the adjustments 
in the financing system of forced labor, German companies and institutions 
were forced to compensate Jewish employees for the work done. The fixed rate 
was, in general, about 2 zł for a ten-hour working day. In certain occupations 
or positions workers earned more, although not significantly. Frequently, the 
only compensation was free rent. For example, a worker in Kołomyja earned 
80 zł; a doctor in Tłuste earned 90 zł; a translator at the print shop in Czortków 
got 130 zł.32 The farm workers received food, and often did not receive any 
monetary remuneration at all. Importantly, food stamps were also issued at the 
workplace. Prices of bread on the open market were very high, so that a 1 kg loaf 
of bread costed 3 zł in food coupons, but on the open market it costed 16 zł in 
the summer and up to 24 zł in the winter. Receiving additional food coupons 
was sometimes more important than money, because salaries did not keep up 
with inflation.
GERMAN INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYING JEWISH FORCED LABORERS
In Eastern Galicia, Polish estates were nationalized by the Soviet authorities 
and collective farms were set up in their place. Some were transformed into 
Ukrainian cooperatives. The German authorities took over the farms without 
privatizing them and they were then transformed into agricultural estates under 
German management called Liegenschaften. This form facilitated not only the 
acquisition of large properties, but also their adaptation for the war economy 
and food production. The new German administration could freely adjust 
the profile of agricultural production, moving away from traditional crops to 
increase the cultivation of selected products, such as sugar beet. The naval 
blockade of Germany also encouraged the search for substitutes for different 
inaccessible raw materials that could be found in the fertile areas of Ukraine, for 
example, a plant called koksagiz that was used to produce rubber. To increase 
31 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 17.
32 Ibid.
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the profitability of their vast farms, the German management also used forced 
labor, including, above all, Jewish forced labor. Towards this objective, a 
network of labor camps was set up in the German holdings. Jewish labor in 
these farms was practically free of charge.
In addition to companies engaged in the expansion of construction of 
new roads, the Eastern Railway (Ostbahn) was one of the largest companies 
employing Jewish workers. Since the beginning of the war between Germany 
and the USSR, Lwów and other towns in Galicia were on the route of transpor-
tation of people, equipment, and supplies to the Eastern Front. In particular, 
Lwów became an important place of shipment of goods, which required much 
labor. Work was carried out around the clock. Besides, the Eastern Railway 
workers had to repair and lay new railway tracks. A large number of workers 
were needed to repair the rolling stock. They were employed by the railway 
repair establishments (Ostbahnhof-Ausbesserungswerk). Since September 1941, 
hundreds of well-off Jewish specialists were working at the railway. In addition, 
many physical laborers were hired for loading and unloading, transporting, and 
moving different substances, such as coal.33 
The idea of creating urban workshops arose as a result of the so-called 
“March Action”—the deportation of “antisocial elements” (Asoziale Elemente) 
in March 1942. In the course of “March Action,” a part of Jewish population 
from Lwów was deported to Bełżec. This action prompted people who had no 
work cards to find jobs at any price, as only that could protect them from depor-
tation. In this case, the game was no longer about economic survival but about 
life itself. High public pressure in search of employment meant that the leader-
ship of the Jewish community began to think of how to solve this problem. After 
the action in March 1942, a Jewish entrepreneur named Grajwer arrived from 
Bochnia for talks in Lwów. He was a man of experience, since he had founded 
workshops in Bochnia in which hundreds of Jews worked. In Lwów, the talks on 
the establishment of urban workshops were attended by a number of people, 
including Volksdeutsche Dormann, Commandant of Lwów, Dr. Heller, his 
 economic adviser, Dr. Rasp, and three Jewish businessmen: Traimski, the lawyer 
Dr. Rajzler, and David Schechter.34 The initiative on the establishment of urban 
workshops was supported by the head of the Department of Jewish Mutual 
Aid, activist Dr. Landau and the Association of Jewish Artisans in Lwów, 
33 Ibid., 7. 
34 Eliyahu Jones, Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji 1939–1944 (Lodz: Oficyna Bibliofilów, 
1999), 95.
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Dr. Maarer. Already in April 1942, the workshops were opened. Grajwer 
became their general director while the three above-mentioned entrepreneurs 
became their managers.35
The urban workshops were located at 20/22 Kazimierzowska Street and 
employed about 4,000–5,000 people.36 Obtaining a job in the workshops was 
easier for workers who had their own equipment or tools, especially sewing 
machines. Besides, those interested in working paid money to receive a job. 
This system meant that the organizers in a short time, without spending their 
own money, received the necessary equipment and funds for production. Such 
a situation could have occurred only in exceptional circumstances—at the risk 
of deportation. Employees received the necessary documents and badges with 
a letter “W,” signifying that they were employed for the Wehrmacht, to be worn 
on their clothes. The urban workshop primarily produced uniforms and uni-
form items. Some of the production was also designated for the free market.
In spring of 1942, urban workshops, like those in Lwów, were founded 
in other cities, such as Borysław, Drohobycz, and Stanisławów. The carpentry 
workshop established in Borysław produced furniture for German offices. 
The following workshops: tailoring, linen, producing baskets for ammunition, 
carpentry, brushes, and toys were established in Drohobycz. In turn, workshops 
set up in Stanisławów dealt in plumbing, electricity, tailoring, furs, watchmaking, 
sign painting, and making women’s hats. In this last town, workshops were 
located outside the ghetto in the Umschlagstelle.37 The situation in Kołomyja 
and Kosów was similar. In Brody, the workshops were called “Craftsman 
House” and employed 400 people. Later on, the Judenräte organized  workshops 
in Jezierzany, Tarnopol, Zbaraż, Złoczów, and other places.38 
Collecting recyclables remained a special type of employment for Jews. 
During the war, there was an extensive demand for various raw materials that 
were lacking for war production. To offset the increasing demand for these 
resources, the German authorities in occupied territories limited the produc-
tion of consumer goods for the local population, which resulted in only a slight 
improvement in those deficiencies. The solution was, on the one hand, the 
strong growth of a used goods market and, on the other hand, the development 
35 “Warsztaty dzielnicowe we Lwowie,” Gazeta Żydowska, April 29, 1942, 1.
36 “Z gmin żydowskich w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie: Warsztaty dzielnicowe we Lwowie,” 
Gazeta Żydowska, April 29, 1942, 1; “Wiadomości ze Lwowa: Rzemieślnicy na przedzie,” 
Gazeta Żydowska, June 14, 1942, 3.
37 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 12. 
38 Ibid., 13. 
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of illegal production and trade. Additionally, the collection of materials, espe-
cially iron, nonferrous metals, paper, rags, and other waste had become an 
important source of resources. For this purpose, special companies, which 
 handled the collection of desired materials, were formed. The Management 
Office for Old and Waste Materials (Bewirtschaftungsstelle für Alt-und 
Abfallstoffe) granted special concessions to companies engaged in  collecting 
refuse, garbage, and rubbish. The largest company, founded by Victor Kremin, 
was called Victor Kremin Old and Waste Materials Collection for the Districts 
of Lublin and Galicia (Viktor Kremin Alt- und Abfallstoffe Erfassung für die 
Distrikt Lublin und Galizien), and specialized not only in the collection of rags 
and scrap metal, but also in their sorting, cleaning, and repair. In  addition to 
 collecting and processing discarded materials, those companies owned  facilities 
that also dealt in repair and laundering of the uniforms of frontline soldiers. 
Jewish workers collecting materials had special certificates and were marked 
with the letter “R” (Rohstoff), which allowed them to move around freely. This 
was a privilege, because at this time most Jews were contained in ghettos and 
labor camps. There were also two other companies: Lindberger, which col-
lected glass, bottles, and glass packaging, and a business owned by R. Wolf, 
engaged in collecting waste paper.39
LABOR CAMPS IN GALICIA
One of the largest networks of camps was set up along a strategic road DG IV 
(Durchgangsstrasse IV), which ran from Przemyśl, through Lwów, to Kiev.40 
This route was 350 km long. All along the route, camps were established—each 
managing a separate section of the road. The modernization project involved 
constructing new roads and repairing railways, old roads, and bridges. In order 
to implement this plan, the commander of the SS and police (SSPF) in the 
Galicia District, Fritz Katzmann, created a network of labor camps for Jews. 
In his report Katzmann wrote about this project: 
The best means for this [evasion of forced labor and black market] was 
the establishment of Forced Labor Camps by the SS and Police Leader. 
There was, first of all work on the urgently needed reconstruction of  
39 Ibid., 9.
40 Andrej Angerick, “Annihilation and Labor: Jews and Thoroughfare IV in Central Ukraine,” 
in The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memory, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008), 190–223; Sandkühler, “Endlösung,” 137–148.
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Dg. 4 [Durchgangstrasse IV], which was extremely important for the 
entire southern section of the Front and which was in catastrophically 
bad condition. On October 15, 1941, a start was made on the building of 
camps along the railroad tracks, and after a few weeks, despite consider-
able difficulties, 7 camps had been put up, containing 4,000 Jews. More 
camps soon followed, so that in a very short period of time the completion 
of 15 such camps could be reported, to the Higher SS and police Leader. 
About 20,000 Jewish laborers passed through these camps in the course 
of time. Despite all conceivable difficulties that turned up on this project, 
about 160 km have now been completed.41
At the head of the Board of Labor Camps stood SS-Obersturmführer 
Gustav Bolten and the inspector of the camps was SS-Untersturmführer Konrad 
Hildebrandt. The first four camps were set up in October 1941 in Złoczów 
County (Kurowice,42 Lacki Wielkie,43 Jaktorów,44 and Płuhów). In December 
1941, six camps in the district of Tarnopol (Kamionki,45 Hluboczek,46 Stupki, 
Borki Wielkie,47 Zborów,48 and Jezierna49) were established, and one camp 
appeared in the district of Lwów(Winniki50). Later on, two other camps 
(Hermanów, Ostrów51) were created in this district. In total, the road construction 
camps employed about 4,000 people. In May 1942, there were 15 labor camps.52 
To supervise the technical performance of the work, German companies 
such as Otto Heil of Kissingen and Radebüle, Pohl und Lückel were enlisted. 
A company from Darmstadt named Auto Carriers for Galicia (Autotransport für 
Galizien) was accountable for transport.53
41 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of Galcia, 
on “The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” in Galicia (L-18) in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 336.
42 YVA-O.3/6822.
43 YVA-O.3/435, testimony of Joel Cygielman; O-3/1818, testimony of Marian Szatkowski; 
O.3.434, testimony of Dr. Bernard Gerber.
44 YVA-O.3/6822, testimony of Karol Kohan.
45 YVA-O.3/726, testimony of Juda Loewenson. 
46 YVA-O.3/3320, collective testimony.
47 YVA-O.3/1813, testimony of Tzadok Mondschein; O.3/3344, testimony of Arieh Czart; 
O.3/732, testimony of Itzhak Neuman. 
48 YVA-O.3/2135, testimony of Natalia Brauner. 
49 Ibid.
50 YVA-O.3/3225, testimony of Israel Gleich.
51 YVA-O.3/7524, testimony of Lehrer Mateusz.
52 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 20.
53 Ibid., 22.
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These camps were not permanent or built specifically for the purpose of 
road construction. Rather, they were improvised. Existing large buildings, such 
as farm buildings, monasteries and public buildings, were used to accommodate 
the inmates. Some workers were employed directly for the road works while 
others worked in the extraction of necessary construction material from 
 quarries. Working in the camps, both on the roads and in the quarries, was 
physically demanding. 
DAW was among the first German plants created in Galicia. Immediately 
after the occupation of Lwów by the German army, SS-Obersturmführer 
Wolfgang Mohwinkel from Lublin arrived in the city to set up a subsidiary 
company of DAW. Mohwinkel took over the former mill machinery factory 
and the Steinhaus Company TBM Building Society on Janowska Street. 
SS-Obersturmführer Fritz Gebauer54 was a branch manager of DAW. He 
 proceeded to organize workshops of different specialties, such as metalwork, 
carpentry, and auto repair. The haste of the SS men was understandable. 
Since Mohwinkel was one of the first to come to the area after the German 
army seized the region, he took advantage of his belonging to the SS and 
seized the equipment for his future plants. He collected machinery and raw 
materials in Lwów and carried them into the Janowska Street establishment. 
In this manner, he took over the administrative authority and authorized 
seizure of equipment.55
Fritz Gebauer immediately launched establishments employing a large 
number of the pre-war office staff and officials. In order to increase the number 
of employees, he demanded supplies and additional workers from the Judenrat. 
At the end of August 1941, 150 workers were employed in the plant; by October, 
up to 500 people worked there. Initially, DAW plants at Janowska Street were 
called outposts or places of work (placówka), where the Jews arrived for work 
and left afterwards. As early as autumn 1941, roundups took place in the newly 
created labor camps,56 apprehending many Jews who willingly volunteered to 
work in DAW. However, on October 31, 1941, after finishing work the laborers 
were not allowed to go home, but kept on location. They were placed in uncom-
pleted boarding houses within the factory premises, fenced in with barbed wire, 
guard towers were set up, and the whole area was secured, thereby turning the 
DAW plant into a labor camp.
54 YVA-O.3/1691, testimony of Artur Wiejski-Weiser.
55 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 5. 
56 YVA-O.3/1772, testimony of Jacub Friedman, 2–3.
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The Camp on Janowska Street was expanded in February 194257 after the 
expulsion of existing residents. The management set up new workshops in the 
camp. In the new area adjacent to the old camp, facilities for several thousand 
prisoners were built. The commander of this camp was SS-Untersturmführer 
Gustav Willhaus.58 At the end of March 1942, about 400 Jews came from Lwów 
to this new camp. In April and May, groups of Jews from various towns in the 
Lwów District arrived at the camp. This was associated with the deportations 
to the extermination camp at Bełżec, where selections were conducted and 
able-bodied workers were sent to labor camps. The total number of prisoners 
amounted to about 2,000. Initially, the prisoners were engaged in building and 
cleaning the camp. Then, workshops were set up. The inmates of Janowska 
Street camp were also a reservoir of labor for various German institutions in 
the city. To work in the city, groups of Jewish workers left their base in the camp 
every day. The prisoners from Janowska Street worked in railway stations and 
railway workshops and in factories under the management of military author-
ities, the police and SS. They also performed clean-up work and construction 
in the city.
OTHER WORK CAMPS IN THE DISTRICT OF GALICIA
In addition to the labor camps along the strategic transportation routes and 
the Janowska Street camp, other camps were set up in the district of Galicia. 
The camps developed especially fast in the spring of 1942, when mass 
 deportations of Jews to extermination camps began. Throughout the period of 
 deportations, selections in the ghettos were carried out, during which young and 
strong men were sent to labor camps or left in the ghetto to work in offices and 
help clean out abandoned homes. Many German institutions and plants in this 
period were transformed into labor camps. Labor camps, in contrast to the ghet-
tos, had a selected workforce and were almost entirely composed of able-bod-
ied  workers. Once places of employment were converted into labor camps, the 
workers there were protected from deportation. Transforming outposts to labor 
camps was easy, as the outposts already retained permanent detachments of 
57 Sandkühler, “Endlösung,” 185–90; YVA-O.3/2373, testimony of Dr. Efraim Halpern; 
O.3/3320, collective testimony; O.3/2842, testimony of Szarlotta Nachta (Wach); 
O.3/2233, testimony of Dorota Seilaender; O.3/1691, testimony of Artur Wiejski-Weiser; 
O.3/1772, testimony of Jakub Friedman; O.3/3225, testimony of Edward Gleich; O.3/3849, 
testimony of Shemuel Dreichs; O.3/2373, testimony of Dr. Efraim Halpern.
58 YVA-O.3/1691, testimony of Artur Wiejski-Weiser.
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workers, which only had to be put into buildings and guarded. As in other dis-
tricts of the General Government, in Galicia, the  transformation of the ghettos 
into labor camps took place during the deportation, when Jews were consid-
ered nonproductive, they were eliminated. The only difference was the mode 
of transformation. In some places, small ghettos (Pol. getto  szczątkowe; Germ. 
Restghetto) were created to house the remaining workers, which de facto became 
labor camps. In other cases, selected workers were sent to  different  locations, 
where they were housed and worked in one or more places. Therefore, the out-
posts, during the liquidation of the ghettos, were not typically used for resident 
ghetto laborers, but rather for prisoners from labor camps.
In spring of 1942, the places of work at Czwartaków Street59 and Grodecka 
Street in Lwów were converted to labor camps. Similarly, a labor camp was 
established in Sasów (Złoczów County). The prisoners worked in a quarry in 
Ruda Kołtowska. However, it was clear that German companies were interested 
in maintaining Jewish labor force; therefore, they set up labor camps to secure 
cheap labor and to protect the laborers from deportation. For example, the 
management of military facilities (Heeresunterkunftverwaltung) created a labor 
camp in Sambor. The District Forestry Office in Złoczów created a camp for 
their workers as well. The Wehrmacht set up a camp in Sielec Zawonie for 870 
prisoners.60 In Stryj County, labor camps for workers employed at the mills in 
the villages Delatyn, Mikuliczyn, Nadworna, and Skole were created. A similar 
process of establishing labor camps in existing facilities was carried out in agri-
culture; especially in koksagiz farms in the Drohobycz County where they hired 
thousands of girls and young women. Other agricultural labor camps were cre-
ated in Kazimierówka, Kopanie, Grzęda, and Drohobycz.61
The prominent development of German companies working for the 
Wehrmacht took place in 1942, even though already in 1941 there was a great 
demand for work on infrastructure development, shipment of goods, and 
repair of rolling stock. The difference lies in the fact that in 1941 there were 
reserves of ammunition, equipment, and supplies for the army. However, these 
materials had been exhausted and German industry could not keep up with the 
production of items necessary for the army. Moreover, the longer communi-
cation lines and the transfer of many supplies for the troops into territory occu-
pied by Germany resulted in an increased demand for services and provisions 
59 YVA-O.3/1691, testimony of Artur Wiejski-Weiser.
60 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 5. 
61 Ibid. 
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for the army, which in turn led to the development of companies working for 
the Wehrmacht. In many factories, Jewish workers constituted from 25% to 
100% of the workforce. Unsurprisingly, the precise number depended on the 
specialty, but in some plants, particularly those repairing military uniforms, 
building carriages (the specialists were called stelmach in Polish, or Stellmacher 
in German), or saddles, Jews made up to 100% of the labor force.62
Among the plants working for the Wehrmacht were the Military Car Park 
(Heereskraftpark), Army Supply Management (Heeresunterkunftverwaltung), 
Office of Military Construction (Heeresbauamt), Training Workshops 
(Ausbildung swerkstätte), Military Forest Office (Heeresforstamt), Local Commands 
(Ortskommandantur), Economic Command (Wirtschaftskommnado), power 
plant Booty Storehouses (Beutesammelstelle), and Border Protection Corps 
(Grenzschutz). Other facilities included military barracks, camps for prisoners 
of war, radio stations, et cetera. Among companies working for the Wehrmacht 
were United Timber Companies (Vereinigte Holz Betriebe, VHB) and Schwarz & 
Co. Among the workshops that dealt with the repair of uniforms were Textilia, 
Metrowat AG, Holzbau A.G. (Hobag), and others. In Bolechów, furniture facto-
ries worked for the army. Karpathen Öl A.G., which dealt with the extraction of oil 
in Galicia, was particularly important for the German economy. 63
WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS
Living and working conditions of Jewish prisoners in forced labor camps in 
Galicia were as harsh as in the labor camps in the rest of the General Government. 
Jewish prisoners were very severely exploited. The institutions responsible for 
organizing the work were trying to reduce the costs of forced labor as much as 
possible, and, consequently, attempting to increase their profits. However, this 
aspect of economic life requires further explanation, because it was not only a 
result of the policy of the companies that employed prisoners. First of all, we 
have to consider that the Jews were at the bottom of the social ladder and were 
practically deprived of all rights. In particular, this could be seen in Galicia from 
the first days of German occupation, when the wave of pogroms and massacres 
was carried out by the Einsatzgruppen while the Jews were denied of any option 
of appeal. Despite temporary stabilization, the situation of the Jews remained 
62 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 22.
63 BA-MA, RW23-14, Rüstungskommando Lemberg, Bericht des Dienststellenleiters zu Ziffer 
2c des Kriegstahebuches, Lemberg, den 1 Juli 1943, 10.
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very difficult with no great hopes of improvement. Particularly in Galicia in 
1941, there was practically no possibility of recourse to any judicial or admin-
istrative institution, so that the abuse of Jews continued virtually unpunished.
The situation of Jews in labor camps was difficult not only due to the 
employment and economic policies of companies that used forced labor, but 
also because they were exposed to the whole system of corruption within the 
German administration. With war economy and shortages, all food products 
became precious commodities, which could be used for consumption, 
exchanged for other goods, or sold. Jews had already suffered from low standards 
of food; and food products intended for the Jews did not reach them in their 
entirety. Some foodstuffs had been appropriated en route by various officials. 
In addition, the control system, particularly in the labor camps for Jews, did not 
function properly. As mentioned above, Jews had very limited possibilities to 
appeal to higher authorities. They could not bring lawsuits against the Germans, 
which explains why, with the exception of a few well-known cases of anti- 
corruption investigations by the German authorities against German officers, 
most of the violations remained unpunished. Jews were the object of ruthless 
exploitation. Despite the injury inflicted by functionaries that weakened or 
caused the death of Jewish workers, it was easier to replace those Jews with new 
workers than to improve their life and work conditions. This repressive system 
had no mechanism of regulation. It was dominated by a propensity towards 
unlimited exploitation, thus creating a mechanism which led to the elimina-
tion of the labor force, while, at the same time, reservoirs of Jewish labor force 
seemed endless.
There were, however, differences in the treatment of prisoners between the 
camps operated by the SS and the camps subject to other administrative author-
ities. In the camps run by the SS, the situation was much more difficult, because 
corporal punishment was commonly used and the discipline was very severe. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that the SS was a repressive organization of police and not 
an economic organization had an impact on this situation. The treatment of sick 
Jews in the Jaktorów labor camp in spring of 1942 can illustrate the situation. 
During epidemics of typhus, instead of providing medical treatment, 80 patients 
were simply shot to death and thus the epidemic problem was solved.64 
Prisoners working in the camps did not receive financial compensation. 
Companies employing Jewish workers from the camps only paid the camp 
64 Relacja Heryka Charasza, 2299, 6362, in Dokumenty zbrodni i męczeństwa, ed. Michał M. 
Borwicz, Nella Rost, and Josef Wulf (Krakow: CKŻP, 1945), 28
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authorities for the Jewish labor and not the workers themselves, which, in 
effect, turned the Jewish workers into slaves. The work of the prisoners was 
paid according to daily wage rates, with additional 10% for accommodations 
in the camp. Daily wages paid by the company for road works were 3.4 zł plus 
10%, a total of 3.8 zł for ten hours of work, or 0.38 zł per hour, while Polish 
workers received 1.2–1.5 zł per hour, and German workers received 3 zł per 
hour.65 These tariffs were very advantageous for German companies, since the 
cost of Jewish labor was about 28% of the Polish worker’s labor cost and only 
12.6% of the cost of a German worker. Despite the low rates for Jewish workers, 
their upkeep was profitable for the camp authorities because only a small por-
tion of the sum received was earmarked for feeding the prisoners.
65 Berenstein, “Praca przymusowa ludności żydowskiej,” 27.
CHAPTER 7
Jewish Labor in  
the Shadow of  
the Aktion Reinhardt
After the first two years of the occupation, the economic situation of the  Jews in the General Government was very difficult due to economic 
 persecution, high unemployment, and ghettoization. However, after the 
 beginning of Operation Barbarossa the situation began to change quite quickly. 
The need for more and more war material for the Eastern Front caused rapid 
development of new enterprises producing for the army. The drainage of 
Polish forced labor to Germany reduced high unemployment in the General 
Government. On the other hand, the search for a cheap labor force reached 
the great ghettos, such as the Warsaw Ghetto in the General Government and 
Litzmannstadt Ghetto in Warthegau. In both places in 1940, and even at the 
beginning of 1941, the living conditions of the Jews were catastrophic and the 
mortality rate was very high. In medium and small towns, the mortality was 
lower due to better possibilities to obtain food.1 However, when predominantly 
German firms began to open workshops in the ghettos, the death rate dropped 
and living conditions improved. The Jewish inhabitants had hope. This was a 
change of improvement, and the Jews believed that their work was so import-
ant for the German war economy that it would save their lives. Despite this, 
at the beginning of 1942, the die was cast. During the entire period of Aktion 
Reinhardt, Jews were living between death and hope.
 1 YVA-JM.814. The mortality rates in Lublin in November 1940 were the following: Poles–
68, Jews–61. In November 1939, 120 Poles and 59 Jews died. Lublin, Stadthauptmann, 
Lagebericht für November 1940, scan 379. 
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THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT DURING  
THE WANNSEE CONFERENCE
The Wannsee conference, which took place on January 20, 1942, was attended 
by Dr. Josef Bühler,2 representative of the General Government.3 His state-
ments are of prime importance, since they represented the official position 
of the General Government and directly referred to the fate of the Jews living 
there. During the conference, arguments concerning the use of Jews as a labor 
force were also presented, but these arguments were drowned out by other 
participants. It is worth quoting part of the protocol: 
As to the question of the effect of the evacuation of the Jews on the 
economy, Secretary of State Neumann stated that Jews employed in 
essential war industries could not be evacuated for the present, as long 
as no replacements were available.4 
Despite this argument, it should be noted that the Germans were at this 
time almost at the peak of their power, and despite supply difficulties on the 
Eastern Front, there were, in fact, no serious labor force shortages yet, and 
that during the winter of 1941 and 1942 millions of Soviet POWs had died of 
 starvation.
As mentioned, Dr. Josef Bühler was one who took part in the discussion:
Secretary of State Dr. Bühler put on record that the Government-General 
would welcome it if the final solution of this problem was begun in the 
Government-General, as, on the one hand, the question of transport there 
played no major role and considerations of labor supply would not hinder 
the course of this Aktion. Jews must be removed as fast as possible from 
the Government-General, because it was there in particular that the Jew 
as a carrier of epidemics spelled a great danger, and, at the same time,  
 2 JD Josef Bühler (1904–1948) was since November 1939 the chief of the Office of the 
General Governor (Chef des Amtes des Generalgouverneurs) Hans Frank. Since March 1940 
he became the secretary of state (Staatssekretär), and since June 1940 he was the deputy of 
the General Governor (Stellvertreter). He fled from Kraków on January 18, 1945. Bühler was 
arrested by Americans on May 30, 1945, extradited to Poland in May 1946, sentenced to 
death on July 10, 1948, and executed in Kraków on August 21, 1948.
 3 AIPN, NTN, 196/239, 193.
 4 Protocol of the Wannsee conference, January 20, 1942 (NG-2586-G), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 260.
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he caused constant disorder in the economic structure of the country by 
his continuous black-market dealings. Furthermore, of the approximately 
2.5 million Jews under consideration, the majority were in any case unfit 
for work.5 
Bühler’s reasoning was the result of an earlier economic policy in the 
General Government, according to which the nonproductive population 
should be reduced and only the productive population be allowed to remain. 
The problem was that in the eyes of the German authorities, members of 
Jewish families of working people—that is, children under 14 years old, elderly, 
sick, or anyone unable to work, were also considered to be nonproductive. The 
remaining arguments concerning the spread of illnesses and the black market 
were also unfounded, since the spread of disease was the result of living condi-
tions in the ghettos, for which the German authorities were responsible, and 
black market trade was a result of transforming most manufactures into war 
production industries, thereby creating shortages of consumer goods and food 
products in the general market.
Bühler endorsed the “Final Solution,” which was consistent with the 
principles of General Governor Dr. Hans Frank. The minutes of the confer-
ence stated: 
Secretary of State Dr. Bühler further states that the solution of the Jewish 
question in the Government-General was primarily the responsibility of 
the Chief of the Security Police and the SD and that his work would have 
the support of the authorities of the Government-General. He had only 
one request: that the Jewish question in this area is solved as quickly as 
possible.6
To facilitate the action, Jews were persuaded that they were being evacu-
ated to the east in order to transport them to new places of settlement and work. 
Ultimately, as news of mass destruction spread and the Jewish population reluc-
tantly reported to the transports, the most brutal methods to intimidate, even 
terrorize, the Jews in order to break any psychological resistance were used. In 
addition, mass murder, constant shooting, and use of dogs during the evacua-
tion of the ghettos to extermination camps caused additional fear.
 5 Ibid., 260–61.
 6 Ibid., 261.
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Deportations from the ghettos took place in stages. Frequently during 
the first deportation a selection was made, leaving behind a small percent-
age of able-bodied people. This number was usually from 10% to 30% of the 
total population of the ghettos. Obviously, it was also dependent on needs and 
opportunities. For example, before the liquidation of the Jews, the ghetto in 
Częstochowa had about 42,000 inmates. During the liquidation in September 
1942, only about 6,000 people were left, representing approximately 15% of the 
total population. In some small ghettos, where there were no factories and no 
particular need for Jewish labor, the special units usually liquidated the entire 
population. Typically, in small ghettos, a Räumungskommando was employed. 
After completing their work, in general, the team was liquidated or transferred 
to a labor or concentration camp.7
Evacuation of larger ghettos to death camps was via the railway. In local-
ities without a railway station, the Jewish population was usually concentrated in 
larger towns. Transport took place on foot or with the aid of peasant carts. 
In remote villages, far away from railroads, mass executions were perpetrated 
in the nearby forests. Łomazy, in the Lublin District, is an example of the kind 
of extermination that was implemented by Police Battalion 101. Similar execu-
tions took place in Józefów Biłgorajski and other places.
The beginning of the deportations of Jews to extermination camps was 
also marked by an extensive disinformation campaign. On the one hand, a list 
of those exempted from evacuation was announced, but on the other hand, the 
authorities did not keep their word and people who came to the square and 
presented themselves for document control could not be certain whether they 
actually would be exempt. An announcement posted in the Warsaw Ghetto 
contained a long list of people exempt from the evacuation:
The following are excluded from the resettlement:
a.  All Jewish people employed by German authorities or enterprises, who 
can show proof of this fact;
b.  All Jewish people who are members or employees of the Judenrat (on 
the day of the publication of this regulation);
c.  All Jewish people who are employed by a German Reich company and 
can show proof of this fact;
d.  All Jews capable of work who have up to now been brought to their 
workplaces are to be taken to the barracks in the Jewish quarter;
 7 Henryk Schönker, Dotknięcie Anioła (Warsaw: Ośrodek Karta, 2005), 205–6; AŻIH, 
301/4605, testimony of Lejzor Richman, 3.
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e.  All Jewish people who belong to the staff of the Jewish hospitals. This 
applies also to the members of the Jewish Disinfection Team;
f.  All Jewish people who belong to the Jewish Police (Jüdischer 
Ordnungsdienst); 
g.  All Jewish people who are first-degree relatives of the person listed 
under a) through;
f.  Such relatives are exclusively wives and children;
h.  All Jewish people who are hospitalized in one of the Jewish hospitals 
on the first day of the resettlement and are not fit to be discharged. 
Fitness for discharge will be decided by a doctor to be appointed by the 
Judenrat.8
In Lublin, the Germans launched a document exchange. Previous personal 
documents were canceled and replaced by new ones. 
The evacuation of the Jewish population will continue in future with 
the difference that the valid document permitting a person to remain in 
Lublin will no longer be the Arbeitsausweis with the stamp of the Sipo, but 
the J.[uden]-Ausweis. Those in possession of the J.-Ausweis are entitled to 
remain in Lublin, all others will be evacuated.9 
The technique of document exchange was used throughout Aktion 
Reinhardt in various forms. This was a relatively simple and effective form of 
public confusion to prevent forgery of documents.
EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH LABOR DURING AKTION REINHARDT
Liquidation of the ghettos meant the total elimination of the Jewish 
population, with almost no exceptions. Only the members of the 
Raumungskommando were allowed to live for a few days or weeks and then 
were also killed. Liquidations took place in a progressive manner, as those 
who were responsible for carrying out the selection left the healthy and able 
8 Announcement of the evacuation of the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto, July 22, 1942, in Arad 
and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 281–82; Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 300–302.
9 Protocol of the general meeting of the Lublin Judenrat on March 31, 1942, in Arad and 
Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 269–72; Blumental, Documents from Lublin Ghetto, 
314–18.
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to work alive. Therefore, the general argument regarding the usefulness of 
the Jewish workforce was still brought up in various discussions, protocols, 
and correspondence. Especially in the early days of liquidation actions, even 
in talks between German officials, it was attempted to keep the elimination 
totally secret. Therefore, a memorandum of the conversation between the 
staff of the Lublin District governor’s offices, Reuter and Höfle, and the chief 
of staff of the liquidation action by the SSPF in the Lublin District, Odilo 
Globocnik, may have caused some consternation. Höfle, apparently, tried to 
mislead Reuter, which was possible in the first day of the action in the Lublin 
ghetto. The following is an excerpt of the interview notes:
It would be right if the Jews from transports coming to Lublin were 
already divided at the departure station in those able and unable to work. 
If making this division at the station is not possible, it would eventually be 
desirable to perform the separation in Lublin.
All Jews unable to work are to be transported to Bełżec, the furthest 
border station in Zamość County. SS-Hauptsturmführer Höfle plans to 
build a big camp, in which Jews able to work shall be registered according 
to their occupations and considering the demand.10 
Further on, Höfle tried to convince the caller that the evacuation of 
the Jews was irreversible. Nevertheless, Bełżec was located on the edge of the 
district of Lublin, on the border with Galicia. “In conclusion, he stated that 
he could take 4–5 daily transports of 1,000 Jews sent to Bełżec station. Those 
Jews, once they had crossed the border, would never return to the General 
Government.”11
SS and police commanders also elaborated on the usefulness of the Jews. 
On the one hand, they admitted the fact that Jews were useful and needed to 
work in war production, but on the other hand, they announced that they were 
willing to follow orders concerning the liquidation of Jews.12
10 Reuter’s note, about a conversation held with Höfle, the future chief of staff of Operation 
Reinhard, in connection with an action of extermination of the Jews, commenced in Lublin, 
Lublin, March 17, 1942, 281.
11 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 281.
12 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of 
Galicia, on “The Solution of the Jewish problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 337.
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JEWISH INITIATIVES IN THE FACE OF AKTION REINHARDT
Even before the beginning of Aktion Reinhard, the Jewish Self-Assistance tried 
to take initiative of organizing Jewish communities of workers. In one of their 
circular letters of February 16 [1942], one month before the liquidation of the 
ghetto in Lublin began, they wrote: 
The branches and institutions of Jewish Self-Assistance, with few excep-
tions, have so far limited all their activities towards providing so-called 
“primitive” aid: food, clothing, healing, and to combat or prevent an 
 epidemic. This type of aid inevitably has temporary nature. Every social 
activity, however, should strive to ensure that after some time help will 
become unnecessary. Therefore, we warn our centers of the need to 
address other forms of assistance, more purposeful and constructive.  
We are thinking in particular about assistance in the field work.13 
This change in concept of social assistance had not been motivated by the 
imminent danger of destruction. As the Self-Asistance officials explained: 
Only recently we were able to persuade the central economic authorities 
to consider the problem of employment of Jewish craftsmen. For larger 
workshops and craft associations it is possible to receive orders for goods 
of daily use and some products of small industry. For this we need in the 
coming days to provide information on production opportunities by 
Jewish craftsmen in different localities. Primarily, it concerns joiners, coo-
pers, tailors, shoemakers, harness and haberdashery (like toys) makers.14
In order to obtain an accurate picture of the production capacity of each 
locality, the Presidency of the Jewish Self-Assistance asked for a list of bigger 
workshops or associations of workers in mentioned branches of production 
or other possibilities of production in every locality: which machines they 
 possessed; the size of orders could they accept; and in what time could they 
perform those orders. The local committees of Self-Assistance were also asked 
whether the local communities had before received orders of labor from the 
13 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Okólnik nr 55, Kraków, dnia 16 lutego 1942, scan 691.
14 Ibid.
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German authorities, German institutions, or both German and Polish com-
panies, and how large were these orders. The Presidency of the Jewish Self-
Assistance asked for exact and precise data. In that circular letter, the Presidency 
asked the officials to speak with craftsmen or their associations and make effort 
to receive orders on the spot. The Presidency also requested the officials to 
provide the utmost support to artisans and their associations according to their 
needs and local conditions.15 The necessary permits to establish labor asso-
ciations were issued by: Regional Chamber of Crafts (Gruppe Handwerk in 
der Abteilung der Distriktkammer Gewerbliche Wirtschaft) or Kreishauptmann, 
Stadthauptmann, Stadtkommissar, or Landkommissar.16
After obtaining permission from the authorities, a joint office in every 
locality shall be formed for the organization of labor community, which will 
take care of all administrative matters. Next, a community manager shall 
be chosen, who could be authorized to establish the labor community. The 
 manager was to be responsible for the proper operation of the  community 
and had to sign the appropriate declaration. A text of the membership 
 agreement should be prepared, which also had to be accepted by the super-
vising  authority. The membership agreement recorded the commitment of 
members to the joint execution of any orders received by the community, 
joint liabilities for damages, the regulation of working schedule, payment, 
and the like. Members welcomed into the community were to receive uni-
fied identification cards. Next, various professional groups were to be estab-
lished within the community of labor, run by headmasters, who were to guide 
the work from technical point of view. The community could divide orders 
among individual  workshops, or execute the orders in joint workshops, where 
artisans have put their machines. The establishment of a labor community was 
to be reported to the appropriate territorial Chamber of Crafts. In addition, it 
had to be registered in the Office of the Governor of the District, Branch of 
Trade and Industry (Gewerbliche Wirtschaft).17 
The community was to be created regardless of whether the order was 
obtained or not. According to the experience of the Jewish Self-Assistance, 
it was much easier to get the order for communities already organized, than 
for those that were yet to be established. In the localities with closed residen-
tial quarters, labor communities were to be established after approval of the 
15 Ibid.
16 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Instrukcja o organizowaniu wspólnot pracy, Załącznik do okólnika nr 
61 z dnia 11 czerwca 1942, scans 700–701.
17 Ibid.
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appropriate authority, their branches outside the Jewish quarter in order to take 
their orders from individual customers. The circular of Jewish Self-Assistance 
also stated that when applying for the orders, not only the production of new 
items from normal raw material had to be taken into account. The  communities 
should also apply for material to repair, refresh, and rework damaged  clothing to 
make it fit for use, and eventually for orders, concerning the production of util-
itarian objects from waste and substitute materials.18 According to the  circular 
letter, “People who do not have professional qualifications in the field of handi-
crafts should be, in consultation with the Labor Office, in part directed to work 
on the official facilities, and in part allocated to the needs of the  existing com-
munities, to perform their assignments after a brief training, which  experience 
has proven possible.”19 
According to the Jewish Self-Assistance, the Division of Labor [of the 
General Government] supported calls to the local offices of the Jewish Self-
Assistance with a drafted plan to use the winter period for the preparatory 
work related to gardening and farming. Primarily, they had in mind intensive 
horticultural production, and certain branches of the livestock and agricultural 
industry. According to the letter of January 5, 1942, “One can use rationally 
all, even the smallest scraps of land, which makes it easier to accept agricul-
tural youth.”20 In towns, where it was possible, lectures on local conditions for 
the agricultural and horticultural production were to be arranged, short-term 
courses organized for landowners, written instructions issued on how to use 
and exploit the land, and the like. Previously uncultivated areas were prepared 
for transformation into allotment gardens and large sections of land suitable for 
cultivation were acquired. Finally, cooperation with all existing institutions of 
agricultural work—employing candidates for agricultural training or students 
of agricultural courses at all agricultural facilities—was established.21 
The Jewish Self-Assistance urged their committees and delegation to orga-
nize preparatory work related to gardening and farming. Before starting the work 
they sent letters to most of their local committees asking to give  displaced  farmers 
and youth of both sexes preference when hiring for  agricultural work. They also 
sent a delegate to all villages in the district of Kraków to  perform  preparatory 
work and to tour the surrounding mansions, trying to find  accomodation for the 
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Okólnik nr 50, Dotyczy pomocy w dziedzinie pracy dla robotników 
rolnych. Kraków, dnia 5 stycznia 1942, scans 683–84.
21 Ibid.
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Jewish agricultural workers. Thanks to the efforts of the Jewish Self-Assistance, 
about 2,500 Jews found work in agriculture.22 
The Jewish Self-Assistance in the face of destruction and total liquidation 
of smaller ghettos and partial liquidation of larger ghettos wrote: 
We know that in a vast majority of cities and towns inhabited by Jews, 
Jewish productive forces are not even roughly used. Many people who 
have lost their livelihood, are forced to use the assistance of our social 
institutions, confined as it is very common to a bowl of soup a day. Pulling 
certain parts of dependents to the working process, on the one hand, 
would relievea large extent our [of the Self-Assistance] institutions, and 
on the other hand, would provide the opportunity to employ them work-
ing in their place of residence. The matters raised by us must be regarded 
as very urgent. Department Managers of “Work Aid” in the Municipal 
and District Committees of Assistance and members of the Delegations 
should strive as soon as possible to engage into the work process the great-
est number of Jews—that is their next goal.23
In 1942, the Jewish Self-Assistance was also actively engaged in supporting 
Jewish workers in labor camps. In contrast to other districts, in the district of 
Kraków during the spring and summer of 1942 many new labor camps for Jews 
were established. In addition, the camp in Płaszów underwent strong develop-
ment and received many new inmates. New camps were established frequently 
without any reasonable infrastructure, in order to perform certain works under 
the management of civilian firms. This is a fragment of a report concerning new 
established camp in Prokocim near Kraków:
In Prokocim, the camp is just being developed. Currently, about 600 Jewish 
workers, mostly from Biecz, Rymanów, Jasielnica, and Brzozowa live there. 
In addition, [there are workers from] the small number of closely located 
villages, such as Myślenice. In this camp, there are no sanitation facilities 
and we even saw the workers wash themselves in the moat. At the moment 
there is not even a kitchen, and lunch or dinner is cooked on the open fire. 
It would be very important if these people could have bath and delousing 
22 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Okólnik nr 61. Dotyczy pomocy w dziedzinie pracy, BARDZO PILNE, 
Kraków, June 11, 1942, scans 702–3.
23 Ibid.
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in the first place; moreover, they should get a physician assigned by medical 
insurance company to visit them on-site and eventually arrange a first aid 
kit. Due to the large distance from their places of residence, these people 
are not able to receive additional food from their homes. Their  journey 
lasted about a day, so that they came without any inventory and were simply 
starving. Even having some money they are not able to buy anything them-
selves because they are not allowed to leave the camp. They work in com-
panies Klug and Vogel. The group from Biecz, who arrived first, had been 
promised 100 loaves of bread, which for technical reasons they have not 
yet received. Currently the number of loaves would have to be significantly 
increased in order to provide for the groups from Rymanów, Jasielnica, 
and Brzozowa. To organize constant help for these people, it is required to 
communicate with the companies Klug and Vogel, as well as with the com-
munities they come from. Their home municipalities could bring food to 
Gorlice, and from there it could be transported to Kraków by road from the 
Płaszów camp. Clothes and shoes should also be provided, because some 
people have very tattered clothes and walk barefoot.24
Another report of the Jewish Self-Assistance from the labor camp in 
Koszcz, near Kraków, describes accommodation and nutrition of the workers: 
Accommodation. Workers [in the camp Koszcz] live in underground 
dungeons, disastrous in terms of sanitation. The straw, in which they 
sleep, is already very old, as it remains after the Russian prisoners. As of 
yesterday, the 18th of this month [April 1942], 69 people were sent to 
the second fort to reduce overcrowding. In the fort, there is no straw at 
the moment, so that the workers are sleeping on the bare ground. Despite 
this relocating, the workers continue to complain of overcrowding.  
Due to the deterioration of the water supply tubes, there is lack of water in 
the dungeons and the toilets are in bad shape. It would be very important 
for health reasons if the workers could get some mattresses and blankets 
to cover. For now, it is still chilly in the evenings, the accommodations 
are very wet, and they do not have coat. They also sleep in their clothes.  
As workers indicate, the community in Działoszyce has mattresses and 
blankets, which it would be important to get. Ing. Strauch promised to 
deliver fresh straw and repair water tubes. 
24 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Notatka, Kraków, August 6, 1942, scan 295.
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Nutrition. During the first days, the workers did not receive any 
bread. Only on the 18th of this month [April 1942], after the intervention 
of the head of the works, they were given 200 g of bread and the soup was 
also more rich and nourishing than in previous days.
During our stay, the delegate of the community of Kazimierz [Wielki] 
came to visit the camp, and we talked about the food. He stated that  
he was ready to help the people of his community (9 people). He is only  
waiting for concrete proposals from our side.
If we can secure assistance with the meals, I hope that the relationship 
at work will also be improved successfully. Already the 30 or so workers 
who are employed on Wilga [River] get extra dinners at the local peo-
ple’s kitchen (kuchnia ludowa), and the question of accomodation was also 
favorably resolved, so that there is a good mood among the employees.25 
The Jewish Self-Assistance was probably also one of few, if not the only 
body, that could intervene in favor of Jewish workers and bring about real 
change. The Jewish Self-Assistance had not only direct access to every labor 
camp, but was also was in constant contact with the German authorities, 
especially with the Department of Internal Affairs, Group for Population and 
Welfare (BuF). It must be underlined that interventions of the Jewish Self-
Assistance were frequently effective and could bring a real improvement of the 
workers’ conditions. 
After the visit to the camp in Koszcz, the representatives of the Jewish Self-
Assistance wrote:
Our current task:
1.  Firstly, contact with Ing. Strauch in order to find as soon as possible 
a remedy for the deficiencies in terms of sanitation. It is important to 
issue passes for some people from among the workers who could then 
go to the city and carry out errands from all inmates.
2.  Ensure that food rations for the workers are actually given to them.
3.  Examination by a physician of all employees on the site, as there is a 
certain percentage of people completely unable to work, including 
epileptics. These people were taken off the street and sent [to the 
labor camp].
25 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Notatka z odwiedzin obozu pracy w Koszczu dnia 17 i 18 kwietnia br., 
Kraków, April 19, 1942, scans 120–21.
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4.  The most important task is to send a delegate to Działoszyce, who 
should consult with the local Municipality and the Delegation of the 
ŻSS in order to determine the best way to help the camp (in previous 
years the Commune [in Działoszyce] subsidized the same workers, 
paying them 2 to 3 zł per day).
5.  To arrange with Ing. Strauch a weekly bath for the workers (on Sunday). 
Similarly, to arrange with the local Community that these people can 
take a bath free of charge.
6.  Among the workers there are about 30 people, who are married and 
have children. The Community of Działoszyce promised that they 
would be exchanged. This matter is quite urgent.26 
In other camps, the situation of the Jewish workers was not much better 
but bearable: 
In the company in Płaszowianka, 59 Jewish workers are employed, coming 
mostly from Książ Wielki [. . .] and Miechów. Conditions there are 
 bearable, the kitchen has its own board of workers, and the  management 
is reasonable. They have recently been provided 800 kg of potatoes at the 
maximum price. They only ask for a certain amount of clothing and a 
 certain number of shoes. [. . .] In the company Płaszów Factory of Bricks 
and Roof Tiles, there are relatively bearable conditions for the workers. 
Recently people originating from Frysztak and Żmigród were transferred 
to the company from the camp in Płaszów 12. These people are unable to 
work and starving.27
In order to expand and standardize the care of workers in camps in and 
around Kraków, Jewish Self-Assistance founded a joint commission after con-
sulting with the commissioner of the Jewish community in Kraków, which 
managed to establish a direct agreement with the direction of labor camp in 
Płaszów and discuss the main points of their care—which aimed to improve 
the position of workers placed in that camp, regardless of the locality they came 
from. To improve the feeding of the workers, absolute, regular, and disciplined 
assistance was required from various localities and from the Jewish councils 
and delegations in these towns, from which groups of workers were recruited. 
26 Ibid.
27 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Notatka, Kraków, August 6, 1942, scan 295.
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It was decided to send a truck from the camp in Płaszów every fourteen days 
to important towns in the center of the region, such as Działoszyce, Miechów, 
Bochnia, Jasło, and Gorlice, to receive food, especially bread, and parcels of 
clothing and underwear. At the request of the management of the camp in 
Płaszów, partition of bread was to take place centrally—that is, the bread was to 
be evenly distributed in equal parts to everybody. To do this, each Jewish council 
had to ensure that for every worker coming from their locality and staying in 
Kraków, they would be provided with an additional ration of at least 300 g per 
day or 4.5 kg for fourteen days. Additionally, there were plans to distribute spe-
cific quantities of other products, such as marmalade and legumes.28
Although the members of the Jewish Self-Assistance tried to avoid 
unambiguous information concerning liquidation of Jewish ghettos, in a note 
 concerning a discussion with a representative of BuF they noted: 
Activity of the Jewish Self-Assistance (ŻSS). Mr. Stachow was interested  
in our activity today, all the more that it is known that the number of neigh-
boring towns in the county of Kraków or other counties of the district of Kraków 
remained without Jews. [emphasis mine—W.M.] I have explained that 
15–55-years-old men able to perform physical labor have been mostly 
sent to labor camps. I have portrayed the relations in these camps and 
added that we are doing everything in our power to come to the rescue 
of these people. The situation in the camp in Płaszów is so well known to 
Mr. Stachow that he intervened once to procure better food rations and 
he knows that the conditions in this regard have changed slightly in favor 
of [the campers].29
It was a very important development because the Presidency of the 
Jewish Self-Assistance became a central body whose jurisdiction encom-
passed all of the General Government. It was able to negotiate with the 
German administration of the General Government. Moreover, it became 
the central body to initiate and coordinate establishment of new labor 
communities or craftsmen in the wake of ongoing Aktion Reinhardt. The 
Jewish Self-Assistance, as the central organization of social assistance in the 
General Government, was probably the only Jewish organization that had 
28 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Do Rady Żydowskiej Frysztak, Kraków, August 2, 1942, scans 154–55.
29 YVA-JM.1581, ŻSS, Notatka z rozmowy z referentem BuF im Distrikt Krakau p. Stachow. 
Kraków, September 23, 1942, scan 751.
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access to every Jewish ghetto and labor camp, receiving constant and actual 
reports on the development of events, and had a perspective that permitted 
them to see a complete and exact picture of what was happening to the 
Jews in the General Government. As such, the Jewish Self-Assistance tried 
to avoid the worst: the destruction of Jews in the General Government, 
providing its assistance to every possible Jewish community, ghetto, labor 
camp, or other gathering of Jews. 
ACTIVITY OF MAX FRAUENDORFER DURING  
THE AKTION REINHARDT
Among the representatives of the civil authorities, one of the most active 
defenders of the Jews in the high ranks of the General Government was the 
head of the Labor Department, Dr. Frauendorfer. He was responsible for coor-
dinating the use of the pool of labor in the General Government and provid-
ing forced laborers for the Reich. He represented a considerably more rational 
approach than the police authorities. Frauendorfer held much more balanced 
views than Frank. While the position of the civil authorities in Jewish affairs 
in the summer of 1940 was much more powerful, in 1942, when the Aktion 
Reinhardt was already in progress, the police authorities and SS came out victo-
rious from this conflict.
Perhaps, Frauendorfer underestimated his own position, but he tried to 
preserve the Jews who had employment in their workplaces, as there was a 
shortage of qualified manpower. On June 22, 1942, the following statement by 
Dr. Frauendorfer was recorded in the minutes of a meeting: 
According to President Dr. Frauendorfer, resettlement of the Jews, repre-
senting a major proportion of the population, would cause far-reaching  
consequences in all sectors of public life. The country, in terms of 
labor force, is very exhausted. Approximately 100,000 professionals are 
employed in the armaments industry, 800,000 workers live in the Reich, 
and a further 100,000 workers employed in the labor detachments 
[Dienststellen] of the commander of the armed forces in the General 
Government.30 
30 Statement of Head of the Main Department Labor of the General Government Frauendorfer 
on a need for further employment of the Jews in the interests of the German economy, 
Kraków, June 22, 1942, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 240.
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Frauendorfer, undoubtedly, represented the faction that urged care for a 
skilled labor force, because he realized that it was not possible in such a short 
time to find or train others who could replace the Jews. Obviously, “far-reaching 
consequences” in Frauendorfer’s speech meant a significant decrease of mili-
tary production and manufacturing in a difficult time for the economic activity 
in general, when, in fact, the fate of the war was in balance. We have to bear 
in mind that at the same time when Frauendorfer warned about a decrease in 
war production, Albert Speer, nominated by Hitler to the post of Minister of 
Armaments on February 8, 1942, was reforming the military industry. Clearly, 
the activities of Himmler and Albert Speer were in conflict; nevertheless, this 
clash, in the General Government in 1942, could appear as local, without any 
special significance for the outcome of the war. 
The difficulties of mobilizing a labor force became much more acute in 
1943 and 1944. Recorded in the protocol of a meeting on June 22, 1942 was 
the following: “President Dr. Frauendorfer is currently dependent exclusively 
on the work of the Jews [. . .]. They are in the absence of Polish professionals, 
irreplaceable.”31 Despite this, Dr. Frauendorfer was fully aware of the limit of 
his power and his argumentation, since in his speech he said, “The Jews are not, 
in fact, to be excluded from the actions conducted by the SS, but during the 
war we should exploit their work. He [Frauendorfer] is not interested in the 
withdrawal [entzogen] of Jewish workers from the economy or the industry.”32 
As we can assume, Frauendorfer clearly tried to agree with the general political 
line that the Jews should be “evacuated,” but not now—preferably later.
Frauendorfer’s speech clearly provoked violent reactions from some SS and 
police authorities, because only three days later he sent another circular letter 
to the departments of labor and employment offices in the districts, writing 
about the need to communicate with the local commanders of the police on 
matters relating to forced labor of the Jewish population: 
The engagement of the Jews affects the interests of the police. Therefore, 
ensure immediately that the Jews are allowed to be hired only after 
 consultation with the relevant local police commander. Labor Offices are 
prohibited, until further notice, to take all the steps needed to offset labor 
shortages in various districts.33 
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Circular of the head of the Main Department Labor of the General Government, 
Frauendorfer, to the all Labor Departments and Employment Offices in the districts on 
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It was certainly a setback in comparison to his speech of June 22, 1942. 
This time he clearly gives up and underlines that the Jews were in the hands of 
the police, and only the police were authorized to take decisions concerning the 
exploitation of Jewish forced labor. As this letter goes: 
It is expected that in future the police itself will to some extent use Jewish 
labor force, especially in the armaments industry. In these circumstances, 
the role of the intermediary, which Labor Offices currenly have, will 
become redundant. Any eventual police requests for help, addressed to 
the Labor Offices, shall be fulfilled, of course, as far as possible.34 
However, he did not urge the labor offices to help the police, but only to 
comply with their requests to a certain extent.
Harsh criticism from the police can be observed in the report of Friedrich 
Katzmann, in which he accused the civil administration of being unable to deal 
with the Jewish problem. Katzmann insisted that only the SS and police were 
capable of handling Jewish matters. 
As the administration was not in the position to overcome this chaos, and 
proved weak, the whole issue of Jewish labor was simply taken over by 
the SS and Police Leaders. The existing Jewish Labor Offices, which were 
staffed by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All work certificates issued by 
firms and official employers were declared invalid, and the cards given to 
Jews by the Labor Offices revalidated by the Police.35 
Katzman, like other SSPF, offered ideological, rather than rational 
economic considerations, showing a harsh attitude towards the Jews—con-
trary to the position of the civil administration. 
The actions of Dr. Frauendorfer coincided with the activity of Jews who 
wanted to save their lives by working in factories necessary for the Wehrmacht. 
But the motives for such conduct were different, because Frauendorfer needed 
to ensure a sufficient number of qualified laborers, and the most available 
the need to communicate with local police commanders in matters of Jewish forced labor 
(Kraków, June 25, 1942), in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 240.
34 Ibid.
35 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of 
Galicia, on “The Solution of the Jewish problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 338.
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and amenable workers were Jews. The Jews, on their part, had an alternative: 
either to work or to die. Naturally, a person would try to find a job at all costs. 
Katzmann referred to that situation in his report: 
Their place of work was often only a means to an end for them: firstly, to 
escape the sharper measures taken against the Jews; and, secondly, to be 
able to carry out their black-market dealings without interruption. Only 
continuous police intervention could prevent these activities.36 
Katzmann was aware of the corruption prevailing among German officials, 
who in exchange for various rare goods were willing to arrange work for Jews: 
In addition, Jewish “organizing” on behalf of their “employers” reached 
catastrophic dimensions [so] that energetic action had to be [performed] 
in the interest of the reputation of the German people. [. . .] Draconic 
measures had to be introduced . . . after it was noted in increasing numbers 
of cases that the Jews had succeeded in making themselves indispensable 
to their employers by providing goods in short supply, etc. [. . .] It is very 
sad to have to note that the wildest black-market deals with the Jews were 
made by Germans who were brought here, and in particular those in the 
so-called “operating firms” (Einsatzfirmen) or the “ill-reputed trustees” 
(berüchtigte Treuhänder), both of which operated Jewish firms, taken from 
their owners. Cases were known where Jews seeking to obtain some kind 
of working certificate not only did not ask for pay from their employers 
but paid [their employers] regularly, themselves.37
Katzmann’s criticism was directed not only towards the civil administra-
tion, but also to the Wehrmacht. 
In the course of this Aktion thousands of Jews were again caught in  
possession of forged certificates or labor certificates obtained fraudulently 
by means of all kinds of excuses. These Jews were also sent for special treat-
ment (Sonderbehandlung). The Wehrmacht authorities in particular aided 
the Jewish parasites by issuing special certificates without proper control.  
[. . .] There were cases where Jews were caught with from 10 to 20 such 
36 Ibid., 337.
37 Ibid., 337.
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certificates. When Jews were arrested in the course of further checks, most 
of the employers felt obliged to attempt to intervene in favor of the Jews. 
This was often done in a manner that can only be described as deeply 
shameful.38 
He did not refer to the war production, so needed by the Wehrmacht, 
but rather was willing to accuse the Wehrmacht of corruption and the Jews of 
forgery and cheating. Needless to say, Katzmann considered himself a soldier, 
even if until then he had not served even one day at the front line. 
COMPLETION OF AKTION REINHARDT AND THE  
CONCENTRATION OF JEWS IN CHOSEN CITIES
The campaign of mass murder of Jews in death camps during the first months 
ran smoothly. After activating the Bełżec death camp, where Jews from the 
districts of Lublin and Kraków were murdered, Sobibór death camp opened 
soon afterwards, and in late July the third death camp in Treblinka started 
operation. Himmler was pleased with himself. Every day, thousands of Jews 
were sent to their deaths and the numbers of Jews in the General Government 
declined dramatically. Some of the ghettos were liquidated completely, and 
others were converted into so-called small (provincial, reduced) ghettos (małe 
getta) or “remainder” ghettos (Germ. Restghetto; Pol. getto szczątkowe). The 
progressive murder of Jews undoubtedly resulted in Himmler’s euphoria. To 
survey his achievements, he visited Katowice, Auschwitz, and then some other 
cities in the General Government, among them Lublin. On July 19, 1942, he 
issued an order to complete the Final Solution in the General Government. 
Himmler planned to end the “resettlement of the entire Jewish population 
of the Government-General” by December 31, 1942. According to his order 
from December 31, 1942, no people of Jewish origin could remain within 
the General Government outside of the collection camps in Warsaw, Kraków, 
Częstochowa, Radom, and Lublin. All other work in which Jewish labor is 
employed had to be finished by that date or, in the event that this was not 
possible, transferred to one of the collection camps.39 So at this time, despite 
38 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of Galicia, 
on “The Solution of the Jewish problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, Documents 
on the Holocaust, 338.
39 Order by Himmler on July 19, 1941 for the completion of the “Final Solution”’ in the 
Government-General (NO-5574), in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 275.
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the fact that more and more Jews were sent to labor camps in arms factories 
in the district of Radom and other places, Himmler did not plan to establish 
a network of labor camps close to great factories, except for designated areas. 
Although he envisaged that it might be difficult to accomplish this task, he, 
apparently, believed that the obstacles could be overcome. Himmler had not 
forgotten, as usual, to present arguments justifying his conduct, even if it 
seemed redundant. As he wrote in his order: 
These measures are required with a view to the necessary ethnic division of 
races and peoples for the New Order in Europe, and also in the interests of 
the security and cleanliness of the German Reich and its sphere of interest. 
Every breach of this regulation spells a danger to quiet and order in the entire 
German sphere of interest, a point of application for the resistance move-
ment and a source of moral and physical pestilence. For all these reasons a 
total cleansing is necessary and therefore to be carried out. Cases in which the 
date set cannot be observed will be reported to me in time, so that I can see 
to corrective action at an early date. All requests by other offices for changes 
or permits for exceptions to be made must be presented to me personally.40
The idea of concentrating the Jews in larger towns, in order to facilitate 
their management or the actions against them was not something new. 
It had already been instructed in the telegram from Reinhard Heydrich dated 
September 21, 1939. Such concentration was also carried out before and during 
Aktion Reinhardt.41 Moreover, during the discussion at Globocnik’s office it was 
already said that “to the use of Jewish auxiliary forces at the German institutions 
(Dienststellen) are to be put only the Jewish professionals who are indispensable. 
They should be housed in a special part of their ghetto.”42 Therefore, not only 
concentration of Jews in determined places but also separation of working forces 
facilitated further development. However, despite Himmler’s order of July 19, 
1942, already in the autumn it was clear that full implementation of this idea 
would not be possible. Therefore, HSSPF issued two orders. The first one was 
released on October 28, 1942, for the Warsaw and Lublin Districts, setting aside 
40 Ibid.
41 From a letter of the Deputy Commissioner of the Jewish quarter in Warsaw, Grassler, to the 
Department Raumordnung [Planning] of the Warsaw District on the concentration of Jews 
in the various counties, Warsawa, March 3, 1942, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Ekstermincja 
Żydów, 178–79.
42 YVA-JM.12331, Notiz für Brigadeführer über die Besprechung beim Amtschef am 8. August 
1941, 10 Uhr ist festzuhalten, scan 221. 
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several places where the Jews could stay.43 The second order, dated November 
10, 1942, concerned the Radom, Kraków, and Galicia Districts.44 These direc-
tives were issued in the spirit of Himmler’s order of July 19, 1942, since they 
restricted Jewish places of residence and prohibited living outside the permitted 
areas. The second paragraph of the October regulation reads as follows: 
From December 1, 1942 it is forbidden for any Jew in the Warsaw and 
Lublin Districts to stay outside the Jewish quarter, or leave it without 
police permission. From the date of December 1, 1942 other people [i.e., 
non-Jews] are allowed to reside in the Jewish quarter, or just come to 
it only having a police permit. The authorizations are granted in accor-
dance with Jewish residential quarters by Kreishauptmann, for the Warsaw 
Ghetto—by the commissioner of the Jewish residential district.45 
This order did not concern the Jews working in the armaments industry 
who lived in closed camps.46 The third paragraph of the regulation prohibited 
the Jews, under penalty of death, from leaving the designated sites and the 
non-Jewish population from helping the Jews—also under penalty of death.47 
The result of this residential confinement for Jews was the establishment of 
closed labor camps. One of them was the camp in Płaszów, where Jewish work-
ers were transferred by order of Scherner—the commander of the SS and police 
in the Kraków District—dated December 14, 1942.48
Limitation of Jewish freedom of residence also affected the Poles, and in some 
regions the Ukrainians, as it was forbidden to grant Jewish refugees any assistance 
under penalty of death. As the mayor of Przemyśl announced on July 27, 1942: 
II.  Every Ukrainian or Pole who attempts by any conduct to disturb the 
action of resettlement of Jews will be shot. 
43 Police regulation on establishing Jewish residential areas in District Warsaw and Lublin, 
October 28, 1942, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 313–14.
44 Police regulation of Higher SS and Police Commander Krüger on establishing Jewish resi-
dential quarters in some towns in the districts of Radom, Krakow and Galicia, November 10, 
1942, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 316–17.
45 Police regulation on establishing Jewish residential areas in District Warsaw and Lublin, 
October 28, 1942, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 313–14.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 The commander of the SS and police in the district of Kraków, Scherner to entrepreneurs on 
the transfer of Jewish workers employed by them to the camp in Płaszów, Kraków, December 
14, 1942, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 253.
242 Macht Arbeit Frei?
III.  Every Ukrainian or Pole who will be found in the Jewish quarter loot-
ing Jewish homes will be shot. 
IV.  Every Ukrainian or Pole who tries to hide any Jew or to help him to 
hide will be shot.49 
This prohibition also applied to taking possession of Jewish property:
V.  The acquisition of Jewish property for money or for free is  
prohibited. Offences against this ordinance shall be punished as 
harshly as  possible.50 
Similar regulations were issued by the police in other towns of the 
General Government, since regulations issued by higher level officials51 were 
often repeated by the administration at lower levels. Regulations  published 
by SS and police leaders were frequently repeated by Stadhaupleute and 
Kreishauptleute. In the district of Radom, such regulation was issued by 
SSPF Herbert Böttcher.52 
THE RESULTS OF DEPORTATIONS ON THE ECONOMY  
OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT
The deportation of Jews from the General Government achieved the desired 
propaganda effect, of which Frank boasted in his speech on August 15, 1942: 
[. . .] if someone among the visitors of Kraków, Lwów, Warsaw, Radom, and 
Lublin today would doubt the successful results achieved in this area by 
the efforts of the German administration, it would not be easy. Formerly, 
49 Notice of the Kreishauptmann of the Przemyśl County, warning Polish and Ukrainian 
population against assistance to the deported Jews under death penalty, July 27, 1942, in 
Eisenbach and Ritkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 298.
50 Ibid.
51 Circular of the SS and police commander in Radom, Böttcher, to the administrative and 
police authorities ordering to warn the Polish population that hiding Jews and helping 
them will be punished by death penalty, Radom, September 21, 1942, in Eisenbach and 
Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 299.
52 JD Herbert Böttcher (1907–1950) was since August 1939 regiment commander of SS 
regiment in Memel; then since October 1940 police president (Polizeipräsident) in Kassel; 
and since the beginning of 1942 he held the post of SSPF in Kaunas. At the end of 1942, 
he was nominated for the post of SSPF in the district of Radom. After the assasination of 
Franz Kutschera on February 1, 1944, Böttcher was SSPF in the district of Warsaw, and since 
November 1944 he was the commander of the police in Königsberg. 
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Jews leisured here. However, this smelly people were only allowed here 
before 1939! So where are the Jews today? One will see almost no trace of 
them (applause). Everywhere one only sees working Jews.53 
From his statement it could be understood that the long-awaited trans-
formation of the Jews into a productive population had finally taken place. All 
Jews were working, because those who were not able to work were murdered. 
This was confirmed in Fischer’s report: “In the Jewish quarter in Warsaw, about 
35,000 Jews remained. These are almost exclusively the workers left behind in 
munitions factories.”54
Also, food shortages and the economic situation in the Jewish quarter of 
Warsaw were due to the new principles:
[The] SS and police commander who was responsible for the entire 
Jewish action has obliged firms to pay for Jewish workers—with effect 
from September 1, 1942—5 zł per day for each remaining Jewish worker. 
They should transfer 3 zł to the SS and police commander and use the 
remaining 2 zł to maintain the Jewish worker.55 
This statement illustrates how the forced workers were transformed into 
slaves, and the ghettos—into labor camps. From September 1, 1942, Warsaw 
Jews did not receive any remuneration for their work. The value of their 
daily work was estimated to be 5 zł, of which the SS received 60%, as holders 
of slaves; and the remaining 40% was taken by the establishments for them-
selves, for maintenance costs. Such a system allowed corruption, because with 
sufficient quantity of workplaces, the establishments could reduce maintenance 
costs, leaving larger sums for themselves and increasing profitability.
The original success of using Jewish productive capabilities before their 
liquidation turned out to be unfavorable for the economy afterwards. As 
Fischer evaluated in his report: 
While in July the value of exports from the Jewish quarter [in Warsaw] 
exceeded 15 million, in August the total was reduced to 1.9 million, and in 
53 Keynote speech of Hans Frank on the occasion of the annual meeting of the NSDAP, August 
15, 1942, Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 510.
54 From the report of the Warsaw District governor for August and September, 1942 to the author-
ities of the General Government about the situation in the Warsaw Ghetto after the great depor-
tation, Warsaw, October 15, 1942. Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 305–6.
55 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 305–6.
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September to 1.1 million, while these are still the old settlement of trans-
actions of goods and services.56 
Various branches of industry were also in decline:
Warsaw textile industry suffered heavily after deportation of Jews. This 
branch of industry was from the end of 1939, with few exceptions, in the 
hands of the Jews, and most of the crew were also Jewish. Jews did not 
train Aryans, so that there were almost no skilled Aryan workers. Among 
3,500 industrial knitting workers there were formerly at least 3,000 Jews. 
As a result of resettlement of Jews, a significant decrease in production 
took place. In August, production dropped from 4.4 million zł to 3.3 mil-
lion zł, or by about 25%. In fact, however, production dropped by 50%, as 
companies made a bid for more goods than they had in stock. Returning 
back to normal production can only occur when a sufficient number of 
Aryan professionals will be trained.57 
The consequences for other industries in 1943 will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. Undoubtedly, “resettlement” of Jews did not concern 
only the Jews who were unable to work, but also a large number of labor-
ers. Not always could they provide relevant documents, because some-
times they worked in home-production or illegal manufacture. Even the 
people running households were useful because it allowed others to work. 
Therefore, one cannot agree with the notion that only nonproductive Jews 
were deported. Moreover, motives of deportation were ideological and not 
economic. Even where economic arguments were presented, the police 
often did not take them into account. 
At the end of 1942, the number of Jews in the General Government 
dropped significantly compared to the period before Aktion Reinhardt. 
Statistics Officer Korherr of the RFSS reports in his paper “The Final Solution 
of the Jewish Question in Europe,” delivered in Berlin on March 23, 1943, 
56 Ibid.
57 From the report of the Warsaw District governor for August and September 1942 to the 
authorities of the General Government about the situation in the Warsaw Ghetto after the 
great deportation, Warsaw, October 15, 1942, 305–6. 
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that according to official statistics, 297,514 Jews were still left in the General 
Government at the end of 1942.58
This number is not accurate, because even during this period a number of 
Jews remained in hiding. However, given the large percentage of able-bodied 
Jews who were among those nearly 300,000 people, it still was undoubtedly a 
significant potential labor force, which could be used in the General Government 
economy, affording a chance to survive for most of those Jews. However, even 
this limited number of Jews still alive in the General Government, became a 
bone of contention between the SS and police on the one hand, and the civil 
administration, the Wehrmacht, and the private sector on the other.
58 The paper of Korherr, statistics officer at the RFSS, entitled “Final Solution of the Jewish 
Question in Europe,” Berlin, March 23, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 322.
CHAPTER 8
War Industry Requirements 
in the Face of Annihilation  
of the Workforce 
The beginning of Operation Barbarossa marked a new era of warfare, which was neither limited to the battlefield nor the armed forces. The 
German-Soviet war directly affected large parts of the population who were 
subjected to terror, persecution, population transfer, or mass murder. The 
whole population, under the control of one or another party, was occupied 
with a total mobilization of all economic resources, including the adop-
tion of war economy and mobilization of labor resources. Apparently, the 
German army, while occupying new territories, was also reinforcing its 
economic resources, which included new factories, more food, raw mate-
rials, and more labor forces. Those significant elements needed to be used 
in appropriate ways in order to bolster the war economy. A surplus of 
resources could, however, lead to misuse or waste. Therefore, we should 
carefully analyze any declaration of German authorities and verify if the 
declarative content corresponded to the conduct in practice. 
On April 20, 1942, Fritz Sauckel wrote in his labor mobilization program 
the following: 
The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich 
and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting 
Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of 
the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw 
materials, as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their 
247War Industry Requirements  CHAPTER 8
human labor power, are to be used completely and conscientiously to 
the profit of Germany and its allies.1 
Despite these words, we have to examine to what extent the resources of 
the conquered territories were used “completely and conscientiously.” I would 
argue the opposite: the non-coordinated policy concerning the use of existing 
human resources led to losing them when they were available. Moreover, even 
when the shortage of a qualified labor force was clear, the German authori-
ties continued the opera mortale, losing millions of workers who were in their 
hands, while attracting unreasonable funds to mobilize other, much less quali-
fied labor forces. This contradiction was particularly obvious during the Aktion 
Reinhardt, when on the one hand, considerable forces were used to complete 
the mass murder of the Jews, and on the other hand, significant police and mil-
itary forces were used in order to forcefully mobilize hundreds of thousands of 
new workers. 
BEGINNING OF LABOR SHORTAGES, 1942–1943
Shortage of manpower began to be progressively acute already in 1942. 
After the attack on Moscow faltered in December 1941, the Eastern Front stag-
nated. It became increasingly clear that Germany lost its opportunity to con-
quer the European part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet Union 
was not strong enough to fully repulse the German forces., being not able to 
stop the German invasion and to keep it in check. The interval between the 
attacks on Moscow and the defeat at Stalingrad was a time of frequent local 
offensives followed by withdrawals. Nevertheless, from an economic point of 
view, this period marked a depletion of reserves and the beginning of constant 
growth in the need for war material, which meant the necessity to increase war 
production. Apparently, the battle was not just on the battlefield: in reality, the 
fight was no less intense in factories and on the manufacturing belt. The result 
of war was to be decided not by the quality of soldiers and officers but rather 
by the production potential. This rather simple fact should have been well 
understood by the leaders of the Third Reich, and actually it was. But we must 
 1 Sauckel’s labor mobilization program sent to Rosenberg on 20 April 1942 (016-PS), in IMT, 
Red Series, vol. 1, 876.
248 Macht Arbeit Frei?
not forget that the regime of Nazi Germany had other priorities as well, which 
consequentially would lead to the downfall of the Nazi state. In truth, the Nazi 
regime was able to engage considerable forces in order to realize its plans, which 
had ideological character and were the raison d’être of Nazism. 
The General Government, as an occupied territory, served as a reservoir 
of manpower for the Reich. This was the first occupied territory, which had a 
quasi-state organization, but was not annexed to the German Reich and was 
different in form from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The German 
administration was more ruthless here than in other territories and treated the 
General Government as a war trophy. Since autumn 1939, there were constant 
requests from the Reich to provide more and more labor force that was needed 
in different branches of the economy, mainly in agriculture. 
The Polish forced laborers were more preferred in the Reich than the Jews 
and Soviet POWs. Since the German authorities wanted to get rid of Jews and 
declare their regions judenfrei, which was for them mainly a propagandistic suc-
cess devoid of any practical value, bringing in Jewish workers would be a con-
tradiction. On the other hand, Soviet POWs were also considered dangerous 
from an ideological point of view; therefore, during the first months after the 
beginning of the German-Soviet war, there was a prohibition against bringing 
Soviet POWs into the Reich’s territory. However, this ban was lifted as soon 
as autumn 1941. According to Göring’s statement at a conference at the Air 
Ministry on November 7, 1941, “The Führer’s point of view as to employment 
of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far [we keep] a 
total of 5 million prisoners of war—employed so far are 2 million.”2 Göring 
was thinking about POWs in general and not former Soviet soldiers who at that 
time were dying en masse of starvation in temporary POW camps that lacked 
elementary facilities and even the most primitive barracks. 
One year later, in a secret memorandum issued from Hitler’s headquarters 
on October 31, 1942, Wilhelm Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order 
to use POWs in the German war economy. “The lack of workers is becoming 
an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future the German war and arma-
ment industry. The expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is 
uncertain as to the extent and date; however, its possible extent will by no means 
correspond to expectations and requirements in view of the great demand. 
 2 Göring’s statement at a conference at the Air Ministry on November 7, 1941, where was also 
discussed the use of POW’s in the armament industry (1206-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 
912–13.
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The Führer has now ordered that even the working power of the Russian pris-
oners of war should be utilized to a large extent by large scale assignment for the 
requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate 
nourishment. Also very small wages are to be planned for the most modest 
supply with a few consumers’ goods (Genussmittel) for every day’s life, even-
tual rewards for production.”3 The use of POWs in the armament industry vio-
lated Geneva conventions that prohibited the exploitation of POWs in warfare 
and the war industry. However, the above-mentioned directive did not entirely 
open the possibility of importing Soviet POWs into the Reich. Therefore, the 
authorities of the Third Reich used to make exchanges of Soviet POWs for 
Polish workers. In the minutes of the meeting concerning problems of the labor 
force on September 20, 1941, it was said: “[. . .] as is clear from the letter of the 
Ministry of Labor, Marshal Göring wishes to provide a further 100,000 Poles in 
exchange for 100,000 Russian prisoners of war, which are placed in the General 
Government. The speaker expressed his view that prisoners cannot be con-
sidered a full equivalent in exchange for Poles sent to the Reich.”4 Only later, 
when the shortage of forced laborers became acute, the authorities made the 
decision to authorize bringing in Soviet POWs and employing them in mining, 
heavy industry, and the war industry. 
Frank and the leadership of the General Government were under con-
stant pressure from the Reich to provide more and more Polish workers. 
In a Kraków meeting of Frank and the General Plenipotentiary for Labor 
Deployment Fritz Sauckel on August 18, 1942, the issues of providing addi-
tional forced workers from the General Government were raised. During that 
meeting Hans Frank said: 
I am glad that I can officially report to you, Comrade Sauckel, that until 
today we have handed over 800,000 workers to the Reich. If we also take 
into account the number of able-bodied Polish prisoners of war found in 
the Reich, the total number of manpower greatly exceeds the 1.2 million 
people from the General Government.5 
 3 A secret memorandum issued from Hitler’s headquarters on October 31, 1942; Keitel 
directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use POW’s in the German war economy (EC-
194), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 912. 
 4 Conference of September 20, 1941 on delivery of manpower to Germany, at which were 
present Frank, Frauendorfer, and Boepple, in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 376–77.
 5 Hans Frank’s speech on the occasion of the visit of Fritz Sauckel on further supply of forced 
workers’ quotas, Kraków, August 18, 1942, in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 512.
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According to Frank’s evaluation, about 400,000 Polish POWs coming 
from the General Government were in the Reich. In fact, the total number of 
Polish POWs in German hands could have been closer to 450,000, if not only 
those from the General Government, but also from all of pre-war Polish territo-
ries were counted. Since some of the POWs including Jewish soldiers from the 
Polish army were released, Frank’s number is probably more accurate. Frank 
usually liked to assign himself achievements, even if he had no part in them. 
However, this number of about 1.2 million Polish laborers was not sufficient. 
Frank went on to say: 
Recently you reported a demand for manpower counting 140,000 men.  
I am pleased to declare to you and make it official that under our agree-
ment yesterday I will deliver to the Reich until the end of October 60% of 
the working force of this new demand, and the remaining 40%—by the 
end of the year. [. . .] You may, however, expect in the next year to continue 
supplying manpower from the General Government because the action 
will be conducted by the police.6 
It should be stressed that already in the summer of 1942, a shortage of 
manpower was felt in the General Government due to the advanced liquida-
tion of ghettos and deportation of hundred thousands of Jews to death camps. 
Since the Jews could not be brought into the Reich, they were filling in for 
the deficiency of laborers in the General Government, especially in industry 
and handcrafts. They performed many important tasks for their communities, 
towns, etc., which freed Polish workers to perform other jobs. Nevertheless, 
substitution of Polish workers was only part of the exploitation mechanism 
of labor force in the General Government. Jews were also employed in many 
workshops, enterprises, labor camps, and independent labor detachments that 
were not connected to the management apparatus of the Polish labor force. 
We have to mention yet another aspect of the labor force management in 
the General Government. After the beginning of Operation Barbarossa in the 
General Government, intensive development of the war industry took place 
and any labor surplus that had existed during the period of economic stagna-
tion was drained not only by the export of manpower, but also by industrial 
development. Moreover, due to intensifying aerial bombardment of German 
territory, many industrial plants were evacuated to safer areas of the General 
6 Ibid., 513.
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Government.7 Therefore, extermination of Jews within the framework of the 
Aktion Reinhardt created an acute shortage of workers. 
Lack of coordination between the extermination of Jews and management 
of the labor force in all territories occupied by the German Forces created seri-
ous difficulties in providing not only a sufficient quantity of workers, but first 
and foremost, of qualified workers. Frank summed this problem quite clearly: 
For the government of the General Government one particular aspect 
seems to be important. One of your most difficult tasks was, probably—
you are likely to confirm this on the base of your experiences from his last 
trip—to enable the Reich to settle the central planning concerning labor 
for the war exigencies once and for all. About the area such as the General 
Government one may say: “You are a reservoir of labor,”—then you can 
export work force from here, or, “you are part of the industrial compo-
nent of the total area of the Reich,” then you can build factories here. You 
cannot do both: export labor and expand the industry of the Reich on the 
same territory. [. . .] We have to realize the gigantic investment program of 
the Reich, including expansion of the rail network. Two-thirds of the gen-
eral supply for the Eastern Front pass through the General Government.8
These objections were quite reasonable. It was the time when Aktion 
Reinhardt was conducted, even though that is not mentioned in the above quotes. 
That should have been the topic of the conversation during the exchange with 
Sauckel. However, despite his protests, Frank was actually a conformist. Even 
though he played the role of a courageous leader, he was rather submissive, espe-
cially toward people that were above him in the party hierarchy. Thus, despite 
expressing his displeasure, he was in fact fulfilling the tasks Sauckel imposed 
upon him. It would be unlikely for Frank to oppose the mass murder of Jews, 
even if that were against the interests of the territory under his administration.
In the early months of Aktion Reinhardt, Bühler expressed his dissatisfac-
tion with the deportation of the qualified Jewish workforce. At a meeting on 
May 11, 1942, he said:
New information is released about the alleged deliberate termination 
of the Jewish ghettos, when the Jews able to work are stopped and  
7 BA-MA, RW23-5, Geschichte der Rü In im GG (1. Juli 1940–31. Dezember1941), 115.
8 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 513–14.
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transported further to the east. Jews fit for work are to be placed in large 
concentration camps, which act as production centers. At the first glance, 
these plans look alluring, but a closer look shows that the damage result-
ing from the realization of this plan—because it will involve destruction 
of existing forms of organization—often outweighs the benefits that one 
could ever promise after such a move. At this time, in any case, such plan, 
according to the speaker, will not be beneficial. [. . .] Chances that it 
will free more Polish laborers for the Reich are minimal. As a result of a 
survey of 27,000 workers of the military industry, only 42 people volun-
tarily signed up to work in the Reich. But police coercion is used, then 
many workers do not come to their work at all in fear of shipment to the 
Reich. The Reich also recommends conducting raids of population on 
the streets of major cities. It is expected that as a result of this action, 
we will manage to get 52,000 workers. All these projects are completely 
meaningless, and actually had such action been taken, it would certainly 
endanger supply to the front in a significant way.9
Despite Bühler’s disapproval, the methods he described were widely used 
after just several months,10 because, as stated above, the authorities of the 
General Government were not able to mobilize the laborers for the work in 
the Reich with incentives or by threats. Special publications describing good 
working and living conditions in the Reich were issued to convince potential 
laborers from among the Polish population.11 These attempts, however, were 
not favorably embraced.
With increasing difficulties in obtaining the labor force, more and more 
drastic methods were used to attract forced workers. This happened not only 
in the General Government, but also in other areas occupied in the east, and 
above all, in the Reichskommissariate Ukraine and Ostland. To round up people 
to work, in addition to the gendarmerie and the police, the army was engaged. 
These brutal methods were used not only for Poles, but also for Ukrainians 
 9 Minutes of the 5th meeting of the heads of main departments of the General Government, 
fragment concerning security and delivery of workers to the Reich, Kraków, May 11, 1942, 
in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 459–60.
10 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 564–65. 
11 Fryderyk Didier, ed., Europa pracuje w Niemczech: Sauckel mobilizuje rezerwy produkcyjne 
(Berlin: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1943).
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and Belarusians. The Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee in Kraków 
wrote in a letter to Frank in February 1943: 
The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns and 
country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night in houses, 
has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. Everybody is 
exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any time by mem-
bers of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly and to be brought into an 
assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him, 
only months later one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.12 
These complaints could not change the situation, since the problem of 
labor forces was discussed in the highest echelons of power in the Reich. The 
new programs of armament led by Speer were based not only on reorganiza-
tion of industry, but also on developing production, which was only possible 
on condition that the required number of workers was provided. Therefore, 
Speer pressed Sauckel, using the authority of his relationship with Hitler, to get 
what he wanted. Speer’s statement in the minutes of conferences with Hitler on 
August 10, 11, and 12 of 1942 reads as follows: 
Gauleiter Sauckel promises to make Russian labor available for the fulfill-
ment of the iron and coal program and reports that if required, he can supply 
a further million Russian laborers for the German armament industry up 
to and including October 1942. So far, he has already supplied 1 million for 
industry and 700,000 for agriculture. In this connection the Führer states that 
the problem of providing labor can be solved in all cases and to any extent; he 
authorizes Gauleiter Sauckel to take all measures required. He would agree to 
any necessary compulsion (Zwangsmassnahmen) in the East as well as in the 
West if this question could not be solved on a voluntary basis.13
However, in 1943 when the shortage of manpower became even more 
acute, the highest authorities pressured Sauckel and he pushed other regional 
12 Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee to Frank, Cracow, February 1943 (1526-PS), 
in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 881.
13 Speer’s statement in a record of conferences with Hitler on August 10, 11, and 12, 1942 
(R-124), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 885.
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bodies to obtain more and more workers— it did not matter at what price. In a 
letter of October 5, 1943, Sauckel wrote:
The Führer has worked out new and most urgent plans for the arma-
ment which require the quick mobilization of two more million foreign 
labor forces. The Führer therefore has granted me, for the execution of 
my decree of March 21, 1942, new powers for my new duties, and has 
especially authorized me to take whatever measures I think are necessary 
in the Reich, the Protectorate, the General-Government, as well as in the 
occupied territories, in order to assure at all costs an orderly mobilization 
of labor for the German armament industry. The additional required labor 
forces will have to be drafted for the majority from the recently occupied 
Eastern Territories, especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. 
Therefore, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish: 225,000 labor 
forces by December 31, 1942 and 225,000 more by May 1, 1943.14
The lack of workers was strongly felt not only in industry but also in agri-
culture— an essential sphere, which provided food for the country. As more 
and more German men were recruited to the army, numbers of workers needed 
to replace them at home significantly grew. 
Especially the labor supply for German agriculture and for the most 
urgent armament production programs ordered by the Führer make the 
fastest importation of approximately one million women and men from 
the Eastern Territories within the next four months necessary. Starting 
March 15 [1943], the daily shipment shall reach 5,000 female and male 
workers respectively, and at the beginning of April [1943] this number 
has to be increased to 10,000. This means that most urgent programs 
shall be implemented, so that the spring tillage and other agricultural 
tasks are not to suffer, causing detriment of nutrition and bad situation 
in the armed forces.15
The directives from Hitler were passed to Sauckel and then to Rosenberg. 
Rosenberg instructed his subordinates to use the most severe measures to recruit 
the forced labor. A secret report of a conference between the Commissioner 
14 Sauckel to Rosenberg, October 5, 1942 (017-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 882. 
15 Sauckel to Rosenberg, March 17, 1943 (019-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 883.
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General of Zhitomir and Rosenberg in Winnica on June 17, 1943 stated the 
following: 
But as the Chief Plenipotentiary for the mobilization of labor explained 
to us the gravity of the situation, we had no other device. I consequently 
have authorized the commissioners of the areas to apply the severest mea-
sures in order to achieve the imposed quota. The deterioration of morale 
in conjunction with this does not necessitate any further proof. It is nev-
ertheless essential to win the war on this front too. The problem of labor 
mobilization cannot be handled with gloves.16
The recruitment in the east in no way was “handled with gloves,” but 
rather with fire and blood. A report from the chief of Main Office III with the 
High Command in Minsk, dated June 28, 1943, to Ministerialdirektor Riecke, a 
top official in the Rosenberg Ministry, quite vividly described how recruitment 
of forced laborers looked in the field: 
The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had disastrous 
effects. The recruitment measures in the last months and weeks were 
absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and economic 
effect. From White Ruthenia, approx. 50,000 people have been obtained 
for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be obtained. Considering the 
2.4 million total population these figures are impossible.17 
In the course of the mobilization, whole areas were emptied and vil-
lages and fields became deserted, which, undoubtedly, caused damage to the 
German economy. “Due to the sweeping drives (Grossaktionen) of the SS and 
police in November 1942, about 115,000 hectares of farmland is not used, as 
the population is not there and the villages have been razed.”18 However, this 
was not a priority, since lack of food in these areas mainly hit the local popula-
tion—something that did not make any impression on the German authorities. 
16 Secret report of a conference between the Commissioner General of Zhitomir and 
Rosenberg, Winniza, June 17, 1943; dated June 30, 1943, and signed by Leyser (265-PS), in 
IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 890.
17 Report from the chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk, dated June 28, 
1943, to Ministerialdirektor Riecke, a top official in the Rosenberg Ministry (3000-PS), in 
IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 726. 
18 Ibid. 
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The recruitment in some areas looked like hunting for slaves. “Estates of those 
who refuse to work are to be burned; their relatives are to be arrested as hos-
tages and to be brought to forced labor camps.”19 
Violent methods were also used in the area of the General Government, 
which unequivocally led to a violent reaction of the population and the Polish 
underground. Recruitment of the labor force became a rather dangerous job. 
According to the documents:
Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extraordinarily seri-
ous. It is well known that vehement battles occurred just because of these 
actions. The resistance against the administration established by us is 
very strong. Quite a number of our men have been exposed to increased 
violence some of them were shot dead, e.g., the Head of the Labor Office 
of Warsaw who was shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. 
This is how matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done 
with the best [efforts] will remain extremely difficult unless police rein-
forcements are at hand.20
The lack of manpower forced the German authorities to search the reserves 
in every possible area. Already in April 20, 1942, a program was initiated which 
was outlined as follows in a letter from Pohl to Himmler: 
Today I report about the present situation of the concentration  
camps and about measures I have taken to carry out your order of 
March 3, 1942.
1.  The war has brought about a marked change in the structure of the 
concentration camps and has changed their duties with regard to 
the employment of the prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the 
sole reasons of security, education, or prevention is no longer the 
main consideration. The mobilization of all prisoners who are able 
to work for purposes of the war now, and for purposes of construc-
tion in the forthcoming peacetime, more and more comes to the 
foreground.
19 Directive of the Commissioner General in Lusk of September 21, 1942, referring to the 
extreme urgency of the national conscription (290-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 889.
20 Statement by Timm (Sauekel’s deputy) at the 36th conference of the Central Planning Board 
(R-124), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 881–82.
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2.  From this knowledge some necessary measures result with the aim to 
transform the concentration camps into organizations more suitable 
for the economic tasks, while formerly they were merely politically 
interested.21 
This document indicated that two processes were taking place: deterio-
ration of conditions of the prisoners and transformation of the concentration 
camps into economic enterprises. 
Yet another reserve of labor forces had been found by Himmler. 
He ordered on December 17, 1942 that prisoners who would not otherwise 
have been bound for concentration camps were to be sent there and used as 
qualified workers. 
For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed here further, the 
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German police on December 14, 1942 
has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at least 35,000 prisoners 
qualified for work are to be sent to the concentration camps. [. . .] Every 
single laborer counts!22
The deterioration of conditions was unlimited, as we can see in a doc-
ument concerning an agreement between the Minister of Justice Thierack 
and Reichsführer SS Himmler. The judicial system transferred full power 
over the prisoners into the hands of the SS. The document reads as follows: 
The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their sentence 
to the Reichsführer of SS to be worked to death. [. . .] It is agreed that, 
in consideration of the intended aims of the Government for the clear-
ing up of the Eastern problems, in future Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians, 
and Ukrainians are no longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so 
far as punishable offenses are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the 
Reichsführer of SS.23 
21 Pohl, SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen SS (R-129) to Himmler (dated April 
30, 1942), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 915.
22 Himmler’s order, December 17, 1942 (1063-D-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 918.
23 Memorandum of an agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice Thierack, 
September 18, 1942 (654-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 916.
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In March 1943, yet another document was published: a secret order by the 
SS concerning the prohibition of releasing prisoners after serving their sentences. 
An agreement was reached stating that, whatever prisoners can be 
released, they should be put at the disposal of the Commissioner of the 
Labor Office. When searching (Überholung) villages, resp., when it has 
become necessary to burn down villages, the whole population will be put 
at the disposal of the Commissioner by force.24
Despite mass murder of Jews in the course of the Aktion Reinhardt, some 
Jews sent to Auschwitz were selected and used as forced laborers. In a secret 
telegram to Himmler evaluating the percentage of Jews able to work out of the 
transports the following was written:
In the total of 45,000 the physically handicapped and others (old Jews 
and children) are included. In making a selection for this purpose, at 
least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers will be available when the Jews arriving at 
Auschwitz are assigned.25 
The percentage, between 22% and 33% of able-bodied workers, was much 
higher here than during the selection in most ghettos where between 10% and 
20% of those able to work were left in special labor detachments.26 
At the same time, when trains full of Jews rolled into the death camps, 
Sauckel required a comparable number of workers from the east. In the record 
of a telephone conversation of the Chief of the OKW Keitel with the Chief of 
the Economic Staff East of the German Army, dated March 11, 1943, we find 
the following information: 
The plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, points out 
to me in an urgent teletype that the Arbeitseinsatz in German agriculture 
24 Secret SS order (dated March 19, 1943) (3012-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 889.
25 RSHA to Himmler (telegram marked “Urgent” and “Secret,” dated December 16, 1942) 
(1472-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 989.
26 During the first liquidation action in the Warsaw Ghetto between July 23, 1942 and 
September 21, 1942, about 300,000 Jews, or about 80% of the ghetto’s population, were 
deported; during the great deportation from the Częstochowa ghetto, between September 
22 and October 8, 1942, about 40,000 (83.3%) Jews were deported and approximately 
2,000 (4.2%) were killed on the spot. In the small ghetto only less than 6,000 (12.5%) Jews 
remained; from the ghetto in Lublin between March 16, 1942 and April 11, 1942 about 
30,000 Jews (88.2%) were deported.
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as well as all the most urgent armament programs, ordered by the Führer, 
make the most rapid procurement of approx. 1 million women and men 
from the newly occupied territories an imperative necessity. For this pur-
pose, Gauleiter Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000 workers daily 
beginning March 15 [1943], 10,000 workers male and female beginning 
April 1 [1943] from the newly occupied territories.27
Sauckel’s Arbeitseinsatz was truly impressive. His action brought additional 
millions of workers to Germany, not counting the other millions that were 
already employed in the Reich and many more millions who were employed 
in the war industry, agriculture, and other branches of industry in the occupied 
territories. In his report Sauckel wrote: 
After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Deployment of Labor, 
I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were given to the 
German war economy from April 1, of last year [1942] to March 31, this 
year [1943]. [. . .] The 3,638,056 are distributed amongst the following 
branches of the German war economy: Armament: 1,568,801. . .28
At the same time, the very close number of Jews were executed in the gas 
chambers of the death camps. However, there were still more Jews to be exter-
minated and, on the other hand, many more forced laborers were needed for 
the German economy. In a memorandum of a conference with Hitler which 
took place on January 4, 1944, concerning allocation of labor, the following 
request was registered: “The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall 
procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.”29 
EMPLOYMENT OF THE JEWS BY THE WEHRMACHT
Jews constituted an important part of the labor force exploited by the 
Wehrmacht in the General Government. Those workers were essential for var-
ious reasons. They were relatively cheap, available, and qualified. Therefore, it 
was not easy, perhaps even impossible, to substitute them. The beginning of the 
27 Chief of the OKW Keitel with the chief of the Economic Staff East of the German Army 
(telephone conversation; dated March 11, 1943) (3012-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 930.
28 Sauckel’s to Hitler, April 15, 1943 (letter containing a report on one year of Sauckel’s activi-
ties) (407-VI-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 909.
29 Memorandum of conference with Hitler (4 January 1944; concerning allocation of labor) 
(1292-PS), in IMT, Red Series, vol. 1, 927.
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Aktion Reinhardt initiated a new era; when two very important factors began to 
act in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the SS and police started to 
realize the program of total extermination of the Jews in Europe; on the other 
hand, the German Army needed qualified workers in order to maintain a high 
level of war production. Of course, we would be mistaken, if we thought that 
the Wehrmacht was interested in protecting the Jews. Instead, they were solely 
concerned about winning the war. We should not forget the fate of millions 
of Soviet POWs who died of hunger in autumn and winter of 1941 and 1942. 
They died because this supposedly served the German victory. The dead Soviet 
POWs could not fight their captors and tons of food, which they otherwise 
would have consumed, were left for the German army.
However, in 1942, Jews were needed for the war production. Therefore, the 
Wehrmacht in the General Government became preoccupied with them. The 
following are a number of quotations confirming the importance of the Jews 
for the Wehrmacht. “In Kraków, there are 11,000 Jews, who were employed as 
laborers by the Wehrmacht, Inspection of Armaments and various government 
departments and companies.”30 Also in Galicia there was an attempt to leave 
Jewish workers in the military industry:
The Jewish laborers remained in the W-Betriebe for the last quarter of 
the year, following an agreement of the Rüstungs-Inspekteur (armament 
inspector) of the General Government with the Higher SS and Police 
Leaders in the General Government. From other strategic enterprises the 
Jewish laborers were inconsiderately withdrawn and returned only par-
tially on intervention of the Rüstungskommando. The company Schwarz & 
Co., manufacturing clothes for the Wehrmacht exclusively and employing 
2.000 Jewish laborers, was taken over by the SS and the Jews were taken 
to the forced labor camp. The production was merged with the Deutsche 
Ausrüstungswerkstätten and will retain the current volume of output. The 
former managers were arrested for severe irregularities.31 
Thousands of Jews were also working for the Wehrmacht in Warsaw:
Jews are employed in a high percentage. In the ghetto 110 factories are 
located, which employ 77,000 people, of whom 22,000 work in the arms 
30 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 487. 
31 BA-MA, RW23-14, Rüstungskommando Lemberg, Kriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 1. 
April bis 30. Juni 1943, 7–8.
261War Industry Requirements  CHAPTER 8
factories. All private production remaining in the ghetto is rearranged into 
tasks of the importance for the war. Of these 30,000 Jews [not working in 
the ghetto], a significant number is currently employed outside the ghetto, 
employment rate will increase, but it would be absolutely necessary to 
better feed the work force.32
Yet another document characterized the development of production for 
the Wehrmacht in Warsaw in the following manner: 
Contrary to previous views on the matter, so far one has been able to acti-
vate the ghetto from an economic point of view that, so far, it was not nec-
essary for state subsidies. In the ghetto work about 25,000 Jews in plants 
of the importance of war, while 3,000 Jews from the ghetto are employed 
outside of the ghetto. The second biggest fur company, covering the lion’s 
share of the Wehrmacht demand for these products, has its plants in the 
ghetto. Monthly turnover between the ghetto and the Aryan quarter now 
stands at 6 million, to be added to the turnover, which cannot be exactly 
evaluated and are estimated at 2–3 million. From this turnover the ghetto 
inhabitants live somehow. The speaker hopes that Warsaw will soon be 
freed from the ballast of Jews unfit for work.33 
The last words of this quotation perfectly present the attitude toward the 
Jews, who were needed only as labor. Similar reference had been made to them 
in the Radom District: “In Radom and Częstochowa Jewish workers . . . in arms 
factories have to be preserved. Of course, we need to leave the immediate family 
of such workers, while all others will be displaced.”34 In this case, only the work-
ers employed in arms factories and their families were eligible to remain and 
thus temporarily avoid deportation to extermination camps. The situation in 
Galicia was similar: “The Jewish question is no longer a problem. The Jewish 
labor still used in the armaments factories and in the Karpathen Öl A.G. must, 
however, remain in any case, because their replacement by local workers at this 
time seems impossible.”35
32 Meeting of the GG government, Kraków, July 13, 1942, in Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 
1, 496. 
33 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 1, 479. 
34 Ibid., 484–85.
35 BA-MA, RW23-14, Rüstungskommando Lemberg, Bericht des Dienststellenleiters zu Ziffer 
2c des Kriegstahebuches, Lemberg, den 1. Juli 1943, 10.
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BEGINNING OF PERMANENT FACTORY LABOR CAMPS
With the liquidation of the ghettos and the creation of small ghettos, many Jews 
were looking for a way to save themselves. Many firms were also looking for 
means to save Jewish workers. As stated by Frauendorfer:
. . . the resettlement of Jews, representing a major proportion of the popula-
tion, would cause far-reaching consequences [. . .] The country in terms of 
labor force is exhausted [. . .] therefore, at this moment it depends only on 
the job of Jews; this is the point of view that is also shared by the Inspector 
of Armaments for the General Government, Generalleutnant Schindler.36
Frauendorfer stressed that due to a lack of Polish specialists, the Jews 
were irreplaceable. He did not fail to point out that, “Jews are, in fact, not to be 
excluded from the actions conducted by the SS, but during the war, we have to 
use their work.”37 In order to preserve the Jewish workers, it was necessary to 
protect them by removing them from the jurisdiction of the SS. For this pur-
pose, the Jews had to be put into enclaves where they would be safe. Those 
enclaves could only be labor camps. Therefore, discussions between the bodies 
interested in Jewish labor were held on this topic. According to the minutes of 
one of those meetings, 
[O]n the basis of an agreement with Schindler on the transfer to the 
arms industry of the Jews, it was completely and clearly explained that he 
[Frauendorfer] can fully satisfy the wishes of [Schindler]. For this pur-
pose, thousands of Jewish laborers would be put at the disposal of [the 
armament industry], placed in camps which will be erected near the muni-
tions factories; the SS would take care of them, provide food, and if nec-
essary provide units [of guards]; Reichsführer SS, Reich Minister Speer 
and the plenipotentiary for employment, Gauleiter Sauckel, attach great 
importance to the hiring of able-bodied Jews.38
36 Statement of the head of the Main Department Labor of the General Government, 
Frauendorfer, on a need for further employment of the Jews in the interests of the German 
economy (Kraków, June 22, 1942), in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 240.
37 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 240.
38 Ibid.
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Frauendorfer’s statement announced the creation of permanent labor 
camps near factories; however, this had, undoubtedly, provoked a strong reac-
tion from the SS. The SS was not interested in the civil administration meddling 
in matters falling within their competence. Overall, the SS treated the civilian 
administration dismissively. It was felt that the civil administration was unable 
to efficiently carry out any decision, and all its actions were chaotic and corrupt. 
For example, Katzmann wrote in his report on the action in the Galicia District: 
It became increasingly apparent that the civil administration was not in a 
position to move the Jewish problem to an even reasonably satisfactory 
solution. Because repeated attempts of the city administration of Lwów, 
for instance, to move the Jews into a Jewish quarter, failed, this question, 
too was solved by the SS and Police Leader and his organizations.39 
In another place, Katzmann wrote: 
As the administration was not in the position to overcome this chaos, and 
proved weak, the whole issue of Jewish labor was simply taken over by 
the SS and Police Leader. The existing Jewish Labor Offices, which were 
staffed by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All work certificates issued by 
firms and official employers were declared invalid, and the cards given to 
Jews by the Labor Offices revalidated by the Police.40
Just three days later, Frauendorfer issued another circular to the depart-
ments of labor and employment offices in the districts. He wrote in it about the 
need to communicate with local police commanders on matters relating to the 
forced labor of Jews, because “. . . the employment of Jews affects the interests 
of the police.”41 Therefore, it was necessary to employ Jews only after consul-
tation with the police. “I order therefore with immediate effect that the Jews 
39 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of 
Galicia, on “The Solution of the Jewish problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 336–37.
40 Ibid., 338.
41 Circular of the Head of the Main Department Labor of the General Government, 
Frauendorfer, to the all Departments Labor and Employment Offices in the districts on 
the need to communicate with local police commanders in matters of Jewish forced labor 
(Kraków, June 25, 1942), in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 240. 
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are allowed to be hired only after consultation with the police.” Frauendorfer 
banned the labor offices from taking any action to combat labor shortages in 
various districts. We do not know which precise interests of the police were 
violated by hiring Jews. There is no doubt that the actions of the labor offices 
interfered with Aktion Reinhardt, since they allowed Jews to find employment. 
From the onset of Aktion Reinhardt, the Jews formally passed into the 
hands of the police and SS and became their property, as will be revealed later 
in our discussion. The labor offices lost their powers, which had been intro-
duced with the agreement of July 4, 1940 between Frank and Krüger. Therefore, 
Frauendorfer was not sure whether labor of Jews under the SS would be used at 
all: “. . . it is expected that in the future the police will be dealing with exploita-
tion of the Jewish labor force to some extent, especially in the armaments 
industry.”42 Frauendorfer ordered that the labor offices no longer be intermedi-
aries in matters of employment of the Jews. However, in cases of requests from 
the police, the labor offices could, as we remember, provide assistance in these 
matters.43
The conflict between the SS and the Wehrmacht was inevitable, and as 
the statements above show, the SS had the task of implementing the “Final 
Solution,” while the Wehrmacht was designed to ensure victory at the front. This 
was essentially contradictory, because the SS did not bear any responsibility for 
the fate of the war, despite the fact that they created the Waffen-SS troops. The 
SS was not an organization capable of engaging in economic activity, although 
some established enterprises, such as DAW and OSTI, were controlled by the 
SS. However, these companies were founded on the use of virtually free Jewish 
slave labor, which was very cheap, so that even poorly organized, poorly man-
aged, and unprofitable companies could be lucrative. The SS, only because of 
the division of powers in Jewish affairs in Germany and in order to maintain 
the same model of organization in the occupied countries, had been granted 
full authority over the Jews and the possibility to freely exploit or use them as 
slaves, whom they could “lend” to other institutions.
During World War II, the Wehrmacht was not merely the German army 
whose task was to wage war. Through a network of inspectorates in the occu-
pied territories, the Wehrmacht also had to take care of and control the level 
of production for the war effort, in order to provide enough materials to con-
duct the war. Despite such an enormous task, the Wehrmacht encountered a 
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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derogatory attitude on the part of the SS, which had the functions of the police 
and dealt with the criminal activity behind the front line. While the Wehrmacht 
fought at the front against the enemy, the SS was engaged in murdering defense-
less women, children, the sick, and the elderly. In this context we may read 
Katzmann’s statement: 
The Wehrmacht authorities in particular aided the Jewish parasites by 
issuing special certificates without proper control. ... There were cases 
where Jews were caught with from 10 to 20 such certificates. When Jews 
were arrested in the course of further checks, most of the employers felt 
obliged to attempt to intervene in favor of the Jews. This was often done in 
a manner that can only be described as deeply shameful.44 
Katzmann’s words were contrary to what he had said earlier about the 
Jews: “Owing to the peculiarity that almost 90 percent of the artisans in Galicia 
consisted of Jews, the problem, to be solved could only be carried out gradually, 
as an immediate removal of the Jews would not have been in the interest of the 
war economy.”45
Further in the report, Katzmann wrote about acquisition of control over 
the Jewish workers by enclosing them in a labor camp that remained under the 
control of the SS. In this case as well, Katzmann did not hesitate to express his 
derogatory attitude toward the Wehrmacht:
The Higher SS and Police Leader gave further instructions to accelerate 
the total evacuation of the Jews, further considerable work was necessary in 
order to catch those Jews who were for the time being, to be left in the arma-
ments factories. These remaining Jews were declared labor prisoners of the 
Higher SS and Police Leader and held either in the factories themselves or 
in camps erected for this purpose. For Lwów itself, a large camp was erected 
on the outskirts, which holds 8,000 Jewish labor prisoners at the present 
time. The agreement made with the Wehrmacht concerning employment 
and treatment of the labor prisoners was set down in writing.46
44 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of 
Galicia, on “The Solution of the Jewish problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 338.
45 Ibid., 336–37.
46 Ibid., 339.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM  
OF SS LABOR CAMPS
The SS only appeared to be a homogeneous organization representing 
common interests. In actuality, it was split, and different interests of its fac-
tions constantly clashed. One of the reasons for these clashes was the use of 
Jewish labor. Even in the General Government, which was a relatively small 
area, constant friction existed between forces allied to Himmler, HSSPF, 
and SSPF, who were the controllers of their area. Especially outstanding 
was Globocnik, the SSPF in the Lublin District, who for years had been 
associated with Himmler through ties of friendship. Globocnik constantly 
fell into trouble and was repeatedly saved by Himmler. He had a great 
opportunity to repay a debt of gratitude to Himmler, when he was assigned 
the commander of Aktion Reinhardt. It was Himmler’s friendship and the 
task of extermination of millions of Jews in death camps that allowed 
Globocnik, despite his formal subordination to Krüger and Frank, to avoid 
the official system successfully and to communicate directly with Himmler. 
Krüger and Frank, in turn, also dependent on Himmler, had to accept this 
state of affairs. The same was true of other districts, where the SSPFs often 
had great power and competed with the governors of the districts. In par-
ticular, much power was in the hands of Katzmann, who, like Globocnik, 
degraded the civilian administration. 
Until September 1943, the SSPFs of the districts had Jewish labor camps 
under their control, but at the beginning of September 1943, an import-
ant change concerning subordination of labor camps took place. In Berlin, 
on September 7, 1943, a conference in the Economic and Administrative 
Main Office [WVHA] was held in which SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl, the 
SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik, SS-Brigadeführer Glücks, SS-Brigadeführer 
Lörner, SS-Obersturmbannführer Schellin, SS-Obersturmbannführer Maurer, 
SS-Sturmbannführer Florstedt, and SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Horn were pres-
ent. It was the last conference of this type attended by Globocnik, who had 
just completed Aktion Reinhardt in the autumn of 1943 and was to be trans-
ferred to Yugoslavia, where he would combat the partisans. At the conference 
on September 7, it was decided by the Main Economic and Administrative 
Office to take over ten labor camps for Jews, which until then had been under 
the jurisdiction of SSPF in the Lublin District. These camps were to be subju-
gated directly to SS-Sturmbannführer Florstedt, who was to ensure their safety 
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and efficient management. Important, however, was the second point in Pohl’s 
notes from this conference:
With the acquisition of [the camps] by the Main Economic and 
Administrative Office of the SS (Group D), inmates [Insassen] of 
these labor camps have become prisoners in the concentration camp 
[Konzentrationslager-Häflinge]. Allocation of prisoners to workshops that 
are active or will be established in the future by OSTI in these camps shall 
be paid and the payment received will be transferred to the Treasury.47 
From this quotation we may assume that after this conference an-SS 
owned company had to pay for prisoners’ labor. This change meant that the 
OSTI Company suddenly became unprofitable and underwent liquidation.
Although at the beginning of the document only the Lublin District was 
listed, the order would apply to the entire area of the General Government. 
All the labor camps in the Lublin District, numbering about 10, shall 
together with other labor camps in the General Government be taken 
over by the Main Economic and Administrative Department of the SS. 
SS-Sturmbannführer Florstedt will oversee the acquisition of these camps 
by the Group D at the Main Economic and Administrative Department 
of the SS.48 
From now on, all SS labor camps became de facto concentration camps 
and all the Jews working in them were henceforth prisoners of concentration 
camps. The document stated: “We should strive to dissolve small camps and 
those whose production is not significant for the fate of war, or has no decisive 
meaning for the victory.”49
One of the most important documents illustrating the attempt to main-
tain the Jewish workers in the war industry was the memorandum written 
47 Official note of Oswald Pohl on the takeover of Jewish labor camps in the General 
Government by the Main Economic and Administrative Office of the SS (WVHA), subordi-
nate until then to commanders of the SS and the police, the Central Office of Economic and 
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on September 18, 1942 by General von Gienanth to the General Staff of the 
Wehrmacht in reaction to the removal of Jews from industrial production.50 
Although this document is called a memorandum, this was in fact a letter of 
protest. In the beginning, von Gienanth recalls the earlier directive, according to 
which, “the Polish and Ukrainian workers were to be replaced by Jewish work-
ers, in order to release the former for work in the Reich.”51 However, seeing the 
growing demand for forced labor in the Reich and the reluctance of Poles to 
leave to work in the Reich, which made the application of police methods nec-
essary, von Gienanth stated with a bit of irony: “. . . if the Commissioner General 
for Labor is prepared to relinquish the 140,000 Poles who were assigned for 
work in the Reich, and if the police is successful in rounding them up. Previous 
experience gives cause for doubt in this respect.”52
In order to employ Jews in war production factories, “. . . the enterprises 
concerned will set up camps for the Jews.”53 However, von Giennanth also 
advised that “. . . for the full exploitation of Jewish labor for the war effort, purely 
Jewish enterprises and Jewish sections of enterprises will be established.”54 
General von Gienanth also explained why the work of Jews was so 
important in war production:
According to the figures supplied by the Government [General’s] Central 
Labor Office, manpower in industry totals a little over a million, of which 
300,000 are Jews. The latest include roughly 100,000 skilled workers. In 
the enterprises working for the Wehrmacht, the proportion of Jews among 
the skilled workers varies from 25% to 100%; it is 100% in the textile fac-
tories producing winter clothing. In other enterprises—for instance the 
important motor manufacturing works which produce the “Fuhrmann” and 
“Pleskau” models—the key men, who do the wheelwork, are mainly Jews. 
With few exceptions all the upholsterers are Jews. A total of 22,700 work-
ers are employed at the present time on reconditioning uniforms in private 
firms, and, of these, 22,000 (97%) are Jews. Of these, 16,000 are skilled 
textile and leather workers. A purely Jewish enterprise with 168 workers 
50 Memorandum by General von Gienanth to the General Staff of the Wehrmacht in reaction 
to the removal of the Jews from industrial production (September 18, 1942), YVA, O/4-4-2; 
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produces metal parts for harnesses. The entire production of harnesses in 
the Government-General, the Ukraine and, in part, in the Reich depends 
on this enterprise.55 
As we see from this quotation, the Jews were extremely important in war 
production, not only because of their number, but also because of their quali-
fications. It is significant to note that in some industries, especially those with 
100% Jewish workers, sudden evacuation of the Jews could result in the total 
closure of production. In addition, such closure could result in lack of parts and 
components needed to manufacture other products, which would also affect 
other areas.
There was also a high percentage of skilled workers among the Jews whose 
sudden substitution was not possible because there were no reserves of skilled 
workers and training new workers would take a very long time. Von Gienanth 
confirmed this in his memorandum: 
Fully skilled labor would first have to be trained. The training of labor 
drawn mainly from agriculture requires several months to a year, and more 
in the case of particularly highly qualified workers and craftsmen. Whether 
the solution to this especially complex problem, on which the continued 
productivity of the Government General for the war economy depends 
primarily, can be speeded up by the release of skilled workers from the 
Reich is beyond my competence to judge. [. . .] Unless work of military 
importance is to suffer, Jews cannot be released until replacements have 
been trained, and then only step by step.56 
Training new workers, however, was very difficult and costly under war 
conditions. In some cases of highly skilled specialists, it was simply impossi-
ble. This was probably why, in the end, compromises in the struggle over the 
Jewish labor force were made by both sides, and some Jewish workers were left 
in armament factories.
The German Army, however, struggling with the SS over Jewish workers 
never used the argument that they wanted to save the Jews, but rather the oppo-
site. Keeping Jewish workers in armament factories was to be only temporary. 
The Wehrmacht argument was consistent with the policy of elimination of 
55 Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 287–89.
56 Ibid.
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the Jews and it seemed that was, in fact, true. We cannot say that there were 
no individual cases of saving the Jews gratuitously or in exchange of money; 
nevertheless, this was not representative of the Wehrmacht as a whole. In his 
memorandum, von Gienanth expressed his view clearly, exclusively employing 
practical arguments:
The general policy will be to eliminate the Jews from work as quickly as 
possible without harming work of military importance. [. . .] A great vari-
ety of Wehrmacht offices have placed military orders of the highest prior-
ity, particularly for winter needs, in the Government-General, without the 
knowledge of the Armaments Department or the Military Commander of 
the Government-General. The evacuation of the Jews makes it impossible 
for these orders to be completed in time. It will take some time to register 
systematically all the enterprises involved. [. . .] It is requested that the 
evacuation of Jews employed in industrial enterprises may be postponed 
until this has been done.57 
In any case, von Gienanth argued that the evacuation of the Jews, if nec-
essary, should be coordinated with the Wehrmacht. Otherwise: “the evacua-
tion of the Jews without advance notice to most sections of the Wehrmacht 
has caused great difficulties in the replacement of labor and delay in correct 
production for military purposes.”58
In response to von Gienanth’s memorandum, Himmler sent a letter on 
October 9, 1942, where he listed the steps taken in order to preserve the level of 
production and insisted that the Jewish workers should be closed in concentra-
tion camps. However, Himmler warned that employment of Jews was in order 
to save them and not because it was necessary: 
I have given orders that all so-called armament workers who are actually 
employed solely in tailoring, furrier, and shoe-making workshops be col-
lected in concentration camps on the spot, i.e., in Warsaw and Lublin, under 
the direction of SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger and SS-Obergruppenführer 
Pohl. The Wehrmacht will send its orders to us, and we guarantee the con-
tinuous delivery of the items of clothing required. I have issued instructions, 
however, that ruthless steps are taken against all those who consider they 
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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should oppose this move in the alleged interest of armaments needs, but 
who in reality only seek to support the Jews and their own businesses.59
Continuing, Himmler argued that the process of removal of Jewish work-
ers would persist, but gradually taper off:
Jews in real war industries, i.e., armament workshops, vehicle workshops, 
etc., are to be withdrawn step by step. At the first stage they are to be con-
centrated in separate halls in the factories. In the second stage in this pro-
cedure the work teams in these separate halls will be combined, by means 
of transformation into closed enterprises wherever this is possible, so that 
we will then have simply a few closed concentration-camp industries in 
the Government-General. [. . .] Our endeavor will then be to replace this 
Jewish labor force with Poles and to consolidate most of these Jewish con-
centration camp enterprises into a small number [. . .] in the eastern part 
of the Government General, if possible. But there too, in accordance with 
the wish of the Führer, the Jews are some day to disappear.60
The pressure from Himmler towards complete annihilation of Jews found 
unexpected opposition from Frank. Although he also advocated “sending the 
Jews to the East,” on December 9, 1942, Frank said during a conference: 
Not unimportant labor reserves have been taken from us when we lost our 
old trustworthy Jews [altbewährten Judenschaften]. It is clear that the labor 
situation is made more difficult when, in the middle of the war effort, the 
order is given to prepare all Jews for annihilation. The responsibility for this 
order does not lie with the offices of the Generalgouvernement. The directive 
for the annihilation of the Jews comes from higher sources [emphasis mine—
W.M.]. We can only deal with the consequences of this situation, and we 
can tell the agencies of the Reich that the taking away of the Jews has led to 
tremendous difficulties in the labor field. Just the other day I could prove 
to Staatssekretär Ganzenmüller, who complained that a large construction 
project in the Generalgouvernement had come to a standstill, that it would 
not have happened if the many thousands of Jews who were employed there 
59 Himmler’s response to the memorandum from General von Gienanth (October 9, 1942) 
(NO-1611), in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 289–90.
60 Ibid.
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had not been taken away. Now the order provides that the armament Jews 
also are to be taken away. I hope that this order if not already voided, then 
revoked, because if it is not changed, the situation will be even worse.61
The words of Himmler left no doubts: “The Jews were some day to disap-
pear.”62 The only question was when and at what rate. This truly was a question 
of survival. Nobody knew when the war was to end, but surviving one more day, 
and then another, was most essential. The race had begun and the question was 
who would reach their goal faster—the SS with its mechanism of total murder 
or the Jews with their ability to survive. Those two processes were progressing 
in parallel. However, only useful and physically able Jews were to survive, since 
what counted was their work, and their utility to the victory of the Reich—not 
their lives as such.
61 Frank’s remarks at the General Government conference (December 9, 1942), in Hans 
Frank’s Diary (PS-2233); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 529.
62 Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 289–90.
CHAPTER 9
Harvest Festival (Erntefest)—
Extermination of the 
Remaining Jews in the 
District of Lublin
THE GROWING JEWISH RESISTANCE IN 1943
Since the beginning of 1943, a systematic increase in armed resistance had been noticed with various large gatherings of Jews. The January resistance 
in the Warsaw Ghetto marked the launch of these events. This occurred a 
few months after the large-scale deportations from the Warsaw Ghetto in the 
summer of 1942. Since the Great Action from July to September 1942 and 
over the coming months, relative calm prevailed. That period was used by the 
Jews to consolidate various youth movements and political parties in order 
to create a common organization united in battle. However, a total union did 
not come about because of too much discord among the Jewish organizations. 
Eventually, two militant organizations were established: the Jewish Fighting 
Organization (ŻOB) and the Jewish Military Union (ŻZW). Lack of orga-
nized preparation during the large-scale deportations from the Warsaw Ghetto 
in the summer of 1942 was a painful experience and brought home all the 
dangers it entailed. They decided to resist deportation at the next attempt. 
Indeed, such a moment came on January 18, 1943 when another deportation 
was set in motion. The Jews tried to hide in bunkers and basements, and young 
people, mainly from the ŻOB, resisted. The Germans managed to deport 
some thousands of Jews, but it was much fewer than planned. The Jewish 
fighters had lost many of their people. Finally, the deportation was stopped. 
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The January experience was used in further preparations for the battle. The 
underground organizations started to collect funds, often threatening with 
weapons, resumed intensive construction of shelters, and continued the elim-
ination of Jewish collaborators. They acquired or sequestered weapons and 
established contacts with the Aryan side. News of resistance in the Warsaw 
Ghetto quickly began to spread around the country and not only among the 
Jews. The German authorities collected information about these events and 
about the mood among the Jews. In addition, knowledge about new places 
where Jews were being deported also circulated.
Probably not coincidentally, on January 20, 1943, Himmler turned to 
Ganzenmüller, secretary of state at the Ministry of Communications of the 
Reich, regarding the need to accelerate the provision of trains for deportation 
of Jews. Himmler argued as follows: 
The condition for [the establishment] of peace in the General 
Government, Białystok, and on Russian territory is the deportation of any 
band of helpers, and suspected of involvement in gangs. It does concern 
here in the first instance, we think, deportation of Jews [. . .] because on 
else case, we expect an increasing number of attacks in those areas.1 
At the same time, in January 1943, the Jewish Fighting Organization in the 
Warsaw Ghetto published a call for resistance: 
We have received information from all sides about the destruction of the 
Jews in the Government-General, in Germany, in the occupied territories. 
When we listen to this bitter news we wait for our own hour to come every 
day and every moment. Today we must understand that the Nazi murder-
ers have let us live only because they want to make use of our capacity to 
work to our last drop of blood and sweat, to our last breath. We are slaves. 
And when the slaves are no longer profitable, they are killed. Everyone 
among us must understand that, and everyone among us must remember 
it always.2
 1 Himmler to the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Communications of the Reich, 
Ganzenmüller, on the urgent need to supply trains for deportation of Jews, Berlin, January 
20, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 321.
 2 Call to resistance by the Jewish Fighting Organization in the Warsaw Ghetto, January 1943, 
in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 301–2.
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After the great deportation, Jews no longer believed that deportation meant 
“to work in the East,” as it was so often quoted in the German announcements. 
Therefore, no promise of work in the camps in the district of Lublin, which were 
announced later, was able to convince the Jews that the Germans’ intentions 
were pure. Armed struggle was suggested as the only alternative. As the Jewish 
Fighting Organization’s pamphlet stated:
The blood-stained murderers have a particular aim in doing this: to reas-
sure the Jewish population in order that later the next deportation can be 
carried out without difficulty, with a minimum of force and without losses 
to the Germans. They want the Jews not to prepare hiding-places and not 
to resist. Jews, do not repeat these lying tales. Jews in your masses, the 
hour is near. You must be prepared to resist, not giving yourselves up like 
sheep to slaughter. Not even a few must go to the train. Let everyone be 
ready to die like a man!3
Already on January 22, Ludwik Landau wrote:
It is said that the deported people are taken to perform fortification works 
somewhere in the East,4 but it is also said that some transport go to the 
prison camp in Trawniki. It does not seem that doing some work was the 
goal of this action, rather, all the impression is that the point is to destroy 
the population, its most energetic and most enterprising part in the first 
place, and in general the urban intelligentsia. Perhaps this fear dictates 
the deportaion—or maybe just the desire to destroy as much as possible 
before approaching the end? 5
In another place Ludwik Landau wrote, “The news about people who have 
been deported from Warsaw mention constantly the same points of destina-
tion: Trawniki, Majdanek, and Bełżec.6 Escapees from the trains still arrive, but 
many have died trying to escape.”7
 3 Ibid.
 4 Such fortification works were done in Bełżec labor camps complex in 1940–1941.
 5 Entry of January 22, 1943, in Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, vol. 2, 133.
 6 In 1942–1943, a notorious death camp was active in Bełżec. Any news about going to work 
in Bełżec were misleading. In fact, the transports were destinated to be exterminated in 
Bełżec death camp.
 7 Ibid.
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THE EVACUATION OF THE LABOR FORCE FROM THE  
WARSAW GHETTO TO LABOR CAMPS IN LUBLIN
Formal decisions on the transfer of industrial plants to the Lublin area were 
soon to be taken. On February 2, 1943, the commander of the SS and police 
in the district of Warsaw, Ferdinand von Sammern-Frankenegg,8 wrote to 
Himmler about relocation of industrial plants and workers from the Warsaw 
Ghetto to the concentration camp in Lublin: 
Preparations for the translocation of all textile factories employing Jews 
are in progress and a mobilization plan was completed in cooperation with 
factory managers. To a concentration camp in Lublin not only Többens 
and Schultz & Co., but also all other companies will be moved. It is eight 
plants with a total of approximately 20,000 Jewish laborers. Departure will 
be made by group departments. SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik joined us in 
the process of taking over these industrial plants.9
On February 16, 1943, RFSS Heinrich Himmler issued two important orders. 
One of them instructed Pohl to create a concentration camp in the Warsaw Ghetto 
where all Jews living in Warsaw were to be transferred, and dictated the deportation 
of Jews to the Lublin area.10 At the same time, Himmler forbade Jews to work in 
private establishments. All existing private companies in the Warsaw Ghetto were 
to be transferred to a concentration camp. In the next stage, industrial plants had to 
be moved to Lublin in such a way that production did not suffer.11 
The second command was issued to Krüger and concerned the complete 
destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto after having all its valuables removed.12 
 8 JD Ferdinand von Sammern-Frankenegg (1897–1944) since July 1942 was the SSPF in the 
district of Warsaw, Following the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising he was substituted by Jürgen Stroop. 
He was transferred in April 1943 to Croatia where he occupied the post of Disrtict Police 
Leader (Polizei-Gebietsführer). He was killed by Jugoslav partisants in Serptember 1944.
 9 Letter of the SS and Police Leader in the district of Warsaw, Ferdinand von Sammern-
Frankenegg, to Heinrich Himmler on the translocation of industrial companies and work-
ers from the Warsaw Ghetto to the camps in Lublin area, Warsaw, February 20, 1943, in 
Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 250.
10 Himmler’s order to the chief of the Main Economic and Administrative Office of the SS, Pohl 
to set up in Warsaw a concentration camp and deportation of Jews to the Lublin area, Field 
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In this order, Himmler expressed his great contempt for the Jews and their 
district, while arguing that his actions were for security measures: 
For reasons of security I herewith order that the Warsaw Ghetto be 
pulled down after the concentration camp has been moved: all parts of 
houses that can be used, and other materials of all kinds, are first to be 
made use of. The destruction of the ghetto and the relocation of the 
concentration camp are necessary, as otherwise we would probably 
never establish quiet in Warsaw, and the prevalence of crime cannot 
be stamped out as long as the ghetto remains. An overall plan for the 
destruction of the ghetto is to be submitted to me. In any case, we must 
eliminate the living space for 500,000 subhumans (Untermenschen) that 
has existed up to now, but could never be suitable for Germans, and 
reduce the size of this city of millions, Warsaw, which has always been a 
center of corruption and revolt.13 
Together with an attempt to eliminate all Jews from the ghetto in Warsaw, 
actions intensified in order to eliminate the remnant of the Jewish people hiding 
in the countryside. On March 13, 1943, von Sammern-Frankenegg issued a cir-
cular to mayors in the district, concerning detection and elimination of Jews in 
hiding: 
I order to take action immediately with all the energy to the detection and 
transmission of the gendarmerie—in order to liquidate—all Jews who are 
still in various cities or in villages, especially those who move freely, with-
out armbands, and who therefore could not be included in the course of 
the deportations of until now conducted actions.14 
The Polish population was to be used to increase the effectiveness of these 
activities. Von Sammern-Frankenegg encouraged denunciation of Jews: 
Those who have submitted the appropriate reports for recognition and 
elimination of these Jews shall receive in each individual case to one-third 
of the acquired assets of detected Jews. These claims for premiums must 
13 Ibid.
14 Circular of the SS and police leader in the district of Warsaw Ferdinand von Sammern-
Frankenegg to mayors in the district concerning detection and elimination of Jews in hiding, 
Warsaw, March 13, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 326.
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be reported to the commander of the gendarmerie, bonuses should be dis-
tributed by him after my acceptance. I ask that this action shall organize 
according to your will, after consultation with the relevant branches of the 
military police commanders.15
The next attempt to deport Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto was met with even 
greater resistance. After unsuccessful attempts to deport the Jews in January 1943, 
the Germans prepared for military action under von Sammern-Frankenegg’s 
command to liquidate the ghetto and to deport the remaining Jews. On April 
19, 1943, when German forces entered the ghetto, they were met with great 
opposition. Although scheduled to last a couple of days, the action had to last 
longer. Failures caused the German side to become enraged, and von Sammern-
Frankenegg was immediately replaced by SS-Gruppenführer Jürgen Stroop. The 
new commander applied brutal scorched-earth tactics, which in spite of the 
fierce resistance of the Jewish fighters, brought results after a few days. The Jews 
deprived of water, electricity, food, and air (because most of the ghetto was in 
flames), began to come out and surrender to the Germans. Only well-stocked 
militant groups, who were ready for anything, survived significantly longer. 
The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising had resonance in the highest echelons of 
Nazi leadership. Even Goebbels recorded in his diary:
Noteworthy is exceptionally sharp fighting in Warsaw between our Police, 
and in part even the Wehrmacht, and the Jewish rebels. The Jews have 
actually succeeded in putting the ghetto in a condition to defend itself. 
Some very hard battles are taking place there which have gone so far, that 
the Jewish top leadership publishes daily military reports. Of course this 
will probably not last long. But it shows what one can expect of the Jews if 
they have arms. Unfortunately, they also have some good German weap-
ons in part, particularly machine-guns. Heaven only knows how they got 
hold of them.16
The uprising was eventually suppressed, but it served as a warning to the 
Nazi leadership that the Jews would take up arms in order to defend themselves 
and to die with honor. This warning was particularly felt by Himmler, who 
15 Ibid..
16 Extract from Goebbels’s diary on the ghetto revolt, May 1, 1943 (Saturday), in Arad and 
Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 319.
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since then became very careful regarding the Jews. He did not want them to 
be in the ghettos anymore, but in concentration and labor camps. He wrote, 
“The condition for [the establishment] of peace in the General Government 
[. . .] is [. . .] deportation of the Jews.”17 Practically since the beginning of 1943, 
Himmler sought at all costs to liquidate all the Jews in the General Government, 
regardless of the consequences for the war economy. The new situation created 
a new relationship, which was essentially different from that during the Aktion 
Reinhardt. Then the Jews believed that the work can save them, this is why they 
tried hard to get a job and work hard. In 1943, the Jews ceased to believe that 
their work could save lives and therefore resisted. In turn, resisting resulted in 
the acceleration of their elimination, due to the fears of the German authorities. 
It was a relationship that led in one direction only: to the destruction of the last 
Jews in the General Government. It turned out that desperation, along with 
good organization, could lead to results that no one could have predicted.
Even before the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, operational decisions on the 
transfer of existing factories and the workers from the Warsaw Ghetto were 
issued. The order was addressed to German firms concerning the transfer of 
Jewish workers from these establishments to the Lublin region. The directive 
was issued by Walter Caspar Többens, as the plenipotentiary for the transloca-
tion of plants from the Warsaw Ghetto to the Lublin region. Translocation con-
cerned the eight largest plants: W. C. Többens, Schultz & Co. Sp. z. o., Bernard 
Hallman & Co., Tow. Oskar partnerships Schilling & Co., Hoffman and Curt 
Roerich Sp. Ltd., Hermann Brauer, Heeresstandortverwaltung, E. Welk, 
G. Gerlach, Julian Kudasiewicz, and W. v. Schöne.18 The evacuation of the 
companies from the Warsaw Ghetto continued during the fighting. Due to the 
difficult conditions of being in hiding, many reported to the assembly point 
because of hunger, exhaustion, lack of water, etc. Some plants, which were 
remote from the main areas of fighting, were evacuated as a whole at the begin-
ning of the uprising. Great risks were associated with the evacuation because 
no one could really know where the transports were going. When conditions 
in the ghetto became unbearable, many presented themselves to the transports. 
17 Letter of Heinrich Himmler to the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Communications of 
the Reich, Ganzenmüller, on the urgent need to supply trains for deportation of Jews, Berlin, 
January 20, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 321.
18 Order of Többens as a plenipotentiary for translocation industrial plants from the Warsaw 
Ghetto given to German companies concerning the transfer of Jewish workers of these 
plants to the Lublin area, Warsaw, April 21, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 251–52.
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It should be noted that the majority of Jews living in the ghetto did not take part 
in the battle.
Events in the ghetto led to increased numbers of state police in the General 
Government. On May 10, Himmler wrote:
Therefore, the German police force would increase to almost 19,500 
people. It should also be noted that I have in the General Government 
SS units that, although they are replacement units, have in force of  
17,000 people. For short-term actions, such as street fighting in the 
Warsaw Ghetto, these individuals had been and are being used.19 
Already at that time, despite assurances that the Jews working in factories 
that produced for the army would be replaced gradually, to avoid any drop in 
production, Himmler had already decided to liquidate all Jews in the General 
Government. As he later wrote:
Evacuation of at least 300,000 Jews remaining in the General Government 
will not stop, but I will proceed with the utmost haste. Although the evac-
uation of the Jews at the time of their conduct causes great concern, yet 
after its end, it will be the primary condition for the establishment of total 
peace in the territory.20
This securement of Himmler was confirmed by the note from Greifeldt on 
May 12, 1943, who recorded the following words:
Reichsführer SS has ordered to continue the transplantation continued 
under the existing possibilities and to accelerate the movement of dis-
placed Poles elsewhere. The primary task of the General Government is 
to remove 3[00,000]–400,000 Jews still living there.21 
19 The note of Himmler concerning increase in the number of police force in the General 
Government and acceleration of the liquidation of the remaining 300,000 Jews in the 
Geeral Government, Berlin, May 10, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 328.
20 Ibid.
21 The note of Greifeldt, Himmler’s representative for the strengthening of Germanism, on 
accelerating liquidation of the rest of the Jewish population in the General Government, 
May 12, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 329.
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However, it is interesting that a week later, on May 19, 1943, Himmler 
took the time to write to the head of RSHA, Kaltenbrunner, about organizing 
a new anti-Jewish propaganda campaign exploiting the alleged trials for ritual 
murders.22 It proved Himmler’s anti-Jewish obsession. He was looking for 
new ways to strike at the Jews. His propaganda was also translated to English, 
and eventually to Russian, and directed to areas not under German control. 
Presumably, it was also one of the ways to justify his murderous actions. 
Himmler’s position was opposed by Krüger. The divergence of views 
became transparent at a high-level meeting, held in Kraków on May 31, 1943. 
Krüger, the HSSPF elevated to the rank of secretary of state in Frank’s domain, 
took a rather unexpected position: 
The elimination of the Jews did undoubtedly bring about a calming down 
of the overall situation. For the police, this had been one of the most diffi-
cult and unpleasant tasks, but it was in the European interest. [. . .] Recently 
he [Krüger] had again received the order to complete the elimination of 
the Jews in a very short time [Er habe neulich erst wieder den Befehl erhalten 
in ganz kurzer Zeit die Entjudung durchzuführen]. One has been compelled 
to pull out the Jews from the armaments industry and from enterprises 
working for the war economy. [. . .] The Reichsführer wished that the 
employment of these Jews should stop. He [Krüger] discussed the matter 
with Lieutenant General Schindler [head of the armaments inspectorate 
of the OKW, under the command of General von Gienanth] and thought 
that in the end the Reichsführer’s wish could not be fulfilled. The Jewish 
workers included specialists, precision mechanics, and other qualified 
artisans, that could not be simply replaced by Poles at the present time.23 
The difference of positions continued during summer and autumn 1943, 
until Krüger’s removal from the post of the HSSPF in the General Government 
on November 9, 1943.
22 Letter of Himmler to the head of the Reich Security Main Office, Kaltenbrunner on the 
organization of the new anti-Jewish propaganda campaign by means of the trials of alleged 
ritual murders, Field Headquarter, May 19, 1943, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 331. A large text entitled “Warum begehen die Juden Ritualmorde?,” used for propa-
ganda purposes, can be found on microflim JM.15083, PDF frames 104–35.
23 Saul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945 (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 497.
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THE ARMED RESISTANCE IN GHETTOS AND CAMPS
In mid-1943, almost all the Jews were closed in different camps. In the Lublin 
District, the largest Jewish population centres were at Majdanek, Trawniki, 
Sobibór, and Poniatowa. After the April uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto and 
the armed resistance during the evacuation of the Białystok Ghetto, Germans 
feared that the Jewish resistance movement would emerge in other places of 
detention for Jews. In addition, there were concerns that the difficulty of sup-
pressing the Jewish resistance could affect the Polish resistance movement. 
By this time, the Polish resistance was rather passive and beyond armed con-
frontation, opposing the deportation of the Polish population from the Zamość 
area. Their activity did not exceed single actions of diversion units. The Jewish 
struggle in the Warsaw Ghetto and other centers were examples of fighting in a 
relatively limited area, in which, although not very numerous and poorly armed 
Jewish forces were involved, but with good preparation they were able to fight 
relatively large forces of the enemy and resist for a few weeks. These clashes 
took place in a well-fortified urban area using guerrilla tactics, without signif-
icant support but suffering heavy losses among the civilian population. How 
much more dangerous could guerrilla warfare be in large clusters when enacted 
in a vast and familiar area? The Germans knew that the difficulty in defeating 
such an underrated enemy could be deleterious for them. Jews who were con-
centrated in the remaining centers knew that they had little to lose and at the 
earliest opportunity of evacuation or attempt at their elimination, they could 
resist and try to escape. 
In the General Government, there were cases of armed resistance, 
although on a smaller scale. One instance is the armed resistance group of the 
Jewish Fighting Organization (ŻOB) during the liquidation of a small ghetto 
in Czestochowa, on June 25, 1943. The event, on a much larger scale, was the 
rebellion of Jewish prisoners in the Treblinka death camp on August 2, 1943.24 
During this action, prisoners were able to obtain small quantities of arms. They 
set fire to the barracks that caused confusion in the camp. Although only a few 
dozen prisoners managed to escape alive from the camp, their resistance meant 
24 Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1987); Yitzhak Arad, “Jewish Prisoner Uprisings in the Treblinka and Sobibor 
Extermination Camps,” in Nazi Concentration Camps ( Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1984), 
357–99; Stanisława Lewandowska, “Powstania zbrojne w obozach zagłady w Treblince i 
Sobiborze,” BGKBZpNP-IPN, 35 (1993): 115–27.
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that the camp ceased to function, and after a short period, was liquidated. In its 
place, trees were planted and a farm had been set up, which remained fenced in.
Only two weeks later, on August 15 and 16, 1943, the next occurrence 
of Jewish armed resistance took place. When trying to liquidate the Białystok 
Ghetto, an armed uprising broke out.25 Just as in other places, the revolt did 
not have a chance to change the situation of the Jews. The important thing 
was fighting and dying with weapons in hand. The leader of the resistance in 
Białystok was Mordechai Tenenabum-Tamaroff. As in other cases of armed 
resistance, the equipment of the fighters was very limited: pistols, grenades, 
and incendiary bottles. Stocks of ammunition soon ran out and the uprising 
was suppressed.26 
The Jewish armed resistance and guerrilla attacks were discussed at the 
highest levels, and the problem was treated very seriously. In the autumn of 
1943, there were also many personnel changes in the General Government. 
On October 10, Himmler sent a telegram to Frank concerning the removal 
of Krüger from his post, and Wilhelm Koppe27 was appointed in his place. 
However, in fact, power was handed over to Koppe only on November 18.28 
After the conclusion of Aktion Reinhardt, Globocnik again fell into disfa-
vor and was dismissed from his commanding post.29 Along with a significant 
number of his colleagues at Aktion Reinhardt headquarters, Globocnik was 
transferred to Trieste. In his place SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der 
Polizei Jakob Sporrenberg30 was appointed.
25 “Odezwa Organizacji Samoobrony Żydowskiej w getcie białostockim z 16 sierpnia 1943 
r.,” BŻIH 60 (1966): 97–99; Szymon Datner, Walka i zagłada białostockiego getta (Lodz: 
Centralna Żydowska Komisja Historyczna przy CK Żydów Polskich, 1946). 
26 Sara Bender, The Jews of Bialystok during World War II and the Holocaust (Hanover: University 
Press of New England, 2008), 243–63.
27 Wilhelm Koppe (1896–1975) since October 26, 1949 was higher SS and police leader in 
Warthegau and Plenipotentiary of the RKFDV Heinrich Himmler. From November 10, 
1943 he was higher SS and police leader in the General Government as well as secretary of 
state (Staatsekretär) and deputy (Stellvertreter) of the general governor.
28 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 2, 242–46, and 304.
29 Information on the removal of the SSPF in the district Lublin of Odilo Globocnik from his 
post, Kraków, August 5, 1943, Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 2, 191.
30 Jakob Sporrenberg (1902–1952), the participant of the Kapp Putsch, since September 1939 
until June 1940 was the HSSPF “Rhein” and then until May 1941 the HSSPF “Nordost.” 
From July to August 1941 he was the SSPF of Belorussia (Weissruthenien) and then trans-
ferred to the staff of the Commissar of the Reich for the Reichskommisariat Ukraine. From 
August 1943 to November 1944 Sporrenberg was SSPF in the district of Lublin. From 
November 1944 to May 1945 he was SSPF in southern Norway. In May 1945 he was arrested 
and extradited to Poland. He was sentenced to death in 1950 and hanged in Warsaw in 1952.
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Meanwhile, another uprising broke out, this time in the extermination 
camp at Sobibór, on October 14, 1943.31 On that day, a group of prisoners 
under the command of Leon Feldhandler and Soviet POW Alexander (Sasha) 
Peczerski managed to kill several SS men and guards. Although the original 
plan to kill all SS men failed, hundreds of prisoners managed to escape. Many 
prisoners died during the rebellion, or during the escape because of land mines 
around the camp. Also during the hunt for the escapees, many of those who 
initially managed to escape were killed. Nevertheless, armed resistance and 
mass escape of Jewish prisoners from yet another death camp was their great 
success. For the Germans it was also an important event, about which the SS 
and police headquarters, including Himmler, were immediately informed.
On October 15, 1943, the day following the uprising in Sobibór, 
Sporrenberg, accompanied by some 50 SS officers, visited the camp for inspec-
tion. Sporrenberg took note of the camp and received a detailed report on the 
course of events of the previous day and then ordered all the “working Jews,” 
who still remained in the camp, to be shot.32 After the uprising, it was also 
decided to liquidate the camp. For the demolition of the camp, Jews from other 
places in the General Government were brought in. An agricultural farm was 
established on the camp grounds under the control of the camp staff. Upon 
completion of the work, these Jews, numbering at least thirty people, were also 
shot in November 1943.33
Four days after the uprising in Sobibór, Hans Frank called a special meet-
ing of the government regarding security. During that meeting, Frank discussed 
the latest developments and measures that had to be taken. In addition to mem-
bers of the government, all those responsible for security matters in the General 
Government were present: SS-Oberführer Walter Bierkamp—commander of 
the SiPo and SD in the General Government, Generalmajor der Polizei Hans 
Dietrich Grünwald—Orpo commander, Gen. Haseldoff—representative of 
the Wehrmacht, General Sommé from Luftwaffe, and General Schindler, head 
of the Armaments Inspectorate in the General Government.34 The following 
was stated at that meeting, “The Jewish camps in the General Government con-
31 A. Peczerski, “Powstanie w Sobiborze,” BŻIH 1(1952): 3–45; Arad, “Jewish Prisoner 
Uprisings”; Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, 322–33; Jules Schelvis, Sobibor: A History of a 
Nazi Death Camp (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007), 145–68. 
32 YVA, TR.10/662-II, 301.
33 Ibid.
34 Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 2, 242–46.
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stitute great danger, as was evidenced by the escape of Jews from one of these 
camps [Sobibór].”35
During the meeting, Hans Frank ordered Schindler, Bierkampf, and 
Grünwald to review the Jewish camps in the General Government thoroughly 
and to evaluate “[. . .] how many Jews being there [in the camps] are used as 
labor force. Others should be removed from the General Government.”36
OPERATION HARVEST FESTIVAL (AKTION ERNTEFEST)
The decision to exterminate all Jews in labor camps in the Lublin District 
was issued by Himmler and referred to Krüger. Krüger, in turn, summoned 
Sporrenberg and told him to execute Himmler’s order. Himmler claimed 
in his order that all the Jews in the Lublin District should be immediately 
eliminated, because they had established an underground organization that 
constituted a threat to security in the district. After returning to Lublin, 
Sporrenberg received a teletype from Kraków, where he was informed that 
in order to carry out operations against the Jews, specially assigned SS and 
police units would come.37 This would suggest that despite the execution of 
the action by the commander of the SS and police in the Lublin District, the 
whole operation was planned by Krüger.
At the end of October, preparation for Operation Erntefest in the con-
centration camp at Majdanek began. Three meandering rows of trenches 
were dug beyond field number 5, south of the crematorium. This work was 
done by a team of three hundred prisoners. This detachment was divided into 
three groups that carried out the work around the clock to finish it as soon as 
possible. In order to allow work at night, the area had been illuminated with 
special reflectors. In addition, prisoners performing the work were provided 
with extra food and at night, they were even given unlimited amounts of soup. 
Various rumours began to circulate through the camp concerning the purpose 
35 Conference on security affairs, Kraków, October 19, 1943; Frank, Okupacja i ruch oporu, vol. 
2, 242.
36 Frank’s statement shows his lack of insight into the situation and even naivety. In October 
1943 the percentage of able-to-work Jews in the labor camps was very high, only in rare 
cases there were non-working members of the family, mostly children, Frank, Okupacja i 
ruch oporu, vol. 2, 242. 
37 Berenstein, “Obozy pracy,” 18; Adam Rutkowski, “L’operation ‘Erntefest’ ou le massacre 
de 43,000 Juifs les 3–5 novembre 1943 dans les camps de Maidanek, de Poniatowa et de 
Trawniki,” Le Monde Juif 72 (October-December 1973): 14.
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of these trenches. The official version was that they are anti-aircraft ditches. 
The ditches were each about 100 meters long, 2 meters deep, and 3 meters 
wide. All the ditches touched each another at one deep end that led to a slop-
ing descent.38 After completing the trenches and just before the operation 
began, SS Kommandos from various places of the Lublin District and from 
other places outside it—Lwów, Kraków, Radom, Warsaw, and Auschwitz—
were brought to Majdanek.39 There, two police cars equipped with big speak-
ers drowned out the shooting during the operation. One of them parked near 
the trenches and the other at the gate. On the night between November 2 and 
3, about 500 police officers from Lublin armed with machine guns arrived at 
the camp. Before the morning roll-call, they formed a cordon surrounding 
the prisoners’ fields. Moreover, the number of sentries stationed in the guard 
towers was increased.
ACTION ON NOVEMBER 3, 1943 IN  
MAJDANEK—“BLOODY WEDNESDAY”
When prisoners went out for roll-call at around 5 a.m., on November 3 it was 
still dark. At dawn, the prisoners begin to notice the reinforced and heavily 
armed guards around the prisoners’ fields. The roll-call proceeded normally. 
Only after the roll-call, the command ordering the Jewish prisoners to line up 
separately was given. At this time, the SS of the Majdanek camp staff entered 
the field to search the prisoner barracks. The guards were checking whether 
the number of prisoners corresponded with the camp’s prisoner list. After 
completion, the Jewish prisoners were separated from the rest of the prison-
ers and sent to the individual field’s harvest collection area. Then they were 
ordered to the field number 5. Similarly, sick Jewish prisoners were separated 
from others in the infirmary of the camp, loaded onto trucks, and transported 
to the field number 5. From field number 5, non-Jewish prisoners were trans-
ferred to field number 4. After gathering the Jews from fields numbers 1, 3, and 
4 to field number 5, which was located near the previously dug trenches, the 
shooting began. For this purpose, the barbed wire around field number 5 was 
cut and repositioned nearer the ditches. The German police formed a “guard 
of honour,” through which batches of one hundred prisoners were led to the 
38 Tadeusz Mencel, Majdanek 1941–1944 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1991), 258.
39 W. Zyśko, “Eksterminacyjna działalność Truppenpolizei w dystrykcie lubelskim w latach 
1943–1944,” in Zeszyty Majdanka VII (1972): 189–90. 
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place of execution. The prisoners, before their execution, were put into one of 
the barracks at field number 5, where they were told to strip naked and so con-
ducted to the place of execution. When the shooting started, the loudspeakers 
were switched on in order to muffle the gun bursts. On the same day, in the 
morning, Jewish prisoners from other camps in Lublin and the prison in the 
castle began to be brought to Majdanek. Specific measures were applied during 
the transfer of prisoners from the camp at 7 Lipowa Street, many of whom were 
former Polish POWs.
After leading the group of prisoners from field number 5 to the place of 
execution, smaller groups of ten men were marched along an earthen ramp that 
lead to the ditches until, at the opposite end, they were shot. Men and women 
were shot separately. The action lasted without interruption until 5 p.m. Only 
the firing squads changed. According to the report by Erich Musfeldt, head of 
the crematorium at the Majdanek concentration camp, an SD officer, who was 
in constant contact by means of communication equipment with the command 
of the SS and police in the district of Lublin, directed the action. It may have 
been Sporrenberg, but it is also possible that the whole operation was coordi-
nated by Höfle, who was chief of staff of Aktion Reinhardt.
Jewish prisoners who gathered in field number 5 understood that the aim 
of this operation was to eliminate all Jews from Majdanek concentration camp 
and other places. They reacted very differently. Some, albeit few, people tried 
to attack the Germans, even though the situation was hopeless. Others fell into 
despair and attempted suicide in various ways: by cutting their veins, poison-
ing, or hanging. After the action in field number 5, twenty-three Jews who hid 
were found alive. They were taken to the crematorium and shot. Jews were also 
hunted in other fields. Those who were found were shot.
During the action of November 3, 1943, about 300 Jewish women and 
300 Jewish men were isolated and left alive. The women were recruited after 
the action for searching and sorting the clothing of the victims. In mid-April 
1944, they were sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau and gassed. The men were at dif-
ferent intervals taken by dozen to Sonderkommando 1005. These Jews were 
employed to dig up mass graves at execution sites and then to burn the recov-
ered bodies.
According to the testimony of Erich Muhsfeldt, on November 3, 1943, 
in Majdanek, 17,000 Jews were murdered. According to the Polish-Soviet 
Commission that gathered the data after the liberation, 18,000 people had been 
shot, of which 8,100 were inmates of Majdanek. Among the executed prisoners 
of Majdanek about 1,660 were women. The others annihilated were from other 
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camps of Lublin. In addition to the operation in Majdanek, at the same time 
similar actions were conducted in the camps in Trawniki, Poniatowa, Annopol-
Rachów, Dorohucza, Puławy, and others.40
The course of action in Trawniki was described by one of the residents 
of this city, Władysław Hobot.41 Just like in Majdanek, so was it in Trawniki. 
A few days before the action, Jewish prisoners were employed in digging 
trenches in the garden of a former sugar mill and along the road leading to the 
Wieprz River. Before the action, the Trawniki camp was surrounded by a ring 
of police and soldiers. Polish residents living near the camp were displaced and 
residents that lived farther from the camp were forbidden to leave their homes. 
Just like in Majdanek, in Trawniki loudspeakers were also used to drown out the 
gun shot noises. The process began around 7 a.m. and lasted, without a break, 
until 5 p.m. Naked Jews were driven towards the trenches, and there they were 
shot, men first, then women and children. After the operation, the trenches 
were filled with earth. However, several weeks after the action, the place of the 
mass graves was encircled by a high fence and a special Kommando proceeded 
to extract corpses and burn them.
Esther Rubinstein, who survived the massacre, related the following about 
the action that took place in the camp in Poniatowa on November 4, 1943.42 Ten 
days before the action digging of zigzag trenches began. It was argued that these 
were anti-aircraft trenches. On November 4, 1943 at 4:30 a.m., the guards began 
to drive out the prisoners for roll-call. They were joined by the Jewish prisoners 
in Poniatowa who lived outside the camp, in the so-called settlement (osiedle). 
After collecting all the prisoners, they were driven to their barracks and then taken 
out in groups of fifty. Then the prisoners were forced to take off their shoes, strip 
naked and after that, they were driven to the place of execution. In Poniatowa as 
well, loudspeakers that broadcast noisy music in order to drown out the shots 
were prepared. During the execution, Esther Rubinstein was wounded. She fell 
into a trench along with other victims, but was one of the last to drop onto the 
top layer of dead bodies. After the action, German police checked if anyone 
was still alive. If they discovered anyone alive, they would shoot those people 
40 Edward Dziadosz, ed., Masowe egzekucje Żydów 3 listopada 1943 roku—Majdanek, Poniatowa, 
Trawniki (Lublin: UMCS, 1988), 4–5.
41 WładyslawHobot, “3 listopada 1943 roku w Trawnikach”, in Dziadosz, Masowe egzekucje, 
31–32. 
42 Relacja Estery Rubinstein, in Dziadosz, Masowe egzekucje, 28–31; Nachman Blumental, 
Dokumenty i materiały, vol. 1, Obozy (Lodz: Żydowska Centralna Komisja Historyczna, 
1946), 261–66. 
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in the head. Because Rubinstein was splattered with blood, she did not arouse 
suspicion. Afterwards, the corpses were covered with pine branches. In the dark-
ness, Rubinstein crawled out of the mass grave and scampered into the woods, 
where she met another naked woman, who had also survived. Both naked, they 
moved away from the place of execution, but because they were undressed, they 
provoked fear in the local inhabitants. Only after a chance meeting with Maria 
Maciąg, a woman from the village of Rogowa, were the two women provided 
assistance. Maria Maciąg gave them clothes, allowed them to wash, fed them, led 
them to a doctor, and later helped get them to Warsaw.
As a consequence of Operation Erntefest, the Jewish labor force was almost 
eliminated in the Lublin District. The total number of Jews murdered during 
Operation Erntefest in the Lublin District is estimated at 42,000.43 This action 
depleted the three most important clusters of working Jews in Lublin, Poniatowa, 
and Trawniki. However, in Lublin, there were several different groups of Jews 
in various places in the city, such as Jewish prisoners from Majdanek, Jewish 
laborers from the camp at 7 Lipowa Street, and many other smaller installa-
tions. In addition to these three major clusters in the district, executions also 
took place in other smaller towns, such as Annopol-Rachów. Although second-
ary literature states that this operation was limited to the Lublin District, never-
theless, similar smaller actions during this period also took place in the Galicia 
District, which probably had a connection to this operation.
Despite Himmler’s efforts to liquidate the remaining Jews in the General 
Government, practically only the Jews in the Lublin District were liquidated. 
In other districts Jews were still present, even though their number was very 
small. In the Warsaw District there were virtually no Jews, besides those in 
hiding. In the Galicia District all labor camps were liquidated during the second 
half of 1943. In the Lublin District after Erntefest, some small groups of Jewish 
Kommandos in Dęblin, Budzyń,44 and other places remained. However, in two 
remaining districts—Kraków and Radom—tens of thousands of Jews endured. 
Most Jews in Kraków were concentrated in Płaszów camp45 and Emalia 
43 Dziadosz, Masowe egzekucje, 5.
44 WojciechLenarczyk, “Obóz pracy przymusowej w Budzyniu (1942–1944),” in Erntefest: 
Zapomniany epizod Zagłady, 3–4 listopada 1943, ed. Wojciech Lenarczyk and Dariusz 
Libionka (Lublin: PMM, 2009), 280–82.
45 At the end of 1943 in Płaszów camp there were about 11,500 Jewish prisoners, see Angelina 
Awtuszewska-Ettrich, “Płaszów-Stammlager,” in Der Ort des Terrors: Geschichte der national-
sozialistischen Konzentrationslager, ed. Wolfgang Benz und Barbara Distel, vol. 8 (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 2008), 274.
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factory.46 Besides, there were also labor detachments at the Kraków airport, a 
factory in Mielec (Heinkel factory), and some other places. The biggest con-
centration of Jewish workers was in the Radom District due to the presence 
of the armament industry and because of General Schindler who headed the 
Armaments Inspectorate (Rüstunginspektion) in the General Government. In 
the Radom District, many companies were parts of the armament industry; 
among which the biggest was HASAG, having four factories in Częstochowa 
(Pelcery, Warta, Raków, and Częstochowianka), one in Skarżysko-Kamienna, 
and one in Kielce (Granat). Apart from HASAG, in the Radom District compa-
nies such as Steyer-Daimler-Puch (Steyer-Daimler-Puch A.G. Waffenfabrik in 
Radom) and Braunschweig (Stahlwerke Braunschweig GmbH Starachowice) 
were active. Altogether in the Radom District, at the end of 1943, about 25,000 
Jewish prisoners were employed. 
The end of 1943 was marked by a very difficult situation at the Eastern 
Front, where the German troops were entangled in the war without any clear 
perspective of a breakthrough. The army needed large quantities of supplies, 
especially arms and munitions. In this emergency situation, the armament 
industry had to provide a constant supply of large quantities of war material. 
The only way to continue was to maintain a high level of standardized produc-
tion as initiated by Speer. Any removal of Jewish workers from the armament 
industry could provoke a crisis and cut off the vital supply for the army. An 
emergency meeting on January 4, 1944 in Berlin was called to discuss the ques-
tion of manpower for the munitions industry. The meeting was attended by 
Speer, Sauckel, and Himmler. According to Felicia Karay:
At Speer’s insistence, it was decided not to transfer workers out of the 
munitions plants in the occupied territories so as not to hurt produc-
tion. This decision also constituted an informal sanction of continued 
existence of the factory camps. To judge by results, this implication 
was made clear to Himmler as well. In short, the survival of the factory 
camps stemmed not from the power of the private concerns operating 
in the General Government, but from the nature of the plants in which 
the Jews were employed. The favored status was enjoyed by HASAG, 
46 In 1943 in Schindlers Deutsche Emalwarenfabrik were employed about 900 Jews, in 
Edyta Gawron, “Oskar Schindler, Fabryka Naczyń Emaliowanych i jej pracownicy,” 
Kraków czas okupacji 1939–1945, ed Monika Bednarek et al. (Krakow: MHMK, 2010), 
337; Angelina Awtuszewska-Ettrich, “Emalwarenfabrik,” in Benz and Distel, Der Ort des 
Terrors, 289–93.
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which in the General Government had a monopoly in the production 
of ammunition.47
HASAG48 was one of the greatest suppliers of munitions in the General 
Government; and employed, in early summer 1944, 15,000 Jews in addition 
to Polish workers. It had Speer’s full support and many solid reasons to do 
that. One of them was the demand for constant supply of munitions, which 
was used mainly on the Eastern Front. However, the interests of Ministry of 
Armaments and of HASAG met at another important point: the costs of pro-
duction. HASAG could lower the cost of production by using Jews who were 
incarcerated in subhuman conditions and who were reduced to the status 
of slaves.49 The Jews received no wages or social benefits; they could be killed 
at any moment with impunity. The Jews, at the price of suffering those inhu-
man conditions, achieved a temporary respite from the threat of execution. 
Speer knew this, but even so, he supported the policy, since due to Jewish labor 
he could supply munitions at lower prices and in large quantities.50 It is thus not 
surprising that in January 1944, an overwhelming majority of the 26,296 Jews 
employed in the munitions industry in the General Government were working 
for the companies in the Radom District.51
47 Karay, “The Conflict among German Authorities,” 26.
48 Karay, Death Comes in Yellow; Krzysztof Gibaszewski, Hasag: Historia obozu pracy przymu-
sowej w Skarżysku-Kamiennej (Skarżysko-Kamienna: Muzeum im. Orła Białego w Skarżysku-
Kamiennej), 2011.
49 Róża Bauminger, Przy pikrynie i trotylu (Obóz pracy przymusowej w Skarżysku-Kamiennej) 
(Krakow: CŻKH, 1946), 21–42.
50 Judgement of Albert Speer by the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, 1947, in 
Edward R. Zilbert, Albert Speer and the Nazi Ministry of Arms: Economic Institutions and 
Industrial Production in the German War Economy (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 
1981), 270–74
51 Karay, “The Conflict among German Authorities,” 24; Karay, Death Comes in Yellow, 52.
Conclusion
From its inception, Jewish forced labor under the General Government was 
not only the result of economic policy, but rather of ideological considerations 
that were synchronized with practical opportunity for their implementation. 
The Nazi ideological platform allows us to understand the development and 
transformation process of Jewish forced labor in the General Government. 
The Jews, from the onset, were subjected to the decisions of the HSSPF, that 
is, police and SS apparatus, and not to the civil administration. Frank’s decision 
of October 26, 1939 gave supreme control to non-economic actors that fully 
exploited the situation. The Jews in the General Government became, from 
the beginning, a separate class of people, whose citizenship status remained 
undefined. The legal system of the General Government alienated them from 
other ethnic groups and established special laws regarding them exclusively.1 
This legal system erased the Jews from Polish society and pushed them into the 
hands of the police and SS. The police and SS used instruments of force and 
persecution in order to compel the Jews to fulfill their orders and wishes. This 
situation was very grave because in the territory of the General Government, 
there were about 2,284,000 Jews.2 
Jews represented an important element of the Polish economy. In some 
professions Jews, despite their small percentage in the population (about 
10%), were overrepresented. Violent removal of the Jews from the General 
 1 As an example may serve one of the first regulations issued by Hans Frank concerning 
forced labor of Jews, VBlGG, 1939, vol. 1, 6–7. For the Poles separate regulationwere issued, 
VBlGG, 1939, vol. 1, 5.
 2 Fritz Arlt estimated a number of Jews in the General Government (four districts) as 1.5 milion 
in 1940, see Fritz Arlt, ed., Übersicht über die Bevölkerungsverhältnisse im Generalgouvernement, 
vol. 3, Volkspolitischer Informationsdienst der Regierung des Generalgouvernements, Innere 
Verwaltung, Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge (Krakow: n.p., 1940), 16; At the Wannsee 
Conference on January 20, 1942 the number of Jews in the Generalgouvernement (five dis-
tricts) was given as 2,284,000, see Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 255.
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Government economy, whether by legal methods or through confiscation, 
robbery, and unlimited exploitation, could not be successful without seri-
ous repercussions. Police and SS authorities used administrative methods 
in order to remove the Jews from society. Through Jewish forced labor, the 
authorities benefitted from unpaid labor,3 thus they received services without 
spending any of the General Government budget.4 This process, which took 
place between October 1939 and the summer of 1940, caused the General 
Government administration to change their system and transfer competences 
to labor offices, which became solely responsible for the organization of the 
Jewish labor force. 
The civil administration of the General Government was, however, not 
very stable in its attitude towards the Jews. On the one hand, Frank’s circle 
was well aware of the value of Jewish labor. Even Krüger and Globocnik 
admitted that the Jews were able workers and performed positive tasks 
within the General Government’s economy, something that had been 
unknown to them previously.5 On the other hand, Frank supported elim-
inationist penchants. Many times in his public speeches, he expressed his 
wish to get rid of the Jews. For example, when he spoke at The University 
of Berlin on November 18, 1941, he said:
. . . A problem that occupies us in particular is the Jews. This merry little 
people (Völklein), which wallows in dirt, and filth, has been gathered 
together by us in ghettos and [special] quarters and will probably not 
remain in the Government-General for very long.6 
His ambiguity is understandable. Frank wanted, as many of his officials 
did, to eliminate nonproductive Jews but, at the same time, to temporarily pre-
serve the productive Jews. 
 3 Only in 1940 the Jews of Warsaw performed 1,934,437 workdays, of which 381,112 work-
days were for the benefit of the SS and police and 636,745 workdays for the benefit of the 
Wehrmacht. Ekspertyza Historycznej Komisji Żydowskiej. AIPN, NTN, 196/59, 187.
 4 Minutes of the meeting of the SS and police leader in the district of Lublin, Globocnik 
with heads of departments at the Lublin District governor’s office on the forced labor of 
the Jewish population, Lublin, April 22, 1940, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja 
Żydów, 209.
 5 Speech of Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger from December 8, 1939, in Eisenbach and Rutkowski, 
Eksterminacja Żydów, 204.
 6 From a speech by Frank at Berlin University, November 18, 1941, in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 246–47.
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Their perceived nonproductiveness, together with eugenic theories, were 
the main grounds for their execution. In view of that attitude, Frank sent his 
representative, Bühler, to the Wannsee Conference that fully supported the 
Final Solution. According to the protocol from the Wannsee Conference: 
. . .the Government-General would welcome it if the final solution of this 
problem was begun in the Government-General, as on the one hand, 
the question of transport there played no major role and considerations 
of labor supply would not hinder the course of this Action. Jews must be 
removed as fast as possible from the Government-General because it was 
there in particular the Jew as carrier of epidemics spelled a great danger, 
and, at the same time he caused constant disorder in the economic struc-
ture of the country by his continuous black-market dealings. Furthermore, 
of the approximately 2.5 million Jews under consideration, the majority 
were in any case unfit for work. Secretary of State Dr. Bühler further states 
that the solution of the Jewish question in the Government-General was 
primarily the responsibility of the Chief of the Security Police and the 
SD and that his work would have the support of the authorities of the 
Government-General. He had only one request: that the Jewish question 
in this area is solved as quickly as possible.7
However, when Aktion Reinhardt began in March 1942, the previous divi-
sion of competences from July 4, 1940 became obsolete. The civil adminis-
tration in the General Government lost most of its power concerning the fate 
of the Jews in favor of the SS. Moreover, Frank had his own Trojan Horse in 
the person of Globocnik, who was responsible for the realization of Aktion 
Reinhardt. 
All existing relations between employers and employees were completely 
erased with the mass murder of the Jews, the liquidation of the ghettos, and 
their transformation into so called “small ghettos”—de facto labor camps. Until 
then, exploitation of workers was without charge or nearly gratis. Forced labor-
ers from provisional camps, who were prisoners only in name, actually held 
the status lower than slaves that were struggling for their survival. This change 
of status of the Jewish workers was sanctioned by Himmler. According to the 
circular of December 1, 1942, all the Jews in the General Government were 
 7 Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 260–61.
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considered prisoners of HSSPF in the General Government (Arbeitshäftlinge).8 
Interestingly, until the end of the General Government, the term used for 
Jewish forced labor (Zwangsarbeit) stuck. This moniker was empty of content, 
since the Jews were treated as slaves or, as mentioned, even less than slaves. 
If someone held the status of slave, at least he was permitted to live and even 
to have a family. In fact, the term Sklavenarbeit was rarely used in Nazi jargon.9 
The Jews were working in order to remain alive, if only temporarily. Their final 
destination was certain death. 
In the context of the reflections written above, we may ask the question: 
what was the rationale behind the elimination of fully available and extremely 
cheap forced labor in the gravest moments of the Nazi regime? Was the ideolog-
ical motivation so strong and so important that it overruled rational thinking 
and behavior needed to preserve the Nazi regime? To what extent were the sui-
cidal tendencies of this regime’s ideological factors stronger than rational fac-
tors linked to the Wehrmacht, German economists, and industrialists? We may 
find an answer to these questions as early as the summer and autumn of 1941. 
According to the Blitzkrieg theory, the Wehrmacht agreed to the Hungerplan—
mass starvation of millions of Soviet citizens and Soviet POWs in 1941 and 
1942.10 By February 1942, about 2.8 million Soviet POWs died of starvation, 
lack of elementary hygienic conditions, and a deficiency of accommodations.11 
We do not know how many other Soviet and non-Soviet citizens died at the 
same time. Concurrently, the Wehrmacht agreed to allow the activities of the 
Einsatzgruppen—the military forces that were farthest from the front—who 
committed mass murder, mainly of the Jewish population and those suspected 
to be communists. The Einsatzkommandos were even permitted to penetrate 
POW camps in order to filter out Soviet political commissars. Thus, since 
the beginning the Nazi regime, it was decided to reach mainly ideological 
goals, suppressing other considerations in order to attain those aspirations. 
 8 MA, R-H 53-23/87, Substitution of Jewish labor force (Ersatz der jüdischen Arbeitskrafte), 
December 1, 1942.
 9 Speer, Der Sklavenstaat. 
10 Alex J. Kay, “Germany’s Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May 1941,” 
in Journal of Contemporary History, 41/4 (2006): 685–700; Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: 
Europe between Hitler and Stalin (London: The Bodley Head, 2010), 162–88; Christian 
Streit, “The German army and the policies of genocide,” in The Policies of Genocide: Jews 
and Soviet prisoners of war in Nazi Germany, ed. Gerhardt Hirschfeld (London: German 
Historical Institute in London, 1986), 9. 
11 G. L. Weinberg, A World at Arms (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 300.
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Those goals may be more easily understood by relating them to some of reflec-
tions expressed by Himmler in his famous Poznań Speech of October 3, 1943:
. . . I am referring here to the evacuation of the Jews, the extermination 
of the Jewish people. [. . .] This is an unwritten and never-to-be-written 
page of glory in our history. [. . .] We had the moral right, we had the duty 
towards our people, to destroy this people that wanted to destroy us. [. . .] 
All in all, however, we can say that we have carried out this most difficult 
of tasks in a spirit of love for our people. And we have suffered no harm to 
our inner being, our soul, our character. ...12
At the peak of the Barbarossa campaign, decisions regarding the Final 
Solution had been taken. On January 20, 1942, the Wannsee conference took 
place, which confirmed the agreement of the highest civil administration insti-
tutions to eliminate the Jews. Thus, as early as 1941 and the beginning of 1942, 
the highest military and civil administration institutions expressed their con-
sent for policies of mass murder of Jews as well as non-Jews, who were simulta-
neously a valuable labor force. 
The attempt to correct the ideologically motivated decisions came later, 
when the situation of the regime became critical. Even then, ideological factors 
were a stronger motivation than economic factors, aimed primarily to preserve 
a high level of production and high profits, and not the Jews. The Jews were 
only one element, and not the decisive or essential one. 
THE TERM “FORCED LABOR” 
The term “forced labor” was used since the beginning of the war practically 
until its end for different kinds of labor performed under coercion. However, its 
meaning was continuously evolving. Frank, in his decree of October 26, 1939, 
did not define the term at all. Only in subsequent orders issued by Krüger could 
it be understood as labor performed for the benefit of the ordering authorities 
or the society, and this labor was unpaid. However, since the beginning it was 
not exactly true. This work was paid by the authorities, but it was payed instead 
by the Judenräte, which tried to compensate the Jewish workers. Initially, forced 
labor meant one day a week of unpaid work performed by the able-bodied Jews. 
12 From a speech by Himmler before senior SS officers in Poznań, October 4, 1943 (PS-1919), 
in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 344–45.
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Those Jews could be employed on free employment (Beschäftigung für 
Belohnung) during the rest of the week. However, the Judenräte, in order to pre-
vent absence in regular places of work and due to a growing number of destitute 
and unemployed Jews, introduced a system of replacements of those mobili-
zed by others who were unemployed. Thus, certain Jews were not performing 
forced labor at all, paying instead for this, while the others were working conti-
nuously in the framework of forced labor groups or so-called labor battalions. 
Yet another version of “forced labor,” exceeding the original definition, was work 
in early labor camps, which existed in the General Government from 1940 until 
1942, and even until 1943. According to the Agreement of July 4, 1940, the 
work in the labor camps was unpaid. It was, however, unpaid by the authorities. 
Moreover, in camps unpaid forced labor was performed not a day per week but 
continuously, in general, six days a week, while Sundays were dedicated to bath, 
works in the camp proper, or additional works. Therefore, since the beginning, 
“forced labor” had different meanings and forms. 
Since the beginning of Aktion Reinhardt the term “forced labor” acquired 
new meanings. In the wake of brutal reduction or liquidation of the ghettos and 
mass deportations to death camps, any employment could save life. At least, the 
Jews believed that labor would save them from elimination. We will examine 
this question below in detail. At that time, it was of the utmost importance to 
find employment, preferably at a firm producing for the army. The best cate-
gory were firms belonging to armament industry, however, in the spring and 
summer of 1942, rather few firms from that category were available to Jews due 
to the prohibition against employing them in armament industry. Nevertheless, 
during 1942 more and more Jews became employees of the armament indu-
stry. The situation of the fronts during 1942 changed from German offen-
sive to stalemate, which resulted in stagnation, as, for example, in the area of 
Leningrad, or advances and retreats, as it was in the central part of the Eastern 
Front. In general, the Wehrmacht lost its initiative, and the Blitzkrieg had to 
end. Сonsequently, the army needed great quantities of supplies in order to 
maintain the balance of power. The conquest of new territories, new reservoirs 
of raw material, food, fuel, prisoners of war, and labor forces came to stand-
still. The economy that sanctioned low armament production, increasing only 
during the preparation period for a new Blitzkrieg, was over. German war pro-
duction was not ready for this new situation. 
After the death of Fritz Todt on February 8, 1942, Hitler’s protégé Albert 
Speer took the post of Minister of Armaments and War Production. Thanks 
to Hitler’s support he became one of key personalities in the Third Reich. 
298 Conclusion
After some time of preparation, he made profound reforms of armaments 
production and gave it preference over many other tasks within the German 
economy. Expansion of war production required increase of labor force, 
which was, generally, in low supply. These changes touched also the General 
Government, where many new factories producing arms and munitions were 
established and the existing plants were enlarged. In parallel, however, since 
the spring of 1942 Aktion Reinhardt began, in the wake of which hundred tho-
usands of Jews, including able-bodied men, women, and children were sent to 
death. These conflicting processes, when shortages of labor force existed, on 
the one hand, and on the other, thousands of potential workers were extermi-
nated, naturally created tension between the SS and the Wehrmacht. In fact, in 
late summer and autumn many meetings took place and both sides exchanged 
much correspondence. In the end, a compromise was reached, which was more 
or less maintained. 
In the wake of total destruction, labor assumed a new meaning and became 
a synonym for life. Unemployment became a synonym for death. Only rela-
tively small percentage of Jews could escape and find a shelter permitting them 
to hide until the end of the war. In that situation, Jews searched for any employ-
ment and were ready to pay in various ways in order to get work certificates. 
About this phenomenon Katzmann wrote in his report: 
Owing to the peculiarity that almost 90 percent of the artisans in Galicia 
consisted of Jews, the solution of our problem could only be carried out 
gradually, as an immediate removal of the Jews would not have been in the 
interest of the war economy. Not that one could observe that those Jews 
who were working made any special contribution by their work. Their 
place of work was often only a means to an end for them: firstly, to escape 
the sharper measures taken against the Jews; and, secondly, to be able to 
carry out their black-market dealings without interruption. Only continu-
ous police intervention could prevent these activities.13 
In this report from 1943, Katzmann did not spare contemptuous words 
concerning German firms engaged in war production. At the same time, 
he tried to give himself more importance, not only elevating his deeds but 
also boasting of the moral values of his criminal police who used draconian 
13 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of Galcia, 
on “The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 337.
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measures to combat Jewish bribery. However, the most important was his final 
statement: “There were known cases where Jews seeking to obtain some kind 
of working certificate not only did not ask for pay from their employers but 
paid regularly themselves.”14 Thus, we can observe apparently absurd situation 
when Jews are ready not only to give up the payment for their work but to pay 
to the employer for their employment. 
Raul Hilberg wrote in his book about the will of the Jews to survive at 
any price: 
The Jews, on their part, sensed what the new arrangement had in store 
for them. There was no hope for anyone who could not work. Only the 
best and strongest workers, ‘the Maccabees,’ as Krüger called them,15 had 
a chance to live. All others had to die. There was not even room in the 
SS-army agreement for dependents. Survival had become synonymous 
with work. The Jews were grasping labor certificates as a drowning man 
grasps a straw. How deeply this labor survival psychology had penetrated 
into the Jewish community is illustrated by a small incident observed by 
a Pole. In 1943, when an SS officer (Sturmbannführer Reinecke) seized 
a three-year-old Jewish girl in order to deport her to a killing center, she 
pleaded for her life by showing him her hands and explaining that she 
could work. In vain.16
On the other hand, relatively free Jews in labor camps were gradually 
enslaved. Many of those Jews who initially escaped Aktion, facing lack of possi-
bilities of finding shelter and assistance outside ghettos, returned to small ghet-
tos and infiltrated labor camps in order to survive.17 Over time, when smaller 
camps were liquidated, their inmates were transferred to bigger labor camps and 
concentration camps. Since summer 1942 a new category of camps appears: 
company camps (Firmenlager). Jewish laborers were sent from the ghettos to 
SS labor camps (SS Arbeitslager) and to company camps (Firmenlager). It is 
important to remember that since the beginning of Aktion Reinhardt, the SS 
again took over all the matters concerning the Jews. The Arbeitsämter again lost 
their competences regarding the management of the Jewish labor force. The SS 
14 Ibid.
15 Krüger’s remarks at conference (May 31, 1943) (PS-2233).
16 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 529.
17 Calel Perechodnik, Spowiedź: Dzieje rodziny żydowskiej podczas okupacji hitlerowskiej w 
Polsce (Warsaw: Ośrodek Karta, 2004).
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attempted to establish their own enterprises in the camps (DAW, OSTI), but 
they did not have much success.However, the SS became the only dispatcher 
of the Jewish labor force, while many armament industries in the General 
Government urgently needed Jewish workers. Therefore, the SS supplied 
workers from ghettos and SS camps to armament companies. All Jews who had 
left the ghettos were labor prisoners of the SS. This became a very profitable 
enterprise because the SS and not the state—in this case the government and 
the treasury of the General Government—became the exclusive dispatcher 
and proprietor of Jewish labor force. The employers had to pay wages to the 
SS and police at the agreed rates of 5 zł per each man and 4 zł per each woman 
minus 1.6 zł for food. The Jews themselves did not receive any wages, becoming 
de facto “slaves” of the SS. As slaves and not prisoners (Häftlinge), they practi-
cally did not have any rights. Certainly, they did not have the right to live and 
their existence depended exclusively on their utility for the SS and the facto-
ries. It is important to underline that although armament firms maintained the 
workers, the only thing important for them was the number of workers. When 
the workers could be supplied, they had value for the firms; but at any moment, 
they could be substituted out for others. What counted was their number.18 
LABOR CAMPS
Labor camps, since the beginning of their establishment in the spring of 1940, 
were supposed to provide a Jewish labor force for various infrastructure projects 
that were launched in the General Government: mainly road construction, brid-
ges, railways, queries, regulation of rivers, melioration works, and others. These 
camps were established by various organizations, including the SS and civil 
administration on different levels. Local administration also established labor 
camps at agriculture estates. However, since the very beginning, labor camps 
became a symbol of persecution due to the appalling conditions in most of the 
camps. Yet, we should ask why it happened. Was it a general policy of perse-
cution and destruction, or was it a result of other factors? On the basis of this 
research we may claim that hard conditions in most of the labor camps resulted 
from lack of proper organization and control by the higher authorities, which 
permitted many cases of corruption and exploitation of workers. The main goal 
of those institutions and the firms performing the works for which the camps 
were created was to complete the works, without proper care about the workers. 
18 Karay, Death Comes in Yellow.
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The whole process of mobilization to the labor camps was chaotic and disorga-
nized. Due to bad living and labor condition in the camps, most of the Jews did 
not want to be sent there. By default, those who found themselves in the camps 
were poor, physically week, destitute, not adapted to hard work. Naturally, those 
people in the camps quickly became weaker, sick, and unable to work, as they 
did not receive any acceptable living conditions, proper tools, clothes, and shoes. 
Therefore, the performance of those workers was rather poor. Moreover, due to 
complex organization, when the responsibility for providing food, money, and 
clothes fell on the Judenräte, while private firms were responsible for the works, 
and the coordinating authority was distant enough, with the rationing or food 
and other goods, the result was the suffering of workers. However, in the atmo-
sphere of racial policy and propaganda, the Jews had very limited possibilities 
to complain. It would be difficult to argue that at this early stage of the war, the 
policy of extermination through labor was already employed. The experience of 
Jews in those camps could be comparable to concentration camps, which also 
witnessed periods of better or worse treatment of prisoners. 
The number of early camps were reduced during 1942; though, some of 
them continued to exist. The reason for this reduction was not only poor perfor-
mance, but also, the limitation of infrastructure works after 1942. At the begin-
ning of the occupation, the German authorities in the General Government had 
grandiose plans of building or rebuilding the infrastructure, rebuilding the the 
cities, and constructing new settlements for ethnic Germans. However, after the 
period of intensive construction as part of the Otto Program, which was suppo-
sed to prepare the infrastructure for the invasion against the Soviet Union, and 
extensive plans of modernizing agriculture, in order to produce more crops with 
intensive cultivation, those plans became obsolete due to the lack of a labor force 
and resources, which were directed towards war production. 
A new type of camp was created in the summer of 1942, when the arma-
ment program, which recognized the urgent need for more workers, was 
launched by Speer,. The General Government had numerous armament facto-
ries, mainly in the District of Radom, Warsaw, and the District of Kraków, and 
the supply of Polish workers was so insufficient that camps opened near the fac-
tories where Jews became inmates. The possibilities of mobilization of Polish 
workers were reduced because about 500,000 of Polish POWs were already in 
Germany, many young men and Polish soldiers found themselves in the ter-
ritory occupied by the Soviets, dozens of thousands of men perished during 
the war, and a significant number were handicapped. Moreover, from 1939 
onward, thousands of Polish men and women were constantly mobilized and 
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sent to work in the Reich. At the same time, in the summer of 1942, thousands 
of Jews were sent to the death camps. Going to work in factory labor camps was 
an option to remain alive. However, even in 1942, new camps and labor detach-
ments were created in the district of Kraków. In the district of Warsaw, the Jews 
from the western parts of the district were transferred in 1940 to the Warsaw 
Ghetto; and many Jews from Warsaw were dispersed in various labor camps in 
the district of Lublin and Warsaw. Staying in factory labor camps also had some 
advantages, despite hard living and working conditions. These camps had fewer 
selections than regular SS camps.19 The latter ones were constantly reduced, 
and the Jews were concentrated in larger camps according to Himmler’s decree 
of July 19, 1942. The transfer of Warsaw Jews, mainly to the labor camps of 
Poniatowa and Trawniki, began in early 1943. Some became employed at the 
plants of Schulz and Többens in those camps. The others were employed at the 
short-lived enterprises of the SS, DAW and OSTI. However, after the rebel-
lion of Jews in Sobibór death camp on October 14, 1943, Himmler decided to 
murder all the Jews in the district of Lublin. One of the consequences of the 
murder of about 42,000 Jews was the closing of camps factories of Schulz and 
Többens in Poniatowa and Trawniki and the liquidation of OSTI. For the time 
being, Jews in the district of Radom employed at factory camps, among them 
HASAG, and some other labor camps in the district of Kraków were saved. It 
is important to mention that from 1942 onward, all the Jews in the General 
Government became the property of the SS and every institution employing 
Jewish labor force had to pay the SS for using the Jews and spend a certain sum 
on their maintenance. The SS, even if they failed in their economic activity, still 
profited without any effort. The last chapter of the existence of labor camps in 
the General Government began in 1943. As Raul Hilberg put it: 
The SS camps were originally under the jurisdiction of the SS and Police 
Leaders, but starting in October 1943 and continuing in 1944, a series of 
transfers took place in the course of which the camps were taken over by 
the SS Economic-Administrative Main Office (WVHA), i.e., the agency 
that controlled the concentration camps. At heretofore undisputed terri-
torial and functional control of the camps by the SS and Police Leaders 
was now reduced to a purely territorial (disciplinary) jurisdiction. The 
new master was the WVHA.20
19 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 531.
20 Ibid., 532.
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JEWS IN THE FACE OF PERSECUTION AND EXTERMINATION 
Jews living under the rule of the General Government since the beginning 
of the occupation were subjected to persecution and looting. Their attitude, 
however, was never passive, as it frequently appears in the historiography and 
in the sources. It is frequently repeated that the Jews went to death like sheep 
to the slaughter. On the basis of this book, I would argue that the Jews were 
very active from the beginning of the persecutions until the end. They not only 
reacted in face of the persecution but frequently initiated processes in order 
to protect themselves and survive. Until the beginning of the Aktion Reinhardt 
in spring 1942, the first and foremost problem was finding means of subsis-
tence. Destruction of economic links, closing of businesses, unemployment, 
and restrictions of bank accounts (or simply robbery) brought great economic 
losses to the Jews. Many were transferred or deported. Therefore, only a part 
of them could use their movable property or even real estate in order to cover 
their current expenses. For many of them, the one and only solution was work. 
Avoiding conscription to forced labor, especially in the labor camps, was only a 
means of protection from exhausting work, which in many cases could hardly 
provide food for them and their families. Quickly enough, the Jews began to 
establish workshops and various enterprises under the aegis of the Judenräte. 
However, during the first years of the occupation there was predominant policy 
of destitution and elimination of the Jews from the economy of the General 
Government, using them to perform forced labor, frequently without any pay-
ment, and pushing them to the margin. In larger ghettos, Jews died of starvation. 
As a rule, nearly all of them suffered hunger. The situation begun to change 
only in early 1941 and was improving constantly until the spring of 1942, 
when Aktion Reinhardt begun. The economic considerations were initially not 
important to the SS. However, during the summer of 1942 the Jews understood 
that the only possibility of survival was labor. The drive of the Jews to work for 
the enemy was met by Polish and German entrepreneurs, willing to do busi-
ness in the General Government, butduring the liquidation of the ghettos in 
summer 1942, the Judenräte were either liquidated or lost their authority. Only 
few Judenräte, which acted as regional umbrella organizations extending their 
powers on the whole region (like the Judenrat in Lublin, Kraków, or Radom), 
remained. Those Judenräte were replaced with the Jewish Self-Assistance (ŻSS 
in Polish or JUS in German). This was the official self-assistance organization, 
acting in the framework of the Central Welfare Council (RGO) and having 
close contacts with the Department of Internal Affairs, Group Population, and 
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Welfare (BuF). The presidency of the Jewish Self-Assistance sent a number of 
circular letters asking for data on Jewish workers and prompted the establish-
ment of so-called labor communities in all towns. Despite limited possibilities, 
the Jewish Self-Assistance made great efforts in order to improve the condi-
tion of Jewish workers in the labor camps and frequently proved to be effective, 
probably thanks to support from the BuF. Those efforts were important on the 
micro level, but proved to be absolutely ineffective while speaking about the 
possibilities to save the Jews as a whole from destruction.
JEWS IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY
The Jews were employed in the armament industry at various stages of the war. 
From this example we may observe the constant struggle between the two most 
important factors in Nazi Germany: the SS and the Wehrmacht. This strug-
gle over Jewish forced labor depended on changing policy towards the Jews. 
Various actions were considered: deportations, extermination, prohibition of 
employment, but also preservation of the Jews due to acute shortages of labor 
force permitting, and much else. One of the first examples of this struggle is 
presented in following quotation. It was a telegram dispatched by one of firms 
employing the Jews to the army on October 14, 1941: 
As a matter of common knowledge, there is now proceeding a new depor-
tation of Jews that affects our Jewish workers who have been arduously 
trained to become specialists. They have been broken in as electro- welders 
and zinc-plating experts, and their removal would entail a reduction of 
production, perhaps by a third. We are therefore telegraphing you in this 
matter. [. . .] We would be grateful if, aside from a lot of good advice, a pos-
itive contribution would be made for the preservation of our productive 
capacity, in that you obtain through the OKH a proper directive.
Parenthetically, we should like to observe that these Jewish workers 
are the most capable and industrious of all, because they are after all the 
only ones who risk something if their output is not satisfactory, and they 
are actually achieving such records that one could almost compare the pro-
ductivity of a Jew with that of two Aryan specialists. For the rest, we can 
only repeat with emphasis that we do not need, after all, these iron casks 
for ourselves but that the Wehrmacht needs them, so that it is the busi-
ness of these agencies to repress such—in our opinion not quite purpose-
ful—ordinances. [. . . T]he unrest among the Jewish workers is naturally 
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considerable, since the deportation to Poland without any means of sub-
sistence is more or less equivalent to a quick and certain doom and, under 
such auspices, their productivity must naturally decline measurably.21
Economic considerations did not prevent the deportation of German 
and Austrian Jews to the east. In the fall of 1942, Hitler himself ordered that 
the Jews be removed from the armament industry.22 However, the problem of 
replacing the Jews in the plants was not solved until the Reich Security Main 
Office conceived the idea of replacement. Since the Jews could not work in 
the armament industry, they could be replaced by Polish workers brought to 
Germany. According to Hilberg: 
The Reich Security Main Office submitted this plan to the official who 
had overall responsibility for labor recruitment and the labor supply: the 
plenipotentiary for Labor commitment in the office of the Four-Year Plan, 
Gauleiter Sauckel. Armed with the RSHA proposal, which seemed rea-
sonable to him, Sauckel ordered the regional labor offices to prepare for a 
shuttle system of deportations: Jews out, Poles in. Jews performing menial 
work could be deported as soon as their Polish replacements-arrived. 
Skilled Jewish workers could be deported as soon as the Polish laborers 
familiarized themselves with the work.23 
As a consequence of this order, tens of thousands of Jews were deported 
to killing centers in 1943.24 However, the Jews were not the only group, which 
could not be employed in the armament industry, at least at the beginning of 
the war. The Soviet POWs were also forbidden to be employed in armament 
plants. Despite shortages of labor force felt already in 1941, the Soviet POWs 
21 OKH/Chef HRüst. u. BdE (Replacement Army)/Wa Amt (Weapons Office) to OKW/
Wi Rü–Rü V October 22, 1941, enclosing letter by Brunner Verzinkerei/Brüder Boblick 
(Vienna) to Dr. G. von Hirschfeld (Berlin W62), October 14, 1941, Wi/ID.415, in Hilberg, 
The Destruction of the European Jews, 440.
22 Testimony by Speer, Trial of the Major War Ciminals, vol. 16 (Nuremberg: n.p., 1948), 519. 
According to Speer, many Jews were then employed in the electrical industry (AEG and 
Siemens). Speer and Labor Plenipotentiary Sauckel attended the conference during which 
Hitler gave the order.
23 Sauckel to regional labor offices, November 26, 1942, L-61. The RSHA plan is summarized 
in the Sauckel’s directive. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 442.
24 See letter by Sauckel to the regional labor offices, inquiring how they were getting along 
without their Jews, March 26, 1943, L-15. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 442
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died en masse in the winter of 1941 and 1942. The labor replacement theory 
conceived by RSHA had, though, one weak point. According to Hilberg: 
the Reich had an absolute labor shortage. If all available foreign labor-
ers, prisoners of war, and concentration camp inmates had been added 
to the Jewish labor force, the labor gap could still not have been filled. 
It is true that the labor supply increased with German conquests in the 
West and East, but it is also true that with the great industrial expansion 
of the 1940s the demand for labor increased faster than the supply. If Jews 
were “replaced” in one plant, the only result was that another plant, which 
needed laborers to expand production, went short. It is therefore not sur-
prising that industrial firms clamored for increasing allocations of skilled 
workers and heavy laborers. The clamor began in 1940 and grew more 
insistent in 1941 and 1942.25
Until 1942, Jews had been employed mainly in ghetto workshops and con-
struction projects in labor camps, but, beginning from 1942, due to shortages of 
labor force, Jews had to be employed in war industry, including aircraft plants, 
munitions works, and the steel industry. This replacement program was just 
getting under way when the SS and police liquidated the ghettos and deported 
the Jews to the death camps. The army found itself in the impossible position 
of trying to replace the Poles departing to Germany with the disappearing Jews. 
Ironically enough, some of the Poles were replacing Jewish workers deported 
from Germany to the east. This was quite a chaotic situation, as the Wehrmacht 
tried to maintain the armament production on the highest level and fight on 
the fronts, while the SS was pursuing its ideological goals, and at the same time 
sabotaging the war effort of the Wehrmacht. 
The labor situation in the General Government was very serious, 
because of the constant pressure from the part of Sauckel to provide more 
and more workers to Germany. At the same time, the armament industry and 
the economy of the General Government had also to realize its own goals, 
among them maintaining high level of war production, exporting food to 
Germany, providing accomodations to German troops based in Poland, and 
maintaining the German administration and police apparatus. Therefore, the 
biggest struggle over a remnant of thousands of skilled Jewish workers took 
place. Among the participants in this struggle were the civil administration, 
25 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 443.
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the Ostbahn, private firms under contract to the military commander or the 
Armament Inspectorate, and the SS itself— all of them were making use of 
Jewish labor in various business ventures. Among the offices attempting to 
preserve irreplaceable Jewish workers, who were regularly sent into the kill-
ing centers, were the military commander, General von Gienanth, and the 
armament inspector, General Schindler.
Already in July 1942, Schindler came to an understanding with Krüger, 
according to which Jewish workers in armament enterprises were to be held 
in plant barracks and the SS labor camps in order to continue production. 
On July 19, 1942 Himmler accepted the agreement; the same day, though, 
he ordered the resettlement of the entire Jewish population in the General 
Government to be carried out and completed by December 31, 1942. 
According to his order, no people of Jewish origin could remain within the 
territory of the General Government except for the collection camps in 
Warsaw, Kraków, Częstochowa, Radom, and Lublin. “All other work in which 
Jewish labor is employed must be finished by that date or, in the event that 
this is not possible, it must be transferred to one of the collection camps.”26 
These measures, according to Himmler, “were necessary for the new order 
in Europe as well as for the ‘security and cleanliness’ of the German Reich 
and its spheres of interest. Every violation of this regulation would endanger 
peace and order and would create in Europe ‘the germ of a resistance move-
ment and a moral and physical center of pestilence.’”27 
According to Raul Hilberg: 
The military offices soon found out that Himmler’s concessions were 
even more restrictive than they appeared to be in the agreed stipu-
lations. The army had not protected its own installations. An army 
supply depot, loading cattle and flour for the front, lost half of its 
Jewish labor force overnight even while empty freight cars were waiting 
on the sidings.28 
26 Order by Himmler on July 19, 1941 for the completion of the “Final Solution” in the 
Government-General (NO-5574), in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 275.
27 Himmler to Krüger, July 19, 1942, NO-5574.
28 Militarbefehlshaber im GG/oQu via oFK Krakau to vo/Mic, August 5, 1942, Polen 
7502219a. See also incident at Przemysl on July 26, 1942, during which army personnel 
were actually shooting at police taking away their Jewish workers. Report by KdS Kraków / 
Grenzpolizeikommissariat Przemyśl (signed Benthin) July 27, 1942, Israel Police, 1113; 
Grenzpolizeikommissariat to OKW Kommission, August 23, 1942, Israel Police, 1114; 
Himmler to Bormann, October 3, 1942, Israel Police, 1155. The episode infuriated Himmler.
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Also he writes:
Soon another, more serious omission was felt. The generals discovered 
that their understanding with Krüger covered only a part of the arma-
ment industry, the so-called Rüstungsbetriebe, or armament plants under 
contract with the Armament Inspectorate. Apparently, the agreement did 
not cover armament enterprises that were filling orders placed directly 
by agencies in the Reich or by the myriads of small repair shops and 
finishing plants that were under contract with the military commander 
(Wehrkreisbefehlshaber im Generalgouvernement).29
The struggle with the Wehrmacht over Jewish labor force had also its 
impact on Himmler and the SS when he decided to develop his own busi-
ness on the field of armament production. Since the SS had no knowledge 
and experience in the real armament industry, they developed enterprises 
that principally manufactured uniforms. In the case of armament production, 
the SS was in charge of labor supply. This was arranged by establishment of 
labor camps. As said above, the payment was made to the SS and not to the 
workers. In order to make the final arrangement on October 14 and 15, 1942, 
Oberst Forster, the Oberquartiermeister of the military commander in the 
General Government, met with Krüger to explain several contentious issues. 
The new agreement also covered the firms operating under contract with the 
army (i. e., the Armament Inspectorate or the Wehrkreisbefehlshaber), and not 
only the armament industry plants.
The most important thing, however, was the arrangement to under-
take the reduction of the Jewish labor force only after mutual consultation, 
and no disturbance of production was to be expected. In addition, for the 
first time, the SS was to be paid for camp labor at a daily rate.30 It has to 
be underlined that Krüger was much more ready to make concessions and 
reach an agreement than Himmler. The October 1942 agreement was a 
last-minute arrangement to save the Jewish labor force for military needs, 
but this agreement did not concern civilian firms, the Ostbahn, or civil 
administration enterprises. Jews were withdrawn from projects and plants 
outside the scope of the written agreement with the Armament Inspectorate. 
29 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 526.
30 Ibid., 528.
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The effects of the deportations were consequently felt everywhere except in 
the narrowly defined armament industry. Even there the Jews were to remain 
only temporarily. On December 9, 1942, Frank said during a conference:
We can tell the agencies of the Reich that the taking away of the Jews has 
led to tremendous difficulties in the labor field [. . .] a large construction 
project in the Generalgouvernement had come to a standstill; that would 
not have happened if the many thousands of Jews who were employed 
there had not been taken away. Now the order provides that the armament 
Jews also are to be taken away. I hope that this order if not already voided, 
will be revoked, because then the situation will be even worse.31
Himmler’s order of July 19, 1942 for the deportation of nonproductive 
Jews in the General Government by the end of 1942 could not be executed. 
In December 1942, there were still about 300,000 Jews in the General 
Government itself. From the small ghettos of the General Government, the 
SS and police selected the strongest and the best-trained workers to pre-
serve them as forced labor reservoir that lasted for about two years. Many 
firms not included in the agreement between the Armament Inspectorate 
and the SS also attempted, however, to preserve their Jewish labor force. 
According to Katzmann’s report of July 1943: “When Jews were arrested in 
the course of further checks, most of the employers felt obliged to attempt 
to intervene in favor of the Jews. This was often done in a manner that can 
only be described as deeply shameful.”32 As Himmler write in the letter of 
October 9, 1942:
Jews in real war industries, i.e., armament workshops, etc. are to be with-
drawn step by step. As a first stage they are to be concentrated in separate 
halls in the factories. In a second stage in this procedure the work teams 
in these separate halls will be combined so that we will then have simply 
a few closed concentration camp industries in the General Government. 
Our endeavor will be to replace this Jewish labor force with Poles and to 
31 Frank’s remarks at the General Government conference (December 9, 1942), in Hans 
Frank’s Diary (PS-2233). 
32 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of Galcia, 
on “The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 338.
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consolidate most of these Jewish concentration camp enterprises-in the 
Eastern part of the General Government, if possible. But there, too, in 
accordance with the Führer wish, the Jews are some day to disappear.33 
By saying that the Jews would be consolidated in concentration camp 
enterprises-in the Eastern part of the General Government, Himmler meant his 
ambitious plans to establish the SS-owned enterprises exploiting Jewish labor 
force, among the Deutsche Wirtschaftsbetriebe (DWB), DAW, and Ostindustrie 
GmbH (OSTI). The latter company had been set up by Globocnik according to 
Pohl’s and Himmler’s directives. Those newly established SS workshops would 
be financed by the assets of the victims murdered in the Aktion Reinhardt.
In the meantime, within the framework of the Aktion Reinhardt, thousands 
of Jews who were able to work were sent to death. In order to illustrate this mur-
derous mentality of the SSPF, brutally liquidating thousands of Jews willing to 
work and to save themselves, we bring a quotation from Katzmann’s report July 
1943, where he presents himself as a kind of “savior.” He wrote: 
As the [civil] administration was not in the ‘position’ to overcome this 
chaos, and proved weak, the whole issue of Jewish labor was simply taken 
over by the SSPF [Katzmann]. The existing Jewish Labor Offices, which 
were staffed by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All work certificates 
issued by firms and official employers were declared invalid, and the cards 
given to Jew by the Labor Offices revalidated by the Police.34 
Obviously, his goal was to murder all the Jews in his district, without any 
reflection or consideration. He presented himself as a man abiding the law 
and pursuing forgery. He still regarded the Jews, even when they were willing 
to work, according to his ideological clichés, as fraudulent parasites, nothing 
more. He permitted himself also to criticize the Wehrmacht, which struggled 
for the survival of the state, while he continued to perform his murderous tasks 
on the rear. He continued: 
In the course of this Aktion thousands of Jews were again caught in  
possession of forged certificates or labor certificate: obtained fraudulently 
33 Friedländer, The Years of Extermination, 495–96.
34 From the final report by Katzmann, commander of the SS and police in the district of Galcia, 
on “The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” in Galicia (L-18), in Arad and Gutman, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 338.
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by means of all kinds of excuses. These Jews were also sent for special treat-
ment (Sonderbehandlung). The Wehrmacht authorities in particular aided 
the Jewish parasites by issuing special certificates without proper control.35
With the establishment of the SS enterprises like OSTI, Himmler’s ideo-
logical conviction in total extermination of forced labor became somewhat 
shaky. According to Hilberg: 
The SS industries in the General Government were organized in a typ-
ical fashion, and their short life is an ironic postscript to the history of 
Polish Jewry under the Nazis, for in these enterprises Himmler himself 
attempted at the last moment to slow down the deportations—to hold 
up the works, as it were—and to make some profits. Originally, SS enter-
prises had been set up in the concentration camps with a view to exploit-
ing the cheap inmate labor supply. Now that the end phase of the Polish 
deportations had arrived, one of the SS firms, Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke 
(DAW), emerged from the concentration camps and stretched out its 
arms for a share of the surviving labor force.36
Although on October 3, 1943 Himmler still glorified the extermina-
tion conducted by the SS, it seems that already then, he was himself not 
convinced about the truth of his own words.37 About ten days later, on 
October 14, 1943, a mutiny at Sobibór took place, during which several 
SS men and some Hiwi guards were killed, the death camp burned down, 
and about 300 men escaped from the camp. Himmler’s reaction was immi-
nent. To prevent further rebellions he ordered the execution of all the Jews 
in the district of Lublin. Ironically enough, he murdered the Jews who 
were employed in his enterprises as well as in factories inside the camps of 
Poniatowa and Trawniki, which brought about liquidation of those enter-
prises. For the time being, the Jews employed at the armament industry and 
various camps in the district of Kraków were saved. 
Like Himmler, Goebbels also dreamed about a judenfrei Germany. He 
wrote in his diary: “When Berlin is free of Jews, I shall have completed 
35 Ibid.
36 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 532–33.
37 From a speech by Himmler before senior SS officers in Poznań, October 3, 1943 (PS-1919), 
in Arad and Gutman, Documents on the Holocaust, 344–45.
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one of my greatest political achievements.”38 However, according to Saul 
Friedländer: 
German policies regarding the fate of the remaining Jews became increas-
ingly inconsistent. On the one hand, Hitler himself and part of the SS 
apparatus directly involved in the implementation of the “Final Solution” 
did not waver to the very end in the policy of extermination, although it 
was delayed at times by last-minute need for slave labor. In fact, in early 
1944 already, Hitler had been ready to compromise regarding the presence 
of Jewish slave laborers on German soil. Speer confirmed, in a memoran-
dum dated April 1944, that the Nazi leader authorized the use of 100,000 
Hungarian Jews in urgent building projects for munitions factories to be 
located in the Protectorate. In late 1944, Himmler’s hesitant search for a 
way out becomes apparent. It seems that at some stage the Reichsführer 
countermanded the steps taken by his underlings (and approved by his 
master) to pursue the “Final Solution,” but was unable to sustain this alter-
native, afraid as he was of Hitler’s reaction. Nonetheless, from early 1945 
on, in order to find an opening to the west, Himmler was ready to give up 
some small groups of Jews to prove his goodwill.39
Already since 1943, every possible effort was made in order to hide the 
mass murder of civil population by the Nazi regime, since the corpses consti-
tuted proof. To hide that proof was the main task of Kommando 1005, cre-
ated especially for the purpose of opening burial pits and burning corpses of 
mass murder victims. Therefore, Himmler gave the order for the complete 
evacuation of all the camps in the east which, according to several testimonies, 
included ominous warning to the camp commanders: “The Führer holds you 
personally responsible for [. . .] making sure that not a single prisoner from the 
concentration camps falls alive into the hands of the enemy.”40 As Friedländer 
writes,
. . . in a basic directive that had already been issued in July 1944, [Richard] 
Glücks had stated clearly that in an ‘emergency situation’ (evacuation) the 
camp commanders were to follow the directives of the regional HSSPFs. 
38 Entry of April 19, 1943, in Louis Lochner, trans. and ed., The Goebbels Diaries 1942–1943 
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), 335.
39 Friedländer, The Years of Extermination, 646.
40 Ibid., 648.
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In other words, nobody seemed to know who was in charge of the evacua-
tions. But in the rapidly increasing chaos, the marches westward started.41 
During the marches approximately 250,000 of these Jewish prisoners per-
ished from exhaustion, freezing, shooting, or being burned alive.42
EXTERMINATION THROUGH LABOR  
(VERNICHTUNG DURCH ARBEIT)
Among the historians researching problems of forced labor and exploitation 
of laborers during the Nazi period, some present the thesis of “extermination 
through labor” (Vernichtung durch Arbeit), which, according to their arguments, 
was one of the methods of extermination of Jews and other unwanted groups of 
people. As we know today, the conditions reigning in labor camps in the General 
Government, as well as in other areas, led to the quick destruction of laborers 
who got sick, injured, starved, and then died. I argue that this was not the ini-
tial purpose of those labor camps and, in fact, bad conditions were only a con-
sequence of lack of proper organization, control, shortages of food, and clothes. 
However, as already discussed above, many SS labor camps became places of 
physical destruction of workers, as it was in the case of Bełżec complex. In those 
camps the conditions were much worse than in civil administration camps due to 
the profile of the personnel. Most of the SS men were trained and indoctrinated 
in the spirit of persecution of Jews. Many among the staff went through education 
in concentration camps. Moreover, the staff of those camps was subordinated to 
the SSPF in the district and received his full support. The exploitation of Jewish 
workers in the camps of Bełżec complex caused conflicts between the SS and the 
civil authorities who had to take care of laborers unable to work.
Still, we cannot deny that there were plans to exterminate Jews and other 
groups through hard labor and weather hardships. In part, it remained the long-
term plan. The Generalplan Ost provided that in the future, millions of people 
would be transferred to the east and forced to work there in labor camps: 
According to Heydrich’s reference to the decimation of the Jews by way 
of forced labor, particularly in road building in the East, has for years been 




at this stage (and of course only in regard to Jews capable of working) the 
RSHA chief meant what he said: “Able-bodied Jews would first be exploited 
as slave labor given the escalating manpower needs of the German war 
economy.” “Road building” was probably an example of slave labor in gen-
eral; it may also have been a reference to the building of Durchgangstrasse 
IV, in which, as we saw, Jewish slave laborers were already used en masse and 
where they also perished en masse. Moreover, either at the end of 1941 or 
in early January 1942, Hitler ordered the use of Jewish slave labor for the 
building of roads in the northern part of the occupied Soviet Union.43 
In another occasion on February 2, 1942 Heydrich said: 
. . . when we further open up the area of the Arctic Sea (Eismeer), where 
we will take over the concentration camps of the Russians, which according 
to our present knowledge hold some 15–20 million deported inmates and 
which could become the ideal homeland for the 11 million European Jews. 
According to Saul Friedländer: “In any case, as Heydrich made amply clear 
at Wannsee, none of the working Jews would eventually survive.”44
What Heydrich presented as a plan, the Wehrmacht already put into 
practice beginning in the summer of 1941. According to the Wermacht’s 
Hungerplan, many Soviet citizens were to die in order to free up the food 
resources for the German army. According to Wolfgang Benz: “In the camps of 
the General everyday died from 3.000 to 4.000 [Soviet] prisoners [of war].”45 
An unknown number of Soviet citizens died of starvation. Thus, the fantasy of 
Heydrich was not so distant from reality. This was not the case, however, of the 
labor camps in the General Government. Even the camps such as the HASAG 
camp in Skarżysko Kamienna, where many prisoners were employed for 
production of explosives (and eventually died of exhaustion, exposure to chem-
ical substances, or lack of proper nourishment), death was not the purpose. 
The prisoners died because the management was interested in profit and 
output, and death was rather a by-product. According to Friedländer: 
The German concentration and extermination camp system was geared to 
send its Jewish victims either to immediate extermination or to slave labor 
43 Ibid., 342.
44 Ibid., 343.
45 Benz, “Zwangsarbeit im nationalsozialistischen Staat,” 6.
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that would end in extermination after a short time. Yet some of the smaller 
labor camps attached to enterprises working for the armaments industry, 
whether under control of the SS or not, sometimes kept their Jewish slaves 
alive for longer stretches of time, either due to essential production imper-
atives or (and) for the personal benefit of local commander.46
Over time, however, when shortages of the labor force became more and 
more acute, mobilization of workers in general also became more aggressive. The 
gauleiter of Thuringia, who was appointed plenipotentiary for employment of 
labor in March 1942, understood his duties as follows: “I have received my order 
from Adolf Hitler, and I will bring the millions of Ostarbeiter to Germany regard-
less of their feelings, whether they want it or not.”47 Prisoners in the SS camps 
died, however, not only because of the condition but because of their treatment 
by the staff. SS-Oberscharführer Josef Schwammberger, who from October 1941 
was a staff member of the SSPF in the Kraków District, SS-Oberführer Julian 
Scherner, once said to the prisoners: “I am your God. When I say you live, then 
you live, and when I say you’re dead, then you die. (Ich bin euer Gott. Wen ich 
sage Du lebst, dann lebst Du, und wenn ich sage Du bist tot, dann stirbst Du.)” 48 
Deterioration of conditions in the last stages of war took place independently of 
the plans to exterminate the labor force. For example, “OT rapidly proved itself 
equal to the SS in its mistreatment of the slave laborers, and by the fall of 1944, 
hundreds had been killed or were too weak to continue working.”49
During the last stages of war, thousands of prisoners died in many construc-
tion projects: in the construction of Durchgangstrasse IV,50 in Mittelbau-Dora, 
Gross Rosen, Neuengamme,51 and other camps. However, even then, performance 
was the goal—finishing projects of underground armament factories and other 
enterprises on time. It was a race against time, and the result was either a complete 
46 Friedländer, The Years of Extermination, 582.
47 Benz, “Zwangsarbeit im nationalsozialistischen Staat,” 7.
48 Mario Wenzel, “Ausbeutung und Vernichtung: Zwangsarbeitslager für Juden im Distrikt 
Krakau 1942–1944,” Dachauer Hefte 23 (2007): 199.
49 Friedländer, The Years of Extermination, 646–47.
50 Manfred Grieger, “Extermination and Work under the Nazi System of Forced Labor,” in 
Forced Labor: The Germans, the Forced Laborers and the War, ed. Volkhard Knigge et al. 
(Weimar: Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald u. Mittelbau-Dora, 2010), 209–12; Andrej 
Angerick, “Annihilation and Labor: Jews and Thoroughfare IV in Central Ukraine,” in 
The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memory, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008), 190–223.
51 Hermann Kaienburg, “Vernichtung durch Arbeit”: Der Fall Neuengamme (Bonn: JHW Dietz, 
1990).
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defeat or, as it was often believed, victory. In a situation of struggle for survival, 
Nazi Germany was ready to sacrifice not only thousands of prisoners, but also thou-
sands of its own citizens. 
The central question of this book is whether labor could save life. Another 
question, which is closely linked to it, is this: if Jews were really so important 
for the war industry, why did the Nazis liquidate a great part of them in the 
General Government as well as in other territories? The General Government 
as an administrative unit, even if had some characteristics of an independent 
state (government, judicial system, custom border, and currency), was strongly 
dependent on the policy of the German Reich. In the wake of destruction, liq-
uidation of the ghettos, and deportations of the productive Jews to the labor 
camps, to produce goods necessary for the German war industry seemed to 
be the only way leading to survival. Most Jews still living in 1942 could rightly 
think so. They already had a long experience of persecution, destitution, and 
Nazi propaganda that treated them as parasites. They correctly understood that 
only work could save life. After all, it was in line with the Nazi propaganda. If 
non-productive Jews were useless, then productive Jews could live. The Jews, 
as it was already proved, could contribute greatly to the Nazi war effort. Many 
of them were specialists in different fields of production; they had experience, 
capacity to learn fast, and were cheap and disposible. Apparently, they were per-
fect workers. Nevertheless, the SS, the organization carrying out such an absurd 
program of annihilation of the Jews—not only from a moral and human point 
of view, but also from an economic, strategic and logistical viewpoint—was 
finally able to almost fully realize that annihilation plan. The answer to those 
questions was already given above. However, it is important to sum it up. 
According to Wolfgang Benz: 
The contestation between economic efficacy, important for the war 
efforts, and National Socialist racial politics constituted the pivotal prob-
lems connected to the employment of foreign workers in the Second 
World War. The recruiters categorically demanded maximal work perfor-
mance, but their demands were not rationalized by any renouncement of 
racial principles. The improvement of living conditions of the Ostarbeiter 
in spring 1942, as ordered by Hitler, remained a single episode.52 
The question of Jewish forced labor remained a subject of dispute almost 
until the war’s end. On the one hand, there was consent of the leadership of the 
52 Benz, “Zwangsarbeit im nationalsozialistischen Staat,” 9.
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Nazi state to exterminate, as it was Hitler’s will until the end. On the other hand, 
there were “temporary” concessions to retain Jews in the armament industry 
and concentration camps. This temporariness eventually saved lives of many 
Jews, who survived until liberation. Those dilemmas could be also observed 
in the case of Hitler himself, who at the same time wanted to have Germany 
judenrein and also wished to preserve his county’s force by means of the 
Wehrmacht, and for that purpose, needed supplies of war production. Thus, 
in 1944 approximately “100,000 Hungarian Jews were ordered by Hitler as 
slaves into the German Reich, which shortly before had been triumphantly 
reported judenfrei.”53 As time progressed, this divergence between wishes and 
reality became more and more visible. Moreover, Himmler, one of the leaders 
of the Nazi state and the main perpetrator of Nazi crimes, became shaky in his 
convictions at the end of the war. However, on the other side was Speer, who 
was intensively pursuing his goals of armament production, and for the sake of 
that production he was able to protect Jewish labor force in armament plants. 
We should in no way be mistaken and think that he protected Jews for moral 
reasons. In the case of the Mittelbau-Dora complex, for instance, thousands 
of Jews perished during the construction of underground factories. Speer had 
plans that were implemented without any other considerations. It seems plau-
sible that he was not interested in protecting Jews and he surely did not want to 
ask Hitler to change his mind. Thus, among the military as well as within the 
industrial complex there was lack of willingness to raise ideological questions. 
Nobody wanted to admit openly their interest in protecting the Jews. 
In the General Government, the situation was no less complex. However, 
on the ground the lines of divisions passed between many different authorities 
and no less frequently within the same institutions. The decisions to extermi-
nate the Jews in the General Government came from above and was carried out 
by the staff of Globocnik and the other SSPFs. Most of them were willing exe-
cutioners and they acted quite independently of the civil administration. In this 
case, Krüger’s role is rather interesting. Although he could not compete with 
Himmler, he at least tried to have his own opinion and policy concerning the 
question of forced labor of the Jews. He was able to agree with the Armament 
Inspection on the preservation of Jewish labor force. It seems also that the inde-
pendence of Globocnik, who received orders directly from Himmler, under-
mined his competences. On the other hand, he was in conflict with Frank, 
and that resulted in his removal from the post of the HSSPF in the General 
Government. Frank, who tried to imitate Hitler as the supreme leader of the 
53 Ibid., 15.
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General Government, was rather powerless and inconsistent. He expressed 
many times his wish to remove all the Jews from the General Government, but 
at least during the first years of his rule, he was constantly receiving hundreds of 
Jewish transports for the old Reich and from Warthegau. On the other hand, in 
December 1942 he expressed his regret that the Jews were removed and that he 
could not realize many important projects. Globocnik and Katzmann in their 
activity did not have any economic considerations and were willing executors 
of the “Final Solution.” 
The civil administration of the General Government, especially on the 
level of Main Offices and different divisions, sections, and agencies, was much 
more humane than the apparatus of the SS. The BuF subdivision in particular 
had close contacts with the Jewish Self-Assistance and were frequently efficient 
in helping the Jews. On the other hand, the private firms were quite powerless, 
and their wish to protect Jewish forced labor failed completely. 
On the basis of my research, I argue that the thesis of extermination 
through labor is not fitting to the realities of the General Government, although 
there were cases of high death rate in labor camps. Forced labor was rather used 
in concentration camps and at the end of the war, first of all, to achieve certain 
economic goals and not in order to exterminate the prisoners. I would also like 
to recall that millions of Soviet POWs died in POW camps without doing any 
work, but rather because of the weather conditions, lack of housing and food. 
It is quite striking that the SS did not adapt this model of mass extermination. 
Contrarily, researchers like Götz Aly, Susanne Heim, and others argue that 
Jewish labor had no value to the Germans, and that the Jewish population in 
Poland was seen in terms of overpopulation, as a structural obstacle to modern-
ization, so that there was a consensus from below to murder the Jews as an act of 
economic rationality.54 This is not plausible, since the decisions concerning the 
“Final Solutions” came from above, and there is no direct link between high-
level decision makers and low-level functionaries. There is nothing important 
that the high-ranking leaders did not know that the people on the ground knew. 
Frank and his entourage wanted to realize their grandiose plans and trans-
form the General Government into a kind of exemplary state (Musterstaat). 
Naturally, they supported the idea of removing the Jews, but they preferred that 
this job was done by somebody else. Even so, the question of modernization 
54 Aly, Sozialpolitik und Judenvernichtung; Aly and Heim, “The Economics of the Final Solution”; 
Aly and Heim, Bevölkerungsstruktur und Massenmord; Aly, Endlösung: Völkerverschiebung und 
der Mord; Aly and Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung; Aly, “Final Solution.”
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and remodelling of the population using hard labor and bad living conditions 
was often raised, as seen in sending of thousands of Polish forced laborers into 
the Reich for the development of the war industry. 
Wolf Gruner55 and Christopher Browning,56 among others, state that the 
Nazi policies toward Jewish labor varied according to time, place, and circum-
stances. Their approach is the most reasonable. While many Germans wanted 
to use Jewish labor productively, the others focused primarily on destruction. 
The Jews also found themselves facing those two options and tried to manoeu-
vre between them. For the Jews, labor was the key strategy for survival. Labor 
could save life, but only in some cases, and it was not a question of choice, but 
rather a question of fate. Those who were in the labor camps belonging to arma-
ment industry (and were lucky enough), survived, despite subsequent deporta-
tions and death marches. The others did not. 
The state of affairs in the General Government mirrored the situation in 
Nazi Germany and the occupied territories. The General Government became 
one of the main battlefields of conflicted interests that intersected civil admi-
nistration, the Wehrmacht, private enterprises, and institutions, such as the SS 
and police. Those institutions were predominantly interested in safeguarding 
their competencies and interests, and not in protecting the Jews. As long as the 
Jews were functional and profitable, they were preserved. Most Jews believed, 
as any rational people would, that labor could be an important factor in saving 
their lives. The fact that this belief did not manifest itself was determined by 
political actors, who self-destructively implemented Nazi convictions, even as 
they resulted in disastrous military and moral consequences.
55 Gruner, Die Organisation von Zwangsarbeit; Gruner, Jewish forced labor under the Nazis.
56 Browning, “Jewish Workers in Poland.”
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Table 1.  Number of workdays performed by Jewish men and women in Lublin from 
October 24, 1939 to August 31, 1940.1 
Month Year Men Women Total
October 24, 1939–
August 31, 1940
1939 4564 139 4703
December 1939 7771 877 8648
January 1940 8884 1999 10883
February 1940 6365 2427 8792
March 1940 9696 2795 12491
April 1940 12380 3578 15958
May 1940 15051 3773 18824
June 1940 19134 5748 24882
July 1940 22134 7854 29988
August 1940 5435 1778 7213
Total   111414 30968 142382












































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Wages paid by Judenrat in Lublin to forced laborers in 1940.3
Category of worker
Daily wages in zł
until March 1940 since April 1940
Unmarried man 2.5 3.5
Married man 3 4
Married man, supporting more 
than 4 children
3.5 4.5
Unmarried woman 2.5 2.5
Married woman 3 3
Table 4.  Employment of workers in the industry of Radom District in December 1939 
in comparison to August 1939.4
Industry











Metallurgy 3 20,233 3 2,385 11.8
Cast Iron foundry 9 3,291 7 953 18.9
Metal industry 15 4,276 8 937 21.9
Chemical industry 6 656 3 250 38.1
Textile 16 19,343 16 8,005 41.4
Ceramic and 
mineral industry
30 5,319 11 590 11.4
Wood industry 14 1,585 8 450 28.4
Leather 6 457 6 206 45.1
Food processing 19 977 17 675 69.1
Paper industry 1 220 1 30 13.6
Other 8 935 5 267 28.6
Total 127 57,290 86 14,748 25.7
3 APL, RŻL-40, 3.
4 Meducki, Przemysł i klasa robotnicza, 99.
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Table 5.  Quantity of Polish workers from General Government sent to work in Reich 
before June 1943.5







Table 6.  Numbers of Jewish men registered for forced labor in Lublin in 1939/1940 
according to year of birth.6




















5 Madajczyk, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce, vol. 1, 254. 
6 APL, RŻL-7, 55–56.
337Tables 

































Table 7.  Professional division of registered men and women in Lublin in 
1939/1940.7
Professional category Jewish men Jewish women
Merchants and traders 2388 427
Medium and small-scale industrialists 84  
Householders 293 90
Agriculturers 28  
Unskilled workers 3339 1132




Table 8. Categories of craftsmen (partial data) registered in Lublin in 1939/1940.8











7 APL, RŻL-7, 59.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.  Budget of General Government.10
Department
Expenditure of ordinary budget of the GG in  
million zł
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
General Governor, 
Government of the GG 
and District offices
120.7 157.4 164.7 161.2 135.4
Treasury 36.0 43.5 65.9 65.4 72.1
Internal administration 85.2 253.8 324.6 526.4 541.8
Police 70.6 293.0 369.1 380.4 397.3
Propaganda 9.8 25.9 31.9 34.3 36.8
Judicial system 34.4 43.8 71.3 69.2 65.8
Science and education 94.9 141.7 218.9 214.3 227.5
Alimentation and agri-
culture
81.0 118.9 231.8 391.9 429.2
Forestry 71.5 91.7 156.1 126.7 135.5
Economy 8.7 20.9 26.6 44.1 53.9
Labor 56.7 70.9 96.0 111.2 122.2
Construction 44.7 50.4 156.0 250.0 276.1
Transportation 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Provision 0.0 91.0 125.7 142.1 127.3
General tax  
administration
324.8 364.2 662.1 1138.3 1075.0
Total 1039.0 1767.6 2700.7 1138.3 3695.9










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13.  Income of Jewish community in Lublin from September 1, 1939 to August 
31, 1940.13
Income in zł of the Jewish Community in Lublin from September 1, 
1939 to August 31, 1940
One-time services I 342535.4
One-time services II 349684.59
Community tax 124520.5
Fees for forced labor of men / fees for replacement 497276.34
Fees for forced labor of women / fees for replacement 153320.43
Fees for the postal department 23880.85
Fees for the population registration department 6398.2
Fees for the emigration department 1842.54
Fees for the legal department 718.6
Fees for funerals 75382
Fees for monuments (matzevot) 3507
Fees for weddings 2091.5





Table 14.  Expenses of Jewish Community in Lublin from September 1, 1939 to 
August 31, 1940 in zł.14
Expenses in zł of the Jewish Community in Lublin from September 1, 1939 to 
August 31, 1940





Payment for workers 591872.7
Maintenance of workshops 343202.7
Social assistance     108318.26
Purchase of land for 
cemetery
    10713.5
Salaries     143165.27
Administrative expenses     21426.57
Miscellaneous     93507.48
Total     1619438.87
13 APL, RŻL-8, 5.
14 APL, RŻL-8, 6.
345Tables 
Table 15.  Expenses of Judenrat in Lublin for forced laborers between October 24, 














1939 17913       17913
December 1939 28519.6       28519.6
January 1940 33178       33178
February 1940 20097     10391 30488
March 1940 23903.75 2234   23015.5 49153.25
April 1940 26036.75 50 2514 36417.5 65018.25
May 1940 28785.5   291 41969.5 71045
June 1940 46373     51255.5 97628.5
July 1940 61667.75     49628 111295.75
August 1940 32214.5     11877 44091.5
Together   318688.85 2284 2805 224554 548330.85













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 20.  Employment growth in the workshops conducted by employment  
agencies in Warsaw in 1941.19






Table 21.  Number of worker’s cards issued in Warsaw between November 1941 and 
June 1942.20









19 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Raporty Ludwiga Fischera, 123.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 27. Energy value of food rations in the General Government, calories.26
Term
1940 1941
Poles Jews Poles Jews
January-March 609 503 611 237
April-June 704 449 553 219
July-September 698 331 531 198
October-December 938 369 981 360
Average annual 737 413 669 253
Table 28.  Expenses of Judenrat in Lublin for labor camps in the area of Bełz 
.
ec 
between June and September 1, 1940, in zł.27




Post and telegraph 54.26
Transportation of laborers 3821.6
Maintenance of the services 1461.5




Money paid to the German authorities for the mainte-
nance of laborers 27800
Together 37178.6
26 Szarota, Okupowanej Warszawy, 240.











































































































































































































































































































Table 30.  Quantity of Jewish workers from Lublin sent to work in agriculture from 
mid-June to mid-August 1940.29
Estate Number of men Number of women Together
Jastków 55 15 70
Dys Dominium 6   6
Dys Dwór 7   7
Piotrków 15   15
Radawiec Duży 29 13 42
Motycz 18 11 29
Jakubowice Murowane 25   25
Wola Sławińska 15 2 17
Rury 15   15
Matczyn 40   40
Pólko 38   38
Kawenczyn 20 2 22
Łuszczów 17   17
Krzesimów 23   23
Osmolice 30   30
Sobianowice Wieś 11 4 15
Wola Sławińska 23   23
Elizówka 14 5 19
Nasutów 15 5 20
Baśka 3   3
Dziuchów 5   5
Pliszczyn 2   2
Zakrzów 4 2 6
Konopnica 6   6
Łemszczyzna 3   3
Snopków 24   24
Jabłonna 5   5
Świdnik 2   2
Estates in Hrubieszów 
County 300   300
Together 770 59 829
29 APL, RŻL-47, 54–55. Report on the activity of the Central Camps Council in Bełżec for the 
period June 13 until December 5, 1940.
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Table 31.  Number of Polish forced workers from General Government in Third Reich 
in the years 1939–1943.30
Year
Number of workers from the GG in the Third Reich
in agriculture in industry Together
1939 32,540 7,135 39,675
1940 259,096 42,866 301,962
1941 157,496 65,932 223,428
1942 265,461 133,498 398,959
1943 115,919 59,799 175,718
First half of 1944     52,445
Together 830,512 309,230 1,192,187
Table 32.  Number of Jews placed in small ghettos in General Government on 
December 31, 1942.31






Total in the General Government 297,514







Employment in DAW 
Lublin—percentage of all 
DAW employees
1940 1220 2211 18.1
1941 3650 2000 54.8
1942 7402 2756 37.2
1943 15498 5486 35.4
1944 15799 6492 4.1
30 Skalniak, Stopa życiowa społeczeństwa polskiego, 25.
31 Eisenbach and Rutkowski, Eksterminacja Żydów, 322.
32 Mencel, Majdanek 1941–1944, 381.
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Table 34.  Plan and artillery ammunition production in Stahlwerke Braunschweig 
GmbH in Starachowice in 1943.33
Month
Artillery ammunition caliber 
37 mm 40 mm 75 mm 105 mm 150 mm 152 mm
Monthly plan 20,000 40,000 200,000 20,000 15,000 25,000
January, 
February
no data 38,000 116,500 17,500 16,000 no data
March no data 40,000 130,000 21,500 20,000 1,500
April no data 21,287 102,000 15,250 12,000 4,497
May no data 28,820 85,100 4,650 8,100 14,100
June 500 28,793 75,392 9,037 8,194 10,062
July 21,277 40,000 100,788 17,863 8,430 16,262
August 26,427 26,000 115,638 18,565 8,430 16,262
September 25,436 23,583 144,403 20,005 9,258 16,014
October 21,396 no data 122,703 20,202 9,133 13,850
November 22,752 no data 63,999 14,377 6,259 11,448
December no data no data no data no data no data no data
Together 117,788 246,483 1,056,523 158,949 105,804 103,995
Table 35.  Production of artillery ammunition in HASAG Munitionsfabrik in  
Skarz . ysko Kamienna.34
Period
Artillery ammunition caliber 








average 1941 500,000 50,000 50,000       12,000
November 
1942       37,600 23,200   9,400
December 
1942       39,500 26,500   11,500
First half of 
January 1943   26,000 9,000 6,610 14,405   18,952




Artillery ammunition caliber 







August 1943           30,000  
Monthly 
average 1943     39,636 46,000 28,272   12,454
December 
1943   320,000       88,500  
February 
1944 417,000   62,800   40,000   7,200
March 1944 417,000   80,700   42,000   12,700
Table 36.  Rifle and pistol ammunition production in HASAG Munitionsfabrik in 
Skarz . ysko Kamienna.35
Period Rifle ammunition Pistol ammunition
July 1941 3,417,000 3,993,600
November 1–15, 1941 5,747,000 6,267,000
Monthly average in 1941 2,000,000 2,500,000
November 15–December 31, 1943 21,604,000 18,472,780
Total, year 1943 149,767,000 86,500,000
Monthly average in 1943 12,480,583 7,208,333
February 1944 10,450,200 3,748,600
March 1944 12,985,400 3,898,890
Table 37.  Labor forces in the armament industry in the General Government 
1943–1944.36






January 1943 15,091 12.50 105,632 87.50 120,723 100
April 1943 15,538 12.13 112,499 87.87 128,037 100
July 1943 21,643 14.90 123,588 85.10 145,231 100
October 1943 22,444 14.64 130,808 85.36 153,252 100
January 1944 26,296 15.80 140,057 84.40 166,353 100
April 1944 28,537 13.73 179,244 86.27 207,781 100
May 1944 27,439 13.70 172,781 86.30 200,220 100
35 Ibid.
36 Karay, Death Comes in Yellow, 52.
Photographs
Demolition works at a destroyed tenement house. Warsaw, 1939. (Zeitungs-Verlag 
Krakau-Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-199. National Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
Construction of a bridge over the Narew River by German troops, September 28, 1939. 
Author: Becke. (Zeitungs-Verlag Krakau-Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-61. National 
Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
365Photographs
Jews at forced labor digging a pit in order to bury a dead horse. Rzeszów. Submitter: 
Mosinger. Archival signature: 1024_34. Yad Vashem Archives.
Jewish forced laborers digging a pit, under the supervision of an armed guard, Kraków, 
printed in the periodical Illustrierter Beobachter, November 1939. Archival signature: 
1573_37. Yad Vashem Archives.
366 Photographs
Jewish women in New Sandez, July 1942. Stadtarchiv München, FS-WKII-KB,  photographer: 
Wilhelm Nortz. Image taken during a trip for journalists through the Generalgouvernement.
Hans Frank—Governor of the General Government. (Zeitungs-Verlag  Krakau-Warschau.)
Archival signature: 2-2732. National Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
367Photographs
Governor Hans Frank (second from right) in the company of General Walther von 
Brauchtisch (first from left) and General Johannes Blaskowitz (on the right side of 
Hans Frank, with a mustache) on the cloisters of Wawel. In the background, you can 
see Governor Otto Wachter and German officers. Kraków. (Zeitungs-Verlag Krakau-
Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-2902. National Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
368 Photographs
Josef Bühler (on the left) receives from Hans Frank the appointment as deputy gover-
nor of the General Governorship. In the background you can see Hermann Senkowsky 
(in the dark) and Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger (first from the left). Kraków, July 1941. 
Photographic bet: Otto Rosner. (Zeitungs-Verlag Krakau-Warschau.) Archival signa-
ture: 2-2848. National Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw. 
SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, December 1939. (Zeitungs-Verlag 
Krakau-Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-4469. National Digital Archives (NAC), 
Warsaw.
369Photographs
Heinrich Himmler (on the right) in conversation with the SS and police commander of 
the Lublin district Otto Globocnik. Author: Bruno Wis ’ niewski. (Zeitungs-Verlag Krakau-
Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-4665. National Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
Families meeting near the fence of the Biała Podlaska Camp, June 1940. Archival 
signature: 7711_4. Yad Vashem Archives.
370 Photographs
First group of workers from Mie ˛ dzyrzec coming back from work, 1940. Archival 
signature: 7711_13. Yad Vashem Archives.
Prisoners in the labor camp. Bełz · ec, 1940. Archival signature: 5318_170. Yad Vashem 
Archives.
371Photographs
A work battalion. Krychów, 1942, (submitter Z. Kratzak). Archival signature: 72BO2. 
Yad Vashem Archives.
A group of workers from Mie ˛ dzyrzec working to divert the Krzna River, 1940. Archival 
signature: 7711_21. Yad Vashem Archives.
372 Photographs
Forced labor in a labor camp. Kraków-Prokocim, probably 1942. The photograph was 
given to Yosef Getner after the war by the German Kapo in charge of the work battal-
ion. Submitter Yosef Getner. Archival signature: 3260. Yad Vashem Archives.
Construction of drainage channels in the Krzna valley in the vicinity of Biała Podlaska. 
(Zeitungs-Verlag Krakau-Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-6918b. National Digital 
Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
373Photographs
First group of workers from Mie ˛ dzyrzec in the camp in Biała Podlaska, 1940. Archival 
signature: 7711_23. Yad Vashem Archives. 
Construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Dunajec River in Roz · nów, 1941. (Zeitungs-
Verlag Krakau-Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-7763, National Digital Archives 
(NAC), Warsaw.
374 Photographs
Food distribution in a labor camp in Płaszów. Archival signature: 139fo5. Yad Vashem 
Archives.
Forced laborers washing in the Vistula River after work. Archival signature: 3116_102. 
Yad Vashem Archives.
375Photographs
Construction of the wall around the ghetto. Kraków, 1941. Archival signature: 4797_109. 
Yad Vashem Archives.
Jewish forced laborers in a roll call prior to receiving food, Warsaw, 1941. Propaganda 
company (Propaganda-Kompanie) photographer. Archival signature: 6AO1. Yad 
Vashem Archives.
376 Photographs
A Jewish woman operating a spinning-wheel in a workshop situated at 65 Niska Street 
in the Warsaw ghetto, probably 1941. Foto Forbert. Archival signature: 3119_216. Yad 
Vashem Archives.
A sewing room in a workshop situated at 28 Nalewki Street, Warsaw, probably 1941. 
Foto Forbert. Archival signature: 3119_35. Yad Vashem Archives.
377Photographs
Stroop instructing Ukrainian auxiliary police during Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Warsaw, 
April-May, 1943. Author: Franz Konrad. Archival signature: 2807_31. Yad Vashem 
Archives.
People constructing a barbed wire fence at a labor camp, Poniatowa. Archival 
 signature: 76FO6. Yad Vashem Archives.
378 Photographs
Walter Caspar Többens textile factory at a labor camp in Poniatowa, 1943. Archival 
signature: 76FO2. Yad Vashem Archives.
Women at forced labor, Płaszów, 1943. Archival signature: 139fo8. Yad Vashem Archives.
379Photographs
Workers at an ammunition factory, September 1940. Author: Dieck. (Zeitungs-Verlag 
Krakau-Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-6352. National Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
The Reich Minister Albert Speer (left) and field marshal Erhard Milch (right) are exam-
ining new weapons, September 1943. Author: Kobierowski (Zeitungs-Verlag Krakau-
Warschau.) Archival signature: 2-12936. National Digital Archives (NAC), Warsaw.
380 Photographs
German policemen supervising deportees. Mie ˛ dzyrzec Podlaski, May 26, 1943. 
Archival signature: 77EO2. Yad Vashem Archives.
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